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Regional Oral History Office

Earl Warren Oral History Project

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATS IN THE EARL WARREN ERA

Florence Clifton	<i>California Democrats, 1934-1950</i>
Robert Clifton	<i>The Democratic Party, Culbert L. Olson, and the Legislature</i>
Roger Kent	<i>A Democratic Leader Looks at the Warren Era</i>
George Outland	<i>James Roosevelt's Primary Campaign, 1950</i>
Langdon Post	<i>James Roosevelt's Northern California Campaign, 1950</i>
James Roosevelt	<i>Campaigning for Governor Against Earl Warren, 1950</i>
Volume Appendix	<i>Selected Documents</i>

Interviews Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry

Copy No. 1



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PREFACE

The Earl Warren Oral History Project, a special project of the Regional Oral History Office, was inaugurated in 1969 to produce tape-recorded interviews with persons prominent in the arenas of politics, governmental administration, and criminal justice during the Warren Era in California. Focusing on the years 1925-1953, the interviews were designed not only to document the life of Chief Justice Warren but to gain new information on the social and political changes of a state in the throes of a depression, then a war, then a postwar boom.

An effort was made to document the most significant events and trends by interviews with key participants who spoke from diverse vantage points. Most were queried on the one or two topics in which they were primarily involved; a few interviewees with special continuity and breadth of experience were asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. While the cut-off date of the period studied was October 1953, Earl Warren's departure for the United States Supreme Court, there was no attempt to end an interview perfunctorily when the narrator's account had to go beyond that date in order to complete the topic.

The interviews have stimulated the deposit of Warreniana in the form of papers from friends, aides, and the opposition; government documents; old movie newsreels; video tapes; and photographs. This Earl Warren collection is being added to The Bancroft Library's extensive holdings on twentieth century California politics and history.

The project has been financed by four outright grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, a one year grant from the California State Legislature through the California Heritage Preservation Commission, and by gifts from local donors which were matched by the Endowment. Contributors include the former law clerks of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Cortez Society, many long-time supporters of "the Chief," and friends and colleagues of some of the major memoirists in the project. The Roscoe and Margaret Oakes Foundation and the San Francisco Foundation have jointly sponsored the Northern California Negro Political History Series, a unit of the Earl Warren Project.

Particular thanks are due the Friends of The Bancroft Library who were instrumental in raising local funds for matching, who served as custodian for all such funds, and who then supplemented from their own treasury all local contributions on a one-dollar-for-every-three dollars basis.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons prominent in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative supervision of James D. Hart, Director of The Bancroft Library.

Amelia R. Fry, Director
Earl Warren Oral History Project

Willa K. Baum, Department Head
Regional Oral History Office

30 June 1976
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EARL WARREN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Principal Investigators

Ira M. Heyman
Lawrence A. Harper
Arthur H. Sherry

Advisory Council

Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong *
Walton E. Bean
Richard M. Buxbaum
William R. Dennes
Joseph P. Harris
James D. Hart
John D. Hicks *
William J. Hill
Robert Kenny*
Adrian A. Kragen
Thomas Kuchel
Eugene C. Lee
Mary Ellen Leary

James R. Leiby
Helen R. MacGregor *
Dean E. McHenry
Sheldon H. Messinger
Frank C. Newman
Allan Nevins *
Warren Olney III
Bruce Poyer
Sho Sato
Mortimer Schwartz
Merrell F. Small
John D. Weaver

Project Interviewers

Amelia R. Fry
Joyce A. Henderson
Rosemary Levenson
Gabrielle Morris
Miriam Feingold Stein

Special Interviewers

Orville Armstrong
Willa K. Baum
Malca Chall
June Hogan
George W. Johns
Frank Jones
Alice G. King
Elizabeth Kerby
James R. Leiby
Dillon Myer
Harriet Nathan
Suzanne Riess
Mortimer Schwartz
Ruth Teiser

* Deceased during the term of the project.

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(California, 1926-1953)

Interviews Completed - February 1977

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Volume I - 1972, 137 p.

Mullins, John F., *How Earl Warren Became District Attorney*.

Balaban, Edith, *Reminiscences about Nathan Harry Miller, Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County*.

Hamlin, Judge Oliver D., *Reminiscences about the Alameda County District Attorney's Office in the 1920s and 30s*.

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Shea, Willard W., *Recollections of Alameda County's First Public Defender*.

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Heinrichs, Beverly, *Reminiscences of a Secretary in the District Attorney's Office*.

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Oakley, James H., *Early Life of a Warren Assistant*.

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Harris, Myron, *A Defense Attorney Reminisces*.

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Ash, Robert S., *Alameda County Labor Council During the Warren Years*.

Haggerty, Cornelius J., *Labor, Los Angeles, and the Legislature*.

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Rowe, James, *The Japanese Evacuation Decision.*

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Gallagher, Marguerite, *Administrative Procedures in Earl Warren's Office,
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Salsman, Byrl R., *Shepherding Health Insurance Bills Through the California
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Cline, John W., M.D., *California Medical Association Crusade Against
Compulsory State Health Insurance.*

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Hume, Portia Bell, M.D., *Mother of Community Mental Health Services.*

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Ongerth, Henry, *Recollections of the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering.*

Zimmerman, Kent A., M.D., *Mental Health Concepts.*

Arnstein, Lawrence, *Public Health Advocates and Issues.*

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Links, Fred, *An Overview of the Department of Finance*.

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Beam, Kenneth S., *Clergyman and Community Coordinator*.

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Barnes, Stanley N., *Experiences in Grass Roots Organization*.

Cunningham, Thomas J., *Southern California Campaign Chairman for Earl Warren, 1946*.

Draper, Murray, *Warren's 1946 Campaign in Northern California*.

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Mull, Archibald M., Jr., *Warren Fund-Raiser; Bar Association Leader*.

McNitt, Rollin Lee, *A Democrat for Warren*.

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Knowland, William F., *California Republican Politics in the 1930s*.

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McCormac, Keith, *The Werdel Delegation of 1952, Nixon's Fund, and For America*.

Steinhart, John, *Jesse and Amy Steinhart*.

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Clifton, Robert, *The Democratic Party, Culbert L. Olson, and the Legislature*.

Kent, Roger, *A Democratic Leader Looks at the Warren Era*.

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Roosevelt, James, *Campaigning for Governor Against Earl Warren, 1950*.

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Jones, Walter P., *An Editor's Long Friendship with Earl Warren*.

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Lynn, Wallace, *Hunting and Baseball Companion*.

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Stone, Irving and Jean, *Earl Warren's Friend and Biographer.*

Henderson, Betty Foot, *Secretary to Two Warrens.*

Swig, Benjamin H., *Shared Social Concerns.*

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Hale, Mildred, *Schools, the PTA, and the State Board of Education.*

Kerr, Clark, *University of California Crises: Loyalty Oath and the Free Speech Movement.*

Kragen, Adrian, *State and Industry Interests in Taxation, and Observations of Earl Warren.*

McConnell, Geraldine, *Governor Warren, the Knowlands, and Columbia State Park.*

McWilliams, Carey, *California's Olson-Warren Era: Migrants and Social Welfare.*

Siems, Edward H., *Recollections of Masonic Brother Earl Warren.*

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Earl Warren Oral History Project

Florence McChesney Clifton

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATS, 1934-1950

An Interview Conducted by

Amelia R. Fry



Florence McChesney Clifton
ca. 1959

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Date of Interview: August 9, 1972

Place of Interview: Powell Library, UCLA

Those Present: Mrs. Clifton, interviewer Amelia Fry, and, toward the end of the session, Mrs. Clifton's daughter Helen and a grandchild.

Florence Clifton was chosen to be an interviewee of the Earl Warren Oral History Project because she was head of the Southern California campaign for Governor Warren's Democratic opponent, James Roosevelt, in the 1950 gubernatorial race. The interview happily expanded to include former campaigns in which she had been in an influential position, such as Culbert Olson's victorious contest in 1938 and Harry Truman's wavering California delegation in 1948.

On July 6, 1972, this office wrote to her for an appointment, to which she readily agreed. Chronologies of the 1950 campaign and a suggested interview outline were sent to her August 1, 1972. These were based on a wide variety of sources from the Warren Project research files and also on helpful conversations with her son, Tom Clifton, who was conveniently working on the Berkeley campus in the chancellor's office and who was able to give us advice on which campaigns his mother had been most active in. Frederick Tuttle, then writing his Ph.D. thesis on the history of the Democratic party, provided valuable guides to questions also. Meanwhile, Mrs. Clifton was refreshing her memory by going through her own papers at her home just outside Los Angeles.

One does not call her "Mrs. Clifton" long. Although she had to use her real name of Florence for the eight and a half years she served as chief of the Division of Industrial Welfare under Governor Edmund G. Brown, she is known throughout the state as "Susie." We met in Powell Library at UCLA, where the Oral History Research Office had graciously made a recording studio for us out of the former and temporarily vacant office of the university librarian. On one side near tall, graceful windows were our chairs and a coffee table. A number of folding chairs were lined up elsewhere in the room, as if for a non-existent lecture.

Susie's energy enters a room with her. Her medium-short build seems barely able to contain it, and her high cheek bones, bright eyes, and gray-and-sandy hair that is short and blowy adds to the impression that she is seldom still and tranquil. Her mind is quick, as proven by her fast grasp of the requirements of the interview; her all-out cooperation led her to study the notes from our office and her own files even while enmeshed in the current George McGovern campaign against Richard Nixon. She was dressed in a bright, red-striped turtleneck shirt with navy blue pants and a jacket--which reflected her interest in the family sailboat that serves as an activity for her, her husband, and varying members of an expanding family whose count, at the time of the interview, was five children and ten grandchildren.

Her candor was a joy. She expressed concern that she had not brought out the strong overriding issues of the 1950 campaign, but was satisfied that her interview was primarily structured to fill out the picture after the interviews with others in the 1950 race: George Outland, Langdon Post, and James Roosevelt.

Susie permitted the use of many of her records in the process of reviewing and correcting the interview transcript at this office. After carefully checking with the authors of letters in her possession, she also allowed the deposit (or inclusion in the manuscript) of key pieces of correspondence. The transcript was sent to her for her own corrections and additions May 20, 1975, and Susie returned it for final typing August 11, 1975.

In the meantime, Judge Clifton, during one of their visits to son Tom at the Berkeley campus, took the time to record his recollections of the Democratic campaigns of Olson's governorship as a separate oral history. As for Susie's subsequent career in Governor Edmund G. Brown's administration, we agreed that will be the subject for further taping when this office embarks on the documentation of the Goodwin Knight-Edmund Brown era.

Amelia R. Fry, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

8 November 1976
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1. Birth: Riverside, California.
Married: Robert Clifton, July 29, 1933. Judge of Municipal and Superior Court - 1943-1967. Now retired.
Mother of five children.
2. Education: Los Angeles City Schools - kindergarten through 12th.
4 years UCLA- Major: Physical Education; Minors: Education and Psychology. Extensions courses - UCLA - Insurance, Finance, Accounting, Economics and Government.
3. Political Activities:
Member Democratic County Central Committee - many years.
Member Democratic State Central Committee - 1940-1954.
Member Executive Committee Democratic State Central Committee - 1944-1954.
Delegate or Alternate to Democratic National Conventions - 1944, 1948, 1952 and 1956.
Secretary, California Delegation in 1948.
Southern California Campaign Co-ordinator, Roosevelt for Governor Campaign - 1950.
Southern California Campaign Co-ordinator, Brown for Governor Campaign - 1958. Member of Executive and Finance Committees.
Southern California Finance Co-ordinator, Brown for Governor Campaign - 1962.
Treasurer, Helen Gahagen Douglas for Congress- 1944 and 1946.
Treasurer, Chet Holifield for Congress - 1948, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958 and 1960.
Campaign Manager, Committee for Better Schools - 1953, 1957 and 1971.
4. Government Activities:
Co-Chairman, Urban Re-development Committee - 1951.
Commissioner and Vice-Chairman, Los Angeles City Housing Authority - 1953 to 1955.
Chief, Division of Industrial Welfare, State of California - 1959 to 1962; 1963 to 1967.
U.S. Delegate - ILO Tripartite Conference, Geneva, Switzerland - 1965.
Peace Corps Volunteer, Micronesia - 1967 to 1969.



Florence Clifton (front row, second from left) with daughter Helen to her right, attending rodeo in Los Angeles, ca 1959. Sheriff Eugene Biscaluz stands at right in white hat.



San Francisco Airport, December 1976, as Florence Clifton departs for Liberia on second Peace Corps tour. Left to right: son Tom Clifton, daughter Helen Smith, Florence Clifton, son-in-law Ronald Shoup

I BACKGROUND AND EARLY DAYS IN POLITICS

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

Fry: To start with, where were you born?

Clifton: I was born in Riverside, California. I'm a native Californian.

Fry: Who were your father and your mother?

Clifton: My father was Roy McChesney and my mother was Greta Hazlett. Then we moved to Los Angeles, when I was four, and I started kindergarten. I lived continuously in the Los Angeles area until we went to Sacramento when [Culbert] Olson was governor in 1931.

Fry: Was your father in politics?

Clifton: No.

Fry: What was he in?

Clifton: He was just a worker for the Lucerne Cream and Butter Company first, and then it merged with Safeway and he went with Safeway for years. He and my mother had a little business of their own later, and then they went down to San Diego County to Vista, where he had started as a young man working in some of the citrus groves down there. And suddenly my father was working in groves down there again at seventy-five. He went back to the old Carpenters' Hall where he used to go to dances when he was seventeen, eighteen, nineteen; when he was in his seventies he was still going to dances. At eighty-five he went to the dances at the same Carpenters' Hall.

Fry: Where did you go to school? Primarily in Los Angeles?

Clifton: Yes. I went to an elementary school down by S.C. [University of Southern California], Jefferson Street Elementary School; then I did the seventh and eighth grade in one year at Compton. We moved there and built a little house.

Fry: In one year? How did you do that?

Clifton: Well, I was precocious at the time. Then we moved to Southgate and I went to Huntington Park High School. Southgate is a separate incorporated city but it was part of the L.A. city school system. And then I went to UCLA.

Fry: What did you major in?

Clifton: Physical education.

Fry: Well, that's probably a logical major if you're really going to be active in politics. [Laughter]

Clifton: Right. I had one course in American Institutions or something but I wasn't particularly interested in it; those were required courses.

Fry: Where did you pick up this interest in politics?

Clifton: My husband. He was a lawyer in Hollywood and he was interested in politics. Practically all of our dates in '32 and early '33 were spent going to political meetings. It was during the depths of the Depression and I wasn't particularly interested in taking care of the affairs of the world; I was more interested in trying to take care of our affairs. At this time he was a lawyer, and lawyers really had a rough time. By the time they paid the rent and their secretary and the telephone bill there was little left for lawyers, unless they were some of the big corporate lawyers. It was rough in '33 and '34 and along in '35; and then it started to pick up in '37 and '38.

Fry: Did you help him in his lawyer's office?

Clifton: No. I filled in on vacations, both for him and his two partners, so they wouldn't have to pay a girl. All of them were having a rough go. The senior partner didn't have as rough a go as the other two because he got the biggest proportion of anything left over. I would fill in just as a steno when the regular girls were on vacation. But that's all I did.

Fry: Jobs were pretty scarce for women in those days, so you probably weren't working, is that right?

Clifton: Well, I had planned to be a teacher in physical education, and then I got married, and at that time they didn't hire married teachers, number one. Number two, most of our graduating class had a very tough time because physical education was considered a frill. Just before the Depression came on women were going into the field of physical education as a professional field.

Fry: It was just rising.

Clifton: It was just rising and had special teachers specially trained for it. And then came the Depression and schools had to cut back. They would hire even Spanish teachers to teach physical education, so they did away with it, though not a hundred per cent. But I remember at class reunions we'd come back and we'd find out that now if they touched a girl and she was "warm" (alive) they'd hire her for physical education. At the time that we were doing it, it was an especially tough time. And many of the girls ended up in part-time playground jobs.

Fry: Did you ever teach?

Clifton: No. Because I got married then.

Fry: And by the time the Depression was over--

Clifton: I had several children.

Fry: How many kids did you have?

Clifton: Five. And now ten grandchildren.

Fry: How are they divided up?

Clifton: They're spread out according to campaigns. When we got married we decided to have five children, and of course now this whole argument for large families has gone out of fashion. But at that time we wanted five children. Well, in the depths of the Depression people were only having two, but we wanted five. Bob's immediate family wasn't that big, but his mother was one of thirteen and his father was one of eighteen. He came from the Middle West and they believed in big families. And I came from a family of four children and I thought it was a great idea, so we decided to have a big family. But instead of having them every two years as we originally had thought, it was a sixteen-year spread, because we decided that "this year we are going to campaign" or "this year we're going to have another baby." So our youngsters came along in that way.

Fry: When there wasn't a campaign.

Clifton: Yes. In fact when my oldest daughter was here at UCLA, I had one child at UCLA, one in senior high, one in junior high, one in elementary, and one in preschool. The boy who is at Berkeley now was the preschooler. So they were exposed to politics through the years, in the same way we were.

Anyway, to answer your question, it was just because of Bob's interest in politics that I got into it. Even when I was pregnant with the first child I did precinct work; I organized my area; I drew maps for the whole assembly district that he was working on.

II ROBERT CLIFTON'S ASSOCIATION WITH GOVERNOR CULBERT L. OLSON

Fry: I don't know your husband Robert's political career.*

Clifton: He was active from '32 until '38, and then he was working in [Culbert L.] Olson's office as a lawyer. Not all of that time, but when Olson started running for governor Bob then associated with his office.

Fry: In Olson's law office?

Clifton: In Olson's office, so he was not that involved in politics then. When Olson was away, he was doing some of the legal things. Then when Olson was elected, he appointed Bob on what they call "temporary authorization," as the administrative assistant for the Department of Finance under Phil Gibson, who was later state Chief Justice. And Phil Gibson, his first year with Olson, was Director of Finance. Bob was at that time known as the "administrative assistant" because in theory departments were not supposed to have lawyers because the attorney general was designated to represent departments. But Warren was the attorney general and Olson wasn't about to consult Warren any more than he had to. But this was a civil service position (administrative assistant to Director of Finance) and it was vacant; so Bob filled it for six months and then took the examination and qualified at the top of the list. He was appointed to the position and served for the balance of Olson's term as governor. Then the last week that Olson was in office he appointed Bob to the municipal bench in Los Angeles. Bob was on the bench for twenty-five years, first on the municipal court, later on the superior court.

Fry: So he has been on the bench ever since?

Clifton: Yes, until he retired to go into the Peace Corps. He retired as a superior court judge. His tenure on the bench took him out of politics because the judicial people do not campaign. So he was

*See subsequent interview with Robert Clifton.

Clifton: twenty-five years on the bench, and when he went into the Peace Corps they put him back on the bench on the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), which again was the only assignment in the Peace Corps for which they could have used an American judge on the bench.

Fry: Under Olson, when Earl Warren was attorney general, was your husband very much involved in the dispute that was going on over civil defense and what Warren's role would be?

Clifton: He was aware of the civil defense issue. But Bob and Stan Mosk, who's now on the state supreme court, were looked to for political advice by Olson. Bob was borrowed from the Department of Finance also for two regular sessions and five special sessions of the state legislature that Olson called in his four years, to analyze the bills and make recommendations on the legislation. Now they have regular people on the staff to do this, but at that time Olson had only three constitutional secretaries. That's been changed since then.

Fry: These were recommendations that were related to constitutionality of bills?

Clifton: Well, yes. Every governor and I'm sure the president does the same thing. I was a volunteer just to keep track of the bills because they had to be organized; the bills don't come through in the order in which they are numbered. In other words, something that was numbered 256 may pass long before bill #1, and as they come through a governor only has ten days to act upon it while the session is still on. So, he has to either sign it or veto it. If he vetoes it, he has to send it back to the house in which it originated with his objections so that while they are in session they can still have time to either change it (so that it will be acceptable to the governor) or override his veto with enough votes. It takes more than a majority to override a veto. Bob would look at the bill and find out what the author of the bill had in mind; in other words he would confer with the author of the bill. He would find out from the attorney general what his recommendation on it was and I think at the time (I know Pat Brown's administration did this) he would find out from the department head affected by it how they felt about a bill. For instance, if it was a prison bill he would go to the Department of Corrections and see what they thought of it, being experts in it. And then he would find out what the legislative counsel had to say about it. Now the legislative counsel does not say whether they think it's a good bill or a bad bill in terms of social desirability; they have an opinion only as to whether it does what it says it does.

Fry: If the legal language is effective.

Clifton: Then if it was a bill of great public interest, there usually was a great deal of correspondence pro and con. So Bob would go through everything on that particular bill. He would read it over; then he would boil it all down to a one-page digest and make his recommendations whether he thought that the governor ought to sign it or veto it. And if he thought it ought to be vetoed, based on all of this whole picture, then he'd draft a tentative veto message.

III ORGANIZING THE 1940 CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION

Fry: And you were working in the office too, but as an unpaid volunteer?

Clifton: As an unpaid volunteer and not full time because I was having my third child in Sacramento. I did a lot of political chores for Olson such as helping him put the Democratic delegation together in 1940.

Fry: Oh, you did?

Clifton: Yes. Olson was the titular head of the Democratic delegation to the national convention because he was the governor. Warren was the titular head of the Republican delegation. I helped put the '40 one together, and the '44 one, and the '48 one with Jimmy [Roosevelt]. I was into several other conventions and was involved with them, but I didn't do the mechanical work on them.

Fry: How were delegates chosen in those days, for instance in '40?

Clifton: In '40 there were various recommendations for various and sundry people. For instance, if it would be in the 19th District they would ask Chet Holifield who they thought it ought to be; they'd ask labor who they thought ought to be on; they'd ask the office holders in that particular congressional district. We had two delegates from a district, not necessarily one man and one woman; we had some women but not many.

Fry: From each congressional district?

Clifton: From each congressional district--yes, two delegates and two alternates. Take the 19th District--there would be four office holders in the District: there would be Congressman Chet Holifield and three other Democratic office holders like a county supervisor (e.g. Ernie Debs, who was very active in those days). Then you might have one of your big labor leaders that lived there. In other districts you might have other problems. In Beverly Hills (the old 16th District) you always had a problem because most of your contributors lived in the Beverly Hills area. They would want to be included on the delegation,

Clifton: but since most of them lived in the same congressional district you would have to choose only two. Consequently, you didn't have too many large contributors on the Democratic delegation. It was kind of a consensus trying to balance a delegation.

But the work involved with each candidate for delegate was to file as if he were running for governor.

Fry: For what?

Clifton: Each "candidate for delegate" had to file, because you see his name went on the ballot.

Fry: Oh, you mean the filing system was just as complicated as if he were running for governor.

Clifton: Yes. It was so involved--declarations of candidacy and all those papers to be filed. The mechanics of it were just terrible. But I would say in '40 the delegation represented a broad consensus. Paul Peek, who later was on the supreme court, was the state chairman at the time and I spent quite a few months down here in Los Angeles for Olson helping put that delegation together and then getting the required signatures to qualify it on the ballot afterward, because you had to get a percentage. You had to get a certain number of signatures based on what your top candidate got at the last regular statewide election (two years before). So, if you were the majority party you had to get more signatures than the losing Republicans did.

Fry: In California how much of this was done as a part of the Democratic party structure? Or did the presidential campaign have its own?

Clifton: No. You see, that's how Jimmy Roosevelt got deeply involved in the '48 campaign as state chairman. In 1940 it was the governor (as the titular head of the Democratic party) and Paul Peek, who was the Democratic State Central Committee chairman, who took on the leadership and responsibility. And you looked to assistance from your chairman south and your vice-chairman north (or vice versa) and your state central executive committee, and you looked to your county committee chairman.

Fry: You're talking about the national election?

Clifton: Yes, about the California delegation to the Democratic National Convention. So they did get deeply involved. On our state elections it's been a personality thing practically always, because at the time we had cross-filing. It was awfully hard to say, "This is the party."

IV INVOLVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA STATE POLITICS

EPIC

Fry: In '40 you also had your legislative races going on locally. Were these all related?

Clifton: A great deal. You always have all of your assemblymen and all of your congressmen running, and then you have half of your state senate running: in one two-year period it's the even-numbered ones; in the other two-year period it's the odd-numbered ones. Then in between you have your governor and lieutenant governor and your constitutional officers of the state running in one two-year period. The presidential and the gubernatorial one alternate every two years.

Fry: Your own work in this period we're talking about was primarily in what area of the state campaigns?

Clifton: Bob got involved in the Upton Sinclair campaign, which was for governor, so I got involved in it. He was running for governor in '34 but he started the campaign in '33. He did it with a real people's "thing," just like McGovern's campaign in 1972, except we had more clubs in Los Angeles County. We had three hundred-and-some EPIC clubs--End Poverty In California--and many of these people were not part of the party structure as it existed before that. The Democrats were a minority in California until 1932.

Fry: I think 1936 is when the Democratic registrations passed the Republicans.

Clifton: Right, but in '34 we had a tremendous campaign. Sinclair got nominated, and Los Angeles County was the Democratic stronghold, which has since become much less of a stronghold than the other counties. But then we had these clubs here; I can't tell you how many young Democratic clubs we had in those days, a tremendous number. In fact, we had a delegated body, so many delegates from each Democratic club, that met one night a week. In addition to our club meetings, we had state conventions until they were running out of our ears. This was before

Clifton: CDC [California Democratic Clubs, formed in early '50s]. Frequently I hear newcomers say, "This is the first time we've ever done this," but this was a real people's movement in '33 and into '34.

Many of the people that were active in that campaign then ran slates for the county committees. They ran candidates for the legislature. We elected I don't know how many state legislators on the Upton Sinclair ticket at that time, and a large majority from here. Now, we didn't do as well in other parts of the state. Some of our people were even on welfare and hitchhiked up to Sacramento for the first time. All these young people, like the McGovern people, took over the party as it were, not by main force or anything but by getting elected to the county committees and things like that.

This laid the groundwork for the '36 and '38 campaigns. This was how Olson got elected--on the momentum of the 1934 and '36 campaigns. He was the first Democratic governor in California in forty-four years.

Fry: Had the club system survived in '38?

Clifton: Yes, we still had them. They had become county committee members.

Fry: By that time they were absorbed into the party structure?

Clifton: They were the party by then.

Fry: And then we didn't have the clubs again until California Democratic Council in the early 50s?

Clifton: Yes, until CDC. Well, it's the same old thing again. This is another pattern that runs throughout politics. It takes a real movement and activity like this to get something going. Then when they get in office they are so busy trying to do the job that your grassroots have a tendency to die, by neglect and other things. It's the same old thing with Pat Brown. He was tremendous in his first term. Some of the old newspaper people looked at him and wondered how come Pat was doing such a good job. And he did great. But then when he ran again, he's defending his own record, he's not opposing someone else. He's defending his own record and he's put into motion most of the things that are his big ideas that he wants to initiate, so now he's running on the refinement of those ideas, and such campaign issues don't have the same sex appeal as the initiation of programs.

Fry: It's a status quo candidacy, is that it?

Clifton: Right. And this is why there is a problem with governors running and getting elected again, as James Roosevelt pointed out later. You're great the day you're elected but then starts the pressures around you, the hassles with successes, the failures. Well, I suppose

Clifton: a wedding starts the same way. I mean this is the great day. And then the lack of funds at the end of the first month and "what are we going to do"--

Fry: And you're involved with practical problems from then on.

Clifton: Yes, and this is what happens as a result of political pressures; these movements come and go. Again you see, after Pat Brown got in, then he was in. People get aroused to a fight against something more than they do for something; they take for granted the good things.

Olson as Governor

Fry: I've always been curious why Olson didn't run on both party tickets in '42, when Warren did and beat him.

Clifton: Well, Olson was very much opposed to cross-filing, very much opposed to cross-filing. And he was for a unicameral legislature. He had a strong feeling about both and wanted all partisans to share his intensity. This was one of his shortcomings as governor. He was very much an all black or all white fellow. If he believed in it then he believed in it, and all the partisans should believe in the same thing.

I remember early in his career he had all these new legislators, many of whom were not as capable because they were brand new at it. In fact, one of the "firebrands" up there that had had one term was Sam [Samuel W.] Yorty. Sam was the most capable one, but he was for Sam, not for anybody else. And so he at times gave Olson a bad time.

Many of Olson's blind followers out there would give him a vote on anything. They could not stand up and make a speech. They'd vote right, and they'd come up with some programs, but they were some of the Upton Sinclair troops. They were not lawyers; they were not people used to making speeches, and they just didn't have the ability to do it. The staff would try and get Olson to do what most presidents do and most governors do: invite certain legislators over to the governor's mansion to have dinner and establish a rapport with them on a personal basis, on a social basis so that lines of communication remained open. He wouldn't do this. He wouldn't do this at all. He was very much of a loner. He was a very attractive man and a very good legislator, but he would say, "Look, they were sent up here by the voters to do a job. They were elected on the same platform I was. Why should I invite them over to try to mollycoddle them, as it were?"

Fry: Did he live in the governor's mansion?

Clifton: Yes. His wife died; she had a heart attack and died on Good Friday of the first year he was there. Also, he had collapsed on the week of his inauguration, and he was in the hospital under an oxygen tent for a period of time.

Fry: Was this just from sheer fatigue or what?

Clifton: At the time we didn't know, but later I heard that it was diabetes. I'm not sure that this is true. This is what I heard. The Republican leaders were over there, practically on their knees, praying that he would survive because Ellis Patterson was our lieutenant governor and they weren't about to be left with Ellis Patterson. So, Olson got started off with no vitality and the legislature got away from him right in the beginning. He didn't have a very easy time at all, but as I say he was very much of a loner.

The Concealed Microphone Episode

Fry: You were in his office, so let me ask you a question that we picked up in the Earl Warren part of our series. When Warren took over in '42 there were big headlines about the microphones that were left in the governor's office connected with the dictaphone machines upstairs. I always wondered what Olson was doing with those.

Clifton: No, no. Paul Peek was elected the speaker of the assembly; he was a legislator from Long Beach and he was the first well known speaker who was a Democrat. Before that, for a brief period, William Mosley Jones (Democrat) had been speaker. Then we had Paul Peek. And there was a telephone from the speaker's podium to Olson's office. Let me think, these are two different things. Anyway in the "economy bloc" the Republicans and the conservative Democrats formed a bloc to dump Peek, and the fellow that was elected, Gordon Garland,* came up there very dramatically and snatched the telephone out. This was one incident.

The other incident involved one of the governor's secretaries, Walter Ballou, again not a professional man but very active in the campaign, who worked hard. Stan Mosk was also a secretary; he handled appeals for executive clemency in legal matters. And there was a fellow named Frank Sullivan (not the one that teaches at Loyola) who was Olson's press secretary. Then, Walter Ballou was

*Democrat elected on Democratic and Republican tickets in 1938.

Clifton: the one that handled patronage and things like that. And Walter, unbeknownst to Olson, did have some salesman in, selling the idea of having recording devices in the offices. He did have a recording device attached to his telephone in his office, and it caused a small volcano at the time Olson left office.

Fry: Olson didn't know about it?

Clifton: No, no, no. This was Ballou trying an FBI-type thing. He had some of his own shortcomings; he felt that if he had a record of the content of incoming calls this would be helpful. I think that this recording thing--

Fry: Apparently it was connected in other offices. I thought maybe it was just his secretary who--

Clifton: No, no, no, no, no. It was just that Ballou wanted to be sure of his own power, and since he was not a lawyer or professional man he had his insecurities with these lawyers around, and so he would record incoming conversations with various politicians calling him. There gets to be phobias about these things here and there because it has happened at various times, just like this recent [Watergate] thing in the McGovern headquarters.

Then there was another thing--I can't remember exactly--in which somebody seemingly planted a microphone over in the Senator Hotel in the speaker's room, Gordon Garland's.

Fry: That was in a lobbying investigation?

Clifton: Yes. But I know that it wasn't general. I know that Olson was just furious when he found out about it. He was a man of very high principle and sometimes unyielding in what he was for. There was no compromise. If you were supposed to be for this part of the program, you had to be for it all the way. This is why he did not have good rapport even with his own legislators. He was kind of cold.

Fry: Could you sum up what you think his main "Achilles heel" was after four years, when he ran against Warren for re-election and lost?

Clifton: Well, I think he was stymied by the legislature; I've always said so. He didn't have a record that he could say, "I did this and I did that." He could say, "I introduced this and I introduced that." But when you have an opposition legislature you can't accomplish it.

Fry: Of course in '48 Truman had had the same experience, and he capitalized on it with the "do-nothing Eightieth Congress" charges.

Clifton: That was a dramatic thing which we can go into later.

Fry: I wondered why Olson couldn't have done the same thing in '42, now that we look back on it, and made a political capital out of his terrible legislature?

Clifton: The personalities were entirely different, too. Olson was a loner. And he didn't have his "cronies" that he depended on in this sort of thing. He tried to call it purely as it should be. There has to be a little bit of charisma; I'm sick and tired of too much charisma, but there has to be a little there to get a group that just will die for you. As I mentioned to you on the phone, when Olson left his office for the last day when Warren was inaugurated, Dick (his son) and Bob and I were the only people with him. The rest of the people had already left.

Fry: Tell on tape that story that you told me about coming down on the elevator after the inauguration in '42.

Clifton: After Warren's inauguration ceremony and the assembly chamber emptied, Olson was in the elevator first. Warren was handshaking with his supporters. Then Warren came and got into the elevator (without realizing that Olson was there) with his whole group with him, and they just jammed in. Olson and Bob and Dick and I were standing in the back of the elevator there, and Olson said from the back to Warren, "Well, I hope you have a much better term in office than I did. Mine was four years of hell." He was being gracious-- I mean he doesn't unbend too much, but he was being gracious.

And Warren said, "Hmphh. Well it depends on how you handle it." As I say, it was a small thing, a small thing, but it was just one of the impressions that I got of Warren, that he was just a stuffy guy. He seemed very stuffy to many people.

I don't think there was ever any question in any of our minds about Warren's personal integrity or his being an honest guy in office. We felt that politically he was dishonest at times by being a great nonpartisan in state elections and then in the next election (national) he was a partisan, and then he was a nonpartisan and then he was a partisan. And we always resented his running on this thing that he was going to tighten up the budget and all of this, and then immediately coming up with a budget bigger than Olson's, and in a few years it had tripled and quadrupled. It had gone from a biennial budget to an annual budget. Many of the things that I see are just like Ronnie Reagan against Pat [Brown]. Reagan was never going to go for withholding, he was never going to do this and that, and the realities of life are that this is what they come to. But this is part of our democracy. Did you ever see JFK's interview where he was there in the White House? I think it went for almost two hours and they had a couple of selected press fellows like Walter Cronkite asking him questions?

Fry: No.

Clifton: It was a tremendous interview, you know, his reaction to this and that and the other thing. He said that when he got into office he found out all the things that he was saying when he was running for president were far worse than he had charged and that the problems were more insoluble--he did it so well. So, this is what every office holder finds out sooner or later. The reputation goes from here, where no one is mad at him--he's the victor and everything is great--and then it just goes.

Fry: That's an interesting observation especially from somebody who has seen a number of office holders in California take the reins and then be appalled at the budgetary problems and--

Clifton: Also one experiences difficulty just with the people problems. You have to start selecting somebody to be your Director of Finance and you have ten people that want to be it. Sooner or later you select one. And I've heard Olson say (and I've heard others say) the same thing when they have a judicial appointment to make: "Thirteen people want it and the governor ends up with twelve enemies and one ingrate."

Fry: You sort of wonder how they're able to gather any votes at all at the end of four years.

Clifton: Right. But when you think of how many people they can actually appoint to offices, it's very small compared to the total electorate.

Fry: Except potential appointees usually are vocal people who have a lot of political contacts.

1938-1944

Clifton: So, I got into the '32 campaign. [Laughter] I was in the '33-'34, and then I was in the '36, the [Franklin D.] Roosevelt campaign, and then the '38 Olson campaign. Bob was on the county committee by then. In fact, he was the chairman of the organization of the county committee. Then he went into Olson's office and I did the volunteer thing of organizing Los Angeles County for Olson. We had precinct workers in every precinct, not to the same extent that we had when Sinclair ran because we had lost some of the steam, but we had not lost all of the steam by a whole lot. And it was this surge in '34 that had laid the groundwork for Olson in '38. He was a state senator at that time, the only one from Los Angeles County. Remember,

Clifton: that's changed too. Then we only had one senator from Los Angeles County and we only had about six or seven out of the forty for all of Southern California. So, then you had thirty-three or thirty-four for the rest of the state. Olson was the senator from Los Angeles County and a damned good legislator. He was considered a very good legislator, and that's how he happened to run.

Fry: In '42 did you move back to Los Angeles?

Clifton: Yes, Olson appointed Bob to the bench and we moved back.

Fry: And you continued being active in politics?

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: And your husband had to be his judicial, neutral self.

Clifton: Yes. I've been on the state Democratic committee*, I've been on the executive committee of the state committee, I've been on the--

Fry: When did you go on the state committee?

Clifton: Bob went on the state committee in '38 and then I went on the state committee in '40. And by then he was out because he was working in a civil service job. Then I helped launch Chet Holifield when he ran the first time for Congress in '44. During all my other political activities I was usually treasurer of his campaign also, even after I moved out of this district, until we volunteered for the Peace Corps.

Fry: You just kept working?

Clifton: Yes, but I would be in other campaigns too. Being the treasurer for a congressional candidate after he is the incumbent isn't too much of a job! Just trying to raise money and keep it legal.

Fry: And keep track.

Clifton: Yes, keeping track, but not accepting corporate checks or union checks, you know; and making the reports. The reports for a congressional office are enough to drive you out of your mind because you have to make a state report and a federal report and they don't require the same thing. No matter how honest you are, just trying to balance the two is difficult for people that run for U.S. Senate or Congress from California.

Fry: Is there any move to get some kind of uniformity in the state election report laws?

*Democratic State Central Committee.

Clifton: California is more demanding than the federal government in most areas of law. When I was chief of Industrial Welfare* under Governor Brown and I'd go back to Washington for a conference with my counterparts from other states, I'd find that California was so far ahead professionally, in terms of standards, pay, and ways of running the department, over other states, that it was just unbelievable. California has always been in the forefront. It's been a very liberal state in terms of good juvenile laws, good civil service laws. It was a general impression at all national conferences of people from state offices, whether it was in criminology or whether it was in water resources, whatever, that California was in the forefront. You can't say, "Let's lower our standards to meet the national," because the national is coping with the South, and some of the big city machines and things like that. So, we'd get on a higher level and then we'd cope with improved laws, but not as good as California's.

There're only a few people that are involved in that [reporting campaign donations and expenses] anyway, you know: the candidates, the treasurers, and whoever advises them on that.

Fry: If we go on into 1944 now, could you tell me what you were doing then?

Clifton: The presidential election was in '44; I was very active in that. And I was in Helen Gahagan Douglas's congressional race. She ran for Congress then.

Fry: Was that in your district?

Clifton: No, I didn't live in her district. She didn't either. But I was active in between times in the women's division of the Democratic State Central Committee, and she was, too. In fact, she had been the state co-chairman of the California State Democratic Committee,** and the National Democratic Committeewoman--both at the same time.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

Helen Gahagan Douglas's Entry into Politics

Clifton: Let me backtrack a minute to '40. In '40 the titular head of putting the delegation together in Southern California for FDR, under Olson and under Paul Peek, was Melvyn Douglas, and he was very active there. Helen was home; let's see, her youngest child (she has two) was born in '38 and she wasn't active at that time at all. But Mel was very active and he kind of wanted to be national committeeman, but so did Olson. So they made Helen national committeewoman and Olson national committeeman. That's how Helen got into it. But Helen became very active.

*The Industrial Welfare Commission.

**Democratic State Central Committee.

Fry: When was she national committeewoman?

Clifton: From '40 to '44. She was also the state head of the woman's division when she was national committeewoman, that I know. And her previous political experience had been when Eleanor Roosevelt made a great effort when her husband first went into the White House, since he was crippled, to bring people to him, so he wouldn't get caught in this bind where he would only see the people that someone wanted him to see. And if you read any of her [Mrs. Roosevelt's] books or articles, you will see that she made a great effort to bring people of different kinds of backgrounds and experiences to the White House as guests so that at dinner there would be an exchange, because he was limited by the wheelchair. So Helen and Melvyn, being in the theater, were invited quite a few times. She was quite a friend of Eleanor Roosevelt's.

As to Melvyn's politics, I think he had had a little to do with the "Back of the Yards" thing in Chicago with Sol Alinsky, who just died. He had a little something to do with it at some time in his life, just a little. But anyway Melvyn was the titular head of the campaign in the primary to get the Roosevelt delegation elected. And he was a delegate.

Fry: He had the same job that you had had?

Clifton: No, I worked with him on the campaign to get the delegation elected. I did most of the "leg-work." Frequently you'll see somebody whose name is known as the head of it, but other people usually do a great deal of the work.

Disposition of Political Papers

I do have quite a bit of correspondence at home between me and the governor's office and Paul Peek and some memorandums and stuff like that. Some of that I saved recently, stuff that had to do with the delegation. Most of the other stuff I threw out, but I did save the '40, '44, and '48 correspondence. I've got a great deal of correspondence on James Roosevelt's thing leading up to the '48 convention.

Fry: I hope that eventually we can make provisions to put them in The Bancroft.

Clifton: I was going to come out here and see if somebody in the political science department was writing a thesis on delegations or conventions or something, who might want it. On the other hand--

Fry: It would be very useful. You can give it to The Bancroft just as it is, and they will go through it and put it in a new order. It will be there for you to use if you ever want to, and for any other people to use if you decide it can be open for use.

Black Participation

Clifton: Well anyway, getting back to politics. This is how Helen Gahagan Douglas got into the picture, and then she decided to run for Congress. She had been very close to Tom Ford, who was the congressman that retired from the district downtown where she ran. She lived in Hollywood but she ran in Tom Ford's old district, the old 14th District which included the black community then. She had three assembly districts, one assembly district was black and the other two were white. She ran in '44 and I was very active in that campaign with her and in the '44 presidential one. It was kind of a dual thing.

Fry: I'm interested in how well the blacks were organized then as blacks.

Clifton: Not very well. I was just in a black campaign last year for the school board and we came within an eyelash of winning; they have to run citywide in the white area. The difference between Helen's campaign in '44 and Arnett Hartsfield's campaign last year ('71), in terms of the blacks and the attitudes, are just tremendous. They weren't that well organized at the time. They were just trying to make it in a white world, and there was little organized support, you know, except for a group that we didn't think too much of called the Ministerial Alliance; they had something like three hundred "ministers," as they called them, but I don't think they were all with churches. They would want to give you an endorsement, provided you contributed to their work. And I think that was about all of the organized blacks that we had because we would depend on the AFL-CIO. At that time they had not merged, and each would appoint some one black on their staff to be active in politics, and we would deal with that one person. And we had one assemblyman who is now a congressman, Gus Hawkins, who was a great supporter of Olson's and a supporter of Brown's before he (Hawkins) went to Congress. He was very effective in his time. But as far as black organization, we did not have any. We took lots of whites down to push doorbells in black communities. We took union members and others to organize and push the doorbells.

For Helen we had lots of house meetings that individual blacks would put on for her. And she had had friends like Mary McCloud Bethune, who established a black woman's college. Melvyn, during

Clifton: the Roosevelt delegation thing in '40, had Mary McCloud Bethune out here and we'd have her down in the black community, but it was through the whites that we got her. There was practically no organization as there is now.

V 1946-1948

Jimmy Roosevelt Emerges in California Politics

Fry: Now you wanted to say something about '46 and how Jimmy Roosevelt entered the scene at that time.

Clifton: In '46 Earl Warren had won in the primary on the Democratic and Republican ticket, so we didn't have a gubernatorial candidate. We had Jack Shelley, who later became a congressman and who was in the '48 Eisenhower fracas with Jimmy on the delegation, and then later became mayor of San Francisco.

Fry: He was running for lieutenant governor.

Clifton: He was running for lieutenant governor, and Bill Rogers, Jr. was running for U.S. Senate. Jimmy really did add a lot of strength to the campaign because his name was still a very good one; his father had only been gone a little over a year.

Fry: How did he come in from the Marines and within a year and a half become head of the Democratic party in California?

Clifton: Frequently we have a vacuum and almost anyone who looks presentable can get in that vacuum, and this is how it happened. It was easier particularly when we had cross-filing.

Fry: Were you particularly hunting for a new face or anything like that?

Clifton: No, he had already made up his mind to run. I've always been very active in what goes on in the state committee and I always wanted to see somebody that was good and solid and that would do a good job and really work at it. Frequently we have people that seek these offices and then they sit back and do very damned little, and I wanted to see somebody that would really do something in the party. Harold Lane was Chet Holifield's field representative for many years; when I got to Sacramento for the state committee meeting, Harold Lane said, "Hey, Jimmy Roosevelt wants to be a candidate for state chairman. Why don't

Clifton: you come up and talk to him and see what kinds of things he's interested in?" Harold was a good one at counting noses and getting people lined up on the floor, and I was very good at this sort of thing too.

We'd gone up without a candidate. (I don't know whether Harold went up without a candidate or not.) But I was impressed by what Jimmy had to say and thought he'd make a good state chairman. We started working, and two days is all you have to do it, really, and in the absence of anybody else for it there was no problem. As I say, this was in '46, his father had died in '45 and he was the eldest son of the late president. This was all the Roosevelt era, which meant an awful lot to people. The whole New Deal and Roosevelt and everything else was almost a semi-religion with an awful lot of Democrats.

Fry: Did you think of this, too, as some way you could unify all the disparate elements of the Democrats?

Clifton: Yes. We thought this looked like a strong, good name, charisma and the whole thing. It looked very good. So, we worked the floor and worked the floor and he got elected.

Fry: Now this was in August of '46?

Clifton: July or August. They've changed the time a couple of times in the state committee meetings so I'm not sure whether it was in July or August, but I think it was in August.

Fry: Then you still had the November '46 elections to go through, with James Roosevelt as chairman. What sort of a job did he do?

Clifton: He organized the money and the press and went all out for these candidates to really campaign up and down the state. His being there, in the absence of a gubernatorial candidate with charisma, attracted people in a way that for instance Jack Shelley would not have. Shelley wasn't that well known in Southern California. He was originally a labor leader and then he was state senator from San Francisco before he ran for this particular job.

Fry: Was Roosevelt able to kind of jack up the Democratic party by bringing in big names from the national scene?

Clifton: Right. He got quite a few people out here, and we had more activity than we'd had and more publicity. They'd have a big dinner in San Diego and he'd get a national figure there. He still had all these contacts with his father's old friends, so he'd get somebody for San Diego, and then he'd get somebody for Fresno, and then get somebody for Redding, you know; and he'd get congressmen to come out here,

Clifton: and he was able to get enough money together to pay their fare out and back, which in some of the previous campaigns we couldn't do.

A Split in the Democrats: Roosevelt vs. Ed Pauley and Bob Kenny

Clifton: I think he did a very good job at that period in that election. I was satisfied that our faith in getting somebody new was justified. He created a lot of activity, and they got on with a state committee meeting between times, which is unheard of, and this is how they got off on foreign policy and domestic policy.

Fry: Criticizing Truman's foreign policy?

Clifton: It didn't start out that way; it got into that. There were a lot of people who didn't believe that a state central committee should get into foreign policy. They felt that that was a national thing and they should stick to state issues. These people were represented by Ed Pauley, who was a big pal of Truman and opposed to any criticism of Truman.

Remember FDR had Henry A. Wallace as his vice-president, and they had dumped Wallace for Truman in '44, and Pauley was the guy that did it, really. He twisted arms in the California delegation in '44.

Fry: Oh, he really did?

Clifton: He really did. Helen Douglas was a great disciple of Wallace's. In fact Wallace was the one, after she became a member of Congress, that wanted her to run for the Senate; I think this had more to do with Helen running for the U.S. Senate than anything else. Wallace kept wanting her to do it.

Fry: Why was Pauley--

Clifton: Pauley got to be a big wheel under Olson. They had this oil proposition, Proposition 5 I guess it was. Olson had great faith in Ed Pauley.

Fry: What was that ballot proposition?

Clifton: It had to do with the depletion of the gas. I've forgotten all of the details on it, but seemingly it was directed against the companies that wanted the "hit and run" type of drilling; in other words, the companies that wanted to make a fast buck in a hurry and have short-term leases wanted to blow the gas off, which means that you never recover the lower depths of the oil after you've gotten rid of the

Clifton: pressure that would bring it up. The long-term lease people wanted to conserve the gas so they could keep on, over a period of fifty years, getting the oil up. The Atkinson oil bill is what I'm talking about. That was on the ballot and Pauley wanted to prevent the gas blow off. And Olson was a great conservationist.

Fry: Pauley, as an oil man, was for this proposition?

Clifton: Because he had long-term leases.

Fry: And this was his way of getting rid of the competition from the short-term drillers?

Clifton: Right. But anyway, Olson asked me if I'd come down here and work on this proposition and I said I'd work, after I asked about Pauley. I said, "Tell me about Ed Pauley," because I was suspicious of any oil man; I wanted to know more about him. Olson had run on an oil proposition, the tidelands oil thing, while Frank F. Merriam sold the state down the river when he was governor in 1934. The state didn't get what they were supposed to be getting. In other words, there were all these oil pools along the coast and the oil companies were drilling under the S.P. tracks and into the state-owned tidelands; this is what they called slant drilling. They weren't paying the state anything, and this caused a big ruckus because they were supposed to be. It was uncovered in the campaign that Merriam had settled an owed amount of \$6 million for \$600,000 or something like that. This was a big issue when Olson was elected. So, Olson had a lot to do with this in his committee in Sacramento when he was a state senator before he got into the campaign and ran for governor.

While he was governor this Atkinson oil bill* came up, which was along somewhat the same lines that he was interested in, and he told me that of all the oil men he had met, Pauley was by far the best and that he was a very reputable guy. So, I came down and worked on that proposition [1939, for the November 7 election]. We lost that by a mile and a half. We used a lot of the precinct workers that had worked in '38 for Olson, some of the same organizations that we had used for Los Angeles County, but we lost the Atkinson oil bill campaign.

*California Oil and Gas Control of 1939, to "investigate the petroleum industry...to limit and prorate production of crude petroleum and natural gas..." The bill was backed by such disparate elements as the CIO, Standard Oil Company, and Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes. (From Robert E. Burke, Olson's New Deal for California, U.C. Press, 1953.)

Fry: How did he get so close to Truman, do you know?

Clifton: I don't know how he got close to Truman. I know that he wanted Truman and that he wanted no part of Wallace. Wallace was characterized as a visionary; he would take off on not just issues but strange things that people were telling him to do, as I understand it. Anyway, Pauley wanted an avenue into the White House and he got it. By then he had emerged as a much bigger oil man. Olson appointed Pauley to the Board of Regents. His first appointment was from Olson.

Fry: So, Pauley was campaigning for Truman as vice-president then at the convention.

Clifton: Yes. In '44. As I say, he was using powerful methods. [Attorney General] Bob Kenny was the chairman of the California delegation and he wouldn't call the delegation together so they could caucus for the vice-president. Helen [Gahagan Douglas] was our national committee-woman and she was demanding a meeting of the delegation, and she was in tears when Truman got selected as the vice-presidential candidate. It was a combination of Kenny and Pauley.

Fry: Oh, Kenny wouldn't call the delegation together, in order to prevent a vote that might have been for Wallace?

Clifton: Yes, so he just wouldn't call the delegation together. We really laid an egg right there.

Clifton: Now Kenny--these strange overtones--Kenny had been titular head of Olson's campaign; he was the southern California head of Olson's campaign, at the same time that he was campaign manager for Warren for attorney general. Kenny was a state senator then, and he wanted to be on the state supreme court, but Olson wouldn't appoint him to the supreme court; he appointed Phil Gibson. But he had offered an appellate court appointment to Kenny.

Fry: Why did Kenny turn it down?

Clifton: He wanted on the supreme court and he wasn't going to take it. He thought he could get Olson to change his mind. At that time there was a feeling that Kenny drank quite a bit in public and Olson was quite straightlaced about such things. He wanted to see how well Kenny did on the appellate court and I'm sure eventually would have appointed him to the supreme court, but not that first time and not until he saw how well he did.

But Kenny was a strange character. Evidently you've read all this in his autobiography.* I haven't. Kenny carried water on both shoulders: he would carry the extreme right and the extreme left. I got sucked into going to a meeting at his house with a small clique of young Democrats who turned out to be some of the leading members of the extreme left at the time. You know I was a liberal but I wasn't about to be a part of the Communist thing. Then he'd clear with the California Club on the other side; he'd carry over some of the downtown businessmen. He was an enigma, he really was, and you were never sure which side he was serving. But in this particular case, Kenny was serving Ed Pauley when he wouldn't call the delegation together.

*My First Forty Years in California Politics: 1922-1962 by Robert W. Kenny. Unpublished manuscript available at The Bancroft Library, UCB and at UCLA Library of Special Collections.

Fry: Was Pauley a good contributor?

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: He may have been one of the richest Democrats.

Clifton: He was a good contributor. Pauley was kind of hard to get to and it was hard to get it out of him, but when he made a commitment he gave it. And he was influential in that other people would find out what Pauley was going to do and then they'd do whatever Pauley was going to do. So, Pauley did have an influence in keeping money away from Jimmy or helping him if he wanted to.

Fry: Now let's see, we were talking about--

Clifton: About '44, and then '46 when Jimmy was elected state chairman. And I've digressed on how some of these people are put together.

Fry: You've really tied a lot of things together.

Clifton: In '47, Jimmy Roosevelt, as Democratic State Central Committee chairman, appointed two committees to draft statements--one on foreign policy and one on domestic policy. George Outland was the head of one [foreign policy], and a guy named S.G. Masterson (who is a judge up in Contra Costa County) was the head of the other. Jimmy appointed them because one wanted to do something on domestic issues and the other wanted to do something on foreign policy. So we had all kinds of commotion and meetings.

By that time we were getting to '48, and I think this was before Truman went on his Point Four Program; he had done a couple of things unilaterally on Israel which had the Jewish community up in arms. I don't remember, but it was about the whole Palestine question and this was the cause of the commotion.* The Jewish community was very

*The decision to partition Palestine into Jewish/Arab countries was made by the United Nations November 29, 1947. Guerrilla skirmishing between the two led to a resolution proposed by James Roosevelt for the Democratic Policy Committee in California to call upon Truman to (1) lift the arms embargo in Palestine, (2) recognize the Haganah as the official Jewish militia, and (3) propose and support an international police force in Palestine under the command of the United Nations. (Letter March 9, 1948, from James Roosevelt to George Outland. See also drafts of "National and Foreign Policy," volume appendix.)

Clifton: much against Truman and they were also the big contributors here for a number of years. They were the backbone of the financial support of the Democratic party, the same ones that raised lots of money for Bonds for Israel, so they were wearing two different hats: Bonds for Israel and getting Israel started, and also contributing for the Democratic candidates. They felt very strongly against Truman at that time, and also I think that Truman dropped an awful lot of the Franklin Roosevelt people. He gradually brought in his own, I mean the instances where he brought in his cronies from Kansas City. He dropped some good people to get his own people around him. It was a general picture; they felt that instead of the dedicated New Dealers, he was bringing in the "Kansas City crowd."

Fry: What about the patronage further down the line like the post offices and things like this?

Clifton: The post offices were on the same line as other patronage appointments.

Fry: You mean there wasn't a local aspect to this?

Clifton: No. This the Democratic congressmen had a lot to say about, and we had a U.S. senator then who had a lot to say about appointments. If we had a Republican congressman in a district, then [the Democratic congressman in] the adjoining one would put in his two bits' worth.

But Truman continued this; he did not upset this. In the first place, he wasn't a Roosevelt. You know the whole Roosevelt charisma Truman just didn't have. I got to be a great admirer of his, but at first he just didn't look very great to any of us, and also we still smarted from the way Pauley had rammed him down the throat of a whole lot of California people, because at that time we thought that Wallace was a very dedicated guy, which he was. (Later he got to be kind of visionary.) So, we were disappointed on that whole thing; we were disappointed on the wholesale way that we thought Pauley was using his connections with Truman.

Fry: What was Jimmy Roosevelt doing when Pauley was ramming Truman down people's throats?

Clifton: That was in '44 and before he got here. He was in the Marines then.

Fry: But later, by the time '48 came, this was second-hand knowledge to him but I'm sure he must have been quite aware of the 1944 convention--

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: --although he hadn't been in the thick of that battle himself.

Clifton: Right. Whether he had anything to do with it, I don't know, because we never saw Jimmy until '46.

Fry: So, it looked like in '48 these problems were building up: loss of support of the Jewish community for Truman, and for his foreign policy to send aid to Greece and Turkey, the "Truman Doctrine."

Clifton: His foreign policy statement got to be a loyalty check: whether you're for Truman or not for Truman. But it hadn't really gotten to that.

DELEGATES STATEMENT OF PREFERENCE

(Section 2304 Elections Code)

DELEGATES STATEMENT

"I personally prefer Harry S. Truman as nominee of my political party for President of the United States, and hereby declare to the voters of my party in the State of California that if elected as delegate to their National party convention, I shall, to the best of my judgment and ability, support Harry S. Truman as nominee of my party for President of the United States.

And I hereby enroll myself in the expression of preference for Harry S. Truman for presidential nominee, as one of the group of the following named candidates for delegate:

Delegates at Large

Julian Beck
Edmund G. Brown
Tom Carrell
Henry I. Dockweiler
Mrs. Adah F. Dodge
Mrs. Elinor R. Heller
Harley Hise
Glad Hall Jones
Henry C. Maginn
John P. McEnery
Rollin McNitt
Culbert Olson
George Outland
Ed Riley
Will Rogers, Jr.
John F. Shelley

District Delegates

Mrs. Marjorie Aubrey
George Ballard
Mrs. Sylura Barron
Amerigo Bozzani
Mrs. Louise C. Brown
Allan Carter
Oliver J. Carter
Mrs. Gertrude V. Clark
Mrs. Florence M. Clifton
Mrs. Jessie Cullivan
Charles Dail
Roland C. Davis
Daniel F. Del Carlo

Helen Gahagan Douglas
Clyde Doyle
Francis Dunn, Jr.
John Anson Ford
Mrs. Lillian Ford
Monroe Friedman
Samuel W. Gardiner
Chet Holifield
Floyd A. Klinger
Mrs. Ruth Lybeck
William M. Malone
S. C. Masterson
Mrs. William McClaren
Patrick W. McDonough
Donald C. McMillan
Nathan B. McVay
Paul E. Mudgett
Kenneth Murphy
Mrs. Esther Murray
Jener W. Nielsen
Patrick H. Peabody
Mrs. Charles B. Porter
Mrs. Nettie Scott Riherd
James Roosevelt
Clayton Russell
Mrs. Beatrice Shilkroun
John G. Terry
Mrs. Edna Theiss
Vincent Thomas
Chauncey Tramutolo
James Walker
Louis Warshaw
Charles Wortham

Date February 24, 1948

Amerigo Bozzani
Signed

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of February, 1948.

(SEAL)

Edith J. [Signature]
Notary Public (or other official)

VI THE 1948 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Picking the 1948 California Truman Delegation

Clifton: You see Pauley wanted to name the 1948 delegation with the help of Tom Scully, who was with the Carnation Company and was close to Truman. This would have left Roosevelt really out in the cold.

Fry: You were talking about '48?

Clifton: Yes. Scully had raised money for Truman, and he was a friend of George Luckey's, a kind of citizen-political leader. I don't know that he ever held an office, unless he was finance chairman or something like that, but he had never been chairman of the state committee or anything like that. So, Pauley and this fellow wanted to put the delegation together.

Jimmy met with the then chairman of the national committee, Steve Hannigan. Hannigan met with Scully and with Pauley when he first arrived in Los Angeles, and then he met with Jimmy. I was there. And we persuaded Hannigan to accept a formula for the make-up of the delegation. This was a proposal that we use the executive committee of the Democratic State Central Committee which was composed of one man and one woman from each congressional district (which was roughly what you usually have on a delegation--two people from each district). In addition, this would include the eight top officers of the Democratic State Central Committee plus the national committee-man and committeewoman. This formula would have included Ed Pauley, Ellie Heller, and Henry Dockweiler--who was a pal of this group and treasurer of the state committee--all of the people that were controversial at the top. It would have automatically included them in. Now, Pauley was never active in the party except way up at the top; he never went to state conventions or anything like that. He didn't know who the two people each from the thirty-nine districts were or anything else. He only knew that it would have included Henry Dockweiler and Bill Malone and all of these people that he was interested in being on the delegation; but he didn't realize that they would be in the minority. And at that time he didn't even know who was on the central committee.

Clifton: Hannigan had reservations that Jimmy would go out for a Henry Wallace delegation in the Democratic party. (Jimmy never had any intentions of going out of the Democratic party because of his past history with his father and mother.) This was Hannigan's worry; this is what Pauley and Scully had told him. And so they didn't trust Jimmy. Jimmy swore up and down by all that was good and holy that he would never, never go out for Wallace. If he were to lead the Truman delegation he would lead the Truman delegation and never go out for Wallace. Now, he was never asked about Eisenhower or anybody else. I felt that Jimmy had made an absolute commitment.

Fry: This was about when?

Clifton: Well, you have to qualify the delegation for the ballot and you have thirty days to accomplish it--by March first or April first. You know you have to obtain the Declaration of Candidacy from each delegate before you start the mechanics of obtaining signatures. You have to get the signatures of voters supporting the group of delegates for the candidate for president within a thirty-day period--set by law. It's very difficult and it comes early in the election year, so it was probably in January or February.

Pauley and Scully wanted to control the delegation. Jimmy was the state chairman and had to be consulted; and Jimmy wanted to control the delegation because he wanted to be national committeeman. So it was a question of having to either kick the state chairman, who had a lot of things going, in the teeth, or an individual who was very powerful like Ed Pauley. The only reason Hannigan would even come down and talk about it was that otherwise Pauley would have just taken it up in Washington with Truman and that would have been it. They had to recognize the factors here, and so Hannigan was asking Jimmy, "Are you going to go out on the boss?" And Jimmy swore up and down that he wouldn't. So, they bought the formula and all hell broke loose. Pauley wanted a copy of who was on the executive committee immediately.

But anyway we did have this delegation, which included the key people plus all these Roosevelt people that Pauley didn't even know. Like in my own district, Chet Holifield was on the Democratic state committee as the man on the executive committee, and I was on the state committee and executive committee as the woman; I got on the delegation that way. Ruth Lybeck was on from her district and Helen Gahagan Douglas was on. The formula provided how they got on. When you look at the list, it was a very representative list, because the members of the executive committee were elected at the state convention by the members from their individual congressional districts. You'd have a fight over who is going to be the chairman of the state central committee. Not so for the national committeeman and committee-woman; they were automatically on the state committee executive com-

Clifton: mittee by virtue of holding the position as national committeeman or committeewoman. So they were on. And then you elected your state officers, north and south, and then caucuses of the individual congressional districts would choose the man and woman to be on the executive committee. So the state committee was made up of the appointees of the office holders and this was considered quite representative. Anyway, Hannigan bought it, and that's how we got that delegation, and it was based on a formula.

Fry: Before we get to the convention we should take a lunch break.

[Lunch break]

What problems arose for you as a result of Henry Wallace, who formed a third party [Independent Progressive Party] in December of 1947?

Clifton: When Wallace decided to go off into a third party, it didn't worry us at all. Earlier the worry was that he might try to enter a delegation on the Democratic ballot. They were afraid that a lot of the liberals, like some of the CIO, might go over to Wallace and take the convention away from Truman. Then when he decided to go out of the party into a third party, the Democrats quit worrying about it because he wouldn't be a factor in the Democratic convention.

The time that Hannigan was talking to Roosevelt about the delegation, they were worried about Wallace being divisive at the convention. It caused a lot of uncertainty. If Wallace had run a second delegation here on the Democratic ballot, then the registered Democrats in the primary would be choosing between Truman and Wallace, and whoever won that would get all of the delegates from California. Even if Truman won the primary here, how far the delegates would stick on successive ballots at the convention and not switch to Wallace was a question. But when Wallace decided not to run in the Democratic party, then he was no longer a problem to the Truman forces.

Fry: Wasn't Wallace and his third party considered a threat later, for the November election? Your Democratic liberals could support him instead of Truman, so that the Republicans would win.

Clifton: No. I don't remember any worry about Wallace for November. You see, a third party candidate (and they're usually not in the middle of their party but on one extreme or the other) is more of a threat at a convention, where the spectrum that supports him is proportionately larger because you have only Democrats there. In general election, you have everybody voting, Democrats and Republicans, and your more mid-stream candidate (like Truman) is much more likely to win. We didn't worry about Wallace at all once he moved the battle to the general election.

DEMOCRATS BOOM EISENHOWER: Special NR Reports

CRUMBLING PARTY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

CLEARLY Harry Truman is no longer the Democrats' choice. His party would dump him in a minute—if he would go quietly, and if they could agree on an available substitute. The second *if* is the important one. Given it, most party leaders would not hesitate to fight to the finish against Truman's nomination on the floor of the convention.

As of now, Dwight D. Eisenhower is the one man who all the Democrats agree could reunite their crumbling party for one more victory, and it will take more and louder "no's" from the General to discourage them. The same goes for the anti-Wallace labor leaders who see Eisenhower as a fine escape from the Truman hook on which they are now impaled. The Southerners view Ike's candidacy as a way out of their threatened secession if Truman, the champion of civil liberties, is the party nominee.

No one believes, however, that the General could be enticed into a convention fight for the Democratic nomination. And the chances that the Democratic leaders who favor Eisenhower will be able to offer him a clear title to the nomination in advance of the convention are, to say the least, doubtful. Harry Truman says he is running. His formerly loyal party lieutenants are concentrating on how to change his mind for him. The main thing, they think, is timing. And the time to tell the President that he must step down for the good of the party is not yet. When it does come, it will be the younger blood in the big-city machines who will break the news.

Meanwhile, Democratic National Chairman McGrath and his assistant Gael Sullivan are busy defending candidate Truman as best they can, putting pressure on potential backsliders to stay off the Eisenhower bandwagon, keep-

ing up a cheerful front. McGrath and Sullivan do not deny that as of now they cannot see the necessary convention votes to nominate Truman on the first ballot. But, they say, it is still a long way to July, and the wind may suddenly shift well before then.

Experts agree that it would take a big shift to assure a Truman victory on the first ballot. New York, Illinois and California, where anti-Truman sentiment is now raging, together hold 212 of the 1,234 convention votes. The hostile Southern and border states have another 364. Together they total almost one-half of the convention vote. To poll the majority needed for nomination, Truman would have to win back the support of one of these two key groups.

At present odds are mounting rapidly in the opposite direction.

ARVEY PICKS IKE

CHICAGO, ILL.

TRAMAN, as far as Illinois Democrats are concerned, is through. Jacob M. Arvey, chairman of the powerful Cook County Democratic Committee, has made the announcement. He has suggested General Eisenhower as a substitute. And, if the General will not accept the nomination, then Illinois Democrats will settle for Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Senator Scott W. Lucas (Ill.), Chief Justice Vinson, Senator Barkley (Ky.) or almost anyone else.

The drift away from President Truman has been building up gradually, and the President's bungling of the Palestine issue (there are 300,000 Jewish voters in Cook County) served to bring it into focus.

In Illinois, Democrats win statewide contests only when their usually big Cook County majorities are sufficient to wipe out downstate leads for Republican candidates. Illinois leaders, including Arvey, began to wish for another

"top of the ticket" when their state candidates, after making a primary canvass through downstate, reported Truman sentiment at a low ebb. When the reports showed Republican sentiment riding high downstate, with the third party making inroads on the Democratic majorities of Chicago's West Side, party leaders realized they might even lose the county.

They had started the year with high hopes. Paul H. Douglas, University of Chicago professor and World War II Marine Corps hero, was their senatorial candidate. Adlai Stevenson, who has a long record of achievement in the international field and especially as an American delegate at the United Nations Assembly, was the gubernatorial candidate. Seldom had the party presented a stronger ticket in Illinois. Given a halfway break, Democratic leaders expected to elect a Governor, as the GOP incumbent, Dwight H. Green, is none too strong politically.

Then began the Truman follies. When the President reversed himself on Palestine it became obvious that the great West Side majorities were gone, in so far as the Democratic Party was concerned, unless something drastic was done. And with those majorities would go not only the state ticket's slim, outside chance but the far better chances of the Cook County Democratic ticket as well.

Arvey's statement that "the President



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"I'm warning you, uh—we'll start a FOURTH party!"

has not demonstrated a capacity for leadership" and his plumping for Eisenhower, offered a desperate remedy. It was an unusual statement for one in Arvey's position to make. Ordinarily, those who head political machines are not so blunt, especially when it comes to incumbent Presidents with their huge patronage power.

The results of Arvey's announcement will be seen in the Illinois primaries on April 13, when the delegates to the Democratic convention will be named. It seems highly unlikely that this third largest block of votes to the national convention will be pledged to the present occupant of the White House.

THREE-WAY SPLIT

NEW YORK, N. Y.

HARRY TRUMAN is washed up in New York. The Eisenhower boom is just beginning. The American Labor Party, backing Wallace, expects to finish off the Democrats this year and emerge as the first party in New York City. The Liberal Party, lost with Truman, is backing Eisenhower and trying to force the Democrats to go along. The Democratic bosses are watching and waiting.

Their party is falling apart. Starved of leadership, short on patronage, and shorter still on ideas, the Democratic army has shrunk to a stronghold in New York City, an outpost in Albany, and a few tents pitched in enemy territory. The unified liberal platform, built by Smith, Roosevelt and Lehman, has been replaced by a piecemeal exploitation of racial divisions. Even this approach is bankrupt. The Jewish people, outraged by the betrayal of Palestine, are lost for Truman. The Negroes are also lost. The Italians and Poles are unfriendly. Only the Irish remain loyal.

Fifteen of New York's 45 Representatives and 41 of New York's State Assemblymen are Democrats. If Truman runs, best estimates are that Wallace's vote will almost equal the Democrats'. The Republicans will carry New York by 500,000 votes, and the

Democratic delegations in Albany and Washington will be cut in half.


If the New York Democrats turn against Truman, he is lost. Today they are split three ways.

In control of the party are Paul Fitzpatrick, the state chairman; Ed Flynn of the Bronx; Dan O'Connell of Albany; and Jim Farley, who says he is strong upstate. They hate having a candidate "drafted," because he is beyond their control. They are complacent in their faith that if they can kill the minor parties by boycott, all liberals must come back to the fold for lack of anywhere else to go. Fitzpatrick, although cool to Truman, is influenced by another New Yorker, James Forrestal. The others are dominated by the thinking of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, led by Cardinal Spellman, who has defined the political issue as "Stalinism against God." They are concerned less with the Republicans than with the Kremlin. Truman is going all the way with them.

They know that if the issue becomes peace or anti-communism they will lose. They are ready to lose, but a group of intermediate leaders is not. They include the Representatives who will suffer defeat, and the district leaders who are under direct pressure from their rank and file. Starting in Brooklyn, they are joining the Eisenhower boom as the one means of saving a party that is breaking up.

Far away in California, Mayor William O'Dwyer sits in the sunshine with a wet finger raised to the wind. His break with Flynn is still deep. Tammany Hall is still beyond his control. If he returns to lead the Eisenhower boom, he can force the state machine to repudiate Truman. But O'Dwyer is a cautious man. If the Eisenhower boom proves to be a grass-roots uprising, he will move to its head. If it is only a high-level maneuver to save a few political bosses, he will ignore it. He suspects that this is Eisenhower's own attitude.

Who will lead the necessary uprising? Not the Liberal Party, with its narrow ideology, nor the CIO, now badly split. Draft-Eisenhower head-



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WILLIAM TELL TO DATE

quarters here consists of a couple of AVC boys who scraped up enough change to run an ad in two New York papers and who in the four days following were inundated with three thousand letters from volunteers. Where Eisenhower stands in all this, they don't know. "Hell," they say to anxious liberals who phone to ask what the General's opinions are on public issues, "We don't know. But then who knew where Roosevelt stood in 1932?"


POLITICAL PALSY

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

EASTER MORNING found a series of caucuses being held in Beverly Hills in a last-minute effort to organize a slate of Democratic delegates pledged to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Forgoing sunrise service in the Hollywood Bowl, the early-morning plotters finally concluded that it would not be feasible to organize such a delegation by five p. m. Friday, April 2, the zero hour for entering a slate of delegates in opposition to the "official" delegation headed by James Roosevelt and pledged to President Truman.

No sooner were the rebels in session, however, than Colonel Roosevelt got in touch with them and urged them to hold their fire. Among other items of intelligence which he imparted were the following:

1. That at the Jefferson-Jackson Day



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UP AGAINST THE BRASS

Dinner, scheduled for Los Angeles on April 12—the anniversary of the death of FDR—a long telegram from General Eisenhower would be read by Roosevelt, as chairman of the dinner. The telegram would be an eloquent tribute to FDR and would contain warm praise for his policies, domestic and foreign.

2. Following the reading of this telegram, a carefully organized "spontaneous" demonstration would take place, with shouts for Eisenhower from every corner of the Biltmore Bowl.

Timed to coincide with this demonstration, full-page ads would appear in the motion-picture trade papers, signed by leading Democrats in the industry, calling upon General Eisenhower to accept the Democratic nomination. This phase of the campaign would be in charge of Dore Schary and Milton Sperling, two well-known liberals in the industry.

While the Beverly Hills group was grateful for this information, they insisted that Colonel Roosevelt give some added assurances of his opposition to Truman, including the addition to the present "official" slate of the maximum number of alternates who should be pro-Eisenhower.

This Easter-morning "rising" might be dismissed as of little significance were it not that the expiration of the deadline for filing nominating petitions for the primary revealed the peri-

ous position of the Democratic Party in California. In two districts, liberal Democrats and followers of the Independent Progressive Party will be united in support of a single candidate: Ellis Patterson in the 16th, Ned Healy in the 13th. Here unity of a sort has been achieved largely because both men had the good sense to cross-file (California law allows candidates to run on more than one party ticket) in the third party despite strong pressure from officials of the Democratic Party to boycott the IPP. That the Truman Democrats were unable to find a candidate willing to enter the primaries against Patterson, whose sympathies for Wallace are well-known, is the most telling symptom of the palsy that currently besets the "regular" Democrats. Similarly in the 20th district, William Easterman of the IPP, who cross-filed, stands a good chance of capturing the Democratic nomination.

In the 19th and 14th districts the situation is badly snarled, due in about equal measure to the bad judgment of the Democrats and the intransigence of the IPP. After first pressuring Chet Holifield and Helen Gahagan Douglas to cross-file, in most peremptory and truculent wires, the officials of the IPP then sent conciliatory telegrams to both candidates stating that, despite differences on some issues, the IPP was willing to support them if they would cross-file and accept IPP support. Unfortunately neither candidate saw fit to accept this offer. Hence on the last day for filing, the IPP entered candidates in both districts although these candidates did not cross-file on the Democratic ticket.

All this points up the dilemma of California's liberal Democrats. They distrust IPP leadership yet they have no strong Democratic candidates in most districts nor in the national race. The IPP is now in a position to roll up a heavy vote for Henry Wallace and third-party candidates which may spell disaster for those who have rebuffed the IPP and lost support they will need in November.

Only a strong liberal slate with General Eisenhower or Justice William O.

Douglas could radically alter the situation. Hence the Easter-morning plotting. If Truman is nominated, liberal support will go to Wallace, although it will be given independently of the IPP. Truman would not carry a single county in the state and one could anticipate a repetition of the 1924 election in which John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee, polled 105,514 votes in California to 733,250 for Coolidge and 400,000 for La Follette, the Progressive candidate. These figures were cited at the Easter-morning cabal in Beverly Hills and their significance was noted.

HOME-TOWN BLUES

INDEPENDENCE, MO.

IN PRESIDENT TRUMAN's home town of Independence, Missouri, population 16,066, most persons think they will be seeing lots of Harry Truman in 1949. They believe that by that time he will again be living in his modest frame house at 219 North Delaware.

There is a tinge of regret in folks' voices when they discuss the President's chances in the November election—the town has always been Democratic and it appreciates the prestige that comes from having a favorite son in the White House—but, as one home-towner puts it, "in times like these we think a more able man should be running things."

A. H. Thompson, a local barber who monitors political gossip, reports that three customers in one morning announced they didn't think Truman should be reelected. "They were all Democrats, too," Thompson says. The barber himself thinks Eisenhower is a "good man," but he doesn't go much for military people. He prefers Dewey.

Nevertheless, Independence is not walking out on Truman. It is one town where the President isn't worried about a Democratic revolt. He has the great majority of the Democratic votes still with him, plus plenty of Republicans. But most of the support is for sentimental reasons. Then too, these Missourians don't care for generals, even from nearby Kansas.

The Search for Other Candidates: "I Like Ike"

Fry: When the Eisenhower issue came up, was this just a local effort at first?

Clifton: It didn't start as an Eisenhower thing. It started as a disaffection with Truman on the part of the big city machines because he couldn't win. On the part of the Southerners, it was because he was too liberal on civil rights. On the part of western liberals it was because their contributors from the Jewish community were unhappy over Truman's handling of Palestine. (Usually, however, the monied interests that normally contributed to the Democratic party were not classified as Gentile or Jewish.) So there were these three different factors that were coming into it. They were very unenthusiastic about Truman in the beginning because he wasn't a Roosevelt, but he was our incumbent president. But he wasn't as strong, I might state, either, until this '48 convention. So then they started looking around not with a "dump Truman" thing, but for another candidate. And this is where Douglas's name came into it, Justice William O. Douglas, and a number of others. They were looking around for someone else that they could win with. There were people in Oregon; the national committeeman Monroe Sweetland was involved in it; William O'Dwyer in New York was involved in it because he [Truman] "couldn't win;" Jake Arvey, from Cook County, Illinois, was involved in it because he "couldn't win;" Leander Perez from New Orleans, Louisiana (I forget, he was either chief office holder or chief of the party) didn't want Truman because he saw him as a "nigger lover"--that was the way he put it. And so there were people all over the country that were concerned, and they thought that Truman's campaign was going to go really just down the river.

So they started looking for someone else. There were many names in that movement. It was just a tremendous thing. Jimmy was not leading it. He got pushed into the leadership of it because he was the eldest son of the late president, and he was "pushable."

Fry: Was this at a meeting that they had?

Clifton: Well, he started corresponding with some of these people, and he got criticized for criticizing Truman in the press.

[End of Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

Fry: Jimmy was criticized by whom?

Clifton: By the Pauleys and some of the Truman people for being critical of

STORY OF A MAN



WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

"Our foreign policy should be designed to espouse and promote liberal humanitarian programs for the masses of the people of the world."

"We must be equipped and prepared to meet the political program of the Communists at whatever point in the world they may select for action. Better still, we must ourselves regain the initiative by promoting, in our own areas of influence, tried and true political antidotes to Communism."

"Democracy is a way of life, a habit, and a tradition. Dollars or pounds cannot buy it. It cannot be loaned, leased or borrowed. It can only be won by a people who lay a special claim to the dignity and worth of the individual."

"There are active bidders for the good will and support of the common peoples of the world. There are emissaries of totalitarian regimes in the capitals of the world, bargaining with bags of wheat for the souls of men. They are our competitors, but we need not emulate their example."

CIVIL RIGHTS

"We may never reach perfection in our practice of the ideals of the Bill of Rights. But there is no earthly reason why with education and organization it cannot become an increasingly potent force in the every-day lives of our people. The extent of a community's respect of the human rights of all its citizens is, in fact, the measure of its progress in civilization."

"The goal of people of all races is toward a system which respects their dignity, frees their minds, and allows them to worship their God in their own way. None has yet designed an article of political faith more suited to those ends than our own Bill of Rights."

"We, the democrats, are of different colors, different races, different religions. Our tastes in art, literature and philosophy are as varied as the hues in the sunsets over the Berkshires or Wallows. There are differences in our religious creeds, our political faiths, and our economic theories—differences as great as those of the Great Plains from the crags of the Teutons. This diversity is our strength."

Selected quotations from the
Speeches of William O. Douglas

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS FOR PRESIDENT CLUBS

• 75 EAST WACKER DRIVE

SUITE 3700

CHICAGO 1, ILLINOIS



PUBLISHED BY THE

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS FOR PRESIDENT CLUBS

☆ WILLIAM ORVILLE DOUGLAS has been aptly called "a practical champion of liberal democracy." He's the kind of champion America needs; a man who has come to grips with national and world crises, who has whipped them, and who now offers the inspiration and the leadership vital in keeping our democracy strong and our country a positive force for peace in the world.

Douglas was born on October 16, 1898, in a tiny hamlet in Minnesota. His father, a Presbyterian minister, preached throughout the midwestern wheat country and eventually took his family to the state of Washington. There he died, and upon young Bill's shoulders fell the burden of helping to support the family.

Bill sold papers, became a messenger, and peddled junk—all during after-school hours—to keep his family in food and shelter. When he finished high school, he won a scholarship to Whitman College, in Walla Walla, Washington. The scholarship covered only tuition, and Bill resorted to many improvisations to earn additional funds. He lived in a tent near the campus grounds, washed windows, waited on tables in the college hash houses, sold magazines, and was able to not only get through school but to further assist his mother financially. Douglas served as a private in the first World War and after his discharge returned to graduate and later to teach in a Washington school.

In 1922, he went East to study law—earning his train expenses by "chaperoning" a trainload of east-bound sheep. Arriving in New York with six cents in his pockets, he got a job, registered in Columbia Law School, and after three years of hard work graduated in 1925. Soon after graduation, he was summoned to teach law, first at Columbia and then at Yale.

He made his reputation at Yale as a specialist in corporate law, where he was an unsparing critic of those Big Business practices which he considered harmful to the public good. His brilliance, courage and honesty so impressed President Herbert Hoover that he was called in to assist the Department of Commerce in analyzing the flood of bankruptcies then engulfing the country.

In 1934 he was recalled to Washington by President Roosevelt, who had learned of his outstanding performance in the Department of Commerce. Douglas conducted investigations into bondholders' committees and business reorganizations. As a result of this research, he authored the famed Bankruptcy Act, designed to protect the small investors, which became law in 1938.

In 1937 Douglas was appointed a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in 1938 became Chairman. His first act was to tell Wall Street, "Clean house or be subject to government supervision." The Street immediately cleaned house.

Investment men, some friends and some foes of Douglas, know him as a man of action as well as words. And even his foes admit his capacity, honesty, intelligence and complete sincerity.

When the late Justice Brandeis retired from the Supreme Court, President Roosevelt instinctively thought of Douglas, the "plain Democrat from the West." So, too, did the people and their Congress, for when Roosevelt nominated Douglas to the Supreme Court, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the nomination.

Douglas is married, has two children, and lives in a home in Washington, D. C. In 1944, when Roosevelt wanted a strong running mate, he again turned to Justice Douglas. But for a minor turn in political events, Douglas would be President today.

Although Douglas is principally a doer, his speeches reveal a simple eloquence and a compelling adherence to liberal democratic ideals. Examine the record of Douglas' public utterances for excerpts which provide a key to his beliefs and character.

HIS WORDS

DOMESTIC POLICY



"I am the kind of conservative who can't get away from the idea that simple honesty ought to prevail in the business world."

"It is our generation's destiny, in a time of great distress, to make democracy live, to make the democratic ideal survive the many assaults that beset it."

"A nation's industrial plant represents not only the daring of capital and the imagination of executives, but the blood and sweat of men. The men and women who compose a nation are its greatest natural resource—greater than its mines or forests or rivers. The nation is healthy only if its people are strong. There is in most men a lively sense of decency, of good will, of fraternity. The poor have these instincts as well as those blessed with more worldly goods. The powers of government should be directed to protect them in their struggle to survive and in their efforts to live in dignity and to share the fruits of freedom."

"We must put an end to the shameful practice of branding everyone a Communist who espouses a liberal reform or promotes a program for the underprivileged."

Clifton: Truman, as soon as this hit in the press. Again, he was the eldest son of the late president, remember, and people in other states that had doubts about Truman's ability to be re-elected, or the desirability of re-electing him, or defections in their state because financially their honeymoon was definitely over, started corresponding with Jimmy and saying, "How do you feel about our trying somebody else?" This was not a pro-Wallace thing at all, as Jimmy had given his word that he would not jump the gun and be for Wallace.

Then they wanted meetings, and Jimmy did send a couple of people, one to the South to various leaders there, one to Chicago, and one to New York and other places, to find out just what the interest was. They started sending back reports of how they felt about it, what would happen, who they could get, and this sort of thing. Somewhere along the line Ike's name was thrown in as a total unknown. He was a dearly beloved leader in Europe with the united command over there, and he looked like an attractive guy. No one ever knew whether he had been a registered Democrat or Republican or what his beliefs were or anything at that time. So he looked like a good man, but there was no commitment at that time as to who it was going to be or anything else. But there were a few people that got far out on it. There were several congressmen that felt that he was available, maybe. So again the press started building this up as a possibility of Ike.

Before the delegation left California they were required to have a meeting and nominate a national committeeman and committeewoman and to select the other members to be on certain committees--you know, the platform committee and some of these other committees, and people to be honorary doormen and honorary timekeepers and all these things. And at that time, in San Luis Obispo, there was a great deal of discussion at the meeting and then later at the closed-door meeting in Philadelphia. (I did have some verbatim notes on those meetings that I may be able to find.)*

It was a very tempestuous meeting at San Luis Obispo, arguments pro and con as to what they'd do about Truman. It was not about who was going to be a candidate or anything else, but would they go all the way with him, were they obligated by law--and somebody looked up the laws on conventions, and how far they were bound to a candidate before we ever went to the meeting. It was a very hot meeting. State Senator George Luckey, of course, was for Truman all the way. (He was later that year vice-chairman of the state central committee because the chairmanship rotates--north and south.) Others that sounded off were Bill Rogers, Jr. and he made a statement to the effect that there was practically no chance for Truman, but that we should go down in glorious defeat with him because we were committed

*See volume appendix for minutes of caucus in Philadelphia, Saturday, July 10, 1948.

Clifton: to him. John McEnery was the one that said that he felt we could elect him in spite of everything, and he was very bitter about any suggestion that he might be scuttled at this time. Pat Brown said that he didn't think he could be elected, etc., and we should consider doing something else when we get to the convention in Philadelphia. And Carmen Warschaw was for finding a candidate more acceptable to the Jewish community. They decided to leave it on the "back burner" until they got to Philadelphia and then see what they were going to do.

In the meantime some of these key people (i.e., O'Dwyer, Arvey, Sweetland, et al) from all these other states were going to have a caucus on Saturday before the convention to see what they were going to do. You see, the convention started on a Monday, and we were the last delegation in on a train. We arrived Saturday morning in Philadelphia. So, Jimmy and O'Dwyer and Arvey were kind of the three leaders of the thing, even though they had not just out of the blue sky decided to drop Truman. I mean this is a reflection of many things and I don't know how many national committeemen and congressmen from clear across the country were involved. I can come up with a lot of those names but I don't have them right now. There was a large group that was trying to consider what they were going to do, so they scheduled this caucus in Philadelphia.

Anyway we had our meeting in San Luis Obispo of the delegation and decided to leave it as a Truman delegation, but a lot of harsh words were spoken. But it wasn't black-and-white, not "Let's stick by him until hell freezes over," or "Let's ditch him." It was more, "What are we going to do?" And "Let's wait until we get back there and see what we're going to do." So it was no decisive thing to stay with him all the way or to ditch him all the way. At this meeting we selected Jack Shelley as chairman of the delegation. Jimmy had made an agreement with Bill Malone that if Jimmy would accept Shelley as chairman of the delegation then Malone would support Jimmy for national committeeman. And these things did transpire there. Jimmy nominated Shelley, and Malone nominated Jimmy. So they went through with their agreement. There were a lot of unhappy people at the conclusion of the meeting, but no clear-cut split.

The 1948 Democratic Presidential Convention

Clifton: The delegation adjourned and went back to their respective districts. The delegates were going to Philadelphia on a special train. The Northern California delegates were leaving from San Francisco, the Southern California delegates from Los Angeles, and hooking up in Ogden, Utah. When we got ready to get on the train down here at the

Clifton: L.A. depot, Joe de Silva, who was a delegate, got really carried away on the Eisenhower thing and had a very large and colorful demonstration for Eisenhower--"We like Ike."

Fry: Who?

Clifton: Joseph T. de Silva is a gadfly in our politics here in the state. He's the head of the Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, and he was a delegate who had supported Jimmy all the way. He had his members down at the train station decorating our train like they were crazy with Ike signs all over the place: "I Like Ike." He was way out on the Ike thing. He had had some hand-painted "I Like Ike" signs which he was distributing around on the train.

When we got to Ogden, Utah, there was quite a scene. The Northern California delegation had arrived there quite a few hours ahead of us because they only had to come from San Francisco. And they had seen the Los Angeles Times with the pictures of de Silva and his members--I don't know how many thousand members--all down at the L.A. depot with signs, getting everybody to wear all this "I Like Ike" stuff. They were in the station there and when the Southern California delegation walked off of that train into the station, "icicles" were hanging all over the train station like nothing I ever saw. The fat was in the fire. They felt that this demonstration violated the agreement in San Luis Obispo to maintain the status quo until Philadelphia. Now if you turn it off one moment.

[Recorder off, then on]

You may have not even asked Jimmy, "Did anybody raise the question of the morals of this whole thing?" I felt, even though I stayed with him and I was a loyal volunteer, that he deserved some of the things he got in the governor's race because of this kind of thing. I had learned from Bill Malone, way back years before, that you don't give your word on every little two-bit issue, you don't just keep on sounding off. If you're going to give your word in politics it must be worth something, even if by then it's unpopular or to your detriment or anything else. You either keep it or you go to the person you gave it to and get yourself off of the commitment. You don't just change your mind and double-cross them and history is changed. I feel very strongly about that.

I was kind of a gadfly on some of these things, because I would try to get Jimmy to look at his own conscience since I had been at the meeting with Hannigan and heard him make the commitment about Truman. They were asking him if he would be for Truman all the way, but they were putting it, "You're not going to go off on a Wallace thing?" And he said, "Absolutely. I'm not going to go off on a

Clifton: Wallace thing." And I felt that he was committing himself a hundred per cent to be for Truman or they never would have agreed to this formula of taking the executive committee of the state committee, which he controlled and which they knew he controlled. Actually they tried it on with Pauley and Pauley didn't know whether it was a bad idea or not because he didn't know how much control Jimmy had on that executive committee as long as Dockweiler was on it, Tom Scully was on it, Pauley was on it, and all the people that Jimmy worried about. But they constituted eight or twelve at the top as against two times thirty-nine (two from each of the thirty-nine congressional districts). He didn't know how to count noses.

Fry: A definite minority of Pauley-Truman delegates.

Clifton: I know damned well that Steve Hannigan would not have said, "O.K., we go with your formula," if he had had any idea that Jimmy was thinking of anyone else but Truman. And Jimmy wasn't thinking of anyone else; it hadn't gotten that way at that time. He was just glad that he was now going to head up the Truman delegation. But the national committee was looking at the eldest son of the late president supporting the Truman delegation, and speaking in support of Truman which is important to them too. It shook me when he wouldn't even consider it.

Fry: Consider which?

Clifton: That he had a moral obligation, that while the actual words that were expressed did not rule out an Eisenhower or anybody else, except Wallace, what the two men were saying to each other was a commitment, and I felt very strongly about that.

Conflict in California Democratic Party

Fry: We left out one thing. You might want to back up right now and put it in. That's the special meeting of the state central committee on July 26, 1947. Roosevelt called this to prevent any endorsement of Truman foreign policy, especially the "Truman Doctrine." That was when Bob Condon spoke. Some people were saying Roosevelt's anti-Truman position had caused John Snyder, the Secretary of the Treasury, to cancel his engagement to speak at the Democratic dinner.

Clifton: We were having one of these Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners, and Snyder was scheduled to come as the main speaker. Jimmy was trying to promote the dinner, too, so he called a special meeting of the state committee. And those who could come, came--I mean it wasn't one of the official meetings required by the code, and a lot of people couldn't come down, but a lot of people did come down for the big hoopla. This was where

Clifton: they had submitted a questionnaire, "Are you for or against this foreign policy statement [of the Democratic State Central Committee, opposing aid to Greece and Turkey]?"

George Outland had been drafting a policy statement* which the state committee was going to approve or disapprove because this wasn't during the regular meetings of the state committee. It wasn't a platform meeting or anything else. As we got into the discussions on it--and a lot of people were contacted on it--this is when it got to Pauley and people like that (because he was on the executive committee and the state committee) that this commotion was going on. Pauley didn't even want us to discuss it, let alone finally come up with a statement. So I know that the executive committee--and I can't remember whether it was the whole state committee--voted on it and mimeographed ballots were sent: "Are you for this or not for this?"

This is when the party started getting divided. There were other issues at other times like the 1940 Roosevelt delegation and the Ellis Patterson delegation over "bread not bullets"--collective security vs. isolationism. But this is when it began to divide under Jimmy's leadership, in 1947. There were a lot of people that didn't think we should get into it and others that did think we should get into it. It got to be almost a loyalty oath, "Are you for Jimmy Roosevelt or not," and if you're for Pauley or not. Then it almost got into, "If you're for Truman or not." It was that kind of a thing. Because of this, Pauley was instrumental in getting Snyder to cancel his speech for the dinner.

Now I don't think Snyder ever read the statement or knew that much about what was happening in California, but he also was kind of a stuffy character and a very conservative guy. He was a cabinet officer, and he wasn't about to come out here into that kind of an atmosphere. So it wasn't exactly what was said, or the meeting; it was that the whole thing had been going on for a time. Snyder had already agreed to come a month or so before; when you start putting one of these dinners together you need to have at least six weeks to plan. Then the day before he sends this wire about a cabinet meeting and he wouldn't be able to come. So it wasn't the meeting itself, it was the commotion over any criticism of Truman.

Fry: What did you do when he couldn't speak?

Clifton: Jimmy called his mother and said, "Can you come out?" She did come out and that's when we had the Pauley--

Fry: Oh, tell us about it.

*See the two drafts of the statement in volume appendix.

Clifton: Snyder slipped out, and then Jimmy called his mother and asked if she was up to it, and she said she would come out. We also had Gael Sullivan, who was either a national committee chairman or executive officer of the national committee, and who was scheduled to be here. Of course the press got ahold of the whole thing about Snyder not coming (I don't know how they found out about it) and started asking questions: "Was this a real big thing and a real snub?" and the whole thing. --

Pauley had offered to put on a party at his home for the people that worked hard in putting the dinner together. We had that the night before the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner and Mrs. Roosevelt went. She was not very enthusiastic about going because she wasn't that fond of Pauley, but Jimmy wanted her to go. So she did, and she was very gracious and stayed quite a while. And all the characters in this controversy--Tom Scully, Mike Fanning--the whole group were there.

Fry: How did she get along with Pauley?

Clifton: She was always very charming. She got there a little early and she talked with Mrs. Pauley and to Ed Pauley himself, and to the younger children. Pauley had been married once before and had an older boy, maybe two boys from his other marriage; then he had three youngsters with the present Mrs. Pauley. All of them are grown now, but they were youngsters at this particular time. It was a very elegant party and elegant food. All the leaders in the Democratic party were there, both workers and delegates and the whole bit. Then she left before the last of the guests had left because her son John, who was the only Republican in her family, came to pick her up. (He was the one who lived in Pasadena at the time.)

And the rest of them were standing around talking about this and kind of needling each other about what was going on and what Jimmy was doing and what he wasn't doing. There wasn't any great discussion about this selling Truman down the river or anything, it was just kind of a needling.

As I remember it, after everyone had left, there were about four people still there. One of them was Frank Rogers, who had worked on the Daily News and who was very much for Jimmy. But several of them--I don't know that Pauley was one, but I know Scully and a couple of others were there (and we heard about it bright and early the next morning)--started letting down their hair over drinks and telling about how they had beaten Mike Fanning out to the airport and "squirreled" Gael Sullivan away to Palm Springs.

Fry: Oh, this was the race to the airport to see who could pick up Sullivan first?

Clifton: Yes. He was coming in on the "red eye special" in the wee small hours. Jimmy had told Harold Lane to go pick him up, because he was our guest. And Ed Pauley told Mike Fanning to go out there and pick Sullivan up and take him to Palm Springs instead. So, Sullivan was torn between the two guys when he got out here because here's Congressman Chet Holifield, our man, and here's Pauley's man. So he finally went with Pauley's man at the airport there. And we didn't hear about it until very early the next morning when Frank Rogers called Jimmy and said--I'm not sure whether he called or whether Harold Lane called Jimmy--"Jimmy, we don't have Gael Sullivan for the dinner speaker." Frank was the one who let us in on what all they were plotting because they were just too loose-tongued with too many people; and everyone thought that Frank was with one of the other guys, and Frank, being an old newspaper man, just sat in on the thing. (I don't think he was a newspaperman then.) He just sat there and listened. So we got the picture. Jimmy was just furious the next morning. He went out to the hotel to see his mother. After he left, she phoned Pauley and told him what had happened about Sullivan.

Fry: Weren't you with her then?

Clifton: I was with her when she made the phone call to Ed Pauley. And it was in a very ladylike way of really telling him off. He was really hurt about it, from what he said later. I only heard her end of the conversation. Anyway, there was a huddle right away and we decided who else could fill in because they had planned on two speakers. That's when we got to Dore Shary and he agreed that he would do it. Dore Shary and Mel Douglas and I think Dinah Shore were at the dinner. Danny Kaye was there. Everybody turned out, the dinner was a great success, but the press did make a big deal out of this.

Fry: So, as early as that the status of the Truman candidacy was a big thing in Democratic politics?

Clifton: Yes. Anyway, going on to the '48 convention at Philadelphia, we went by Union Pacific to Chicago and B. & O. from Chicago on to Philadelphia. Every time we stopped the train, any place, we would call Philadelphia about various arrangements--rooms, meetings, transportation from the hotel to the convention arena, badges, etc. Even though Shelley was now chairman of the delegation, Jimmy had made all of these preliminary arrangements before they had ever selected Shelley, because Jimmy was still state chairman. So, all of the negotiations about whether we were going to stop or not stop was always with Jimmy because he had made the arrangements to charter the train. And every stop we made, scheduled stops for various reasons, in Salt Lake City and various places, the press would be there, and they'd rush to the back end of the train to talk to Jimmy Roosevelt, the eldest son of the late president "who is leading this thing against Truman." By then it had really blown up into a news

Clifton: story. There would be Shelley, the chairman of the California delegation, in the front end of the train with the Northern California delegates, who were completely ignored by the press. It was really bad.

Exit Eisenhower

We stopped at Gary, Indiana, right out of Chicago, to call Philadelphia about arrangements. Shelley and I had been sitting in the forward part of the train to fill in the vacancies of delegates unable to make the trip, and decide how we were going to handle the tickets and the details of the delegation at the convention--I was secretary of the delegation, and representing Jimmy in these details. This was a very peaceful thing. But when I got back to our end of the train and we stopped at Gary, Indiana to call our man in Philadelphia--we were at this funny little station with an old-fashioned telephone--I called and got ahold of Mort Ziegler (Jimmy's advance man in Philadelphia) and he said, "The man has sent word that under no circumstances would he be a candidate." (You see, Eisenhower had not said he wouldn't be a candidate, before this.) He also said that Ike would denounce it if his name was submitted. This was the first time he had ever spoken. Mort also said that J. Arvey and O'Dwyer were planning to issue a statement on the subject, including Jimmy's name, in saying that Ike had slipped out and that they were now for Truman. Arvey was still in Chicago because he was flying to the convention. I didn't know whether Jimmy wanted his name on it or not, so I put in a call to Arvey and ran to get Jimmy off the train. He was clear at the other end, so we ran back the whole length of it, you know, with my short legs and his long legs, with my breathlessly trying to explain all the way down, and with the press coming after us. I think I've still got the exact wording of their message, which was issued in a press release later, that Ike would not be a candidate. Jimmy said to leave his name out and he would talk to the delegation and we would see what we were going to do.

"Don't put my name on this statement," he said. Of course the press who were traveling with us were interested as hell as to what was going on and the whole bit. We got back on the train and Jimmy called the delegation together (instead of letting Shelley, and that's where some of the bitterness arose). Jimmy announced that Ike had decided not to go, under any circumstances; his name was going to be left out, and his candidacy was down the river. They would wait until they got to Philadelphia and have this Saturday-before-the-convention caucus and see what everybody else was going to do. Then it was definitely "up in the air."

Front and back of 1948 pamphlet, non-partisan, booming Eisenhower--
from Susie Clifton Collection



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Eisenhower Boom Given Boost

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Clifton: The porters on the train broke down and cried like babies. One of the biggest CIO labor leaders there broke down and cried like a baby. Everyone went back to their own compartments and they were just sick about the whole thing. Now the Northern California people were somewhat relieved, but by then they knew there was a terrible commotion about whether Truman was going to be able to make it at the convention, and they didn't know. [George] Luckey invited Bill Rogers and a couple of people into his compartment and they didn't cry like babies, they just drank for the rest of the afternoon. But it was a very sad group on the train.

Fry: Why, exactly?

Clifton: Because Ike had said he was no longer a candidate. Even though they hadn't committed themselves or hadn't decided to drop Truman, they were really crushed about it. Even the porters on the train and the delegates and everyone else were depressed about the whole thing.

Fry: It may be a simplistic view, but I thought that maybe the porters, who were black, would have wanted Truman because of his civil rights stand.

Clifton: You would have thought so, but you must remember that Eisenhower was a very popular military leader. It was really a sad thing, with most of the delegation not even speaking to each other most of the way.

When we got to Philadelphia that Saturday morning we did have a meeting of the delegation and it was very bitter.* It was a closed meeting. I know that both Bill Rogers and McEnery stood in the back of the room and denounced Jimmy for it and they could be heard by the reporters outside, so there were some snatches of information here and there. Jack Shelley wrote Jimmy a little note saying, "You're doing well handling the meeting. Don't let what they're saying bother you." There was considerable discussion and again no final conclusion about what they were going to do.

Fry: Was there a vote?

Clifton: I don't remember whether there was a verbal vote or not. It wasn't a roll call. Later that night I know that different people, like Monroe Sweetland and Claude Pepper, called personally to throw out different names and different national people, and a lot of other people were then romancing the possibility of maybe Douglas running.

*See minutes in Saturday, July 10, 1948 caucus, in volume appendix.

Truman Fight Backfire on James Roosevelt

'Son Jimmy' Beats Attempt To Oust Him Senator Lucas Given Inside Track for Vice President Spot

BULLETIN

Philadelphia, July 10. (AP)—A move to force the withdrawal of James Roosevelt as Democratic National committeeman-designate failed today.

By JACK BELL

Philadelphia, July 10. (AP)—The collapsing anti-Truman movement back-fired against James Roosevelt, one of its leaders, today while Democratic convention delegates talked mostly about vice presidential possibilities.

The convention begins Monday, with President Truman as much a cinch for the presidential nomination as anything can be a cinch in politics.

Senator Scott Lucas, of Illinois, was reported today to have the inside track to second place on the ticket. Later on, talk developed at convention headquarters that perhaps Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas might get the assignment.

McCormack Agreeable

Rep. John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, arrived in Philadelphia, and told a reporter he would take the vice presidential nomination if it came his way. But he said he wasn't asking for it.

James Roosevelt also came to town. And some of his warring California delegation promptly took steps to rebuke him for leading a drive against Mr. Truman.

The son of the late President said that probably the caucus he had called for tonight to try to promote Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for President now would be called off.

Another anti-Truman man, Sen. Olin D. Johnston, of South Carolina, abandoned a plan to bring before the Democratic National Committee a resolution calling on the President to withdraw as a candidate in favor of Eisenhower.

Since Eisenhower has eliminated himself "completely and finally" as a presidential possibility, Johnston said it would be "useless" to press the resolution.

South Not For Truman

But, he said, "the South will not vote for Truman."

And it looked as if there would be no chance to vote for Douglas, at least for President. At his Oregon home, the justice said—again—that he isn't a presidential candidate and would make a statement later.

John P. McEnery, vice chairman of the Democratic Central Committee of California, started the backfire against Roosevelt. He said he would ask California delegates to demand at a caucus Roosevelt's withdrawal as national committeeman-designate.

Some delegates said McEnery would get the support of the entire Northern California faction in the State organization. One of them, Patrick W. McDonough, had proposed even before the delegation left the coast that Roosevelt resign as a delegate.

Although Lucas himself said he isn't a candidate, an associate of Mr. Truman said that unless plans are changed within the next 48 hours the Illinois Senator may be the White House choice for second man on the ticket.

Voted for Taft-Hartley Law

Lucas, who voted for the Taft-Hartley Act but in favor of sustaining Mr. Truman's veto of the labor law, was described in administration circles here as a "logical" candidate to join the President in expected major attacks on the record of Congress.

But White House aides emphasized that no final decision on the vice presidential nominee has been made.

An assistant Democratic leader of the Senate, Lucas has kept his record of supporting the President's proposals about as clean as any of the ineligible vice presidential possibilities such as Senator Theodore Green, of Rhode Island. Green is counted out only because of his advanced age.

Arvey Finally Converted

Lucas also could be expected to help bring within the Democratic fold the highly doubtful state of Illinois, where Jacob M. Arvey, Chicago Democratic leader, only yesterday was finally converted to the Truman cause.

In one of the most significant moves of the confused and confounded Democratic convention opening here Monday, Arvey joined with Mayor William O'Dwyer, of New York City in an announcement that he will vote for Mr. Truman on what promises to be the first and only presidential ballot at the convention.

Their joint announcement came after Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower put the final kibosh on attempts to draft him.

Goaded into action by reports that his name would be offered despite all he has said, Eisenhower telegraphed Senator Pepper, Democrat, Florida, that, while he was highly honored by the suggestion, he couldn't accept the party's nomination under any terms, conditions or promises.

This was enough for Pepper. It served for Arvey and O'Dwyer, who had been talking of other candidates. Pepper, who said earlier he would present Eisenhower's name come what may, ruled out that procedure.

Search Frantically for Candidate

He and others of like mind, such as Senator Lister Hill, of Alabama, were looking around frantically for another candidate.

They planned to meet today with James Roosevelt, California State chairman, shortly after his arrival here.

Roosevelt telephoned Eisenhower headquarters here he finally is convinced that "General Eisenhower would not serve if nominated by the Democratic party."

(Continued on Page 9)

Clifton: This was the first time we had ever heard Justice William O. Douglas's name, that Saturday night at the caucus before the convention. Other names were tried on for size. Finally it was decided by the delegation that they were going to go down the line for Truman.

Jimmy and Ellie Heller (the national committeeman and committee-woman-elect) put on one big cocktail party for the delegation as they traditionally do. Later Luckey joined with Shelley to put on a party for the delegation because Shelley was chairman of the delegation. (He didn't have that kind of resources himself.) Luckey couldn't make a speech if he had to. He was a state senator. He came from Imperial County and was a conservative type; his whole career in the state senate, any bill he ever passed, had to do with the size of crates for cantaloupes. Luckey put quite a bit of money in, but he was definitely a conservative from Imperial County. He owned huge cattle feeding lots.

At the convention, when Truman's name was put in nomination, the California delegation voted for him. There was one of these demonstrations that they used to have, and Shelley and I paraded around, but we felt that we were going through the motions of a dead campaign and that we had lost everything even while we were doing it.

Fry: Even when you were parading and holding your signs for Truman?

Clifton: For Truman, but I didn't feel happy about it and neither did Shelley. He was sore at Roosevelt for pre-empting his prerogatives all the time, and also at the press because, "Who is Shelley as against the eldest son of the late president?" We weren't too happy. No one was too happy in the California delegation. We had really been beat in the whole thing, but anyway we voted for Truman, unhappily.

Truman came out that night. It was very late, and they had these damned white doves (excuse the language) which they released, you know, an emblem of peace and harmony. The poor things flew up; some of them got killed on guy wires up above, and one of them got on the podium and almost drove Sam Rayburn out of his mind. Sam couldn't keep the band from playing, it went on and on, and these doves went back and forth. A couple of them had lit on the frames around some of these big fans (this was before air conditioning) and we were scared to death of what was going to happen to them.

Fry: And this was also about the first televised convention, wasn't it?

Clifton: Yes, we had local television. The whole thing was a mess. I could see Jimmy putting on his pancake make-up and taking it off; it was ridiculous. [Laughter]

Clifton: So anyway, Truman came out and made his acceptance speech and he was mad at the turn of events. He made an extremely forceful speech outlining what he intended to do--the future, especially about the "do nothing" Congress. And all of a sudden the delegates all said, "Who is he? Where has he been?" This was the first time he was really bold in his statements, where he felt that he was really his own man. And he was mad and by God he was going to fight it from hell to breakfast, and everybody thought, "Great! Where did this man come from?"

Fry: "Fightin' Harry" was born.

Clifton: Right. It was Fightin' Harry, and he really came out and said he was going to call that Congress back into action, and it's going to be this and this and this. He was tremendous that night, just tremendous.

California Election Campaign for Truman

Clifton: Everybody went away feeling entirely different and they really did pitch in and work. They were not able to raise much money. I mean this business of Kenny's is pretty much for the birds. We didn't have too much money.

Fry: Which business?

Clifton: In Kenny's autobiography where he said that Jimmy didn't do anything.

Fry: Oh--that there was no campaign for Truman in California and not more than \$35,000 was spent statewide.

Clifton: Yes. But what you have to realize is that Jimmy was by now national committeeman, but E. George Luckey, Truman's guy, was in charge down here (as vice-chairman of the Democratic State Committee) and he was running the Truman campaign. Jimmy was national committeeman, he was not state chairman or vice-chairman, it was E. George Luckey, so the burden of it was on Luckey. And there were a lot of us in there working on it and working hard. We had a lot of people out in the sticks, and we had a train tour where Truman did a whistle stop thing up and down the state. While we didn't expect him to win (as you well know, no one expected him to win except Harry Truman) and we didn't have what I would call a real top-rate campaign, there was still a great deal of effort. The difference between winning and losing was Truman himself. He was determined to win. We'd have these crowds at the stations crying, "Give them hell, Harry!"

- Fry: What did Pauley do during the campaign itself?
- Clifton: Raised some money--but mostly for the national campaign organization, not for the California committee.
- Fry: I guess this is a naive question, but why did Pauley feel it was so necessary for him to have a direct line into the White House?
- Clifton: I think he had had somewhat of this in the latter part of the Roosevelt administration, and I think it was sort of important to him prestige-wise.
- Fry: Was Pauley the only Democrat in that group of independent oil operators?
- Clifton: Yes, he was the only Democrat in that group. He was also the only so-called "big man" that wasn't in the Jewish business community. On the fringes all the time was a guy like John B. Elliott, who had been an old oil man too. He helped Jimmy here and there, giving advice. (John B. Elliott opened the first Democratic headquarters west of Main Street in 1912. He goes way back to when they could hold a Democratic convention in a telephone booth.)
- Fry: This brings us, after Truman won, to the next meetings of the party in the state, is that right?
- Clifton: Well, just so you know, E. George Luckey was at the presidential inauguration riding his horse in the parade and being the big cowboy (he always wore boots). I think you might be able to pick Tom Carrell's mind a little bit because he was a crony of E. George Luckey.* He's a state senator now and lives out in my neighborhood. He's been an assemblyman, but he'd been a Chevrolet agency guy. He stayed thick with Pauley and Bill O'Conner (who was Pat Brown's guy) and Tom Scully and that whole group, and he's still around. He raised some money. I know he was the treasurer for E. George Luckey when he was state chairman. When Kenny blamed Jimmy for not putting on the Truman campaign, the campaign was E. George Luckey's to put on, in the general election.
- Fry: Tell me about Pat Brown's final position on Truman's candidacy.
- Clifton: Pat's final position was that he was for Truman, but he didn't think he had a chance of winning.
- Fry: Did he work very hard in the Truman campaign?
- Clifton: I don't know. He was north and I can't tell you whether he did or not.

*Tom Carrell died shortly after Clifton's interview.

Clifton: Actually, Truman was doing pretty well on his own.

Fry: Were there any face-to-face meetings between Jimmy Roosevelt and Truman?

Clifton: Jimmy had a meeting with Truman before the delegation left to go to Philadelphia, when there was already a feeling that maybe there was some disaffections here.

Fry: And Truman came out to kind of hold it together?

Clifton: I don't know whether he came out to try to hold it together but he agreed to meet.

[End of Tape 2, Side A]

[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

Clifton: I think Oscar Chapman [Secretary of the Interior] probably set up the meeting with Jimmy and the delegation. We had a big dinner, if I remember right, in which Truman was the speaker. We met with the delegates down at the Ambassador Hotel, and I remember since I had the memory I introduced each and every one to Truman. Jimmy was supposed to be doing it but he was bad on names. Then afterwards Truman and Jimmy had a meeting which Oscar Chapman set up. Only Jimmy and Truman were in on the conference; I was sitting outside and I think Chuck Daggett was there, and I know Oscar Chapman was, and we were talking. So I only know what Jimmy said after he came out. He felt that Truman felt that he, Jimmy, had let him down. We left and went to have a cup of coffee in the hotel, and Jimmy said in effect that Truman had told him that he never wanted to be vice-president in the first place, that he was happy being a senator but that FDR had put a great deal of pressure on him, and so the least he expected from FDR's family was loyalty because he had only done it for FDR. Now this is Jimmy's version of what Truman told him.

Fry: Did you get any other version later?

Clifton: No. That's the only version I ever had and, as I say, this is Jimmy's version just after he came out of the meeting. Oscar Chapman went back in with the president. So, that's all I ever knew, but they did have this one conference.

Fry: Did Roosevelt tell you at that time that he had agreed to anything, or was there no commitment involved?

Clifton: He didn't go any further than that. He just felt that he had been chastised by Truman, really chastised by Truman.

Fry: What was Roosevelt's reaction to this? Did he feel like a bad boy? Was he upset?

Clifton: In a way, but then the next day somebody said, "Jimmy, we've got to do so and so," so he bounced back. But he felt chastised, definitely. He had that much feeling about the presidency, and when the President of the United States chastises you you feel chastised.

He had other correspondence with Truman. Truman was very great at getting up early in the morning and writing handwritten letters to people. Jimmy had at one time asked Truman to "forget" Pauley as his California advisor--that he didn't represent the bulk of Democrats. Truman had written back that Pauley was his friend and that he had no intention of dumping his friends.

VII THE 1950 CAMPAIGN FOR GOVERNOR

Jimmy Roosevelt

Clifton: You asked how Jimmy decided to run for governor. Somewhere along the line Jimmy had a real feeling about trying to emulate his father as a political leader, and I think some of his brothers had the same feeling. The only thing is that instead of going for a local office first, which he could have easily done and have been elected and gotten some experience under his belt, he decided to run for governor, since there was an existing vacuum for this office among the Democrats. Remember, his father was a state senator before he ran for governor. But the vacuum was there and Jimmy was forty-two in '49, so I guess he felt that he didn't have that much time to do it. Anyway, he decided on being a governor and then perhaps a president, instead of going through some of the other steps first.

Who all persuaded him to run for governor, I don't know. He just said, "I'm going to try for governor." And other people were saying, "Jimmy, you ought to," you know and things like that. There wasn't a logical candidate around. Pat Brown, I think, thought that maybe he'd try it at that time, but decided the time wasn't right. It wasn't a time when we were sure of winning. Also, Pat had been a friend of Warren's. Most other people had a feeling that the only thing that Warren had against him was running for a third term; traditionally no one had ever been elected a third time for a four-year term. Seemingly, way back there was a governor when we had two-year terms that made it for a third term. But traditionally no one has been able to break this. Yet Warren was considered fairly invincible. In other words, he was liberal enough to be able to pick up lots of Democrats, and he was partisan enough for Republicans and stuffy enough that he appealed to them. I mean there were some things they didn't like.

There were two factors that may not have been dwelt on which at the time seemed to open a wedge for Jimmy. One was that Warren was for a comprehensive health plan and the doctors were dead set against this. So Jimmy got a lot of doctors and a lot of dentists saying he

JAMES ROOSEVELT'S

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"Good government requires that we strengthen the two party system, not weaken it. It demands, moreover, that the principles and program for which each party stands be stated clearly, explicitly, and honestly."

From state-wide radio address, May 12, 1950

"During this campaign no one is going to be in any doubt as to what party I belong to. I am proud to take my stand on the principles and platform of the Democratic party."

From speech announcing candidacy for Governor, November 15, 1949



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The primary objectives of civilian defense are to minimize human suffering, to sustain civilian morale, and to maintain industrial productivity. . . . Legislation toward these goals must be enacted on the state level, and direction and leadership must come from that same source. . . . Aid to local communities should be made with state funds, if necessary. . . . Take immediate steps to prevent sabotage. . . . PREVENT widespread suffering by effective measures to take BEFORE any disaster.



EDUCATION

Build new the schools that we need. . . . Provide funds immediately to eliminate overcrowded classrooms and double sessions. . . . Pay decent salaries to teachers so that able men and women may be encouraged both to enter and remain in the profession. . . . Take full advantage of Federal aid for school lunches. . . . Establish Child Care Centers on a permanent basis.



HOUSING

Make it possible for more people to own their own homes through a state-sponsored program to reduce interest rates and lower the amount of down payment. . . . Encourage the further construction of low-rental housing through appropriate state legislation which will supplement the Federal programs. . . . Enact stand-by rent control legislation immediately. . . . Provide adequate housing for migratory workers.



JOBS

Institute a long-range program for full employment by encouraging expansion of California industry and agriculture. . . . Develop the state's water resources to provide the ample and inexpensive public power and water needed to achieve this goal. . . . Create a state Department of Commerce to assist such a program and to protect the interests of small business.



LABOR

Guarantee the right of labor to organize freely, bargain collectively, strike, and lawfully picket. . . . Enact legislation to prevent racial and religious discrimination in employment.



OLD AGE SECURITY

Fight for an adequate Federal retirement plan. . . . Provide pensions sufficient to meet the high cost of living. . . . Return pension administration to the State government. . . . Remove the so-called relatives' responsibility clause.



STATE FINANCE AND TAXATION

Make full use of the tax dollar through efficient administration and the practice of wise economy in state government. . . . Revise California's tax system so that the amount each citizen has to pay is related to his ability to pay. . . . Work for the reduction and eventual abolition of the sales tax. . . . Broaden the tax base through expanded industry and agriculture and full employment.



James and Romelle Roosevelt with their three children, James Jr. 4½, Anna Eleanor 2½, and Michael 3½.

THE ROOSEVELT RECORD

BUSINESS

Executive vice president of Roosevelt and Sargent, general insurance agency, founded in 1932.

GOVERNMENT

Administrative Assistant and Secretary to the President of the United States, 1937-38. Coordinated the work of some 18 executive agencies, including the Federal Housing Authority, Interstate Commerce Commission, Farm Credit Administration, Maritime Commission, and the Federal Power Commission.

POLITICS

Chairman, Democratic Party in California, 1946-1948; Democratic National Committeeman for California 1948 to present; campaigned for Democratic Presidential nominees, 1928-1936 and 1948.

FAMILY

Married to former Romelle Schneider. They have three children—James Jr. 4½, Michael 3½, and Anna Eleanor 2½. Home in Beverly Hills.

WAR SERVICE

Active service with U. S. Marine Corps, 1940-45. Combat duty at Midway, Makin Island, Solomons, Aleutians and Philippines. Awarded Navy Cross and Silver Star.

VOTE TUESDAY

November 7

VOTE DEMOCRATIC

James Roosevelt For Governor	X
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown For Attorney General	X
Helen Gahagan Douglas For U. S. Senator	X

JAMES ROOSEVELT FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE, INC.
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- Clifton: ought to run because they feared Warren on this health thing. The other was that Warren had the crime commission, which was a very good crime commission, but there were elements within the state that didn't want a crime commission. So people that were opposed to the crime commission were for Jimmy.
- Fry: That brings up another interesting question; I picked up this story from someone I was talking to up north: that in the campaign there was an offer of a nice sum to help with the campaign if Jimmy Roosevelt--I'm not sure if I can remember this accurately--
- Clifton: He didn't have to do anything. All he had to do was to go and pick it up.
- Fry: I'm not sure if we're talking about the same offer. Was this from Las Vegas?
- Clifton: No. This was from a local bookmaking outfit that had some connection with the Las Vegas scene; but they had headquarters down on Florence Avenue and they wanted to contribute to Jimmy's campaign and they wanted Jimmy to know that they had contributed to his campaign. It was taken up by the campaign committee and it was flatly turned down.
- Fry: I noticed that in his statements on organized crime and on gambling particularly, he did say that maybe off-track race track betting isn't that much different from on-track race track betting and that you might as well allow it.
- Clifton: Well, he supposedly was a more sophisticated guy and not as stuffy as Warren. The general impression was that he was more of a playboy, and that he would take a more sophisticated attitude toward gambling.
- Fry: So if he took that money and then maintained this attitude, he could have been accused of bribery.
- Clifton: There is no question that we said no to the money. This is the last thing you do!
- Fry: The story that I got (and it appeared in the press too, I believe) was that this offer from Las Vegas people was to keep gambling out of California.
- Clifton: That's what they were interested in. In fact, that's how gambling got going there in Las Vegas. I don't know if you know that way back during [Los Angeles] Mayor Bowron's time the issue was to keep gambling out of California for church reasons and all other reasons, and to try to keep this element out, which is the thing that allows Las Vegas to be a big deal.

Fry: But as I understand it that money was turned down also.

Clifton: Turned down flat.

Fry: Although Roosevelt would have been on the side of the angels in keeping gambling out of California.

At any rate he was kind of the frontrunner because of lack of any competition from other Democrats?

Clifton: There was a vacuum, and his name had more publicity value than anyone else. What is the saying?--"When rape is inevitable you might as well enjoy it." They said, "He raped easy." [Laughter] Anyway, there was really nobody else that was really strong on the horizon wanting to run, and Warren was considered pretty invincible.

Fry: Oliver Carter at that time was the chairman of the Democrats in California--state chairman from the north--and I wondered if he was ever considered or if he wanted it?

Clifton: Well, he had a lot of seniority in the state senate, but I don't think he wanted it. His name may have been bandied around, but by that time the campaign had gotten pretty damned expensive; it's become much more so since then because of TV, but they were pretty damned expensive then. They figured you had to have about a million and a half dollars to run in 1950, and that was an awful lot of money then--or now!

Fry: Mr. Roosevelt did tell me that you were his prime fund raiser, and it was on your shoulders to raise a million and a half.

Clifton: I raised a great deal of the money, and then he ended with a substantial deficit and I spent a year dissipating the deficit.

Developing Support Outside the Party

Fry: How was his campaign organized, with all of this dissidence from 1948?

Clifton: The people that were for Jimmy were for Jimmy, and we just took everybody that we could run with that was for Jimmy. I mean it's kind of like this recent thing with [Edmund] Muskie [1972] and all the rest--the people are all for Muskie or all for Humphrey or all for McGovern. But they were busy running their own campaigns and were not necessarily fighting with or for other candidates. Helen Douglas and Jimmy were competing for the same money because they were both liberal Democrats, and the people that were for Helen were pretty much for Jimmy too, and vice versa.

Clifton: Now, we did have a little fight for the labor endorsement with the AFL. The CIO was no problem. But [Cornelius J.] Haggerty [state head of the AFL] and his executive board I think met the day before the AFL convention, and split on who they were going to endorse. But we were able, through the rank and file, to get their endorsement at the convention itself.

Fry: Yes. At that convention, the labor officers seemed to be pro-Warren because Haggerty had been working amicably with Warren and the legislature.

Clifton: Let me say that Warren wasn't a reactionary Republican, and while he didn't do a lot of things that labor wanted because he couldn't get way out in front for labor, he would make appointments acceptable to labor like the Industrial Relations Director, Industrial Safety Board, Industrial Welfare Commission, etc; and he did sign the bills that labor managed to get through the legislature. Warren was very good on it. In fact, he almost let Haggerty name his own people, and [Governor] Goodie Knight continued that practice. The positions on the Unemployment Appeals Board, the Department of Employment, and some of these things that were important to labor, Warren would take Neal Haggerty's recommendation on, and Goody Knight followed the same procedure. Goodie Knight had been very conservative until he ran for lieutenant governor--he decided that the formula was having labor with a Republican, and being more liberal. So he became more liberal and he followed Haggerty's recommendations on appointments.

By the time Pat Brown ran in 1958 we now had all these CIO friends, because the CIO usually endorsed the Democrats, and he lost the AFL, which frequently endorsed Republicans. The Republicans won this endorsement in terms of patronage, not in terms of program but in terms of patronage. So now here comes Pat Brown, who has all these CIO guys who want some consideration, and while they have merged with the AFL, the wedding is not consummated too thoroughly.

Fry: There were a number of other groups, too, that did get behind Roosevelt.

Clifton: The Young Democrats in general supported him, but they weren't the same organization they were back in the early '40s.

Fry: How were they different?

Clifton: Just membership-wise they were very small. In the early '40s it was a very large group. Long before Jimmy came out, there had been a bad split over this Communist thing in the Young Democrats, and it just decimated them. And then World War II took out most of the young people and it never grew into the same organization it had been once. In other words, the young people finally decided that they would rather

Clifton: work directly in the senior party rather than with Young Democrat clubs. They have never come back to the same strength. But in general those that existed did support Jimmy. There were always some dissidents; there were always Democrats supporting the Republicans. This wasn't any big disaffection, but it wasn't any big support either. In other words there were not that many of the Young Democrats. Where you get young people working for a cause you have to get them in the party itself. Why fool around with junior organizations?

Fry: Do you want to go into what you were doing to try to recoup the bad feelings about Truman?

Clifton: We felt that we had recouped a lot of these people in terms of working for Truman and his getting elected. We didn't have any feeling that we had sold the guy down the river and then kicked him when he was down, because he was no longer down, as it were. I know that we did try to get in a lot of people that we never could get back in, like John McEnery. He took a federal appointment anyway as director of the mint in San Francisco. The rest of them didn't go off and support Warren, but they sat on their hands.

The Democratic Ticket

Clifton: Pat [Brown], for instance (who was running for attorney general), sat down and told Jimmy just flatly, "Jimmy, I'm running for a non-partisan office and when I'm in Jimmy Roosevelt territory I'll speak kindly about you and I'll be for you. And when I'm in some of the areas that are not for you or people that are mad at you I'm going to run my own campaign." And he did. Each of the three candidates ran their own campaign, and this has been customary; it wasn't a result of all this commotion. This was one of the problems, Helen's competing for the same people and the same money that Jimmy was competing for.

Fry: I couldn't quite tell what the relationship was between Jimmy Roosevelt and Helen Douglas, because very early, in '49, she had said that if Jimmy was a candidate she would be for him and welcome him.

Clifton: Yes. She was one of the ones that tried to get him [Roosevelt] in on that Eisenhower thing.

Fry: But how close were they as a ticket?

Clifton: She thought she could defeat U.S. Senator Sheridan Downey because of

Clifton: the 160-acre limitation* and she didn't think Jimmy had a chance against Warren. Actually, up until the last rally the day before the election, she felt she would be elected. We put on a rally down in the garment center, a block from Jimmy's headquarters. The garment unions (ILGWU and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers) had this thing all set up and we invited Helen to come. She came up to our office and she looked around and we had a very capable and very attractive black girl working in the campaign. Helen went over and asked her if she would be interested in going to Washington with her because she was going to get elected and she had reservations about Jimmy's chances. This was the day before the election.

Fry: She thought she could beat Nixon? By that time Downey was out and Nixon was running against her?

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: This was the general election you're talking about?

Clifton: Yes. And she just couldn't believe it when she wasn't winning it. She so thoroughly believed she was winning. All of our polls showed that Pat was winning as attorney general and Helen and Jimmy were both losing at about the same level. But Helen absolutely did not believe them.

Fry: There was a little by-play here in the Nixon forces that you might know something about. The Nixon forces kept pressuring Warren to endorse Nixon, which Warren refused to do. And so finally Murray Chotiner and I think Joe Holt and some of the Young Republicans devised the idea of going to all of Helen's meetings to try to get her to come out publicly for Jimmy, and therefore force Warren to come out for Nixon. Warren finally issued a somewhat ambiguous statement about three days before the election without mentioning Nixon by name. Did you see that?*

Clifton: It could have happened. I don't know what the Republican strategy was.

Fry: But I wondered how close Helen Douglas and Jimmy Roosevelt were in their campaign anyway?

*Downey had opposed the federal regulation to limit the number of acres a farmer could own in order to qualify for federal irrigation water.

**Leo Katcher, Earl Warren, A Political Biography, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967, pp. 261-262.

Clifton: Well, they were each running their own campaigns, which was customary. And bruised feelings will come up between a candidate for senator and one for governor because they are competing for the same things in terms of support and money. I remember one minor incident. We had Jimmy's campaign bus down in front of a factory gate to catch people "on the fly" going on or coming off a shift. We had set it up--because Jimmy did attract people; he was a Roosevelt and he did attract mobs--and pretty soon we noticed Helen's car drive up. Then Jimmy graciously invited Helen up on the back of his bus and introduced her; she took the microphone and used up all of his time. I'm very fond of Helen, and the Lybecks were some of my closest friends so we had a good rapport. But Helen, using up all the time with the crowd, caused a little friction between the campaigns.

Fry: What I'm trying to figure out, then, is how her announcement to endorse Jimmy in the last week of the campaign could be so dramatic as to force Warren's hand, which Chotiner said it did. That's according to Chotiner's story to Leo Katcher.

Clifton: I don't know, but I wouldn't trust Chotiner around the corner for anything. I mean he always did Nixon's dirty work and was very bad on that.

Going back to Jimmy, I think he was a self-starter on this, and there was a vacuum, so frequently people get pushed into these things. In fact, Pat almost got pushed into running for governor in 1954. Bill O'Conner, his number one assistant, had put up a big banner, "Pat for Governor," at some Democratic meeting, and Pat had it taken down immediately. Pat could have had the Democratic nomination for governor on a silver platter if he really wanted it at that time, but he realized that the time wasn't right and he had a better sense of timing than Jimmy had. But Jimmy might not have had a chance at a later time; you know, there might not have been a vacuum.

The Democratic Party Campaign Organization

Fry: How did he set up his campaign organization then? For instance, when did you come aboard?

Clifton: Ever since Jimmy was elected state chairman I'd been in it. I'd worked for other state chairmen before; I'd just been a volunteer. And whatever they needed me to do, whether it was just working on a Jackson Day dinner or just work on a local campaign or whatever, if there was work to be done, I did it.

In '49 when he started, I was having Tom, so there was a little while that I was out of it. Tom was born in May of '49, so I didn't get back into it until the fall.

Clifton: [Fry shows list of campaign workers] You have a couple of other names here. Lisa Bronson was the titular head for co-chairman. George Outland was the primary head for here. Langdon Post was appointed up north. George Davis had been in the picture up north and you mentioned that he bowed out of it. Ellie Heller was very good. Gertrude Clark was chairman of Amador County or something and a very dignified older woman, just a great gal. She used to worry about Jimmy hanging around with George Davis and then the guy Curtis somebody.

Fry: Did George Davis's indictment come at this time?

Clifton: I don't remember. George Davis was one of these lawyers that handled many criminal cases. He was a criminal lawyer. And his idea of earning his fees was to be close enough to a governor on an appeal for executive clemency, to get a fair shake. He had done this in Olson's administration and people were kind of negative, even while they had something to do with Davis because he could raise some campaign money. But he wasn't part of the real Bill Malone hierarchy up there.

Fry: There was some speculation in the press that his appointment to the campaign, which came kind of late--I think, in April maybe--meant that there was a rapprochement between Roosevelt and Truman, because Davis was a Truman man.

Clifton: No. Davis was an opportunist from the word go. If you had had a Bill Malone you would not have needed Davis--not that Bill was stuffy about Davis, but Bill had far more political savvy and background and power than George Davis ever had. And so by having to go to Davis, you indicate that Jimmy didn't have Bill Malone.

Fry: What did Malone ever do?

Clifton: He sat on his hands pretty much.

Fry: He didn't fight for Warren?

Clifton: [Laughter] I don't think so, but he had done this because he had an idea that Jimmy was not going to win; if he thought that Jimmy was going to win for sure, I think Malone more probably would have given him lip service toward the end.

Fry: I wondered if the George Davis indictment was a sticky thing for Roosevelt's campaign?

Clifton: Not that big; I don't remember.

Fry: It sounded like a pretty small thing. It was birth certificates for Chinese or something which I don't understand.

Clifton: Well, but it was a press thing that they could make a deal out of.

Fry: Was that why he resigned from the campaign?

Clifton: I guess he did. I don't remember that. I remember this Curtis being appointed, and I remember Gertrude Clark being a little upset because he owned one of the nightclubs on Broadway, in North Beach [San Francisco]. And again this meant Jimmy was not very solid with the solid people in San Francisco.

Fry: Was it because he wasn't quite "in" with the people like the Hellers or was it because he had been--

Clifton: Do you mean Curtis or Davis?

Fry: Curtis.

Clifton: The Hellers represent real solid old families from San Francisco from way back--Mrs. Heller's own family, her husband's family, and the Atherton group. And I think Malone probably came up the hard way, as I know Pat Brown did. But they recognized these old families in San Francisco as very important supporters. In San Francisco it's so cohesive that there are some other elements that you just don't deal with. If you have to have them for support, fine; there's nothing wrong with having a North Beach club operator support you, but you don't put him out in front. Now, Los Angeles is so broken up that if you get an important family from Pasadena--they've never been heard of in Los Angeles or Beverly Hills unless they get into the anti-Jewish thing. We have a Los Angeles downtown businessman's association that fought the fight against the Jewish encroachment into the business community for years, so either you get the [Jewish] Hillcrest crowd or you get the California Club crowd; it's hard to have both. But it isn't a nose-holding thing. They both have a great deal of money, but it isn't like having a strip-tease joint tied in. And they don't know each other that well. So, it's a different thing.

Fry: You're really more free to mix your groups in Southern California than you are up north?

Clifton: Yes. And the mere fact that Malone isn't all out for you and some of these other people aren't all out for you is an indication that there's a certain lack in your campaign in Northern California.

Fry: There seemed to be another problem with George Outland, about whom I picked up repercussions that he was difficult to work with.

Clifton: Yes, he was very difficult to work with. He had been a Democratic congressman and he was defeated. He was a very fine congressman.

Clifton: But he had an awful lot of tensions and real hang-ups. I think he got into the campaign because somehow he was a good student, and he had worked on some of these policy statements that caused all the trouble later. But he never could get over the hurt of being defeated. It was kind of an unusual thing that he ever got elected in Republican Santa Barbara County. And then when he was defeated (and it was in the cards because he was in a very marginal district) it became a personal thing that just really haunted him.

Fry: How did a liberal Democrat get elected in the first place in that area?

Clifton: It was just a fortuitous thing; he was running and somebody else wasn't or something, in a year when we did very well. He campaigned arduously. But it was one of those things you could have counted as a one-term thing. He loved Washington and he loved the whole thing--being a congressman. He couldn't take the pressure in our campaign. And election night I think just brought back again his own loss. It was pretty certain on election night--with that combination of Warren's Republican vote and what he got on the Democratic ticket--

Fry: You're talking about the June primary.

Clifton: Yes, that Jimmy wasn't going to win the general election.

Fry: Jimmy asked him to resign then?

Clifton: I don't know whether he asked him to or not. But George was really depressed on election night. The thing that got him more than anything else was, here's his defeat all over again. Maybe by now he's learned to accept it, but at that time it was still too fresh for him.

Fry: Then he went into academic pursuits.

Clifton: It wasn't over policy or anything else, it was just that he was so high strung that he could hardly stand the "gaff" of politics.

Fry: Was he supposed to have been coordinating the whole campaign?

Clifton: I think so.

Fry: But actually, you raised your own money down here and ran the campaign with it down here?

Clifton: Right.

Fry: The north raised theirs and spent it as they saw fit there?

Clifton: Right. When you asked about some of the other people--I think Ben Swig helped Jimmy quite a bit.

Fry: Was he in on this?

Clifton: I think he did help Jimmy if I remember correctly. I know he came down here for a few meetings and he was in on some of Jimmy's fund-raising affairs and some of the things we had at his hotel up there, the Fairmont Hotel. I think he felt very obligated to Jimmy's father. Jimmy's father had been very helpful to him. When Ben Swig was back in Boston, FDR helped him on something there, so Jimmy felt that they had a relationship.

Fry: That must have been one of Swig's earliest fund-raisings in politics here.

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: Would you like to comment any on Langdon Post?

Clifton: I saw more of Langdon Post than I did of anybody else from up north. He would come down here and we would have meetings and I thought Langdon was running a very good campaign up there. And his wife was very active; I don't know if you met Midge.

Fry: I didn't meet her; I wish I could have.

Clifton: She's a very interesting character and she had been very active with Ben Swig on Bonds for Israel and things like that. She was very good on it too. But I thought that Langdon was doing a very good job, from all that I saw of the campaign.

Fry: According to the newspaper announcements, Langdon Post was in on the campaign since about the fall of '49.

Clifton: I think he was.

Fry: And of course you were too. And then Outland didn't really come aboard until about January.

Clifton: We kind of went from the state committee to the '48 delegation right into Jimmy's '50 campaign, and I can't tell when one ended and the next one began.

Fry: Do you know why Langdon Post was chosen?

Clifton: I think he was the most solid supporter that was available to Jimmy at that time. Jimmy didn't have Malone. And George Davis and this Curtis fellow weren't about to spend full time at it. This is a

Clifton: sixteen-hour-a-day job, seven days a week, if you're running a good campaign. And I think Lang had ties with some of these other people to the extent that he was the likeable choice at that time.

Publicity: Civil Defense Plan

Fry: Let's move on into publicity and newspapers.

Clifton: As I remember, again it's hard to--one period runs into the other-- I know we had Chuck Daggett on publicity all during the period of that '48 delegation. He was very much in that. How much he got into the gubernatorial campaign I cannot remember. I'd have to go and look at some of the old stuff, whatever I have around. I do know that there was a fellow named Mort Donohue, who'd been a PR man for quite a few people and was considered a very high type, who came down from San Francisco and helped.

Fry: What kind of publicity were you concerned with?

Clifton: Press releases. Jimmy put out press releases all day, every day, practically. And you asked how the issues were decided on; I don't think there had been a carefully thought-out "build it up this way" and "we'll go on this and this and this and this issue." I think Jimmy gave more of a response to things that Warren did or something that happened, and he looked for the publicity value of it. I think it was a helter-skelter thing. I know it had to be, or he'd never have gotten into that civil defense thing. Did he comment on his civil defense proposal when you talked to him?

Fry: Yes. [Laughter]

Clifton: He went to Washington, I think, after the primary. Now this is a long time ago and I've been in a lot of campaigns since, so it's a little hard to remember. He went to Washington and he came back and asked us to meet him at Cornelius Vanderbilt III's house in Beverly Hills; this was Glen Wilson* and myself. I don't know who else. We went out there for that meeting. I think he had Joe Shane in his campaign too; he used to be a big fund-raiser in the Jewish community for Democrats and ADA and things like that. I don't know if you've ever met Cornelius Vanderbilt III, who used to own the Los Angeles Daily News years ago; he started it. But he was a very odd character.

Fry: Oh, and the Daily News was then Manchester Boddy's?

*Assistant campaign manager.

Clifton: Yes. But before that it was Cornelius Vanderbilt III's, who was one of these "poor little rich boys" who could hardly tell his right hand from his left hand, but the name I guess was important. Anyway, here is Russell Birdwell who says to us: "I got off of a plane at exactly 7:10 and a half this morning, etc., etc., and I have this much time. This is what we're supposed to do." We'd never seen him before. Jimmy had brought him back from Washington with him and signed a big contract with a fantastic figure to do the PR because this was going to bail Jimmy out.

Fry: And Vanderbilt was paying for this?

Clifton: I don't know who was paying for it. I don't know whether he was going on dreams or what. But he was kind of thick with Vanderbilt.

He started off immediately with this great, fantastic plan about civil defense where everybody in Los Angeles was going to be evacuated to cities in the desert. We were just dumbfounded. We couldn't believe what we were hearing. It had nothing to do with the campaign. There was some interest in civil defense because of the Korean War, and some people were building backyard shelters and they were worried about things. But it really hadn't been a major issue in the campaign at all. And so here he was, as if the whole campaign was going to hinge on this particular thing, and they were going to evacuate everybody out into the desert. They were going to build model cities out there where at the first sign everybody would go. [Sigh]

Glen and I didn't even know where to start to object to it because it was just right out of the sky. I know that Glen said, "Just exactly how are you going to do that logistically? What roads are you going to take? [This was before some of the freeways we have now.] How are you going to have enough toilet paper and restrooms for all these people?" We thought that he had a total plan, because he talked about a total plan. He had something typed up with a fancy cover on it like some people do, these prospectuses, which are usually phony in a campaign unless a lot of work has gone into it. You just don't come up with these things off the top of your head.

But I remember Glen saying, "Well, just how are you going to do it?" And Birdwell looked around and asked [Cornelius], "Hey, do you have a map of Southern California around here?" which to Glen and myself was an indication that he had no concrete plans. He was going to look at the map! We just looked at each other; we just couldn't believe it. Afterwards, when we were going back to the office, we asked Jimmy, "What's this whole idea about?" Jimmy said, "Oh, he did a magnificent thing for my father. It was he that came up with the idea of exchanging the mothballed Navy ships with Britain when they needed them," and stuff like that. I don't know whether it was, but this is what Jimmy told us: that Birdwell had done this great thing

Clifton: and that he was the top press agent of the country. He did the publicity for Jane Russell in her famous movie, "Outlaw." He's a Hollywood press agent, and still around, but inexperienced in political campaigns.

This was getting along toward the time when the new State Democratic Central Committee would meet in Sacramento to elect their officers for the coming year. But before they select their officers the party nominees at the state convention meet the first day. These are all the people running partisan-wise--the party nominees. They meet the first day and they write the party platform. Then the second day the state central committee (which is made up of the party nominees plus their three appointees each to the state central committee) meets and they select the officers for the State Democratic Committee for the upcoming two years.

[End of Tape 2, Side B]

[Begin Tape 3, Side A]

Clifton: This is why the titular head of the party, or the head of the ticket, gives a speech setting the tone, based on the discussions on the platform and resolutions, of what the party is running on in California for this year.

Birdwell wrote the speech for Jimmy, which we saw the night before. It talked about nothing but these "ghost cities in the desert," which is what the newspapers tagged it the next day. We begged Jimmy, "If you have to use this as part of your platform, because maybe it will elicit this much interest on the part of the reading public, please put in all the other things you stand for: the difference between the Democratic and Republican parties, the difference between the whole ticket and Jimmy as against Warren, and set the tone for the campaign because this is the kick-off." (Many national campaigns have kick-off days--the kick-off in Detroit is Labor Day; the kick-off in California is at the state convention.)

So he worked on the speech that night; we all worked on it a little bit. He finally got in a very small portion, in the beginning of the speech, in which he did hit the highlights, but it still ended up about seventy-five or eighty per cent on this civil defense thing. It violated all of our political instincts; we just hated to go into the gallery and listen. And I can remember yet, I went up in the gallery, and Glen Wilson, who was the assistant campaign manager, was with Jimmy, and Birdwell had come up to hear his creation. The reaction of the delegates was appalling. They expected the campaign to be launched with the dreams of the Democratic party, and this is not what it was. They were totally unprepared, just as we had been in the beginning, totally unprepared for this civil defense plan. It

Clifton: was a thing that was on people's minds, and some of them were digging in their backyards and building shelters and things, so it wasn't so far afield if it had been just one thing touched upon. But the idea of evacuating everybody in Los Angeles to the desert and everybody in San Francisco to the desert was just a pipe dream.

We had a feeling that that was the end of it. The press reported it, but they didn't keep it up, I must say; they were so shocked that they put it out as "ghost cities in the desert" as the title of it.

Fry: His other issues that he had been plugging up to that time, which came out in the press, were things like unemployment. This was during an economic slump.

Clifton: Yes. And it had gone pretty high.

Fry: And then some things about Warren's policies that did have the ring of real issues.

Clifton: They were. And in the primary we felt we really had them. But you see, when you come to September, with the "ghost cities in the desert" and with this big vote against you in the primary, your chances aren't too good. It really took the heart out of the campaign, although I feel that we certainly tried hard enough.

Assessment of the Campaign

Fry: You kind of see that as a major turning point?

Clifton: I don't think the speech in itself represented a turning. I don't think the defections of Bill Malone mattered all that much, because there are always defections in some campaigns, I don't care what campaign you're talking about. I don't feel it was this speech in itself. If he'd had a good vote in the primary, we would have had a chance of getting the funds that we needed to develop the campaign. But this didn't do anything to raise our hopes after the primary.

Fry: In the other issues, was there any splash-over from the Helen Gahagan Douglas and Nixon battle, in which Nixon had his "pink" charges going against Mrs. Douglas? Did anything like that occur in your campaign?

Clifton: I don't know that it occurred as a tangible thing, except that we did subscribe to some survey and it was supposedly done in the depth-- "Are you for this or against this?"--and then it tried to do something in attitudes--"How would you characterize Warren? How would you characterize Jimmy," and topics like that. And then you'd see

Clifton: the whole picture: with Helen, the surveys painted her as a "pinko," "leftish," "soft on communism," a "Red;" these were the comments; with Jimmy it was "Warren's a good family man and Jimmy's a playboy and Jimmy's this and Jimmy's that." You saw a solid, all-American boy up here, and then you saw someone less than that over here. "He trades on his father's name," and so on. Whatever was happening in the campaign it wasn't direct charges, but it was the impression that was created.

Fry: And this was a survey after the campaign got under way?

Clifton: Yes. Well, we had several polls during the campaign.

Fry: Was this a fairly consistent pattern?

Clifton: Very consistent, and it got more so as we got closer to the general election.

Fry: Did Jimmy try to contend at all with the bipartisan nature of Warren's campaign?

Clifton: He tried to point out that Warren was just really an out-and-out Republican and had always been a Republican; that his was a Republican position and that he had been running as a Republican for president (because he was always the nominal head of California's Republican presidential delegation, just as we Democrats frequently have nominal heads on delegations). Warren had always campaigned as a nonpartisan for office from the beginning and he had always done a very good job, and he kept far more in the press. Now, I must say in this day and age the Los Angeles Times is much more objective and the reporting has changed with the new leadership of the L.A. Times. Some of us now that have been through politics for years can't believe the Times in some of its editorials and some of its positions. But the kind of thing that they would do! For example, the day after the general election, Warren is elected and Roosevelt is not, there were two big pictures three columns wide each, exactly the same size. One is of Warren and is just tremendous, one of his best hand-picked ones. And there's one of Jimmy, a candid one, not a campaign picture, not anything we've ever given them but one where he looked a little bit like an ape. It was one where he was saying something and he's got his jaw way out. It was this kind of thing that we contended with. It was unfair journalism in every way. Now the Times is not guilty of that kind of thing, but in those days it was--all through the primary and general election campaigns. They made him look like an idiot whenever they could.

Fry: What kind of a relationship did you and others down here have with Kyle Palmer, who was the political editor of the Times then? Was anyone close to Kyle Palmer?

Clifton: No. We had a good relationship with some of the reporters on the Times. Chick Hansen was on as a political reporter and along about then Al Blanchard came along. Burkholtz was a political reporter for the Mirror then; he's on the Times now. And Carl Greenberg from the Examiner was the senior political reporter in Los Angeles and he was very friendly.

Let me say that Jimmy always created news no matter what he did. He could call a press conference and they'd all come. They enjoyed being around because something was always happening, so we had a good relationship that way. I think we put out way too many press releases--so many that "big news" became diluted, just for the sake of getting the name in the paper. And Roosevelt, being an established name, didn't really need to do that. He needed to put something out that had some guts in it and it was done quick, like this [snaps fingers].

Also he was changeable. Once in awhile, he would intend to make a major speech on something, then something else would happen. We would give out the press releases ahead of time, but then some members of the L.A. press were lazy and they would submit this release as their story, and then Jimmy wouldn't even mention it at the banquet. So he ran into a few little "situations" with the press.

Fry: I guess I picked up a story in the newspaper about his having done that when China entered the Korean War; he had to change his speech at the last moment.

Clifton: Our press tried to get down there and say, "Look, you've got the release, but this and this and this is going to go into it." Once in awhile Jimmy would insert ad-libs. Pat's [Brown] been known to do the same thing.

Fry: Did you do very well up north?

Clifton: In a few of the counties we did very well. We had a good campaign in Contra Costa County. This is where we had Senator George Miller and Masterson and some of those people up there, and we did very well there. The Bee papers were very good.

Fry: Monroe Friedman?

Clifton: Monroe was a solid character up there. He was a nice guy and all for Jimmy, but he was kind of easygoing. He later became a judge there. In Alameda County we did pretty well. And where the Bee papers were we did pretty well. The Bee papers were usually helpful to Democrats.

Fry: Oh really? They were so close to Warren. I'm surprised.

Clifton: Well, they reported very well. They may not go with us, but they were fair. The Bee papers were the only ones. Then we had the Daily News, but it was going down the drain and it was getting to be a poor newspaper, so the circulation of the Times and the Mirror as against the Daily News was more persuasive.

Fry: But Boddy did come out with an editorial against Jimmy?

Clifton: Yes. But a lot of people at that time did not pay that much attention to the Daily News editorials. They did read what the political reporters had to say; they were pretty good.

[Interruption]

Fry: Where were we now? Boddy was what?

Clifton: Boddy was off on something called "Mass Man." His editorials were way up in the stratosphere and Democrats quit worrying about his editorials. They read the news and what was happening because in many cases it was the only place where we'd get a break on a political reporter reporting what was happening.

Fry: There's one fairly important consideration and that's what happened to James Roosevelt's support after Warren won the Republican party primary and came so close to winning the Democratic. Did you have problems after that?

Clifton: Well, we didn't have all of the Democratic voters.

Fry: I mean money support.

Financial Contributors

Clifton: Money and the people that liked to go with the winner just looked at the combined vote of Warren in his own party, in the primary where he was unopposed, and his cross-filing into the Democratic ticket. While Jimmy got more votes than Warren did in the Democratic side, the combined one was a foreboding that in November Warren could get these same votes that he did before, and beat Jimmy. (And I'm sure that McGovern's going to run into the same thing: "Can he beat Nixon?" Can the ardent McGovern supporters get the money?) We did get money for Jimmy from the ones that were for Jimmy from hell to breakfast. But for the "independent" people, they would just like to be with the winner.

Fry: Did you have people who put money on both candidates?

Clifton: Oh, I'm sure.

Fry: You didn't know who they were especially?

Clifton: No. But I do know that there are many contributors that do this traditionally. For instance, there will be a law partnership and one law partner is a Republican and active in the Republican party. The other one is a Democrat active in the Democratic party, and they kind of decide between themselves that they'll tentatively put their little money on each of them; then when it becomes clear that Warren is going to win they'll put it on the Republican side.

Fry: Here were the two big contributions that I saw on the state report of campaign contributions filed with the secretary of state. [Shows list] Can you read my handwriting?

Clifton: Yes. Lou Bronstein and Joe Shane. I've already mentioned Joe Shane; he had been raising money for the Jewish bonds and things like that. He was very good at it. Lou Bronstein--I think he was kind of a personal friend of Jimmy's. This is accurate.

Fry: How did this work? Was this money that they had gathered up?

Clifton: No, I think this was their own personal contributions. But when they raised money, particularly in the Jewish community, the fellow that holds the title of chairman of the finance committee or something like that, they pattern it after what they do with the Jewish bonds. He puts in the biggest contribution and tries to get the others to match it. This is not necessarily so when you're raising money in the Gentile community. Sometimes it's a big name and the big name gives you very little. But in the Jewish community they have a tendency to put in the biggest contribution and get other people to come in with an equal amount or near equal amount.

Fry: The head of it acts as a sort of pacesetter.

Clifton: Right. I've been at some of these fund-raising things out at Hillcrest, and the chairman knows very well what Mark Boyer or so-and-so is willing to put in beforehand. He gets certain ones lined up, and starts with the one that's going to give the most. First, he says he's going to do it, and then he'll say, "O.K. What about you, Lou Boyer?"

And Lou Boyer will say, "By God, Joe, if you're going to give that I'll give that much too." Or, "I'll give ten thousand." Because you never want to have it come down to the point where a fellow is going to give \$12,500 and the next one says, "I'll give five hundred dollars," because from there on that's the level, and it goes from there on down.

- Clifton: So, I would say that this report is about right. Our treasurer was a fellow by the name of O.S. Weide that worked out of Utter-McKinley, which was an insurance firm, but it's a funeral home too. Weide was the big man there. I don't know if he's still around. I think Maynard McKinley just died in the last year or two. But Weide raised a considerable amount of money. He was the treasurer and he handled the money and made the report.
- Fry: Outside the Jewish community, what other groups or interests were good at giving money, since the Democratic party itself wasn't very good?
- Clifton: Labor helped us. We got lots of small contributions, lots of small contributions. It's lots of work and it doesn't add up to a great deal, but it's much healthier.
- Fry: How did you get them, by mailings? Or knocking on doors?
- Clifton: A little bit of everything. Lots of finance meetings, and different people would be assigned to go out and try to raise a certain amount among their friends. In other words, Lou Warschaw would try to raise a certain amount of money at Brentwood Country Club, which was where he was active, instead of Hillcrest. And he'd get so many people to put into his campaign and he'd bring it in. There would be others that would do likewise. It seems to me that we had a couple of big affairs. We had one for Jimmy at Max Firestein's home; he was part of the old Jewish community, not the newly rich Jewish community. We had seventy-five couples and a great deal of work had gone into it and it was a beautiful affair. We invited Mrs. Roosevelt to be the pièce de résistance. She came out from New York for this. Just before she informally spoke, the fellow that was the head of Budget Finance, Charlie Offer, and his brother-in-law, Albert Behrstock, who is now dead (I don't know how many times I've said that today) got up and said, "Well, since we have the First Lady of the World, I don't think we should talk about money tonight." [Laughter] What could we do? Later we tried to get some contributions from some of these people--since it was all set up to raise money and she was going to help Jimmy to raise the money. She didn't feel that it was "uncouth."
- Fry: What did you do later, after the party was over?
- Clifton: After the party was over the chairman that had put it together wrote very nice letters to quite a few people and said, "As you well know, that was a finance affair and we would appreciate a contribution...." And some of them did contribute, but we didn't raise any amount of money.
- Fry: By that time you didn't have the group support going for you.

Clifton: Oh, we had some bad times in the campaign.

Fry: What about minority groups? The black community?

Clifton: The black community did not have money like that, then. The black community, I must say, is doing a beautiful job here because now they have a lot of doctors and lawyers and people that are highly educated and are in professional positions; and we've got what's known as the "Golden Ghetto" out here in Baldwin Hills, with beautiful homes and considerable money. They are putting on their own affairs and furnishing the money at their things. They're doing a beautiful job. But in those days the black finance community was a half a dozen people you could name. There was a black dentist that always contributed; Dr. Claude Hudson contributed to Helen and contributed to Jimmy. Whenever we needed something he'd always give us a contribution, and there were several others. But it was peanuts in comparison with what they're able to do today.

Fry: Did anyone handle the Mexican-Americans? I've got the name of one man here: Ed Roybal.

Clifton: Ed Roybal gave Jimmy lip service. He did a little work for Jimmy, but mostly it was always as a city councilman looking out after his own races. He later ran for Congress.

Fry: He's in Congress now, isn't he?

Clifton: Yes. He was on our campaign committee but he didn't do too much. Ed Roybal, and I can't remember if it was at the time of Jimmy's campaign, did a tremendous job of registering the Mexican-Americans on the east side, because he ran for city council once and lost because his own people were not voters. Then he really put on a tremendous campaign with the registrar of voters to educate Mexican-Americans to be deputy registrars. It's something that the registrar hadn't done previously. They even had classes out in front of the Catholic churches in the east side to train deputy registrars that were Mexican-Americans, because an Anglo sent down into the Mexican-American community to try to register people created problems. They'd start by saying, "Well, how did you get your citizenship? Were you born in this country?" Usually the young person you were talking to was a citizen but grandmother was here illegally, or they were afraid that these were people from the immigration department, and they just wouldn't answer the questions, and they wouldn't register. This is what Roybal found out on his first campaign. Then he put on an effort to register the people in his own area, and he did a tremendous job. And if that came along in connection with Jimmy's campaign, that was fine. But we didn't have minority committees as such. We had a good headquarters down in Gus Hawkins' district and he worked with Jimmy.

Fry: Was he a Jimmy man?

Clifton: He was a Jimmy man and he was a Helen man, and he did a very good job. But getting money out of the black community at that time was difficult because they didn't have money; you pretty well had to put money into the community rather than getting it out. The vote we always got out of there was always for a liberal Democratic candidate and anyone named Roosevelt. I used to go with Helen Douglas when she was running for Congress to these house meetings; we'd go in the homes and there would be almost a shrine of FDR there with his picture and maybe flags around and items like that. This was a real deep thing, so Jimmy didn't have any trouble with the black community.

Fry: Did Truman ever help Jimmy in this campaign?

Clifton: I don't think he did very much, to be honest. I don't think he hurt him. It's hard to remember.

Fry: He came out in the press for Helen Gahagan Douglas, but he didn't mention Jimmy.

Clifton: I don't think he did much for Jimmy, really.

Fry: Do you know what efforts were made to get a Truman endorsement?

Clifton: It seems to me that at various times Jimmy tried to get his mother to talk to Truman about it, or something. But Truman was sort of unyielding about people who had deserted him, and he felt that Jimmy had been in the forefront of the fight against him in the 1948 convention. I don't think he realized the forces that were building up that kind of pushed Jimmy on the crest of the wave [in 1948]. I'm not saying that Jimmy couldn't help himself but he didn't just suddenly one night figure out that he was going to give Truman the business. There was a big thing going before Jimmy ever started.

Answering Campaign Charges

Fry: There were other candidates for governor in the primary, like Mr. Wellburn Mayock.

Clifton: Mayock had been what most Democrats considered a renegade Democrat for a long time; he just was not a faithful Democrat even though he may have been a registered Democrat. He didn't have anything going for him, I don't think.

Truman shies from any part of California governor race

By FRANK ROGERS

(Daily News Washington Correspondent)

WASHINGTON, July 26.—(Special)—President Truman, in a frank and emphatic statement on the California political picture, declared he will maintain a strictly neutral attitude in next year's governorship fight among California Democrats.

An authoritative informant who would not permit use of his name today told the Daily News that the President had taken this stand recently in response to a direct question as to whether he would seek to prevent the possible nomination of James Roosevelt, son of his predecessor, as governor.

The inquisitive one was a California political leader with considerable following but who holds no public office and who is not a potential candidate for office. His conversation with the President, which occurred recently, was reported by a third individual who was present at the time.

Truman, so the account goes, told the Californian without qualification that because of his admiration and friendship for Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt he would not and could not so much as lift a finger to harm young Roosevelt's chances if he decides to seek the governorship or any other office.

The President and Roosevelt have not been on friendly terms since the latter's leadership of the abortive effort to replace Truman as the Democratic nominee at last year's party convention.

Roosevelt, while leader of the California delegation which was pledged to vote for Truman, spearheaded the futile effort to nominate either Gen. Dwight Eisenhower or Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in place of Truman.

While the President gave his visitors no indication that he has completely forgiven Jimmy for this, and for his subsequent dog-in-the-manger attitude during Truman's surprisingly successful campaign, he made it clear that he will do nothing that the former First Lady might interpret as unfriendly.

Mrs. Roosevelt, the President told his callers, was a real friend during the campaign; he made a special broadcast from Europe urging his election and he is not going to forget it.

The President, however, gave no hint that he would take any active part in a James Roosevelt campaign or that he would give his blessing if the machinery of the national committee chose to give the latter whatever help it could.

This new disclosure of the President's attitude caused some speculation as to his future relationship with E. George Luckey, Democratic Party leader in Southern California, who is frequently mentioned as Roosevelt's possible rival in the gubernatorial race.

Luckey, while he has not sought Truman's blessing, is known to have asked the President to see to it that Roosevelt gets no help from party politicians here. Luckey and the President have been close friends ever since the former stepped forward to lead the Truman campaign in Southern California when few other political leaders felt the President had a chance.

Truman, noted for his unflinching loyalty to those who have befriended him, is not likely to forget what Luckey did for him. But he feels almost equally beholden to Mrs. Roosevelt and thus has decided the only course open to him is to remain aloof if a Roosevelt-Luckey race develops.

Whether the President's hands-off attitude would likewise apply to the California senatorial race remained a matter of conjecture.

Truman and Sen. Sheridan Byrnes, whose term expires next year, have not been on friendly terms for the past several years—largely because of the senator's extended fight against the Bureau of Reclamation.

There have been recent reports that Truman and Downey have patched up their differences, although there have been few indications that this is actually so. Only last week, Downey opened another public investigation of the Reclamation Bureau and two of its top men, Commissioner Michael W. Straus and California Regional Director Richard L. Boke.



Fry: Was he just running to aid the Warren campaign or something?

Clifton: I don't think so. There was a vacuum then, and he probably had friends who said, "Look, Jimmy is a Johnny-come-lately, he's a carpetbagger. Get in and run," because Jimmy was characterized as a carpetbagger. Jimmy would reply that he had two sons and a daughter who were born here. [Laughter] He had two daughters by his first marriage to Betsy Cushing, and then he had two boys and a girl by his second wife, the nurse. Then he has an adopted child by his third wife. And now he's married to an English girl or Irish girl, and I think he has a child now by her. At that time he had two sons and a daughter that were born here.

Fry: In this campaign was his rather colorful married life anything that you had to worry about?

Clifton: Well, his wife Romelle was very much opposed to any of his political activities, and she was really very upset about it. He had been at the Mayo Hospital for stomach surgery and she was his nurse. He gave her this picture about how he had a miserable childhood because they never had any private lives at all, you know; there were politicians in and out of the house and the kids never really had time with their father or their mother. So, he just wanted a little cottage and a nine-to-five existence. This was the picture he painted for Romelle, and the minute he got back from the service here he is in the midst of campaigns again. And she did not like it. So there were times when he was up and down in the campaign and it was a real problem to him because she disliked the whole political thing from the beginning to the end. I think he sold her on the idea that they were going to have the simple little life, which didn't come about. He had some very bad times later, but they were long after the 1950 campaign for governor.

Fry: He had to contend with those at a later date?

Clifton: Yes, when he was running for Congress later. He got elected but while he was running for Congress a divorce had been brewing for some time. So she finally filed for divorce and named thirteen women that, you know--and some of them had been actresses and celebrities. It was a sensation.

Fry: Oh, that was when her adultery list got put in the papers.

Clifton: Yes. Thirteen women.

Fry: And he won for Congress anyway.

Clifton: Yes. Well, we kept him out of reach of the press; he made no big public meetings, and he went to 604 house meetings in neighborhoods!

Clifton: We had him going to six and seven house meetings a day. No hand-outs, no publicity at all. Every precinct that he went to a house meeting in, he won.

Fry: Whose clever idea was that?

Clifton: The Lybecks and myself, and a guy named Al Meyers who was running the publicity for Jimmy's campaign for Congress. We didn't know how else to handle it.

Fry: That's what they call a "low profile" today.

Clifton: A very low profile. We never even heard of the word. [Laughter]

I want to go back and tell you that we dropped Mr. Birdwell shortly after the "ghost cities" speech. I got the job of firing him. Jimmy said, "Invite him for lunch and tell him." He was going to sue us, but he never did.

Fry: Did you have to contend with Vanderbilt?

Clifton: No. Birdwell was kind of a "little" fellow, not small--little; he's tall. But he'd stand in the background and smile. He was no problem; in fact we didn't have to fire him because he was never under contract--no pay of any kind.

Fry: Was there anything special about Mayock's backers that you had to worry about?

Clifton: Well, I think that you hinted that they brought out this gambling thing.

Fry: Oh yes, they had some charges.

Clifton: That Jimmy called on behalf of somebody.

Fry: Tony Cornero, a gambler-impresario. This charge was that Roosevelt had spoken to--

Clifton: To [Judge] Jim Carter about the case. I don't think that ever happened. Joe de Silva was playing "cops and robbers" (he was the head of the Retail Clerks), and he had someone that was close to Tony Cornero who led me out there one night to talk to Tony Cornero to see what they really had, because Jimmy recalled no such conversation with Jim Carter.

I had been in politics long enough to know that most of these wild ideas are dead-end things and there is usually nothing to them. Most of them you don't even bother to deny, unless it's something that you just can't afford not to deny. What you avoid is to let

Clifton: the other guy keep picking the ground upon which you're going to fight. I don't know if you've seen just yesterday where Sam Yorty keeps saying that [Los Angeles mayoralty candidate] Bradley took a bribe in 1964 in the zoning thing and Bradley says, "I did not." And Yorty says, "I don't know why the district attorney said he'd look into it and found it all kosher because it isn't and I've got new witnesses." And Bradley then comes back and says, "This is a lot of nonsense. He has nothing; that's the reason that he wants to fight."

Some things you just let pass because this is the nature of politics. [For example,] "Roosevelt said today that it isn't true that he beats his wife," but occasionally there are things you have to deny. Or if they're twisting what your position is. I don't know what originally [presidential candidate] McGovern said on this thousand dollar welfare plan, but it sounded pretty far afield with everybody getting a thousand dollars. Sometimes you've got to clarify it. But if you just let them keep on with this stuff, often it will pass.

Anyway, Joe de Silva was a big supporter, so I got assigned to go out and talk to Tony Cornero. I sat down; he seemed a very diffident little man, and he kept calling me, "My dear young lady" and this kind of thing. And he couldn't find any shred of anything that you could put your teeth into at all on this whole thing of Mayock's charge. I came away telling Jimmy that it was just a dry run; I didn't know what he was talking about and he didn't have a single thing. There was some woman whose husband had known Jimmy at some time; it was the most roundabout thing and there just wasn't a shred of evidence. I mean Tony Cornero had been in trouble over the water taxis going out to his gambling ships--years ago.

Fry: Oh yes. And this had been a cause célèbre during Warren's attorney generalship.

Clifton: Yes. But what it had to do with Jim Carter or Jimmy or anything else, I don't know; and if it was connected, it was so far back.

Fry: Why didn't Judge Carter come out and say this wasn't true?

Clifton: I don't know, except he was on the federal bench and I don't think he thought it was worth even going into. He certainly didn't affirm it. As I say, it was such a vague thing. It had something to do with the husband of this woman, who didn't mean anything in the whole campaign. I've forgotten exactly what it was. Oh, I know: It had something to do with some phone call that Wilbur Clark made to Los Angeles, and Wilbur Clark used to be a figure in Las Vegas. He talked with some woman who knew somebody who knew somebody, this type of thing, and seemingly it was recorded somewhere, but there was nothing you could find to it that had any substance at all.

Fry: Well, the other thing was Westbrook Pegler's constant attacks.

Clifton: That didn't worry anybody because Westbrook Pegler had been against Eleanor Roosevelt and was known as against Eleanor Roosevelt, and everybody just assumed that this was sort of the same thing. The only thing that I think got much of a play was that at one time Roosevelt, before he went to Boston and before he lived out here, was either in some kind of a venture with Sam Goldwyn or something to make some kind of movies that you would see in bars, or something. I think they now do it, but they didn't at that time and it went down the drain. Then, there was the story about the insurance firm back in Boston with a guy named Sargent.

Fry: Were the movies close to obscene or something?

Clifton: No, no, no, no, no. It was that he was almost going into a vending machine type thing. The movies were going to be shown in machines and paid for like vending machines. The people that would own these machines were probably some Las Vegas gamblers. It had nothing to do with being obscene, but it was just something that would be in bars and you'd put in your quarters. But it was the ownership of the machines in the background, like some of the other kinds of machines that are supposedly harmless in themselves, but the ownership is supposed to be questionable. Vending machines, just ordinary vending machines, but the indication was that it was going to be a racket. There was never any suggestion that it was going to be obscene. I never heard that.

Fry: I was just trying to see what was wrong about it.

Clifton: Who has vending machines? Unsavory elements. This was going to be like a vending machine with movies. I think they do have them now because I've seen one down at the Officer's Club in El Toro. It wasn't obscene or anything; it was just a very colorful short movie.

Fry: A song and dance act sort of thing; yes, I've seen those.

Clifton: Yes.

Fry: Was that charge seen fit to reply to?

Clifton: I think Jimmy admitted that he'd had some dealings with Sam Goldwyn but it wasn't anything that was bad.

Fry: Well, as you look back on it, where did you think the cause of your losing lay?

Clifton: In the beginning it looked as though it would be almost a hopeless cause, though no election ever is. I would have said the same thing a few months ago about the chance of the Democrats winning this year.

Clifton: I don't think you back away from putting on a race or running and being defeated just because it's not a cinch you're going to win, because too many things happen to change it from the beginning. Warren was a very strong governor and it was very difficult to have won it. Jimmy had no legislative experience or office-holding experience, and he started out by running for governor. He did suffer by doing some sort of unforgivable political things, by not supporting Truman a hundred per cent after he ran on a promise that "you can head up the delegation if you support Truman." This hurt. But the rest of it, if you want my own feeling, was because it just wasn't our year. And then with the results in the primary (and this I felt about many other candidates that barely pulled through their own primary) it became a foregone conclusion that barring some unforeseen thing they were going to lose in the general.

We've got a situation now with Yvonne Brathwaite, who won in the primary for her congressional race. The make-up of her district and everything else indicates that she's bound to win. On the other hand, the other day they had a big "exposé" on Mervin Dymally and Brathwaite's brand new husband (that she married since the election) making a lot of money on a health plan. I still think she's going to win. A lot of people aren't going to realize that she married recently. It could become something; she could lose, but the chances are she won't. This was the same way we felt about Roosevelt; he didn't have much of a chance but we hoped that maybe the feeling against a third term for Warren was strong enough. Other than that I don't think that Jimmy had a chance, except beating Warren down on the third-term tradition, and the "fact" that no one could win the third term.

Fry: I thought maybe Jimmy didn't go into the third term issue because of the vulnerability of his father's third term. Did he talk about that?

Clifton: I don't think we talked about it, except a press guy that asked him how he felt about this. I don't think he was reluctant because of his father.

Fry: But he did mention that lack of third-term tradition in California, as a campaign issue?

Clifton: Earl Warren was the only one that broke it. Pat [Brown] ran against the same thing because he was the first one that tried it since. He couldn't make it.

Fry: Well, these are all the questions that I'm going to ask you this afternoon, because we've run out of time. You've given a vivid and helpful interview.

[End of Interview]

Transcriber: M. Fernandez

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Earl Warren Oral History Project

Robert Clifton

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CULBERT L. OLSON, AND THE LEGISLATURE

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry



Judge Robert Clifton

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Date of Interview: 6 October 1972.

Place of Interview: The Regional Oral History Office in The Bancroft Library,
University of California at Berkeley.

Corrected transcript sent to Judge Clifton for review: June 4, 1975.

Reviewed transcript returned to the Regional Oral History Office: 10 July 1975.

The Interview:

Abstaining from political participation since his ascent to the bench in 1939, Robert Clifton might have escaped unnoticed from the documentation of the so-called Earl Warren era, had it not been for interviews by this project with his wife, Florence C. ("Susie") McChesney Clifton, in 1972. It was her mention of their joint efforts in the gubernatorial campaigns of Upton Sinclair and Culbert Olson, and his subsequent appointment to Governor Olson's office, that led to the present interview.

Robert Clifton was born in Rochester, Indiana, November 1, 1903, the son of Albert and Bertha Lackey Clifton. His LL.B. was earned at Detroit College of Law, and in 1929 he was admitted to the California bar and began private practice in Los Angeles and Hollywood. Four years later he and Florence were married. He started politics somewhat abruptly. Attending a meeting at which Upton Sinclair spoke, he agreed to head the EPIC campaign for the 59th Assembly District (Hollywood area), he organized and financed thirteen EPIC clubs ("out of my own back pocket"), he won election to the Los Angeles County Democratic committee, the state central committee, and, with his wife, helped organize the 1938 Olson-for-governor campaign.

In his job as legislation advisor to Governor Olson (technically an advisor in the governor's Department of Finance) he set up and ran a system for digesting all bills that came over the governor's desk and recommending whether Olson should sign or veto. Because Olson and his attorney general, Earl Warren, were often at loggerheads, Clifton occasionally acted as general legal counsel to the governor and at one point actually had to represent the governor before the state supreme court against the position represented by Attorney General Earl Warren.

Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., elevated him to the superior court of Los Angeles in February, 1962, but five and a half years later he "retired" in order to serve as a judge on the High Court of the Trust Territory in Micronesia, where he and his wife were sent as members of the Peace Corps for two years.

The interview took place on a clear October day in Berkeley during the Clifton's visit to the campus to see son Tom, who was working in the Chancellor's Office. It was held on the fourth floor of The Bancroft Library in a small room of the Regional Oral History Office before lunch. Time was limited, and Judge Clifton's ability is evident in the way he condenses a large amount of information in a short time for the record. The surroundings of the interview were quiet, except for the carillon of the campanile as the taping extended into the noon hour. His lean account is what he intended: a straightforward representation from the Democratic vantage point of Southern California in the thirties.

Although a note of hurry can be read here and there in the interview, a surprisingly few small follow-up questions were required when his transcript was mailed to him for review. He and his wife were involved in summertime activities with various grandchildren and children, including the outings on their sailboat. Nevertheless, he returned it with corrections and additions in short order.

The Cliftons are now beginning another Peace Corps assignment, this time at the University of Liberia, where Judge Clifton will teach law for two years. They exemplify the paradox in producing oral histories of productive, vital people: the interview is rich in significant history, but the final manuscript can never be entirely up-to-date.

Amelia R. Fry
Interviewer-Editor

17 January 1977
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

Robert Clifton

Born in Rochester, Indiana, November 1, 1903. Married Florence G. McChesney July 29, 1933. Father of five children.

Graduated from Detroit Northwestern High School and also from Detroit College of Law, with a degree of L.L.B.

Practiced law in Hollywood and Los Angeles from January, 1929 to February, 1939, after having passed the bar examinations in Michigan and California. Latter part of practice was in the office of Olson and Olson (Culbert L. Olson and Richard C. Olson). Held civil service position of Administrative Adviser of the California State Department of Finance, advising as to contracts, leases, purchases and also as to functions and authority of state officers and agencies. During this time also acted as legal adviser to Governor Culbert L. Olson, digesting and analysing legislative bills, recommending signature or vetoing of the same, drafting veto messages to Legislature, proclamations calling special sessions of the Legislature, advising the Governor as to his authority, etc.

Appointed a Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles in January, 1939 by Governor Olson and served on that bench until February, 1939, being re-elected a number of times to six year terms. Appointed a Judge of the Superior Court by Governor Edmund G. Brown in February, 1962 and re-elected until retirement on September 1, 1967. Joined Peace Corps in September, 1967 and served two year tour of duty in Micronesia (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). Assigned to aid High Court of the Trust Territory and appointed Temporary Judge of the High Court to try cases and appeals with the three justices of the High Court in each of the six districts of Micronesia (Marianna Islands, Truk, Ponape, Palau, Yap and the Marshall Islands.) Appointed by Secretary of Interior Udall.

While practicing law during the period of 1929-1939, was a member of the Democratic County and State Central committees, and took a very active part in the election campaigns of Upton Sinclair and Culbert L. Olson and also campaigns for State Assmblyman, State Senators, U. S. Congressmen and Senators, and campaign for the Presidency. Assisted Governor Olson in formation of California delegation to the Democratic Convention, pledged to support President Roosevelt.

After appointment to the bench did not participate in politics, but had knowlege of political matters through his wife who was very active in political affairs.

Date of Interview: October 6, 1972

I BACKGROUND IN POLITICS

The Sinclair-for-Governor Campaign, 1934

Fry: How did you become interested in politics? Was it directly after law school?

Clifton: No. While I was practicing law in Hollywood, I went to a "Sinclair for Governor" meeting, and after I listened to Sinclair, I decided to enter politics and work in his campaign. When I went to his campaign headquarters, the people there asked me where I lived. I told them I was from the 59th assembly district, and they said, "Well, you are the executive secretary of that district." They gave me the names of four people who had written to their office from the district who said that they were interested in the campaign, or who sent small contributions, and they told me to get in touch with them. So I just followed their directions. They told us to go out and organize "EPIC" clubs, i.e. Upton Sinclair clubs.

I went out into the district, never having been in politics before, and got the use of school houses under the law that permitted the use of them for public purposes. Anyone may just go down to the board of education and get a permit to use public school rooms for somewhat public purposes. And then out of my own pocket I would publish throw-away handbills, for example to help voters find out about "What is the EPIC campaign?" or something like that.

Fry: Did you write the copy too?

Clifton: Yes. Then I would get in touch with the local newspapers for

Clifton: notices and on a stated date I would hold a meeting in the school house to form an EPIC club. The meeting would elect officers, and I would then tell them how to get literature. Then I would go on and organize another club. In the space of a short time I organized thirteen EPIC clubs in the 59th assembly district which functioned during the Sinclair for Governor campaign.

Fry: Was this a typical number of clubs, or did you organize more than usual?

Clifton: Oh, I don't think it was typical, but I just did what they told me: I followed their format for forming the EPIC clubs, which then functioned on their own.

So I ran the EPIC campaign in the 59th assembly district out of my own back pocket as it were. Somewhere along the line, the Sinclair headquarters told us to run a slate of members for the Democratic County Central Committee. I picked seven people to run out of my group of volunteers. As a matter of fact, I didn't put Governor Olson's son, Richard, who wanted to run for the Democratic County Central Committee on the slate because he had not worked in the district. Six out of my seven candidates, including myself, were elected; so we found ourselves members of a political committee that I'd never heard of before.

Fry: Do you mean the County Central Committee?

Clifton: Yes. I asked, "What is that?" when they told us to run a slate. Then later on, when Charles Lyon, a Republican, captured both the Democratic and the Republican nominations for assemblyman, that left four appointments to the state central committee. The assemblyman sat on the committee ex officio and had three appointments. It fell to the County Central Committee or some other group to fill a vacancy on state central committees when the opposite party's assemblyman was nominated. So I selected four people for the Democratic State Central Committee, and I found myself a member of the Democratic County and State Central Committees. Anyhow, that was my political initiation and an example of the difference between the California Democratic politics and Eastern political machines.

There was very little money in the campaign and the campaign headquarters didn't give its workers any money at all. If we wanted literature, we went down to the campaign headquarters and bought it from them; they didn't supply it free. For instance, we gave them enough money for the throw-away pamphlets or the pamphlet, "I, Governor of California", which was a campaign booklet.*

*Sinclair, Upton, I, Governor of California and How I Ended Poverty, (Pasadena: the author, 1933).

Clifton: They allowed each district to print one page for the Epic News, the weekly newspaper for Sinclair, if you gave some money. Usually we printed the necessary local news chiefly about the local candidates in the district who were running for assembly or senate. But we had to go to the campaign office and actually buy the newspaper, and then throw it away from door to door ourselves. During the campaign my organization distributed a number of issues of the Epic News--perhaps 25,000 sheets each--in the 59th assembly district. I and volunteer campaign workers went from door to door dropping them off like newsboys, except we didn't have money for newsboys so we had to distribute them ourselves. The campaign was strictly "from hunger" and I got no money or aid from the headquarters downtown. No one had ever heard of the idea of a paid campaign worker in the Sinclair organization.

Fry: With so little help, was the morale rather low?

Clifton: Oh no. Of course people were out of work and had no money; during the Depression there was very little money and wages were low. It's not like today [1972] where anyone young or old can go out and find a job. Jobs were scarce, so that no one thought anything of not being paid for political work.

Of course, the Republican campaign was well financed. They hired precinct workers, campaign managers, and had very elaborate signs, literature, and stuff like that. If we wanted a sign, we made it ourselves or raised the money during the Sinclair campaign. These conditions remained pretty much the same when [Culbert L.] Olson ran for governor in 1938.

The Olson for Governor Campaign, 1938

Fry: Did the same group of people who worked for Sinclair back Olson four years later?

Clifton: Yes. A very large number of people in the Olson campaign had received their political education and know-how the same way that I had. There was a very large number of people in the Olson campaign from the old EPIC group. They continued, in other words, to have an interest in Democratic politics.

Fry: Were they all young people like yourself?

Clifton: Oh no. All ages. Lots of older people; all sorts of people.

Fry: I had thought the EPIC campaign was like a younger generation movement.

Clifton: No. Definitely not. People were attracted by Sinclair's speeches and personality. And as you know, Sinclair came within 100,000 votes of being elected governor; and if he had not spoken against that old people's campaign, the Townsend movement, he might have won. In the last week of the election, Sinclair was asked what he felt about the Townsend plan, and he said that he was against it. It was an old-age pension plan to be financed by a sales tax. Such taxes always weighed heavily against the poor and so he was against it. If he'd kept his mouth shut, he would have been elected governor.

I think there were twenty-seven assemblymen who were a part of the EPIC group who were elected, and at the same time Governor Olson was elected to the state senate. He was not a part of the original EPIC or Sinclair group, but he was a candidate who ran with the endorsement of the Sinclair campaign like most of the Democratic candidates.

Fry: Were you associated with Olson when he was senator?

Clifton: No. About a year before he was elected governor I was practicing law and having a hard time of it. I got in touch with his son, Richard, and went into the Olson law office. I practiced law there for about a year, not on a salary basis, but here and there they would assign me work and pay me for it. I handled a few cases of my own in the office, but I worked principally with Dick. However, I did try a case or two with [Culbert] Olson while I was in the office. I remember at least one case; and I drew the findings in another case with the governor or for him, and we worked on a few other things.

Fry: How did you ask Dick for this help? Did you know him pretty well at that time?

Clifton: I don't remember. I don't remember how I happened to know him.

Fry: Was Olson considering running for governor at the time you began working for him?

Clifton: Oh yes. I'm sure he knew even before then. After the Sinclair

Clifton: campaign he very soon loomed up as the leader of the Democratic party.

Fry: Is that how you got into the Olson campaign?

Clifton: No, it wasn't because of my association in his office. Actually, I don't think they had any connection with each other. My wife and I got in at the very early, early stages of the campaign. But it wasn't because of my law association; the practice and the campaign had nothing to do with each other.

Very early in the campaign, somewhere along the line we went in to Olson's headquarters and volunteered to work. Charles Henderson, who later on was in the governor's office, was working in the early stages of the campaign, as was Walter Ballou; there were just a handful of other people working in the very early stages. Justice Stanley Mosk (he became a judge later) was supposed to be in charge of the campaign organization work, but he hadn't been in politics at all. So they changed him over to head of the speaker's bureau, which was the function that he had during the rest of the campaign, and my wife [Florence "Susie" Clifton] took over the campaign organization work during the election, i.e. not the publicity, billboards, radio, et cetera, but the district headquarters, precinct work, local meetings, et cetera.

Fry: In other words, she took over the spot that Stanley Mosk had started.

Clifton: Yes, barely started.

Someone had donated to the campaign the use of the office at the corner of Seventh and Hill Streets; the building had a half a dozen floors, including the basement. I think it was Joe Schenck, the movie producer, who donated the use of a number of floors and the basement floor of the building.

My wife borrowed one hundred typewriters and she got girls to volunteer as typists. She paid them a dollar a day for carfare and lunch money and they typed on individual index cards the names of every registered Democrat in the county. Then they cut out from each precinct map every precinct in Los Angeles County, and pasted each precinct inside a file folder. When a person at a Democratic meeting said, "I will cover the precinct, he wouldn't have to find out where his precinct was--the boundaries and stuff like that--because there already was a file with a map of his precinct and

Clifton: a list of every Democrat in the precinct. Then the office would put some "Olson for Governor" literature in the precinct file. So when a volunteer said that he would handle a precinct, the spade work had been done for him. This work was done for every Democratic precinct in the county.

My wife established an "Olson for Governor" campaign headquarters in every one of the then thirty assembly districts. These offices were ordinarily donated, but in some cases the campaign would rent a store building for \$25 a month and my wife would get volunteer workers--usually out of left-over people from the EPIC campaigns--to run the campaign headquarters day by day and week by week. They would put up a sign over the office: "Olson for Governor" and the precinct workers would funnel in and plan the campaign. They had a very, very well organized door-to-door campaign for passing out information, scheduling meetings, and so forth during the Olson campaign. Practically every one of the I-don't-know-how-many-thousand precincts were covered by this campaign organization.

Organized labor came into the campaign with a little money here and there, I believe. But of course that didn't go through her hands; it went through the finance committee's hands. If anyone in organized labor wanted to help the campaign, they would be funneled into the precinct organization and they would go door to door, handing out literature or what have you like other volunteer workers. In other words, labor, which was very heavily Democratic, worked in the campaign and by the time Olson won in the primary election, we had this very, very well organized campaign.

And the campaign was run completely by volunteers. I think later on the campaign managers in each district were given \$25 a week, but I think that happened after the primary election. I know my wife was working as a volunteer, without pay. She didn't even get the dollar a day that these girls got for their carfare and lunch money. But actually, unemployment was so high and money was so scarce that a dollar a day looked pretty good to some people, believe it or not.

Fry: For some that was a going wage then.

Clifton: No. If they had jobs they were paid more, but they were glad to get the dollar. Anyway, my wife borrowed typewriters and with this dollar-a-day business managed to type up these precinct lists and formed a terrifically large, well organized, door-to-door, people-to-people campaign. And of course, they helped to schedule meetings and so forth in each district. That was how the Olson primary

Clifton: campaign was formed.

After Olson was nominated in the primary as the Democratic candidate for governor, then we had the terrific job of continuing. There were only six or eight weeks between the primary and the final election at that time, and the question was how to carry on. Sheridan Downey had been nominated as the Democratic candidate for the U.S. Senate, and Ellis Patterson for lieutenant-governor, but they were not connected in any way in the primary with Olson. Then of course, in each assembly district and congressional district there was a Democratic nominee for Congress and a Democratic candidate for state assembly. The question was how to run a coordinated campaign for the whole Democratic ticket.

I was named chairman of the committee on organization of the Democratic County Central Committee. I had scheduled meetings in each assembly district to form a Democratic campaign committee for that assembly district. My wife was actually running this operation, but it was set up under the auspices of the Democratic County Central Committee--specifically the committee on organization. We sent out a notice to most of the prominent Democrats in each assembly district. And when I say prominent, I mean the working Democrats: the door-to-door volunteers and the former campaign managers for "Olson for Governor," as well as the candidates for assembly or their representatives, the candidates for Congress in those districts, the labor organizations, the members of the Democratic County Central Committee and the Democratic State Central Committee. But each of these groups wanted to run the campaign in their district: "I'm the head of the 'Olson for Governor' campaign so I should run the coordinated Democratic campaign," or the members of the Democratic County Central Committee said, "Well, of course we're the elected representatives of the party apparatus so we should run it." And the assembly candidate wanted to run it and the candidate for Congress wanted to run it, and then a lot of workers and various people wanted to run it. So we would send a notice that we were going to have an organization meeting and have them all come and elect a campaign director, a finance man, a publicity man, and stuff like that--in other words, form a campaign committee in their assembly district. And they either stayed in or stayed out. Usually, the man who had been manager of the "Olson for Governor" campaign was elected as campaign director. I don't know exactly that the elections were rigged, but that was ordinarily the result. The "Olson for Governor" group was the biggest organization, with more workers and everything else. So it naturally followed that

Clifton: the man who was the "Olson for Governor" campaign manager in that district having worked for no pay, would be elected the director of the coordinated campaign. Anyhow, they were there. They were invited and they either stayed in or stayed out.

That local committee ran the campaign from then on, and as I said previously, it was run out of my wife's office. She allocated the money for the literature and she supplied money, what little there was, for maybe \$25 a week for the campaign manager for this short period. And if she could, she helped a little bit with financing the renting of the headquarters. Sometimes the organization branched out, and in an assembly district there would be two or three Democratic headquarters, but in other districts only one.

Fry: Were these multiple offices for different candidates?

Clifton: No. We changed the heading of the campaign so that instead of "Olson for Governor Headquarters" it was "Democratic Headquarters. Olson for Governor, Downey for Senator, Patterson for Lieutenant-Governor," and so forth. So from then on, all literature put out was Democratic literature and had the name of every candidate who was a Democratic candidate in that district. Democratic candidates ran on a slate, so the office was not solely for Olson, or another candidate, but was for the Democratic slate.

My wife, very early, was in touch with the campaign manager for Downey and he agreed on this form of campaign. At first, there was a suspicion that the organization we were going to build up was for Olson only, but that wasn't so. Anyhow, the campaign for "Olson for Governor" was run that way. We just continued pretty much the same format of door to door, unpaid workers, and working out of poorly financed local headquarters--all with a great deal of labor support. And that's how my wife and I worked in the Olson campaign.

Of course my wife did have quite a few contacts during that campaign with the Northern California Democratic group. She became acquainted very well with all the people from one end of the state to the other, besides of course every Democratic congressman, state senator and assemblyman.

Fry: That's quite a good accounting of the Olson election campaign.

What was the political make-up of the 59th district and how important was it in Southern California?

Clifton: The east-west boundaries of it went from Vine Street and Rossmoor clear to the west end of Beverly Hills; and the south-north boundaries were from Pico up to Mulholland Drive. It included most of what is known as Hollywood and all of Beverly Hills. It was very conservative and was represented by Charles Lyon, a Republican. He normally received both the Democratic and Republican nominations for assemblyman. He ended up as the speaker of the assembly. He had been speaker of the assembly during the [Frank F.] Merriam administration [1934-1938] and he was the chief target of the 1939 Philbrick report exposing lobbyists and the "contributions" to the lawyer-assemblymen of the legislature. Lyon was listed as receiving more fees than anyone else. Later on [1953] he got into some difficulties: he was convicted of an offense in liquor license transactions and ended up in jail. But good old Charlie Lyon was the top man in the legislature for years and years.

Fry: In this campaign for Olson, did you try to bring in any Republican voters in the general election?

Clifton: My memory is bad. Of course we did. Didn't Raymond Haight at that time run as a progressive candidate?

Fry: Yes, and he was greatly feared, according to Robert Burke, because he had splintered a Democratic campaign just before that.*

Clifton: My recollection is that after we contributed as much as we could into the Haight campaign, we figured it was splintering off votes from Republicans, not from Democrats.

Fry: He was a progressive who had crossfiled.

Clifton: Yes. And actually I believe that sub rosa the Olson organization helped in the Haight campaign. In fact, I know one man who worked in our campaign who actively worked for or helped Haight.

Fry: Did this campaign exclude many of the old-line Democrats, or was it a pretty good coalition of Democrats across the political spectrum?

Clifton: There were very few old-line Democrats. Of course, a lot of the Democratic office-holders and assemblymen were holdovers who had been elected in the EPIC campaign. You might call them "old line" but most of them pretty much stemmed from the Sinclair campaign,

*Burke, Robert E. Olson's New Deal for California, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).

Clifton: because before that there weren't too many Democratic assemblymen. Of course, after the primary election, a Democrat who wanted to be elected didn't go into the Republican campaign headquarters; he went along with the Democratic organization. He became part of a unified Democratic campaign, and had his literature carried by the Olson organization. But as far as any so-called money bags, or anything like that, I don't think they contributed much if anything to the Olson election campaign.

Fry: Burke states that the Olson campaign was for once a Democratic campaign that was well financed.

Clifton: I disagree with that because there just wasn't any money. There were no paid workers and outside of that one contribution of the use of space in the office building at Seventh and Hill, I can't think of any large amounts of money contributed. It wasn't flowing freely at all. I disagree with that.

Fry: He mentions the figure of something like \$90 thousand, or a little more than that. So I guess if there were large contributions, they wouldn't be considered large by today's standards. It's a little hard to judge.

Clifton: Today it would be a drop in the bucket, but by the standards of those days it was not a well-financed campaign. I told you about the Olson campaign. There was just no money at all. Most of the money that flowed through my wife's hands, that is into the Democratic headquarters, was given to the campaign out in the districts. Roughly forty per cent of the vote in California was in Los Angeles County, so the district campaign was very important. Twenty-five bucks a week for the top man in a district organization was not very much, and probably not all of them got that.

Let me give you an example. When they coordinated the campaigns for Downey, Patterson, and so forth, they had to take in some of Downey's people and some of Patterson's people into the downtown headquarters. They had been paid people and expected to be paid. What little money we had went to pay for them. Well, by the time the coordinated campaign was set up, there wasn't enough money to pay them and buy campaign necessities, such as stamps. My wife complained bitterly that here we had these "bums" on the payroll who were supposed to be doing work and we didn't have enough money for stamps. Her suggestion was that the campaign should go back to how it was in the primary; everybody should

Clifton: volunteer and we could get rid of this bunch of no-goods who weren't doing anything and were just on the payroll with nothing to do.

Fry: Did that happen?

Clifton: Yes. Well as I said, in the early part after the primary campaign, they didn't have enough money to buy stamps, so they did get rid of most of those people. But I mean that's an example of how there wasn't much money for the campaign. This was even after Olson was nominated in the primary and had a chance in the general election, which always enhances the ability to raise funds.

Fry: What were some of the campaign issues? One of them was the "ham-and-eggs" issue.

Clifton: I don't recall that as being much of an issue at that time. That was a continuation of the Townsend plan and ended up in some sort of a scheme called "ham and eggs," that is money for elderly people. The slogan was: "We want our ham and eggs." But I don't think that was a big issue in the Olson campaign for governor. Apparently Olson tried to prevent its being an issue because he didn't want to alienate all the old people that were backing it; but he didn't really agree with the "ham and eggs" plan.

Fry: There was a group called California Federation for Political Unity. And because the former EPIC head, Reuben Borough, was the head of the C.F.P.U., I wondered if this was an electoral group of left-over EPIC volunteers?

Clifton: Right after Sinclair was defeated they organized this committee for political unity to hold the Sinclair coalition together. Borough was the head of it, and William J. Plunkert was very much a part of it. But it dwindled in the four years during Merriam's administration and by the time that Olson ran, it was not a very potent organization at all. A lot of us EPICs went to the first few meetings, since they said they were going to hold the Democrats together, but it dwindled out. In my recollection, it wasn't much of an organization. It was kind of like the Americans for Democratic Action, which started out very well and then gradually dwindled. It looked like it was going to be a gathering place for all liberals but it dwindled in importance.

The Role of Communists

Fry: What was the role of the Communists in the 1942 Olson campaign?

Fry: They were much more a part of the political scene then than they are now.

Clifton: The Communists undoubtedly were there and in this Sinclair campaign. And they were undoubtedly in all campaigns at that time because the strategy of the Communists was to infiltrate into all political organizations and labor unions. So undoubtedly they were in the campaign, but they were in there without the knowledge of the volunteer workers. Undoubtedly they got into a number of the organizations and got to be the heads of them under their "organized minority" theories. But not knowingly, that is I don't think Olson knew of it, or his campaign managers, but undoubtedly it was true that there were Communists all over the place in liberal organizations, and in even some conservative organizations.

Fry: They were pretty hard workers in a campaign.

Clifton: Yes, very definitely. They worked hard and long and were leaders, but unbeknownst to the other people. They were not identified at all. And from my experience with them, they never talked about communist ideas, or Communism as such, or taking over, or revolution--contrary to some of the current revolutionary talk of some of these young groups and radical black groups and SDS--Students for a Democratic Society. There was nothing like that. They were for certain things and against certain things; they professed to be against poverty and against fascism and against discrimination and things like that, just like all the liberals were. But we didn't know them as Communists and actually didn't believe it when broad charges of Communism were made.

Fry: One of Merriam's favorite themes was charging Olson with irresponsible radicalism, and this appears from today's vantage point to have been a very serious blow to the campaign. I wonder why it wasn't such a serious blow then?

Clifton: I don't know. I remember a meeting of the Dies Committee, the precursor to the House Committee on Un-American Activities in Washington, D.C. There were people here and there who testified before that committee who got in a few pot shots at Olson. It was a one-day flash hearing or something like that. Some people may have remembered it of course, and it may have had some negative influence, but I don't think it hurt that much. There were lots of charges here and there about Communism. I don't think it ever made a big impact. The accusations, however, were bitterly resented by all liberal Democrats, because we felt that the charges were entirely untrue and that they were politically

Clifton: inspired smears. We were working Democrats at that time and had been head over heels in Democratic organizations and so forth, so we felt that the charges were just political smears. We knew that we were not Communists, and didn't know any Communists.

Fry: Later on, charges like that were quite successful, such as when Richard Nixon ran against Helen Gahagan Douglas for the U.S. Senate in 1950.

Clifton: Yes, that defeated her.

Fry: Was there more of a voter response to the charge of Communism at that time than there was in '38?

Clifton: Yes, I think so, because of the sensational "exposé" by Nixon of Witter Chambers and the Pumpkin Papers.

Now that you mention it, you might also recall the attacks made on the Truman administration as having been infiltrated with Communism. Good old Harry's reply, and I believe he was very apt in describing it, was that the charges were a "red herring." And they really were.

Just to get in my two bits about this time, Harry S. Truman did more to stop Communism, and absolutely stopped the takeover of the world by Communists, than any other individual. He organized NATO, he organized the relief programs in Europe, the Hoover commission, and things like that. He stopped Communism cold by preventing the collapse of the European governments and the hunger and poverty on which Communism feeds. And then he moved in to aid Turkey to prevent a takeover there by the Communists and then into Korea. He moved quickly against Communism. He was the greatest foe of Communism in the world, and stopped it by his aid to Europe, by NATO, and by a direct military confrontation. Good old Harry S. Truman did more to stop Communism than practically anyone. And I think that without his actions, the world would have collapsed under Communism. Despite this, Nixon and other Republicans continually tried to label Truman "soft" on Communism.

Fry: The charges against Truman's Democratic administration of being pro-Communist were ridiculous.

Clifton: Yes. While we're on this subject, let me add some information. In 1940 [Franklin D.] Roosevelt ran for another term as president,

Clifton: and just in the middle of the campaign at that time, the Russians had joined with Hitler and the Nazis. The Russians moved into Finland and they signed the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact, under which the two countries collaborated to work together. Now up to that time, the Communists had been anti-Nazi. They thought that Hitler was going to move in on them, so the Communists here and in Russia were the greatest foes of Fascism, Nazism, and Hitler.

We were all anti-Nazi and anti-fascist. The Communist party line was also anti-Hitler and anti-fascist. All of a sudden the Communists quit being against Hitler, and tried to stop U.S. aid to England, France and the Low Countries. This, of course, would have meant the collapse of the English and the French defense against Hitler. And so for a short while after the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact, the Communists in the United States attacked President Roosevelt for his aid to those countries. The Communists in the United States reflected, of course, the Communist world position on those countries and were against Roosevelt.

Now, it was at that time that Roosevelt was running for another presidential term and Olson was the Democratic national committeeman in California. He got together a [delegation] slate for Roosevelt for another term, but at the same time there was an opposition slate in the primary election campaign which selected as its nominal head Ellis Patterson, who was the lieutenant-governor, and who opposed President Roosevelt in the primary election. So Olson headed up the Roosevelt re-election campaign and the Communists in California were against Roosevelt because of his aid to France, England and the Low Countries and were for this Patterson slate of delegates.

Of course Roosevelt was renominated and was elected again, and then Hitler turned around and attacked Russia, and immediately the Communist party line world-wide and in the United States became anti-Nazi, pro-English, pro-France and pro-Low Countries again. Roosevelt, who had consistently opposed the Nazis, again got the backing of the American Communists because the new Communist party line was again anti-Hitler. Olson was very definitely anti-Nazi and realized, of course, that the opposition to Roosevelt at that time followed the Communist party line. He was as anti-Communist as much as anyone could be, when the chips were down and when we realized what they were trying to do.

Fry: In the local situation, did Olson lose the support of the Communists and the left-wing liberals who weren't Communists when he failed to support the administrators of the State Relief Administration?

William Plunkert was the first one. I think he received charges of being Communist and Olson did fire him.

Clifton: Yes. Let me give you a little background there. Under the state constitution, all state employees, with the exception of just a handful (maybe fifty in all) were under the state civil service. However, when the State Relief Administration was formed by a constitutional amendment under Merriam's administration; the attorney general at that time had ruled that it superceded (being later in time) the provisions about civil service. No one apparently realized that except the Communists.

Somewhere along the line during this Patterson campaign, when we had all the attacks on Roosevelt, there was a general realization that there had been an infiltration in the Democratic party by the Communists since they were all attacking the head of the party: Roosevelt. And they stood out like flies on a white wall; they were not real Democrats when they were opposing the head of the party, President Roosevelt. And of course, people like myself and my wife who had worked in the grass roots organizations had an awfully hard time fighting these people within the organizations. They almost took over the Young Democrats organization and it was only by heroic efforts that they took back control of the Young Democrats from the Communists who had infiltrated. The same applied to some of the labor unions that had been infiltrated, and gradually there was a throwing out of the Communists there.

Clifton: Anyhow, Olson definitely was not a Communist and had no connections with them. Certainly the record is clear that on the important issue of the world situation he was diametrically opposed to the Communist party line during the time of the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact.

Fry: I'm a little unclear about Ellis Patterson's disenchantment in 1940. Didn't he organize a delegation for President Roosevelt? According to my notes, he was backed by Carey McWilliams, the CIO, and Sam Houston Allen, head of the Los Angeles branch of the State Relief Program, who had been under fire of Communist charges.

Clifton: No, Patterson first agreed to go on the Roosevelt delegation formed by Olson. Then he withdrew and ran for President against Roosevelt and had his own delegation. You can get a list of those delegates on the ballot.

Olson, with my wife and Paul Peek, the then-chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee--I believe--(at least he was the then-secretary of state in California) were forming a Roosevelt delegation for another term for Roosevelt, and Patterson sent in a telegram: "Harmony has not been achieved in the delegation," and he withdrew and formed his own organization. As lieutenant-governor he was offered and accepted a spot on the delegation and then withdrew from it to form the Patterson for President slate with anti-Roosevelt groups backing, some of them associated with the infiltrated labor unions in the CIO and AF of L. The CIO headquarters for a while off Slausen Avenue in Los Angeles was known as the "little Kremlin." We knew of the infiltration of some labor unions by Communists. This was at the time that they were attacking Roosevelt, and it was at the time of the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact.

Clifton: For a background of that, Mayor [Samuel W.] Yorty who was at that time an assemblyman, head of the Un-American Activities Committee in the assembly. He attacked the Patterson for President slate, and line by line and person by person called attention to what they were doing in opposing President Roosevelt. Sam Yorty incidentally took a lot of pot shots at Olson while on this anti-Communist crusade, which I really agreed with. However, instead of going to Olson and saying, "Look, you have been infiltrated in the State Relief Administration and you should do something about it," he went to the public press. Here you have a Democratic assemblyman attacking a Democratic governor. That was at a time when I believe that Olson was not aware of the truth of the fact that the State Relief Administration had been infiltrated.

Fry: I still don't quite see what changed Patterson, so that he sent that telegram.

Clifton: Well, the Communists probably used their common tactic of inflating a person's ego, and maybe also convinced him that Roosevelt was no longer the right Democratic candidate. The Patterson campaign literature attacked Roosevelt and asserted that he had deserted the "New Deal" precepts and that he had deserted the people on relief; there were charges such as that Roosevelt gave people "guns instead of butter," and things like that. Of course I don't believe that everybody that was on the Patterson party slate was a Communist. Possibly a lot of them really believed that Roosevelt had changed and was more interested in military rather than humanitarian aid and had "deserted the New Deal."

Fry: Were you involved in the selection of this slate?

Clifton: No, but my wife was. My wife sat down with Olson and various other people and they put together this slate.

Fry: Yes, I believe she told me about this in her interview.

Clifton: I was on the sidelines. I was working in the Department of Finance, but I knew of it through my wife, of course. Melvyn Douglas was the head of the Roosevelt re-election campaign in Southern California, based in Los Angeles. He headed the

Clifton: campaign and my wife was there. Douglas was the titular head of it, and he was at the headquarters every day. He was wholeheartedly for Roosevelt, especially at the time of the attacks on Roosevelt by the Communists.

Douglas had been the head, and for a while very prominent in the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League, which was later changed in name to the League Against War and Fascism. Also, Douglas had been the head of the Motion Picture Democratic Committee. Both of these groups were extremely liberal at the time, and especially the Anti-Nazi League, which had been infiltrated by the Communists; after all, the Communists were against the Nazis.

When the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact was signed, groups formed within the Hollywood Anti-Nazi group and the Motion Picture Democratic Committee which were no longer against the Nazis, but rather were now against England, France, and Roosevelt. At that time Melvyn Douglas and Phillip Dunne, a prominent motion-picture writer, introduced resolutions within the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League, and I think also in the Motion Picture Democratic Committee, condemning Russia for its attack on Finland. The resolutions were turned down by the board of directors, so Douglas and Dunne resigned. They did it just to point out what the Communists within those groups were doing. Douglas was wholeheartedly for Roosevelt, against the Nazis and against the Communists.

Olson was named as the national committeeman by the Democratic delegation for Roosevelt, which always named the national committeeman and committeewoman. They couldn't make Melvyn the national committeeman instead of Olson, but since he had been so active, the job of national committeewoman was given to Helen Gahagan Douglas [his wife], and that was her real introduction into politics.

Fry: Was she much of a political person before then?

Clifton: No.

Fry: So this was a way to connect Melvyn with the national committee.

Clifton: Well, no. She was a prominent person, a very dynamic person, and she was well-known. But she hadn't appeared on the political scene very much before that time, but it looked like a good idea--her husband was the head of the campaign committee.

Fry: She told me over the telephone last year that Melvyn was responsible for her entry into politics.

Clifton: Well, that's how she got to be national committeewoman.

II ADMINISTRATIVE ADVISOR FOR THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE

Fry: Let's go back to when you were appointed by Olson. Can you tell us how that particular slot in the Director of Finance office was chosen for you?

Clifton: Phil Gibson was the Director of Finance, and he and my wife had worked very closely during the Olson election campaign. There was a vacancy in his office as the administrative advisor. The position required a lawyer who had practiced law. The man who had had the job had resigned from it. It was under the civil service, but Phil Gibson had the authority to appoint someone to a temporary position until a civil service examination was given. So he appointed me as administrative advisor in the Department of Finance. I got the job, but then I had to take the civil service examination to retain it, and there was a lot of competition. All the members of the legislative counsel's office, and most of the other lawyers in the state offices took the examination, both oral and written. I did get the permanent appointment, but I got it through the examination process.

Although I performed the duties of administrative advisor to the Department of Finance, I also did all legal research for Governor Olson. As soon as bills started being passed by the legislature, they came into my office. I set up a system for digesting the bills and the material that came for and against them. During the four years that Olson was in office, all bills passed by the legislature came to me. With a couple of lawyers, former members of the legislative counsel's office, I digested all the bills. Then I would take them in to the governor, usually to his mansion at night, to discuss them and make a definite

Clifton: recommendation for signing or vetoing them. I, or the other lawyers, would also draft veto messages for the governor. I don't mean to imply that I acted as the governor or anything like that. He was a very, very fine lawyer, and had been a state senator for four years, so he knew more about legislation than I did. We read every bill that was passed and sent to the governor; we read them line by line, comma by comma, and as I say, made recommendations and drafted the veto messages.

Fry: Were you judging these primarily from the standpoint of budgetary considerations and their constitutionality, or would you also think of the political considerations?

Clifton: All phases of them. However, the only criteria was whether the bill would make a good law--good for the people. But of course, the majority of them had no political significance at all. As far as my recommendations, and those of the members of the staff, it was a question of whether they promoted good government, good for the people, and whether the bills were constitutional or not. There were very few of them that had any political consideration, maybe one or two of them such as the bill that was to halt certain types of strikes and secondary boycotts. I helped draft the veto message for that, but it was passed over Olson's veto. I viewed that bill as being unconstitutional and it was later thrown out by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. But very few of them had political considerations like that.

A lot of the measures that came along were special-interest bills: for instance, bills which would make it illegal to sell oranges in bulk. All oranges would have had to be put into boxes. Other bills outlawed the advertising of stated prices for dentistry and stuff like this, definitely proposed to aid certain groups or an "economic scene." If you want to point those out as being political, then they were political; but things like that were really not political.

III ASSESSING OLSON'S ADMINISTRATION AND OPPOSITION

The Economy Bloc

Fry: That brings me to a question that I wanted to ask you. Nine Democrats were included in what was called the economy bloc in the state legislature during Olson's term. I have their names here. Each one, I suppose, was opposing Olson for some reason.*

Clifton: I'll give you a picture of the legislature during that time. Some people elected to the legislature gradually fell under the influence of the lobbyists: the lobbyists for the electrical companies, the lobbyists for the transportation groups, for the trucking interests, for the big orange producers, for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and for various others. The lobbyists had then, and still have, a very large role in the legislative picture here: in introducing legislation, of course in killing legislation, and in watching out for their various groups. Each of these lobbies contributed to election campaigns. And then of course the lobbyists took advantage of that; they had an "in" to the legislators' offices. As a legislator got used to his job, he kept being pressured by these various lobbyists. They would take him to lunch or give him tickets to this and that, and they contributed to his campaign, and so forth. Gradually, a legislator would find himself listening to these lobbyists.

*Names of economy bloc: Jeanette E. Daley, San Diego; Earl D. Desmond, Sacramento; Clinton J. Fulcher, Lookout; Chester F. Gannon, Sacramento; Gordon H. Garland, Woodlake; Joseph P. Gilmore, San Francisco; Seth Millington, Gridley; Rodney L. Turner, Delano; Clyde A. Watson, Orange, Ernest O. Voigt, Los Angeles.

Clifton: Then certain lobbyists cooperated together in opposing or furthering legislation. In other words, if a lobbyist for a certain industry or group had influence with a legislator, then the lobbyist, say for Pacific Gas and Electric, would get him to work on a bill helping Pacific Gas and Electric. P G & E wanted the other lobby's man, so they would trade influence that way. The special interest groups were usually against the general public interest--against what is best for the people. There was a regular, continual fight between the two interests. There was cooperation between these various special interest groups.

As a state senator, Olson had been keenly aware of the lobbyists' influence and so forth and had opposed these special interest groups. When he became governor, he immediately clashed with them. Members of the economy bloc were people, in my opinion, whose ties were too close to these groups and represented special interests. So the economy bloc and Olson were on opposite sides of the fence. Now some people in the bloc were from his own party, the Democratic party. But they were people, in my opinion, who had fallen by the wayside after being elected, so it was very easy for them to listen to the lobbyists and to their blandishments. Therefore, they joined this economy bloc of the Republicans which was phony to charge everything that the governor did as being spendthrift, throwing away the people's money, and all that sort of thing.

In my opinion, the economy bloc's position was wholly phony, but it was very effective, and it resulted eventually in the defeat of the governor. For instance, the economy bloc attacked appropriations to the State Relief Administration. Although it had been formed under a Republican governor, by a constitutional amendment, which was in effect at that time, nevertheless, the apportioning of relief through the State Relief Administration continued under the administration of Olson. Of course there were people not as belligerent as they are now but hungrier who still needed funds for relief. This was before World War II and the changing unemployment picture. And of course Olson had to go to the legislature for money for state relief. There arose the direct charge that he was giving away money to people who would not work. That charge didn't apply then nearly as much as it does now, because we really don't have unemployment now in 1972 and it's much easier to

Clifton: get jobs, but then we really had unemployment. But this economy bloc with its continual opposition to Olson made it quite miserable for the governor.

Olson had to go to the legislature with the budget, including money for the State Relief Administration. Instead of appropriating the money for two years for relief, as before (California had a biennial budget at that time), they appropriated just enough money for relief to get by for a few months. Then Olson had to call the legislature into special session and ask them again for money, and again in the newspapers, which published everything against Olson they wanted to, there appeared charges that he was giving away public tax money to these bums on welfare and stuff like that. And he would have to ask the legislature for money and they would appropriate enough money for three or four more months. Then he would have to call in a special session and again have to ask them for money for relief because the money would run out. I think there were seven special sessions during his term of office. I helped him formulate and draft the items that he proposed at the special sessions.

The charges of the economy bloc, in my opinion, were wholly phony and unfounded. Nevertheless, in my recollection of [Earl] Warren's campaign speeches for governor in 1942, he threw in all this business that people had been hearing about all the "extravagance" in government, "we need a business administration," and all that stuff; in other words, he used all the ammunition which had been formed by the so-called economy bloc. That was the main opposition to Olson. Although there were Communists holding some jobs in the relief administration, I think there was definitely a very serious unemployment and relief problem then. And of course I think they were getting a pittance at that time, compared to modern relief. What I am trying to say is that although the relief administration was formed and operated during a Republican administration, when Olson was governor the economy bloc tried to make it appear that giving relief was his idea!

Fry: Did your job by any chance involve the sort of legal advice that a governor would ordinarily get from his attorney general?

Earl Warren As Attorney General

Clifton: Oh, once in a while the governor would ask me, "Can I do this or that," and I would do some research on it. But it was only in a very few instances. I read in your notes that there were some charges by Warren that he was angered at Olson because he had been bypassed by the governor in giving him legal advice and things like that. Again, here and there I did some research for the governor which the attorney general might ordinarily do. I don't think Olson trusted Warren very much because they were on opposite sides of the political fence for years and years. I think that Warren sort of cooperated in the opposition to Olson throughout his whole administration. He was in the wings waiting to run against Olson.

On one definite occasion Warren did not represent Olson, and I did come into the picture in the business of giving him advice. It was after the attack on Santa Barbara, when the United States was either in World War II or close to being in the war.

Fry: When the Japanese submarine shelled Santa Barbara after Pearl Harbor?

Clifton: Yes. In one of the calls for a special legislative session, Olson had asked for an appropriation for money for the state guard. And the legislature acting on a purely political motive provided for a small appropriation but simultaneously cut down numbers of the officers in the state guard. This was at a time when we were actually at war! They actually cut the numbers of the state guard! They were afraid that Olson was going to use the state guard for political purposes, by making appointments.

A number of the state guard officers were highly incensed, and wanted to have a referendum on the bill to see whether or not they could cut it down. But it had been made as an emergency measure to take effect within thirty days, so that it couldn't be stopped by a referendum, so I cooperated in their effort. As a matter of fact, I started a suit for them,

Clifton: calling for the state supreme court to rule that it could not be an emergency measure. I argued that an emergency couldn't go into effect if it created or abolished any office. We also argued that the legislature couldn't abolish offices at the special session of the legislature, because we had only asked for a fiscal appropriation.

There were a couple of state guard officers that started a similar suit down in the Los Angeles Superior Court against the state, the governor, and the state controller, to prevent this bill from going into effect. Warren, of course, ordinarily represented the state and the governor in all suits. But here he was going to represent the governor in defending a bill that Olson had opposed and felt was unconstitutional. So Olson said, "None of that for me," and asked me to appear and state his views. I went before the superior court and said that the governor didn't want the attorney general to present the governor's position that the bill was constitutional, when he really felt that it was unconstitutional. In effect, perhaps, I appeared for the governor, but that's the only instance. As I say, it was because Olson didn't want the attorney general to misrepresent his position.

Anyhow, this legislation came before the state supreme court, and the court ruled against us. It held that the bill was constitutional and that it did come within the purview of the proclamation calling a special session. As to the question of whether or not it abolished a state office, the court ruled that an officer of the state guard was not a person holding a state office. They pulled this right out of the thin air, that the drafters of the state constitution, in saying that a state office could not be created or abolished by an emergency measure, couldn't have meant officers of the state guard or anyone connected therewith, since they had to be in a fluid situation. That was probably not what the drafters of the constitution had in mind.

My opposition to that part of the ruling was based on the section of the state constitution immediately preceeding this one about abolishing offices. It states that no person holding a state office could also hold a federal office excepting an officer of the state guard. In other words, they spelled it

Clifton: out that an officer of the state guard was a state officer who could hold a federal post. I argued that under the legal *maxim expresio unis exclusio alterios*--in other words, the one, the other is excluded--that having once expressed in the preceeding section that it was a state office, they turned around and under the next section for that purpose they held that it was not a state office. Anyhow, the state supreme court decided against me on that issue. Incidentally, I believe that Olson was in the supreme court room at the time the decision came down, and he was fit to be tied because the decision was against him. He felt it was wrong, and it was. It was a horrible political situation. The idea of limiting the number of people who could be in the state guard at the time the United States was at war or on the verge of being in war was wrong. In other words, the legislature actually did hamstring the governor, purely for political purposes!

Fry: Was Warren there too?

Clifton: Warren was the attorney general and he defended the law cutting the state guard and beat me on it.

Fry: He was actually handling the defense personally?

Clifton: Well, no. James Oakley, a deputy attorney general, handled it for him. That is the only instance where the governor and Warren actually could be said to have directly disagreed or tangled. Of course, it didn't come out prominently in the public press that Olson was against the bill and Warren defended it.

Fry: Was the controversy itself in the press?

Clifton: Obviously.

Fry: What about the appointment of Professor Max Radin to the state supreme court, which Warren opposed. Were you in on that at all?

Clifton: No. I knew something of it, but all I knew was that we felt that Radin was an outstanding lawyer, that he should have been appointed, and that through a smear campaign he was knocked down. But I don't know much about that controversy.

Fry: Olson made a statement early in the 1942 gubernatorial campaign that he was going to get his legal advice from private lawyers, and I thought that maybe you were one of them.

Clifton: [Laughter] Well, maybe he did say that. It's quite possible. The background of that of course was that Warren and Olson were so much on the outs in relation to their political and other philosophies. Warren had been Mr. Republican for years. Let me get into this quickly because I haven't got too much time.

Fry: It was a very prominent issue.

Clifton: Warren beat Olson for governor in 1942, and his campaign, which I think employed the public relations firm, Clem Whitaker and Associates, cooked up out of thin air that Warren was a non-partisan. I guess this was the biggest fraud ever because of the predominantly Democratic registration in the state. It was forced on the public because Warren had been the leading Republican in the state for twenty years. He had headed all of the Hoover campaigns; he had been on the ballot as the Republican nominee--the ostensible nominee for United States President on the Republican ticket; he was Mr. Republican. For years he was the top Republican in the state and the idea of him being a non-partisan was the phoniest thing possible.

Warren also picked up the tactics of the economy bloc in the attacks on Olson during the campaign. And I want you to check this if you are interested in it. At the time that Olson was governor, there was a biennial budget, and there were supposed to be biennial sessions of the legislature. In other words, every two years. And if I remember correctly, the budget at that time was \$250 million a year for the two years. After Warren's election as governor on an economy-in-government platform, the budget changed radically. After he was in a year or two they changed it to an annual budget instead of biennial. But inside of eight years, the budget of the state under Warren had increased tremendously. You can get the budget itself and the figures, and don't get misled by the change in budgeting to an annual budget. And I believe that under Warren in about eight years it rose to eight times as much as it was under Olson.

As to charges of bureaucracy and building up the public payroll by political appointments and so forth, I think if you

Clifton: check Warren's administration you will find that the number of state employees increased to tremendous numbers, far out of line with the state population, some sixty percent! I think where Olson had three secretaries, it wasn't very long before Warren had ten secretaries! I'm not talking about stenographers; I'm talking about secretaries. And so the promises of economy in government and cutting down numbers of state employees were not fulfilled by Warren.

When [James] Roosevelt ran against Warren for governor in 1950, I suggested to Mr. Roosevelt at that time that he take these budget figures and show the lack of fulfillment of the Warren promises to economize in government and cut down the bureaucracy and so forth. But Roosevelt didn't seem to feel that this could be a good campaign issue. He felt that businessmen who were theoretically interested in economy and stuff like that would vote for Warren anyhow. Of course, Warren was their man, and Roosevelt felt that he would be appealing to interests who wouldn't listen to anything he would say. This was never made a campaign issue in 1950.

But if you're really interested in what Warren did, look at the budget and compare it to the Olson budget; look at the number of state employees to see whether or not there was a so-called "business administration." I think you will find that as far as the state budget and number of state employees, there was no attempt made at economy.

Fry: Was Warren a gathering point for the opposition to Olson while Olson was governor, for instance during the recall threats?

Clifton: I don't believe so.

Fry: There was, according to the Examiner, a move to draft Warren as a candidate in case recall came about but I didn't know how serious it was.

Clifton: There may have been a ham and eggs recall. But this was one financed by a couple of real estate people (I can't remember their names); it was the real one and it was going great guns. But when Olson filed a few of the petitions for recall, that started the time running, because they had only ninety days to get the full number of needed signatures in, they couldn't get them in.

The Central Valley Project

Clifton: The biggest defeat for Olson was of course over the Central Valley Project. He had sponsored legislation to set up state or municipally owned electrical systems, such as the Department of Water and Power in Los Angeles, to use the power from the Boulder Dam. Pacific Gas and Electric fought that, of course, because, as they said, it would be municipally owned. By almost a miracle, Olson's legislation got through the state senate, which was very conservative; but when it got to the state assembly, it failed to be adopted by one vote. One of our renegade Democrats sat silent without casting a vote, so that measure didn't get the required votes in the assembly and failed to pass. My wife said that the most disgusting thing she ever saw was when that bill failed and the legislators all rushed to see the lobbyists in the assembly gallery to shake the hand of the chief lobbyist for Pacific Gas and Electric. They had all collaborated with him, trading their influence and so forth. So, as I say, this is a picture of the situation of lobbyists and the effect on the legislature. Those were the people that Olson was fighting; and these lobby-controlled legislators were those who constituted the economy bloc.

Incidentally, to illustrate the integrity of Olson, the legislature passed a bill to set up a system of licensing gambling or licensing bookmakers. Olson vetoed it and I probably wrote the veto message for it. The lobbyists for the bookies approached Olson and told him they could get him votes for his Central Valley Project if he would sign the bookie bill. Olson could have had the Central Valley Project, which was nearest and dearest to his heart, if it weren't for his feeling that the bookie bill was bad. I can recall another instance where

Clifton: one of the top people of Olson's administration asked me to tell Olson that a certain man wanted him to sign a bill. I told the governor and Olson's reply to me was: "I don't give a goddamn who is for the bill. What does it do?" I don't know whether he signed it or vetoed it, but I believe he vetoed it.

Fry: That was an oil bill?

Clifton: I think it had to do with oil, but I cannot remember if it did. But anyhow, Olson in my opinion was very fair. He was a dedicated public servant and a man of very great principle. But he went down to defeat, as I said, in a fraudulent campaign that Warren was "non-partisan" and that Warren would run the state government more economically than Olson.

[Interruption]

Fry: On these bills that were vetoed--

Clifton: I recall a bill which was passed to abolish grand juries entirely, which Olson vetoed.

Fry: Oh, it wasn't to limit their power?

Clifton: No. In my recollection, it was introduced by Bob Kenny, because somewhere along the line some grand jury had attacked some political figure. Probably politics was involved in it. To retaliate and to prevent a grand jury here and there from getting into the public press by attacking someone, Kenny put in a bill to abolish grand juries. Olson vetoed the bill, and in the veto message (which was not written by me but was written by Bob Montgomery who was one of the lawyers helping me in the matter) he set forth a long history of grand juries and the need of them for the protection of the public. Anyhow, that was just one bill and he did veto that bill. But I don't think that was a major bill in a political sense, but it would certainly have changed things--that is, abolished grand juries, a traditional part of our judicial system.

The Atkins Oil Bill

Fry: There was a CIO oil worker's bill, the Atkins oil bill, to set

Fry: up the Oil Conservation Commission, which Bob Kenny opposed. Apparently the big oil companies wanted it and it did pass. But at the time Kenny opposed, he was supposed to be the floor leader for Olson--and Olson wanted the bill.

Clifton: I don't remember Kenny's position on the bill which passed and was signed by Olson. Here's the situation again regarding the Olson oil bill. It was supposed to be a conservation measure, and that is why Olson was for it. Normally, when companies searched for oil, they would quite often drill many wells within a certain area and pump it out quickly. Some people figured they had to drill quickly or the other guy would get the oil. There was tremendous competition and there still is, to get into oil pools. As a conservation measure this oil bill specified that there should only be so much drilling depending upon acreage and so forth. And a lot of these large oil companies supported it. But it was our natural resource and it was going fast.

This resulted in a battle between the oil interests, those having long-term leases who could wait for years before drilling, and those who had short-term leases and who had to drill and get it out quickly. It was passed as a conservation measure because of this tremendous depletion of oil as a result of cut-throat competition to get in there, drill for oil, get it out quickly, blow away the gas, and so forth. It was supported by the Navy Department and Harold Ickes, the head of the U.S. Department of the Interior under President Roosevelt. He was for it, the Navy was for it, and Edward Pauley was for it. It was opposed by a very well-financed bunch. I think William B. Keck and Bill Smith of the [independent] oil interests were against it.

Fry: They were the little independents.

Clifton: They called themselves the "little independents," but they put up a much bigger campaign fund than the others, and were big oil interests. I believe various oil companies were for or against the Atkins measure depending on whether they had long-term or short-term leases, not whether they were big or small. In my opinion, it was a good conservation measure. Olson was for the measure but it was defeated on a referendum, mainly as a result of charges that Standard Oil was for it.

Clifton: Ellis Patterson headed up the campaign against the Atkins oil bill.

Fry: On the floor or in the referendum?

Clifton: No, not on the floor; in the referendum after it had been passed.

You had asked me in a letter what made Jack B. Tenney, an assemblyman from Los Angeles, switch from left to right and join Yorty. Tenney had organized and headed in 1941 the California State Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities. Then Yorty came along and took it up after Tenny had started it. As I recall the story, Tenney had been the president of the Los Angeles local of the musicians' union and he blamed the Communists for his defeat when he ran for that position again in 1939. He got a view into the Communist picture and developed a bitter antagonism toward Communists from his own personal experience of being thrown out as union president by the Communists. And you ask, "What made Tenney switch from left to right?" He didn't. Excepting on the Communist issue.

Fry: I can see how that would cause it.

Do you want to go into the microphone and dictaphone issue, for instance the one that was under Paul Peek's desk when Gordon Garland took over as speaker? Was that really connected to Olson's office.

The Olson-to-Peek Telephone Story

Clifton: No. After Garland defeated Paul Peek as speaker of the assembly at a special session of the legislature, Gordon Garland made a big dramatic gesture of pulling out a telephone from the podium to demonstrate that Peek was taking orders over the telephone from Olson. From my experience with Olson, although Peek and Olson agreed on everything, I'm sure they didn't quite do it by telephone into the speaker's podium. This was purely a gesture to show that there would be no more domination by the governor. But there was no question about the fact that Peek and Olson saw eye to eye, and in my opinion, rightfully so. They were both interested in the public interest, and against the things that Garland and the special interests represented.

Fry: This seems to be the same kind of thing that happened when Warren took over as governor; he had all of the dictaphone wires pulled out of his office. Do you remember that?

Clifton: I don't know anything about that. I never heard about any dictaphones in Olson's office. It's possible, but I never heard about any.

Fry: We've discussed most of the things that are connected to Warren. [Pause.]

Oh, the Japanese evacuation.

The 1940 Democratic state convention? All right.

IV THE 1940 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Clifton: In the 1940 convention, Roosevelt was running again for another term. The Patterson slate materialized, which was strictly carrying the Communist party line of opposition to Roosevelt because he was helping the English, the French, and the Low Countries. I've explained about that Patterson slate. I believe there were two other slates for the presidential nomination. I believe there was a conservative group.

Fry: Left over from William G. McAdoo's denunciation of the ham and eggs movement?

Clifton: No. I think there was a conservative group for Garner, the former vice-president, who was the titular head of this group. I think this was a very conservative group within the Democratic party that was opposing Roosevelt's liberal philosophy. I recall there was a ham and eggs candidate for president on the ballot too. During the campaign, and in addition to the conservatives opposing Roosevelt, there were the Communists supporting the Patterson group; the German-American Bundt, who were of course for the Nazis; the American isolationist group, which I believe went under the heading of America First against American involvement in the war. They weren't exactly pacifists, but their theory was that we shouldn't get involved in a war for various reasons. I remember Charles Lindburgh got involved in that group. Anyhow, that's enough on the campaign. Roosevelt was renominated and was re-elected.

Fry: Were you aware of Ickes coming out and kind of serving as a catalyst to bring about a slate called the "harmony slate," which included Peek, and Bill Malone, John Dockweiler, Olson and everybody like that?

Clifton: I knew of it, but Olson, as the titular head of his party, did make a real effort to include within the delegation for Roosevelt all facets of the party; and he pretty well did. There was no special reason why they should keep anyone out, no special reasons as I recall; but maybe there were some.

Fry: Did this big battle affect Olson politically?

Clifton: No, I don't think so, because by the time he ran for office again, the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact was a thing of the past, and the Communists were supporting the war against Hitler and so were for Roosevelt. So I don't think it had a big part in his defeat or his political future. However, within the Democratic party, many of us saw very clearly the infiltration by the Communists, and we didn't want it to happen again to the party. We all saw that picture very clearly.

V APPOINTMENT AS JUDGE

Fry: When were you appointed judge?

Clifton: Two days before Olson went out of office. A number of times during his administration, Olson said that he was going to appoint me as a judge, but when I tried to pin him down he always said he couldn't spare me. So after he was defeated, there were a couple of vacancies on the municipal court and a couple on the superior court in Los Angeles County. He put me on the municipal court as well as a couple of other people. Of course, he filled all the vacancies that he could before he went out of office. But anyhow, that's how I got on the municipal bench. I had worked closely with Olson and had expected an appointment, but he delayed it until the very last minute.

Fry: And you've been on the bench ever since?

Clifton: I served on the municipal bench for seventeen years during the administration of Warren. And then Governor [Edmund G.] Brown, another democrat, elevated me to the superior court, and I served there for six or seven years. I served twenty-five years in all on the municipal and superior benches, and then I retired and joined the Peace Corps.

While in the Peace Corps, I was assigned to Micronesia, and then after preliminary training for about six or eight weeks on an atoll in the Pacific, I was assigned to help the high court there. I was appointed as a temporary judge of the high court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and I served while in the Peace Corps as a member of the bench there, which was the highest court in Micronesia. The only difference

Clifton: was that I was paid eighty dollars a month subsistence in the Peace Corps and the other judges got from twenty-five to thirty thousand and living quarters, but I did the same work they did. When they were on home leave, I served as a trial judge and then also as an appellate court judge. So I've had twenty-five years experience in California as a municipal and superior court judge, and two years as a temporary judge of the high court of the Trust Territory.

Fry: That involved a whole new set of laws out in the Trust Territory. Wasn't that pretty different for you?

Clifton: Oh yes. But I didn't have any more problems with the appointment than any other American who served on the bench there and had to fit into the judicial system. I, of course, had had twenty-five years of judicial experience. In fact, I was the only judge prior to my appointment of the high court of Micronesia that had ever served in a judicial capacity before.

[Interruption]

VI REFLECTIONS ON WARREN AND ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE

Clifton: Let me add this information, which, of course, didn't occur to me but my wife reminded me of it. It's in relation to Warren's one-man one-vote principle. When he was governor, the legislature passed a redistricting bill in 1950 that they had to do every ten years, after the United States census. And that came on his desk with the reapportioning of the assembly, the senate, and the congressional districts. It was about as badly gerrymandered a bill that ever went through the legislature. My wife was one of a group of a hundred people who went before Warren to protest and ask that he veto the bill because it had been so badly gerrymandered by the Republicans. Laughlin Waters, who was later the United States attorney for the southern district, was the head of the reapportionment committee in the legislature.

It was a very badly gerrymandered bill, and that was pointed out by this group to Warren. Warren questioned Waters about it quite a bit. A lot of civic groups, or members of chambers of commerce from cities which had been cut in half by this redistricting, didn't like the bill and so forth. About a hundred people appeared before Warren. He gave them a full hearing all day long and they were very greatly encouraged by some of his questioning, pointing out the deficiencies of the bill. But unfortunately on the way home, after this hearing, they got the news report that the governor had signed the bill. The very same day he signed the bill, I think.

So although he came out for the one-man one-vote principle as a member of the Supreme Court, nevertheless, as a governor

Clifton: concerned with practical and political considerations, he signed this badly gerrymandered redistricting bill which worked against the one-man one-vote principle. Any gerrymandering usually results in making one district much larger than another in population.

For instance, over in Los Angeles, I think in the Democratic district represented by Chet Holifield, they put all the Democrats they could in that district because the Republicans knew he would win. So they put all the Democrats they could in it, and made a very big district. Then next door to that district, in Pasadena and Glendale, they made two small districts for the Republicans. So the Republicans with the same number of people had two congressmen and the Democrats, under Holifield, had one. Well, that's the type of thing that Warren created when he signed the bill. That's another thing I don't admire Warren for: He had an opportunity to oppose a gerrymandered bill, but politics being politics, he approved it instead of sticking to principles.

The tactic that was used to get the bill passed in the legislature was bringing a Democrat in and saying to him: "We've given you this district. You can win in this district. You vote for this bill and you will have a district that you can win. Don't worry about what the rest of the legislation does. As far as you're concerned, this is it. You vote for it or against it." So the guy would vote for it. That's how the Republicans got enough Democratic votes to get a gerrymandered bill through when they were not the controlling party in the legislature.

Fry: I see.

Clifton: They realized that some Democrats were going to win. As I say, this process of making a big Democratic district where the Democrat is a cinch to win insures a Republican victory in the neighboring and newly gerrymandered districts.

This gerrymandering created a lot of districts so that Republicans could win. If the Democrats were in power they could have done the same thing; and they have done it. I think the record shows that in some southern states some districts have been ten times as big as the other.

Fry: Do you think that there was a big change in Warren after he got on the Supreme court?

Clifton: Yes, I do. Very definitely. Particularly in matters of principle, where he wasn't affected by practical or political influence. For instance, he voted for the one-man one-vote principle. But where he and his fellow Republicans were affected, and he had the pressures as a governor from the Republican legislators and so forth, he was not independent, so he didn't act on principle. In my opinion, you could very well say that he deserted a matter of principle when he was governor. But really when you get down to it, men being what they are, most office holders would probably do the same thing. After all, it benefited his people and he believed in his people and their philosophies. "The end justifies the means."

Fry: In other civil rights issues and law and order issues, did you think he changed?

Clifton: The probability is that his views as the district attorney of Alameda County were different than they were as a Supreme Court Justice.

Fry: Thank you very much. This has been an extremely helpful and interesting interview.

Transcriber: Marilyn Fernandez

Final Typist: David Shoup

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Earl Warren Oral History Project

Roger Kent

A DEMOCRATIC LEADER LOOKS AT THE WARREN ERA

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry



Roger Kent (left) with Earl Warren and Sherman Kent, August 1970, at Kentfield for 40th anniversary of the Roger Kents and 100th anniversary of their house.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

As a member of one of California's most distinguished families, the memoirs of Roger Kent should ultimately become a rich compendium of the development of ecological preservation in the West (with his father as an early and effective practitioner), the suffrage battle for women (his mother was a leader in the crucial last years of that long campaign), and, perhaps most significantly, his life in the family of a California progressive congressman and as a leader himself in the Democratic party.

For the purposes of the present series, the interview outline includes only the Earl Warren years: Securities and Exchange Commission lawyer Kent's experiences with young District Attorney Warren; Kent as an unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Congress in 1948 and 1950; and his initial years as the chairman of the Democratic party from Northern California, 1954 to 1965. The latter two roles portray a living example of how a loyal party Democrat who respected the Republican candidate for governor resolves the ensuing political ambiguities.

The interview was held in Mr. Kent's law office on Montgomery Street in San Francisco. He was a willing interviewee and a gracious host, one who, after our telephone agreement as to topics, had given much thought to selecting the items most relevant to this series. In addition, he has remained a supportive friend of the project by serving as a door-opener for introductions to other political and judicial figures to be interviewed.

The transcript was sent to him for his emendations and additions, which he dispatched quickly even though the campaigns of 1972 were discouraging any additional tasks at the time. In fact, for the same reason, there was some delay in getting the pictures from the party headquarters, but Kent persisted and the photographs finally materialized.

Amelia Fry
Director, Earl Warren Project

25 June 1973
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

[Note of reference: a full biographical interview with Mr. Kent was produced by The Bancroft Library six years after the following session was recorded.]

Date of Interview: August 12, 1971

SECURITIES CASES IN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Fry: When did you start working for the Securities and Exchange Commission?

Kent: In December of '36.

Fry: And that was when Earl Warren had been District Attorney of Alameda County for eleven years?

Kent: Yes. Right. I was an SEC lawyer here in the regional office in San Francisco, starting in December of '36. It was possibly a year or two after that that I had my first meeting with Earl Warren as District Attorney of Alameda County.

From time to time in the SEC we'd get complaints from people who had been defrauded in rather simple con games of one kind or another or where they had ordered and paid for securities and they had not been delivered--known as "bucketing." These were simple thefts and could much more efficiently be prosecuted under state law than under the ponderous mechanics of the federal law, because at that time and I think to this day a case cannot be brought involving an SEC violation until it is cleared with the SEC in Washington and by the SEC in Washington clearing with the U. S. Attorney General's office. Then the case is sent back and the local SEC people talk with the local United States attorneys. So that it was obviously much cheaper and more efficient and desirable to have this kind of case prosecuted by local authorities where none of those silly mechanics had to be involved.

Kent: We had a big trouble in San Francisco because that was when Matt Brady was the district attorney here. We could get absolutely no action out of Matt Brady on these cases for a variety of reasons--some of them bad.

Fry: Could you explain that a little more fully? Because it offers a contrast with the Alameda County office.

Kent: That's right. Well, to be very blunt, the "fix" would be in from some friend of Matt Brady, who would decide that he didn't want to prosecute this man who was a friend, perhaps, of one of his friends. We'd get all kinds of excuses and then no action would take place. But then, maybe we were unduly suspicious or else it was just an inefficient and poorly-run office that was not taking actions on cases that should have been prosecuted.

Well, the first time we had one involving Alameda County, one of the accountant-investigators and I made an appointment to see Earl Warren. We went over and we presented this very simple "bucketing" case to him with the evidence of the lady's cancelled checks and orders and the letters and the fact that she had not had delivery of the stock, which presumably had been bought for her.

After we had been there ten or fifteen minutes Warren caught the picture immediately, rang for one of his young attorney-assistants and he said, "Mr. So-and-So, here are gentlemen from the SEC who have a matter which I think we should interest ourselves in--and immediately." So he then told us, "Go on out and give your evidence to this man and we'll take action." My best recollection is that the defendant was in jail that afternoon--but I can't be sure of the precise time at this late stage.

Fry: At any rate, you remember it as being a very short period of time.

Kent: I remember it as being very short. I remember that I was deeply impressed with Warren's attitude, his rapid grasp of the situation, and the manner in which the office was run and the fact that they were prepared to move very effectively, very rapidly. I immediately got the impression that this was clearly the absolute top in a district attorney.

Kent: I think that I went over once more to the Alameda County District Attorney's office with very much the same experience, and I know that in our office other lawyers and investigators had the same experience in Alameda County.

Fry: Did you want to give any other examples?

Kent: I don't really recall other details. That first one sticks in my mind so clearly, but after all it has been a very long time ago and, as I say, I just remember that we had the fullest cooperation out of that office any time we requested it.

ROGER KENT AS A CANDIDATE

Fry: Later on you were head of the Northern California Democrats. In this period of the Thirties were you very active in politics?

Kent: No, I wasn't active at all then. My father, William Kent, had been in Congress as a Republican and he had been exceedingly active in the Bull Moose movement. He had been, in fact, in 1916, chairman of Independents for Wilson, and his last run for Congress he had made as an Independent. I had been brought up in Washington and had seen a great many of the public figures of that time, that era. Gifford Pinchot, Senator George Norris, and these were all friends of my father's. Most of them, of course, were the liberal, Bull Moose type of Republicans.

I had changed--I was the first member of our family to be a Democrat. I was the seventh kid. I was the first that ever registered Democratic, which I did in 1928 when I was graduated from college. But I was not active in politics then. I took small part in it. I was very pleased with what Roosevelt was doing and took a small part in those elections, but I was very busy with the SEC work and with a young family and I didn't really take any active part until after the war.

Although I do recall one time, when I was with the SEC, being down in Ventura County and talking with the district attorney down there about the up-coming race for attorney general, in which Earl Warren was first

Kent: elected attorney general. We agreed that there were a whole lot of people running--and then there was Earl Warren, and that Warren would unquestionably be elected. We thought that was a good thing. That was the talk that was going around the state most places where I talked with people. And of course, he was elected.

But my involvement in politics didn't start really until 1948 when I got through with my stint in the Navy from early '42 to '45. Then I started our law firm, this same firm.

Fry: When did you start it?

Kent: In '46, when we came back from the service. Then in '48 I was asked by some local Marin County politicians, the county chairman and others, to run for Congress in the First Congressional District, which at that time was eleven counties.

Fry: Could you tell me who these politicians were?

Kent: Well, one of them was Sam Gardiner, who is now a Superior Court judge over in Marin County; another was Leonard Thomas, who was a judge and who has died; and there was a fellow named Shep Porter--I don't know what's happened to him, but he was active in Marin County politics, Democratic politics at that time.

Well, they had asked everybody in the First District to run against Republican Hubert B. Scudder, who had been two or three times elected Assemblyman in the primary in the old cross-filing days on both the Democratic and Republican tickets from Marin and Sonoma. He was at this time Governor Warren's Real Estate Commissioner. Everybody figured that he was so strong that they didn't or couldn't get anybody of any stature or any prominence in the district to run. I was very much of a dark horse, not having had any experience. We were getting right up to closing time for filing, and I was in bed, at the time these fellows talked to me, with (perhaps) a recurrence of malaria and--

Fry: Something you picked up in the Navy?

Kent: In the Pacific, yes. I thought about it a while and finally decided to give it a whirl. This was at a time when Clarence Lea, who had succeeded my father, was serving out his final 16th term--32 years in Congress.

Kent: My father had strongly backed him for the job when he retired and went into the Tariff Commission, appointed by President Wilson.

So I got in that race. There were four people in it, and it was the old cross-filing days with no designation of party on the ballot. I was given very bad advice that I should not even mention that my opponent, who was the principal Democrat, Norgard, was also cross-filed as an Independent Progressive, and he was receiving his funds from very left-wing sources. He stole the nomination from me out in the valley by picturing himself as a friendly farmer. I lost in the primary. But I got more votes than any of the four candidates--by about a thousand--but lost my Democratic nomination by a few hundred votes. These were those crazy days!

Fry: That's right. Everybody could cross-file.

Kent: You could cross-file and you were not identified by party. So there would be four people on the Democratic primary ballot and there would be the same four people on the Republican ballot.

Fry: How many did you file under?

Kent: I filed Republican and Democratic. I ran a very close second on the Democrat and a very strong second on the Republican against Scudder.

Fry: Why didn't you also file under the Independent Progressive party?

Kent: Well, I didn't. I didn't know that the Independent Progressive party was really bad at that time but I suspected them. I don't think anybody really knew how bad it was until July, after the June election, when they had their convention where Norman Thomas identified something like twenty-five out of twenty-six of their platform committee as being known Communists to him.

Fry: This was when Henry Wallace ran for president on the Progressive ticket.

Kent: Yes, and why Wallace stayed with those people I really will never know. I guess he was so disappointed at Roosevelt having turned him down for vice president in '44.

ROGER KENT AND GOVERNOR EARL WARREN

Kent: But anyway, we didn't know how bad it was. So I didn't really denounce it or this man Norgard, who was cross-filed that way and who was definitely a Wallace man and an IPP man. But I didn't cross-file and I wouldn't have; but that wouldn't have done me a bit of good anyway. It would have done nothing but harm, as a matter of fact. Had I gotten the nomination, with Truman coming in so strong at the end in 1948 I'm sure I would have been elected. I had, oh, 8,000 more votes than Scudder in the primary, and there is no reason why I couldn't have held those because Scudder was able to defeat Norgard with this IPP association and that was the whole issue of that campaign.

Fry: What contact did you have with Governor Warren?

Kent: What had happened then was that I had known Bill Mailliard--just slightly, I'd known the family--and Bill had been defeated for Congress by Havenner in 1948. He became, I believe it was, adjustments and travel secretary for Governor Warren. He happened to be in San Francisco one day in 1949 and he was talking about this-that-and-the-other-thing when I said, "Well, I'm going to be in Sacramento next week and maybe I'd like to see the governor."

So he said, "Fine, I'll lay it on for you."

So he made this appointment for me, told me I had an appointment. I got to Sacramento and I thought, "How ridiculous this is! I haven't got anything to talk to the governor about." I called up to cancel it out, and as soon as I got the secretary she said, "Oh, Mr. Kent, if you are calling about your appointment, it is on at two o'clock and the governor is expecting you."

So I went there and had a perfectly delightful conversation with the governor. He expressed his great admiration for my father and my mother, who had also been involved in political matters. He also told me that he had not helped Scudder at all. I told him that I was well aware of that. Then he told me that he had insisted that Scudder resign as Real Estate Commissioner before he ran in that race. I told him that I was not aware of that and that I was grateful.

Kent: We had the nicest kind of a conversation.

Fry: Scudder apparently had asked him to support him?

Kent: Yes, I am sure, yes.

Then the other contact I had with the governor in between '48 and '50 was that some of my lumber and sawmill business agent friends asked me to check into convictions and sentences of some strikers who had been involved in violence in Mendocino County in a strike against the lumber and timber companies. This had involved the throwing of bricks and this kind of thing. It was nothing like as bad as a great many of the labor fracasas, but the judge in Mendocino County had sentenced two or three of these men to a year for a misdemeanor and then had given them something like five years on a felony conviction. The misdemeanor sentences were to be served first, and they were served. Then hanging over their heads was this five-year sentence on a felony.

I had looked into this matter with some help from the labor people and found that the punishment meted out was totally out of proportion to anything that had ever been levied against anybody ever involved in a labor strike. I mean, people who had done maybe much worse things than this were given maybe probation and a fifty dollar fine in Contra Costa County and in San Francisco County and in others. So I documented this and put a letter in to the governor, a long letter, and I am not sure whether I talked to him about it personally or not. I don't think I did. But I got back a very nice reply, as I recall. The day that those men were released from their misdemeanor confinement was the day that the governor pardoned them from the felony convictions, which was just great, and which made some points not only for the governor but also for me.

THE 1950 CAMPAIGN

Kent: Then, of course, I had continued active political activity during '49 and into '50, and it was well known that I was going to run again in '50, which I did. This time I was running against Scudder as an incumbent and therefore in those awful cross-filing days, even though it was a Republican incumbent running against a Democrat on the Democratic primary, his name under the law would come first with the designation "incumbent" and no designation of party. So the first thing a non-incumbent like myself always had to do in those days was to establish his identity as a Democrat for the primary, and in the way that Northern California district voted in those days this was probably going to be a handicap to him in the fall. But you had to do that in order to get your own nomination.

So we entered the primary, and I got the nomination quite handily. Of course this time Jimmy Roosevelt was the Democratic candidate against Warren and Helen Douglas against Nixon and this was the disgraceful Nixon-Douglas campaign. Besides the dirt that Nixon threw on Helen Douglas, she had also proposed a great big state redwood park--which probably would have been a very good idea for all concerned--but the people in the north counties chose to designate it as a pastoral playground for Los Angeles that would cut off their means of livelihood and so forth. So she was very unpopular in the North and she was, of course, badly smeared by the Nixon campaign--her being "pink" and "Communist" and so forth. This was, you know, the real bad one.

Fry: Did that really happen, the telephone calls that were made saying she was "pink?"

Kent: Well, that was really the technique of his campaign against Jerry Voorhis, the telephone business. Now I am sure there was also telephone business in the Helen Douglas campaign. But that was done in the congressional seat, where Jerry Voorhis was beaten first by Nixon. They'd call up and say, "Yes, Jerry Voorhis is a fine man, but did you know that he was a Communist?" and then hang up. Or didn't even say he was a fine man. "Did you know that Voorhis was a Communist?"

- Kent: For Douglas, they had a pink piece of paper that compared Helen Douglas' votes with Marcantonio's votes, some of which, if you recall now, pointed out that Helen and Marcantonio both voted economic aid to Korea early, say in 1949. Nixon had voted against it, and he put these votes in there as votes indicating that she was a Communist. And this was on pink paper and this was very widely distributed and it was, of course, well known to Nixon. That was only one of the many smears of red affiliation that were done against Helen Douglas. Anyway, that was a really rough campaign.
- Fry: And she being a Democrat, this splashed over on your race.
- Kent: Yes, if the top of the ticket goes down to defeat very badly, everybody on the ticket just automatically suffers. This is an axiom of politics. And Jimmy Roosevelt was a very poor candidate; he got desperate and he began to tell outrageous stories about Warren.
- Fry: Oh really?
- Kent: Yes, he would just say that Warren hadn't been in any of these places where he was campaigning and that he didn't care about people in this area, and that he was a Republican, and he'd used that old syllogism that the Republicans were against the people and Warren was a Republican and therefore Warren was against the people, and so forth and so on.
- Fry: The same guilt-by-association tactics that the Republicans were using.
- Kent: Yes. Then he would pick up every little tiny cause: the Townsend Plan, he endorsed that thoroughly and a number of others that I can't recall at this time. But it was a campaign with which I definitely did not want to be associated. And I did not. I was not on the platform with Roosevelt at any time during the campaign, except once at Oroville where I was told that if I didn't show they would pull the rug out from under me totally. Bill Mailliard told me--I said, "You know, I haven't been around with Jimmy Roosevelt." He said, "Well, the governor picked it up. You were once." [Laughs] The governor knew. He was following us. He always has [followed] politics in both parties with great interest.

Kent: This was the time when Pat Brown was running for attorney general against the incumbent, Frederick Napoleon Howser. This was a very, very interesting thing because Howser was a bad egg. He had represented the gamblers, and he was told by somebody (in the 1946 race) that if he didn't make his full break with these people that he could never expect to be elected. He is alleged to have said, "One term will be enough." But he hadn't bargained with Governor Warren, because right after Frederick Napoleon Howser was sworn into office Warren established a crime commission. He put Admiral Standley at the head of this.

This always amused me because the place that he chose to have the confrontation between Howser and the forces of justice and right was Mendocino County, where they had a couple of Howser's deputies indicted for bribery in connection with slot machines. I am sure that the governor himself took an interest in this matter, and Admiral Standley was the son of a man who had been one of the early, early and longtime sheriffs of Mendocino County. So this became a confrontation between Sheriff Standley and Howser. The jury and judges of Mendocino County did their duty and Frederick Napoleon Howser's guys were convicted and put away for considerable prison sentences.

The reason I bring this up is because in '50 when Pat Brown ran for attorney general and won (Ed Shattuck had defeated Fred N. Howser in the primary), the day that Pat took office was the day that Warren abolished the crime commission without any statement that he didn't find it any longer necessary! [Laughs] But it was quite clear to everybody that he had established it for the sole purpose of following Mr. Howser around to see that he did not corrupt the State of California.

Well, in 1950 Pat Brown and his brother Harold, who is now a judge in district court, got together and they took out newspaper advertisements in the First District urging the election of Warren for Governor, Pat Brown for Attorney General and Kent for Congress. These were put in a number of newspapers. You can imagine how aggravated the Roosevelt people were at this.

Fry: Yes, Roosevelt was the only Democrat left out of that one.

Kent: That's right. Some of my Democratic friends up North said, "I think that is about the way the people are going to vote anyway." But the Roosevelt campaign managers were all over me to get me to repudiate this. I had a hell of a time not doing it, but I didn't do it. But I think that I went on to say that I was supporting all Democrats or something of this kind. But I just did not repudiate these guys.

Well, the district went against Helen Douglas by about sixty thousand votes and against Jimmy Roosevelt by about fifty thousand, and I lost it by about ten thousand, which is what you can expect if the top of the ticket is running so far behind. About that time I quit any idea that I would again run for office, because regardless of the fact that they had been two pretty good races, all you hear was "two-time loser." So I went back to practice law in my office.

ROGER KENT, GENERAL COUNSEL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Kent: A year or so later I was in Washington and one of my friends recommended me as a general counsel of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense--Legal and Legislative, Charles Coolidge, who was a very fine man, later chairman of the Harvard trustees and a senior partner of one of the big Boston firms. Eventually they did appoint me and I became the general counsel of the Defense Department and served in that capacity for, I think it was February or March of '52 until sometime in May of '53. I stayed on after Charles Wilson and his boys came in, because I had gone to Bob Lovett, the Democratic Secretary of Defense, and told him that since I had my kids in school, although I didn't want to hold on to the desk in any way, but that if I could stay on a few months it would be an enormous help and convenience to me. So he did talk to incoming Secretary Charles Wilson and Keyes (deputy secretary) and they said, sure, and asked me how long I wanted to stay on, and I said through the first of May. So I stayed through that period of Wilson and the controversy about his stock and his statement, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" and so forth. It was quite an experience!

Fry: I guess we should talk about this when we are doing your whole autobiography, but I am curious as to what the reaction was inside the Department of the Defense when he made that statement.

Kent: Well, actually (and we shouldn't be wasting time. You can cut this out of the tape.) but actually it was not as bad as that. This is one of the things that happens. He actually said in this committee hearing, "I am for--" this, that and the other thing "and I think what is good for the United States is good for General Motors." And then he said, "I also think vice versa. So then you see, it was immediately transferred into "What's good for General Motors is good for the country." But if you go back and read that transcript, you'd see it wasn't so.

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATS

Kent: Well, then I came back, and I was so amazed at this time at the fantastic difference that the candidacy of Stevenson had made in the Democratic party in California. All of a sudden there were very good, enthusiastic, hard-working, responsible people who were in the Democratic party. And that had not been the case in '48 or even in '50. He had steamed these people up, and we began to develop a very, very good party. I went to the first of the California Democratic Council conventions.

Fry: Were you involved with Alan Cranston in the beginnings of the California Democratic Council?

Kent: I was in Washington at the time of the Asilomar Conference, which was the real start of CDC. That would have been in the spring of 1953, and George Miller, Jr. was state chairman. He called the Conference, and Cranston was there, of course, as was Libby Smith (now Libby Gatov) and many others of my friends and political allies and associates. When I got back from Washington, Cranston asked me to address a club in Palo Alto, and I went down there and talked to twenty or thirty people about the Washington scene and about Engine Charlie Wilson. I'm sure that the first CDC Fresno Convention was in the summer of 1953 and I'm sure that that was when we elected Alan as its first

Kent: president or chairman.

We had district caucuses, and I remember my comments when the first district caucus asked me if I would be a Congressional district director of CDC. I had just returned to my law office and was plenty busy, but I said that I would take it on, and I would resign if I found that I couldn't give it the required amount of time. I was very faithful in attending meetings of the congressional district representatives and was always completely in tune with Alan and one of his supporters.

In December, 1953, I went to a small cocktail party which was the launching of Dick Graves as our candidate for governor, and he asked me at that party if I would be his Northern California chairman. I had never met the man before, but was impressed and told him I'd work anywhere. I'm sure that the recommendation was made by George Miller.

We cranked up a pretty good campaign with very little money. The staff was small and badly paid but of excellent quality. Don Bradley was in charge as campaign manager, Pierre Salinger was doing some of the writing, Libby Smith was there nearly every day on a volunteer basis and Eugene Lee, now vice president of the University of California and author of many books on California politics, was a young man who was analyzing the Knight budget for the campaign.

The first great hurdle for the campaign was to get the endorsement of CDC at a Fresno convention, pre-primary in 1954. Graves was opposed by Laurance Cross, and it was a close and tough fight. After Graves was endorsed by a fairly close vote, there was a lot of discussion as to who would be the lieutenant governor endorsed candidate. One of Pat Brown's deputies was strongly supported, and there were others, and there was a lot of sentiment for Edward Roybal. It was decided that Roybal would withdraw, and he left the wings of the stage at Fresno with the intention of withdrawing, but the cheers were so loud that he changed his mind in the last twenty feet and gratefully agreed to stand for the election for endorsement and of course was endorsed. Cranston conducted the proceedings of a pretty unruly group with great efficiency and courtesy.

Kent: In August of 1954 I was on a short vacation ending about a week before the State Central Committee's meeting. There had been some talk that I should run for Northern Chairman or Vice Chairman of the State Central Committee, and I left that decision strictly up to Graves, telling him that I would remain as his northern California chairman or run for the Central Committee, just as he chose. He finally made up his mind that it would be important for him to have a friend in that job if he was governor, and therefore he endorsed me; and Bradley, Salinger, Miller and a few others cranked up the support for me and I was elected over John Tolan, who withdrew on the roll-call at the middle of the alphabet, as I was leading about two to one. Tolan had been the candidate of the Congressman. All this leads up to the joint operation which the Northern Central Committee had with CDC over many years.

The Northern Committee had a hole in the wall on Market Street as an office, and eventually we found good quarters at 212 Sutter Street, an address that subsequently became known by Phil Burton and some of his friends who didn't like us as the "212 Gang." We made it a joint headquarters with CDC. They made a contribution towards the rent and at the beginning we had only one secretary for both organizations, Lenore Ostrow, who was smart and fast. She had to be that way, as well as have strength and stamina, which she did. The closest kind of cooperation existed between our committee and the northern branch of CDC through Cranston's chairmanships and Joe Wyatt's chairmanships of CDC. We let the CDC people into positions of leadership on joint committees and in campaign structures, etc., and of course they provided the manpower that any kind of political organization must have. The CDC endorsement under this joint operation became tantamount to victory in a Democratic primary.

Then in the fall of '53, of course, the governor was appointed Chief Justice. At that time we thought that we could defeat Governor Knight with a good man, because Governor Knight, in order to differentiate himself from Governor Warren, had moved way over to an extreme right position, and we knew that that was not a position that would be popular with Californians. It must have amused Governor Warren because he had his finger right on it, that what Knight was appealing to was the same nutty ten percent of rightwingers that are probably still around. But then as soon as Warren went to the Court, Knight shifted ground immediately

Kent: and became the closest friend of Cornelius Haggerty, who was secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, and other labor leaders.

Fry: Yes, Knight became a real friend of labor then.

Kent: Oh yes. But he had made the statement in the campaign that in matters involving labor Neil Haggerty was "the governor of California;" I mean awful remarks like that, I don't think a Democrat would think of making.

Fry: I am interested in your comments on the contrast between the Democratic party after 1953 and before 1953 when Warren was on the scene.

Kent: Well, as I have said, when I ran for Congress in 1948 there were eleven counties in my district in Northern California, up the coast and five of them over in the Sacramento Valley, and about half of them didn't have any county committees at all. Two of them, Sonoma and Humboldt had county committees which were dominated by Communists and I don't use this term lightly.

Fry: Where?

Kent: Sonoma and Humboldt. This was the Democratic committee.

Fry: Well I think of those as rather conservative counties now.

Kent: Well they can be--they probably were conservative then, but the Democratic committee had been captured by these people.

Fry: You mean members of the Communist Party?

Kent: Well yes. One of them was the sister of Mickey Lima, who was the Communist organizer here in San Francisco. The one in Sonoma, the principal force was a guy named Al Brown, who was the brother of a fellow who ran as a Communist for mayor of San Francisco. He was deep in the Progressive Party. There was a woman, whose name escapes me now, whose brother was deported for being a Communist.

Well these people looked at me with much more hostility than any Republicans. And where there were committees, they were very, very weak and where I'd go

Kent: to meet Democrats in Marin there'd be maybe fifteen or twenty tired old faces that would come to these various meetings and that would be about it. As I said, when the Stevenson campaign came on (and of course I was in Washington at the time in the Defense Department job) the large number of very intelligent and good people were vastly stimulated by Stevenson and looked around for a Democratic party to associate with and found there was none. They organized their own Stevenson clubs first and then we were able to pull these into Democratic clubs and into the CDC. There again it was very valuable to us to have a man of the quality of Dick Graves run for governor in '54 because we could sell this man as a man of integrity and ideals and ability to these people who had come in looking for Stevenson. Of course, they were all just waiting for '56 when, of course, they would work for Stevenson again.

Fry: What happened to the Democratic party in the '40's? It was fairly strong in the '30's wasn't it? It became the majority party in California by '36.

Kent: Well, what it was, was that Roosevelt just elected himself, you know. I mean this was it. The organization here, the people who were at the head of it, would persuade Washington that they had an organization and that therefore they should be given consideration in appointments and things of this kind. Then they would persuade the people out here that they had influence in Washington and sure enough they did. But they didn't have any organization really, other than perhaps labor and the old folks and things of this kind.

But it really was a very, very weak party. For instance when the party was totally under the control of the people in San Francisco--Bill Malone, very largely, for the reason that at that time under cross-filing something like 75% of assemblyman and 80 or 90% of senators were elected in the primary. Most of them were Republicans.

Fry: You mean by cross-filing?

Kent: By cross-filing. So there would be no Democratic nominee. Then the way you selected a Democratic nominee was to have the county committee decide who would be a Democratic nominee--not for the purpose of going on the ballot, because he couldn't get on the

Kent: ballot, but for the purpose of the internal structure of the party he would have three appointments--he himself would be a member of the State Central Committee and he had three appointments to the State Central Committee. Malone and his boys would give the county chairman a free ticket to a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner down here or something of this kind. Then they would say, "All right, now we want you to appoint somebody whom you can control, and you can control these three votes." So then they'd go up to Sacramento and they'd have proxies for 51% of the votes that would be cast at the Central Committee, as to who would be chairman and vice-chairman, and women's chairman and secretary and treasurer. It was no participation by the grass-roots.

The CDC was really brought into being by the Stevenson campaigns. It had been started to provide people who would be willing to run for county committees and willing to run for office, and of course as soon as you got designation of party on the ballot then this business of election at the primary just went out the window, with very minor exceptions.

Fry: What about funding for the Democratic party? Some say that in the 1946 gubernatorial race, in which Bob Kenny was the Democratic nominee, one of the reasons that he ran such a weak race in primary was that he had no money. (My own suspicions were that there was also a very strong personal reason--that he didn't choose to carry on a hard campaign.)

Kent: Oh I think this is true. We've always had a great deal of trouble raising money. The sad thing is when this wonderful Ed Heller died. When Ed Heller was alive he was a very wealthy man, but he was very generous, and if you had a statewide candidate that he liked, he'd start you out with \$15,000--five from himself and five from his wife and five from his mother. Then he would raise more money. He'd sit as the chairman and at that point we had no problems of conflict among the money-raisers as to who was the boss. Everybody looked to Ed Heller as the boss in any Democratic campaign where northern California voted. When he died the thing fractured and a number of people were trying to move into this same spot.

But goodness knows, costs have risen! When I ran for Congress in '48 and '50 I don't think I spent

Kent: \$20,000, and when we ran Dick Graves in a statewide campaign in '54 we spent nearly \$200,000. Of course this is just absolute peanuts now! The supervisor in San Francisco is \$100,000.

Then after I got out of being chairman--we haven't traced this--the end of '54 I was elected vice-chairman for the party, and then in '56 I was chairman. I kept on doing that for eleven years.

Fry: Alternating?

Kent: Alternating. Then I resigned as chairman--which I was in '65. We didn't run deficits--and we wouldn't. We wouldn't want the responsibility for deficits either on the State Committee part, for somebody else to handle, the next chairman or other responsible Democrats.

Then began this awful business of deficits, starting with the worst of them I guess, this started with the '64 deficits of Cranston and Salinger. Even Johnson ran a deficit in '64 because George Killion (as chairman of Citizens for Johnson) took all the money he could lay his hands on back to Washington and gave it to Lyndon Johnson, instead of using it here in the state. That put us in a terrible position. So when you say funding, funding is exceedingly difficult.

I suppose Ben Swig is a very good money raiser and I suppose that in '60 we raised maybe \$300,000 or \$400,000 here in Northern California, and they raised more than that in Southern California. This is the Kennedy election.

Fry: Did Heller in any way help Earl Warren, do you know?

Kent: He and his wife were very friendly with Earl Warren, and I am sure that they probably gave a dime to Jimmy Roosevelt because Ed was a faithful Democrat and would be helpful in about every campaign involving a Democrat in a statewide campaign.

Fry: Jimmy Roosevelt. You think he didn't help Kenny either? Of course you weren't on the scene then.

When did Heller die? About?

Kent: I think he probably died in '61 or '62.

Fry: And now Ben Swig helps?

Kent: Ben Swig and Walter Shorenstein and Cyril Magnin.

Fry: What I am trying to tie up here is whether the funding in the '40's might have been funnelled off into Earl Warren's campaigns and that this was one reason why the Democratic party was so feeble. I am kind of grabbing at a straw here.

Kent: Well I am sure that there were a very large number of Democrats, of course, who supported Earl Warren. One of the classic remarks that was made was somebody said, "Well, what we want to get is, we want to get the Earl Warren Republicans," and Don Bradley, who was a very skilled political manager, said, "Forget that! Let's see if we can't get the Earl Warren Democrats!"

I know that they did support him, a large number of them supported him, and I am sure that they supported him with money, but again I am completely convinced that the importance of such vast sums of money is a recent business, and I think it is due to a considerable extent to the cost of the damned TV. That is why I am one thousand percent for these statutes that would limit the use of TV, because that is the place where you can have control of a campaign. Now you can't have control over somebody hiring fifty people to go out and ring doorbells or make telephone calls. You may possibly be able to do that. But on contracts for radio and TV time they are all filed right there in the offices and you can do it.

When I became vice-chairman in '54 we started winning these special elections held to fill vacancies. What we'd do is we'd go to one assembly or senatorial district and we'd get the local people together and we'd say, "All right, now have an endorsing convention and make it broad--all county committee members, all club presidents and special delegates from the clubs, all financial contributors and all members of the board of supervisors who are Democrats, all school board people who are Democrats and whatnot. Maybe get seventy-five or eighty people and have the candidates get up and make their pitch and make a selection and you'll have one guy coming out." Usually we could make it work and sift down the candidates to one. Usually they showed very good

Kent: judgment in the man they selected. Then, what we would do is, we would provide Don Bradley, who is a very experienced political manager; and we would very often have Pierre Salinger, who was a very gifted writer for the San Francisco Chronicle. They would take a little time off and go and work in the campaign. We sent a girl up there who was a regular girl in the office and we'd raise maybe \$2,500 - \$3,000, and we won eight out of nine with that kind of work and money.

These would be covering a maximum of three counties for a senate race, or sometimes five counties or more in an assembly race. Something of this kind. Or one county but with the same result.

But now, look at the election of David Roberti in the Twenty-first Senatorial District who was elected when the incumbent Democrat went to Congress. It was only decided a few weeks ago. Anyway, I am sure the Democrats spent \$200,000, in a strongly Democratic district, to elect this guy. So you've had that kind of an escalation of costs in a good deal less than twenty years--maybe fifteen years.

You've had the thing go from, say, \$4,500, to where Fred Farr, who came back and ran for the state senate, the Sixth Senate District, Monterey County, where he had been elected three or four times, thoroughly qualified guy, gave up a big job in the East in the federal government and was known and qualified. We raised \$100,000 (we didn't raise all that; he spent more than we raised!) and he was defeated! By a man who was an unknown and who spent perhaps \$150,000 to \$200,000. So that's just one county. So this is the thing that every person interested in politics should be concerning themselves with, more than anything else.

JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS ON THE NEW CHIEF JUSTICE

Fry: You mentioned you and Justice William O. Douglas corresponded when Warren was Chief Justice.

Kent: Well, when his nomination as Chief Justice was made and after he had gone back to Washington, I had known

Kent: Bill Douglas, Justice Douglas, ever since he taught me courses in corporate law at Yale Law School in '30 and '31 I guess. He had then gone down and been commissioner of the SEC. I had gotten my job with the SEC just strictly at the local level out here. But he was a commissioner at the time, and as soon as I went back to Washington I checked in with him and we renewed our friendship, and then I kept really quite close to him from there on out.

Even after he went up to the Supreme Court I used to go in and see him when I was back there. I wrote him and said that he would find Earl Warren a remarkably fine man and that I'm sure that he would like him and that he would enjoy him and that he was an able lawyer. I got back a letter from him and it said, "In fact your friend Earl Warren is not only all the things you say about him and I certainly enjoy him but," but he said, "he is going to make a great Chief Justice!"

Fry: And that was just right after he--

Kent: Oh, within a month or so after Warren had gone there. Douglas had made the statement to me that when Truman had appointed Vinson--the one thing I had against Truman is that he didn't really regard the judiciary as being any more important than the janitor--when Truman appointed Vinson and it was widely written that he would be a compromiser and he would get a unanimous court, Douglas deeply resented that because he said Stone had been the most careful and considerate and courteous man imaginable, as well as an extremely good judge and had tried to get the court together and that obviously the Court would not unify under Vinson.

But of course Warren was able in that critical point of Brown vs. The Board of Education of getting a unanimous Court. I feel that the fact that that was a unanimous opinion was just about as important as the opinion itself. And I am sure that the credit belongs right with the Chief Justice.

END OF INTERVIEW

Transcriber: Arlene Weber
Final Typist: Keiko Sugimoto

November 10, 1971

Honorable Earl Warren
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Re: ACLU Proposed Earl Warren Civil Liberties Award

Dear Governor:

I've been a member of ACLU for forty years and my mother and father before me. It's not hard to be a member of ACLU today and you and your brethren who stood with you are largely responsible for that happy state of affairs. It was amusing and should have been shocking when reporters a few years ago asked citizens to sign the Bill of Rights and were indignantly turned down as communist agitators. No one knows better than you that the greatest thing we have in this country is personal freedom or that our 18th century revolutionaries intended it to be secured by the Bill of Rights. Under your leadership, its purpose has been largely fulfilled.

I enclose copy of a letter from Howard Jewel who is Northern California Chairman of ACLU. He is a former Assistant Attorney General, as you probably know, and has fought the "witch hunters" throughout his life.

I was at first reluctant to impose on your friendship and kindness to ask for the help of your great name and presence in aid of the Northern California Branch of ACLU. I have now thought over their proposal very carefully and I think it makes great, good sense and I hope you will, too. The Bay Area is after all your home base and so it's in order that you be particularly honored in this region. You have many great qualities and many great accomplishments in your life of public service but I am certain that your preeminent place in the history of our country will be as the leader of the "Warren Court" and its record in defense of civil liberties. That record makes ACLU the most appropriate organization to honor and commemorate your greatest achievements.

Honorable Earl Warren
Page Two
November 10, 1971

You're not going to need the annual tribute involved in presentation of the "Earl Warren Award" to be remembered warmly and gratefully by those who care for personal freedom.

I'm sure the Board of Directors of ACLU is not thinking only of the tribute to Earl Warren and I'm happy that they have another strong self-serving interest (if support of the organization can be called a "self-serving" motive). You are the realist who knows that the protections of the Bill of Rights will not live unless there are men and women willing to defend unpopular people and unpopular causes and that, of course, is the purpose and thrust of ACLU.

I hope you will agree that ACLU may establish such an award and that you will be present at the first presentation dinner. If you consent, it is obvious that the criteria for the award and all relevant arrangements will be spelled out for your approval. Even better than that, ACLU will, of course, accept your criteria if you have the time and inclination to outline them.

With every good wish and deep thanks for your many courtesies to me and your enormous contributions to the country and its people.

Sincerely yours,

Roger Kent

RK:bjz
cc: Howard Jewel
Jay Miller

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Regional Oral History Office

Earl Warren Oral History Project

George E. Outland

JAMES ROOSEVELT'S PRIMARY CAMPAIGN, 1950

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry



George E. Outland

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Date of Interview: 2 August 1972

Place of Interview: The Outland home in San Francisco

Present at the Interview: George E. Outland and Amelia R. Fry

George E. Outland was chosen as an interviewee for the Earl Warren Oral History Project because he was the 1950 statewide campaign manager for Democrat James Roosevelt in the gubernatorial primary in which his chief opponent was Earl Warren, a Republican who made a practice of cross-filing. In fact, four years before, won both parties' nominations in the primary.

Outland came to politics well-prepared by a full academic education and bolstered by experience in social welfare and teaching. As a representative from Santa Barbara, he rapidly attained an influential position in Congress from 1943 to 1946 as the leader of a liberal bloc to support full employment and other postwar legislation of President Truman's. Because that lay outside the main focus of the present project, additional material on this significant chapter of his life can be found in the appendix and as a related deposit in The Bancroft Library. During the turbulent time of the Truman Doctrine in foreign affairs, Outland was head of the California Democratic party's policy committee. At the time of the interview he was barely through his first year of retirement from California State University at San Francisco as professor of sociology and government.

We held a pre-interview session in his home near the San Francisco State campus about a week before taping. He warmed to the subject immediately and provided background records and correspondence relating to the 1950 campaign. Later he selected some of these documents for deposit. On the basis of our discussion, a general outline was drawn up, and this was rather faithfully adhered to during the interview.

During the interview we sat at his dining table where our papers could be easily accessible. Sun was pouring through the generous windows of the large living room, and muted nature tones of beiges and perhaps greens were repeated in the carpet and upholstery. It was a relatively modern house, with a staircase rising across the end of the living room. Dr. Outland, while an affable host, approached the questions studiously and phrased his answers with care like the scholar he is. There is no excessive verbiage or gratuitous anecdotes, but rather an intent to record only that which his memory and his own homework had distilled as worthy of and proper for documentation.

The transcript was reviewed and corrected at the Regional Oral History Office and sent to him 25 February 1975, by which time he had moved to Anacortes, Washington. He returned it in April of that year, answering specific uncertainties arising from transcribing.

Dr. Outland's work with urban youth in settlement houses left him with a firm awareness of the needs of lower socio-economic groups. It was the resulting idealism that he translated into practical political action while in Congress and also in the gubernatorial primary that this interview attempts to portray.

Amelia R. Fry
Interviewer-Editor

1 November 1976
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

George E. Outland - A Brief Biographical Sketch

Born Santa Paula, California, October 8, 1906

Education: A.B. Whittier College, 1928; M.A. Harvard University, 1929; Ph.D. Yale University, 1937; additional study at Boston University and University of Southern California.

Work Experience: Assistant Director of Boys' Work-Hale House, Boston, 1928-1930; Director of Boys' Work-Denison House, Boston, 1929-1933; Director of Boys' Work-Neighborhood House, Los Angeles, 1933-1935; Director of Boys' Division for Southern California, Federal Transient Service, 1934-1935; Instructor-Yale University, 1935-1937; Director, New Haven Community College, 1935-1936; Faculty member, Santa Barbara State College, 1937-1942; Member of HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1943-1946; Professor of Sociology and Government, San Francisco State College, 1947-1971; Lecturer, University of California, 1956.

Author: BOY TRANSIENCY IN AMERICA (Santa Barbara State College Press) 1939; chapters in several books and more than 35 published articles in the fields of Sociology, Education and Government.

Miscellaneous: Member of Board of Directors of CONSUMERS UNION, INC. 1955-1960 and Chairman of Policy Committee of that organization, 1956-1960; member of Board of Directors, Public Affairs Institute, 1955-1962; member of various professional organizations; Ford Foundation fellowship, 1951-1952; participant in approximately 25 national broadcasts, including 5 appearances on TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR; while a member of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, member of informal committee for the Protection of the Consumer (1945-1946), and Chairman of Steering Committee of 118 members sponsoring Full Employment Bill (1945), sponsoring (Chairman) committee for Minimum Wage Bill (1946); Chairman-Policy Committee-Democratic Party of California (1947-1948); State Campaign Manager-in primary election- James Roosevelt for Governor (1950); Delegate to Democratic Conventions of 1944 and 1948.

I POLITICAL LIFE

High School and William Jennings Bryan

Fry: I'd like to take five minutes and run down your background and your education, who your father was, and that sort of thing.

Outland: Oh, you mean personally?

Fry: Personally, yours; not James Roosevelt's.

Outland: Well, ask the first question and it'll make it easier.

Fry: Where were you born?

Outland: I was born in Santa Paula, California, October 8th, 1906.

Fry: And your father, according to Who's Who, was Elmer Garfield Outland.

Outland: That's right.

Fry: Was he a relative of President Garfield?

Outland: No, he was from Kansas. He came out here at a very early age and got a job working for my [maternal] grandfather and married his daughter.

Fry: What business did he go into?

Outland: Rancher.

Fry: And your mother was Stella Martha Faulkner Outland?

Outland: That's right. My grandfather's name was Faulkner. He fought in the Civil War.

Fry: Oh, which side?

Outland: The Union. Ohio.

Fry: I see. And is there anything about your mother that we should know about.

Outland: Well, she was quite a musician. Otherwise, she was a housewife.

Fry: What did she play?

Outland: Piano.

Fry: Did you get music lessons from your mother?

Outland: Oh yes. I played the piano and the saxophone and the violin until I got this sort of thing [indicates arthritic finger].

Fry: I wonder if your interest in politics started at home.

Outland: No, not especially. My folks were all Republicans and my dad never could understand how he hatched a Democrat. But I did have one very interesting experience: I was president of the student body at Santa Paula High School, and one day when there came to speak at an old Chautauqua session--do you remember the Chautauquas?

Fry: Yes, tent meetings, lectures.

Outland: --William Jennings Bryan. This was in 1924. And Bryan was persuaded to come up and speak to the student body at the Santa Paula High School, and I had to introduce him.

Fry: And you were eighteen years old, probably?

Outland: At that time I was about sixteen.

Fry: You were born in 1906.

Outland: Yeah, but I skipped a couple of grades. At any rate, I had to introduce him and I was scared to death. And after it was over, Bryan came over to me; he put his hand on my shoulder, and said,

Outland: "Nervous, weren't you, young fellow?" [laughter].

And I said, "I certainly was, sir."

And he said, "That's a good sign. Always be nervous. If you don't, your speech is going to fall flat. I try to work myself up to be nervous before I speak."

And I thought to myself that any man who's been a candidate for the presidency three times, and secretary of state and can take the time to speak to a young high school kid may not know much about economics, but he has a heart of gold anyway [laughter].

Then I went to Whittier College for my A.B. and I got my Master's at Harvard. Did five years of social work in Boston during the Depression, two more in Los Angeles. I was the Director of Boys' Work for the Federal Transient Service for Southern California for two years and then went back and got my Ph.D. at Yale.

Fry: In what?

Outland: Education, of all things.

Fry: Your education covered a pretty broad span of things then.

Outland: Yes, I had an A.B. in sociology, an M.A. in history and government, a Ph.D. in education, seven years in social work, and five years in politics. And now you tell me what my specialty is.

Fry: I give up. I think you'd better run for president [laughter].

In Congress

Fry: So, that brings you to--when did you run for Congress?

Outland: I'd never been in politics of any kind. I ran for Congress from the Santa Barbara district, a new district, in 1942; I won the primary by a very narrow margin and the final also by a very narrow margin. That was the year Governor Olson lost



GEORGE E. OUTLAND



Left to right: Representative Wright Patman of Texas, President Truman, George E. Outland, and Representative Carter Manasco of

Outland: the district by 26,000 votes, and I won by about 1,000.

Fry: Did you cross-file?

Outland: Yes. And I came within a few votes of carrying the Republican nomination, too, in the primary.

Fry: And then you were in Congress for--?

Outland: Four years, two terms.

Fry: '43 through '46.

Outland: That's right.

Incidentally, while I was there in Congress, I was chairman of the committee on the full employment bill. It had 117 members of the House.

Fry: Yes. We have this story here, a UP story in February of '46, saying "A sizeable number of House members are about to form a permanent liberal bloc to work for passage of progressive legislation."

Outland: That followed the other one in '45.

Fry: And in '46 did this pass?

Outland: In '46 came the election and I passed out.

Fry: Before anything was done?

Outland: No, we formed a liberal bloc. But then Congress adjourned, you see, in the summer.

Fry: Right, I see. But, it says that you had called the 116 sponsors to a meeting to organize the group.

Outland: Well, we called the 116 members to organize a group to sponsor the minimum wage bill. That was the specific purpose at that time.

Fry: But you really did mean for this group to function together.

Outland: That's right, and we did fairly well.

Fry: And on other liberal matters, too?

N. L. O. Tel-Sub 2/7/46

Rep. Outland Takes Lead In Organizing Liberals

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7. (UP)—A sizeable number of House members are about to form a permanent "liberal bloc" to work for passage of "progressive legislation," it was learned today.

Rep. George E. Outland, D., Calif., said he had called the 116 sponsors of full employment legislation to a meeting today to organize the group.

"The aim," he said, "will be to foster everything dealing with the field of economic betterment. This includes full employment, wage and hour legislation and other domestic matters."

Great Need

"There is a great need for a group that will stand together and plan for cooperation on liberal legislation," he declared.

Outland said he thought the new group should choose an executive committee of 11 or 12 members with power to act for all. He said he would step down from the chairmanship of the full employment group but would be glad to serve in the same capacity in the new body if selected.

Outland, now in his second term in Congress, called the full employment sponsors "the best organized bunch I've seen since I've been here."

Employment Bill

They tallied up one score to their credit yesterday when the House passed a Senate-House compromise on the full employment bill. They admitted its language was not as strong as they had hoped. But they nevertheless counted it a triumph because they felt it was a "real start" on a program to end depression.

The executive committee of the full employment group included Walter K. Granger, D., Utah; Charles R. Savage, D., Wash.; Helen Gahagan Douglas, D., Calif.; Jerry Voorhis, D., Calif.; and Hugh Delacy, D., Wash.

Wash. Daily News 2/7/46

4b

Job Backers Form House 'Liberal' Bloc

By United Press

A sizeable number of House members are about to form a permanent "liberal bloc" to work for passage of "progressive legislation," it was learned today.

Rep. Outland (D., Calif.) told the United Press he had called the 116 sponsors of full employment legislation to a meeting today to organize the group.

"The aim," he said, "will be to foster everything dealing with the field of economic betterment. This includes full employment, wage and hour legislation and other domestic measures."

He indicated the "bloc" might also want to concern itself with international legislation.

Rep. Outland said he thought the new group should choose an executive committee of 11 or 12 members with power to act for all.

The full employment bloc scored yesterday when the House passed a Senate-House compromise on the Full Employment Bill.

It was understood a group of House Progressives have already been holding off-the-record meetings thruout the winter under the chairmanship of Rep. Coffee (D., Wash.). Most of this group were full employment backers. Efforts will be made to amalgamate the two groups.



Rep. Outland

Butter---and Outland

4c

(AN EDITORIAL)

Anonymous letter writers are usually creatures not to be taken seriously for in all probability they are writing about something of which they have only a bare knowledge and that generally gained by listening to sidewalk professors. One thing we do know: They are invariably vicious with full intent and purpose of hurting and resort to anonymity because they are cowards and fear reprisal as their outrageous statements are usually based on nothing more factual than the machinations of a frustrated mind.

Into this category of anonymous letter writers, we place the so-called "Economic Council of Santa Maria" whose sole function in life seems to be to strike out blindly and viciously at anything and everything of which it does not approve regardless of how good that thing may be and lending an air of authority to its puerile efforts with the high-sounding name of "Economic Council of Santa Maria."

For example, it recently took a sideswipe at the OPA, blaming it for keeping the price of butter down—thereby bringing about a butter shortage and then, by the very heels, dragged in Congressman Outland with the statement that "he has a 100% record for voting for all the stupid measures, men and methods that produce these conditions."

Thank God for Congressman Outland if these are the kind of "stupid" measures he votes for.

We can be eternally grateful to the OPA whenever we buy a loaf of bread, a bottle of milk, and we could go on endlessly, for if it were not for the OPA we might well be paying fantastic prices for these simple necessities. There is no doubt that the OPA has helped to keep the cost of living down during World War II.

The following figures were used by Congressman Outland in his last campaign and the people were enough impressed with them to return him to Congress:

Rise in cost of living in World War I—68.8%.

Rise in cost of living in World War II—27.9%.

No, there were no such "stupid" measures as the OPA in World War I. Yes, thank God for the OPA and Congressman Outland and the "stupid" measures for which he has a 100% record of voting, measures such as:

Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act which Sumner Welles described as the "acid test as to whether the people of the United States have determined upon a policy of international cooperation for the future or whether they will once more turn back to that road of isolation which leads to inevitable disaster" which we now know we can never do. . . .

The appropriation of adequate funds for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the organization that no humane person could possibly say should be done away with. Had those congressmen who voted in favor of reducing the size of the appropriation had their way, it would have meant a stab in the back to millions of Axis victims. . . .

Increasing appropriations for soil conservation payments, the program to maintain the natural agricultural resources of this country. . . .

Increasing appropriations for the rural electrification program, a program of great benefit to the small farmers in isolated communities. . . .

The so-called Soldiers' Vote Bill, allowing the soldiers the right to vote. If the soldier is given the right to die for democracy certainly he should have the right to vote for it. If you don't believe this, ask any returned serviceman what he thinks about it. . . .

Anti-labor bills that would hamstring the worker and that doesn't mean the union member only. Don't forget, what ties the hands of a member of organized labor also ties the hands of every man and woman working for a salary.

Yes, Congressman Outland voted in favor of the foregoing measures because these measures were fair and right and just and because they would help the people. Congressman Outland has a record of always voting for what is best for the people and against anything that would hamstring the working man or woman in any way.

But then, perhaps that is what bothers our anonymous letter writer, the fact that our congressman votes for what will help the majority of people and not for what will help the selfish minority who care not how they gain their ends nor who is hurt in the scramble.

And, by the way, who is the "Economic Council of Santa Maria?"

Their identity will, no doubt, reveal whether they are for the good of the majority or for the good of the minority at the cost of the majority.

Yes, who is our anonymous letter writer?

Union Labor News 2/11/46

by Libby Davis

Outland: That's right. But you see we adjourned about the first of August, 1946.*

Fry: Could you give me some idea of how this continued after the elections? Were there enough of them to hold some of the continuity?

Outland: More than half of us were beaten. That was the year of the big Republican sweep: McCarthy, Malone, Jenner.

Fry: In the beginning of which Truman had some interesting comments for them: "That idiot Congress."

Outland: That's right.

The 1948 Democratic Convention: Truman Defection

Fry: If I'm not leaving out anything of importance--

Outland: No. The only political things were, I was a delegate to the 1944 convention in Chicago, and I was a delegate to the '48 convention, and I was chairman of the Democratic policy committee of California for a year.

Fry: 1947-1948?

Outland: It was when Jim Roosevelt was state chairman.

Fry: I think he was state chairman in 1947-48.

*Mr. Outland expands on this in a letter to the interviewer April 8, 1975: "Representative Patman of Texas took the initiative in organizing the 'steering committee' which included 16 Californians. This group later reorganized (in part) to form the 'steering committee' for the minimum wage bill, of which I was also chairman. This bill was stopped by the Rules Committee. The best account of the full employment bill, including much of the work of the steering committee, may be found in Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes A Law, (Columbia Univ. Press, 1950) . . .)" Selected press clippings are in appendix of this interview.

Fry: Well, I would like to start with that 1948 Democratic convention since it was Roosevelt's actions in that that gave him vulnerability that he had to contend with in his campaign against Earl Warren two years later. You were on that delegation. This was when Truman was running. Had the California delegation all agreed to vote for Truman?

Outland: They were pledged to Truman.

Fry: They were. And then Roosevelt went to a meeting in Chicago?

Outland: No, he did not go. He was asked to go and didn't go. He asked me to go in his place, and I didn't go either because we were pledged to Truman.

Fry: Maybe we'd better explain what this meeting was.

Outland: It was a meeting called by Democratic leaders all over the country who were fearful that there was no possibility of Truman being re-elected, and they were looking for a substitute. It wasn't publicized very much. I've never seen it written up in any textbook or any press account. And they toyed with the name of Eisenhower. They had other names in mind, but it was Eisenhower at that time who was a great popular figure and, according to my information, which may or may not be completely accurate, he considered it for quite a while before turning it down. But some of the California delegation felt this might be a good idea. To me it was a dishonest thing.

Fry: So Roosevelt was not alone in supporting Eisenhower?

Outland: By no means. No, he was just a little bit more honest about it and open about it.

Fry: How did he come to support Eisenhower if he didn't go to that meeting?

Outland: I don't know.

Fry: But it sounds like it was just three or four days after he was elected as head of the delegation that he came out openly boosting Eisenhower's name--according to the press accounts.

Outland: Yes, he boosted Eisenhower's name. But Eisenhower, as I say, had still not come out and definitely said no.

Fry: He was still a viable possibility.

Outland: Yes.

Fry: And then on the delegation's train ride to Philadelphia, was Roosevelt actively campaigning for Eisenhower?

Outland: I did not go on the campaign train. Press reports said that he gave interviews at stations. I don't know from a first hand knowledge. I went on a train by myself because I'd been on the 1944 train and I didn't want to go on another one.

Fry: What happened in '44?

Outland: Oh, nothing [laughter].

Fry: Do you mean that all those parties were too much for you?

Outland: Well, I just decided that I'd go by myself.

Fry: [Laughter] You're not going to tell me; you're holding out on me. Well at any rate, I gather that you think his interviews with the press at that time were inopportune because he did come out openly for Eisenhower.

Outland: Well, they were either inopportune or else the press exaggerated. I don't know but it made good copy anyway. And they did cause difficulty in the California delegation at Philadelphia.

Fry: How far did he take this campaigning for Eisenhower?

Outland: By the time we got to Philadelphia, the whole thing had been dropped.

Fry: Oh, it had.

Outland: Oh yes.

Fry: Now, in your work as chairman of the policy committee, can you tell me what you did in that?

Chairman of the Policy Committee of the California Democratic
State Central Committee

Outland: Yes. When Roosevelt became state chairman he appointed chairmen for two committees. One was a policy committee for the state and the other was an organization committee for the state, and they were both darned good ideas. The organization committee organized precinct by precinct, which had never been done and probably never will be again. The policy committee was to try to keep the Democrats of California informed as to where the party stood on the vital issues of the day, and he asked me to chair that one. Originally I chose two representatives from each of California's congressional districts. Then, we later enlarged it. We tried to get representatives of every ideological faction in the party. We had former Governor Olson; we had former Congressman Bill Rogers, Jr.; we had Mrs. Ellie Heller; we had members of the state legislature and others. It was an interesting experience, but it was a rank failure.

In the first place, California is too big a state to call together a committee to determine policy, which I had to do by letter and telegram.

Fry: It was more like a convention, right?

Outland: Right. And in the second place, the issues changed so rapidly that by the time you started to draw a statement of policy, something had happened so that you would draw it up differently if you had to do it over again. Let me give you an example: we drew up the statement on the Truman Doctrine (aid to Greece and Turkey) in 1947, and we mentioned that we thought that it might have been an appropriate thing to have submitted this to the General Assembly of the United Nations first to show the Russian aggression in the Balkan area. Well, some of the Democrats in the state legislature and some others thought that this was being disloyal to President Truman, which it wasn't. We were trying to support him, simply pointing out



CONVENTION SPEAKERS—National and state Democratic leaders who spoke at the first session of the party's State Convention here Friday night. Seated, left to right, are Mrs. Katherine Hickson of Bangor, Maine national committeewoman; U. S. Representatives George E. Outland and Mrs. Helen Gehagan Douglas, both of California; and P. Harold DuFord of Waterville, national committeeman. Standing, are Mrs. Jane C. Kilroy of Portland, chairman of the Convention Committee; Peter M. MacDonald of Rumford, State Committee chairman; former Gov. Louis J. Brann; and Mrs. Nellie Rowe of Lewiston, vice chairman of the State Committee. *Press-Portland ME 3/23/46*

Outland: that this might have been a better technique. The result was that the State Democratic Committee called a special committee meeting in Los Angeles, with most of the voters from up north having proxies to criticize us on this. Well, it came to a vote in Los Angeles at a big meeting, and [former gubernatorial candidate] Bob Kenny and others were there. Nothing was definitely decided, but within a very few days [June 5, 1947] comes the Harvard commencement with its principal speaker being General George Marshall. His subject was the Marshall Plan, which completely wiped out the Truman Doctrine; so before we could vote on the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan had superceded it.*

Things of this nature were happening all the way along the line, so to try to keep an up-to-date policy to inform the voters as to where the party stood just turned out to be impossible, unfortunately. Maybe you could do it like Rhode Island, but you can't do it in a state as big as California. And even in the states where the issues don't change so rapidly, it's next to impossible.

Fry: On that question of our economic aid to Greece and Turkey: I think James Roosevelt was criticizing Truman for that, wasn't he?

Outland: No, I wrote it. Roosevelt signed it but I wrote the statement. We weren't criticizing Truman.

The statement was that there was Russian aggression in this area, the old guard nose issue again. And that we felt that before anything had been done (you remember that \$400,000,000 had been given to Greece and Turkey) we should let the General Assembly of the U.N., where there is no veto power, be a kind of sounding board and explain what we were going to do, instead of suddenly announcing it out of the clear sky. That's all.

Fry: Well then, I guess the next big thing for you was setting up Roosevelt's campaign. In the meantime, do I understand that you moved to San Francisco?

*July 26, 1947 was the final adoption. See copy of "Statement of Policy" as it appeared in final form in volume appendix.

Outland: I moved to San Francisco immediately after the defeat in '46. I wanted to live in the Bay Area and I looked around here, at the University of California among other places, but I liked the position at San Francisco State [College] better because of its program.

Fry: To teach?

Outland: Yes, because I wanted to teach instead of being subsidized to write books, and I liked President Paul Leonard, and I liked the program of general education there.

Fry: General education with a little "e"?

Outland: Yes. Then later on, after I'd been here for a few years, I went with the Ford Foundation for a year studying programs of general education throughout the United States.

Fry : That was for Ford--not the Fund for the Republic?

Outland: It was for Ford. They called it a special fund, but I'm not sure which one. The foundation had so many of these.

Fry: Because Robert Hutchins was head of the Fund for the Republic and he was such a general education man, I thought--

Outland: No, Hutchins was not a general education man. Hutchins was a specialist. As a matter of fact, later on--

Fry: Well, at the University of Chicago--

Outland: Yes, but not what you'd call general education, meaning the crossing of disciplines. He was a strict man for a particular field. Later on, when Hutchins moved to California, in the year I told you [off tape] that I was asked about the possibility of running for the U.S. Senate, so was he. He was living in Pasadena at that time, '54, I think. It was the year that Sam Yorty ran for the Senate as a Democratic nominee. Ancient history to me again. I can't give you the exact dates.

Fry: Well, we can get that date. [1954]

II SETTING UP JAMES ROOSEVELT'S CAMPAIGN FOR GOVERNOR

- Fry: All right, we'll start out then on how you came to join Roosevelt's campaign.
- Outland: I was working here at State College in San Francisco and I had seen him two or three times, and he wrote me a letter after a brief personal interview asking me if I would manage his campaign for governor. It was as simple as that.
- Fry: And your title, exactly, was what?
- Outland: Statewide campaign manager.
- Fry: Did you help him choose some of the other higher-ups in the campaign?
- Outland: Well, again this gets a little bit complicated. You see, he wasn't quite sure as to whether he was going to run when he asked me if I would be his manager. So he hired a survey team to poll the Democrats of California in the fall of 1949. Now, that poll had on it, oh, between fifteen and twenty items, the major one of which was: "Which of the following Democrats would you prefer to be our nominee for governor in 1950?" There were a lot of other questions, some of which were significant and some of which were thrown in, as I think is the case in most polls. But there was one very interesting question. (Remember that this poll was being taken of Democrats only.) One of the questions was: "Is Earl Warren a Republican or a Democrat?" Thirty-nine percent of those answering said he was a Democrat! Remember that cross-filing was still very much in the picture. Isn't this a tip off?
- Fry: And this was right after the 1948--

Outland: When he had run as Tom Dewey's running mate on the Republican ticket for president.

[Sound interference on small section of tape here]

Fry: How did the count come out to the question of "which of the following Democrats would you vote for?"

Outland: Roosevelt topped everybody by a tremendous margin. I don't remember what the other names were or what the number or percentage was. But he was far, far ahead, and it wasn't until he analyzed the results of that poll that he decided to announce his candidacy.

Fry: So all this time you knew that you were going to head up his campaign if he had one, right.

Outland: If he had one, yes. Now this was taken early in the fall of '49, between the time that he decided to announce and when I went on a leave of absence, which was the end of the first semester in '50. I did not have classes on Friday; I had a late evening extension course in Alameda Thursday nights. So for two or three months I volunteered my services, except for expenses, and took the night train down, the Oakland Lark at Fruitvale Station, worked all day Friday and Saturday and what work I could get in informally on Sunday, and then took the Sunday night train back to San Francisco. I was not a paid employee. I think it was February 1st that I actually went on full-time.

Fry: During this time then, were other appointments being made to his campaign?

Outland: There had been at least two people who had been working full-time. One was Mrs. Lisa Bronson, who was heading up a skeleton office staff in Los Angeles, and a Hank Reese--Hank wasn't his name; that was his nickname--who was a publicity man, both of whom later resigned. He also had others who were either on a part-time basis or a volunteer basis: Glen Wilson, Mrs. Richards (Mrs. Richards is the wife of the man who later ran for Senator, Dick Richards, an attorney in Los Angeles--Richard Richards) and there were others. But on what basis they were at that time I didn't know. And the staff was built up gradually.

Fry: And you were in Los Angeles most of the time?

Outland: Most of the time, yes.

Fry: After February 1st?

Outland: Yes, although I did make trips to San Diego, to Ventura, and Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo County, which had been my old district, and several, of course, to Northern California: San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose. But my headquarters were permanently down there.*

Fry: During this time, according to the newspaper files, he began to make some major speeches.

Outland: He made speeches, and as I say, we were working on a series of state-wide radio broadcasts. We were trying to work out an overall program. We had an advisory committee in Los Angeles, headed by J. Ray Files, who was a very prominent Democrat, an attorney there, and others. And we quite early had a Los Angeles County director, Harold Lane, who was field secretary for Congressman Chet Holifield. The name of the man that was in charge of Southern California, generally, was Charlie Wortham. He held the same position in Southern California that Langdon Post held in Northern California.

Fry: Oh, I thought maybe Susie Clifton held that position.

Outland: Susie Clifton held many positions. But her practical work, and it was a good job, was equivalent to that which George Davis had up here in Northern California: the raising of funds. Susie had been an active worker in Democratic politics for a great many years, and knew the contributors and potential contributors and attended financial meetings and was really very good at raising funds.

Fry: And then there are some other names. Gertrude Clark--

Outland: Gertrude Clark was from Sutter Creek in Amador County. What her official position in the Democratic party was, I don't recall. She may have been womans' vice-chairman for Northern

*See volume appendix for selected campaign material.

Outland: California, but this I cannot be certain of. But she was quite active and she accompanied Jim's group on several tours throughout Northern California and was not only active but a very efficient and capable person in the campaign. She recently died.

Fry: Did she start to run for lieutenant-governor in '46?

Outland: Not that I recall, but I don't know.

Fry: At any rate, according to the newspaper files, she did act as hostess on Roosevelt's first swing through Northern California in the absence of his wife. And apparently she was a very gracious woman, in her sixties, who was familiar to a great many people who knew her in all these communities.

Outland: Yes. Gertrude Clark was a very fine woman.

[Interruption]

III PATTERNS OF SUPPORT

Fry: Along about this time too, or even before, on the 11th of January, Roosevelt addressed the Zionist Organization of America with Edmund T. Golden, chairman, and gave three ways to help the new state of Israel. This made me wonder if he did have the support of the Jewish community in some funding, or did he have some difficulties there?*

Outland: Well, of course, I think too frequently there's over-generalization about ethnic groups and their political affiliation.

Fry: You mean in acting as a unit?

Outland: Yes. Jim had quite a little financial support from members of the Jewish community. But he wouldn't have any from a man like Louis B. Mayer, or people like that, you see.

Fry: As I remember, Mayer was on Warren's bandwagon.

Outland: An ardent Republican.

Fry: Was there better support from the Jewish community in the south than in the north?

Outland: I don't know.

Fry: Maybe that's a question for Susie Clifton?

Outland: Yes, except that I don't know how much Susie knew about the support financially in the north; she would know more about it in the south.

There was considerable support. I remember going to San Diego to meet with a group, and Jim was to come down too, to

* See letter from James Roosevelt to George Outland, March 9, 1948, in volume appendix.

Outland: meet with a group of Jewish businessmen, for the sole purpose of raising funds. I went down earlier on the train and Jim was to come down in his own private car later. And the time for the meeting came and there was no Jim.

Fry: The campaign manager's nightmare, isn't it?

Outland: I kept checking with the hotel clerk whether Mr. Roosevelt had checked in, and I'll never forget the clerk's answer: "Roosevelt, Roosevelt; how do you spell that name?" [laughter]

Fry: It sounds like there hadn't been a Democrat in his hotel for twenty years [laughter].

Outland: I had to tell that story, too, when I introduced Jim at the meeting. But there was quite a little Jewish support for him there.

Now, if you ask what proportion or how it compared with the amount in Northern California, I'd have to plead ignorance.

Fry: Also at this time stories continued to crop up in the political columnists' writings that the northern Democrats were still casting about for a candidate to run against Roosevelt in the primaries. Can I read you my notes on this January 28th story just to get them into the record?

Outland: Certainly.

Fry: "The conservatives leading this movement are among Pat Brown's old friends and supporters." (This was the day that Pat Brown had announced he was to run for the attorney generalship.) The same faction that's unhappy over Roosevelt apparently is unhappy over Congresswoman H.G. Douglas's announced candidacy versus Senator Downey, and they're also unhappy over former Lt. Governor Ellis Patterson's attempt to make it a Roosevelt-Patterson ticket." And it went on to say that Patterson might face opposition from members of the state assembly. However, they did expect that Roosevelt would win the primary. I just wondered why this opposition, and what you and Roosevelt were trying to do about it early in the campaign?

Outland: Well, much of the opposition from Northern California stemmed

Outland: from the 1948 Democratic National Convention. It wasn't unanimous up here by any means. We had quite a few prominent Democrats backing Roosevelt, but a lot of office-holders and former officials in the party never quite forgave Jim for temporarily trying to help Eisenhower. There were some of these in Southern California, too. It wasn't limited to Northern California, although there was more of it up here than there was down there.

Now, in the case of Pat Brown, however, Brown was never anti-Roosevelt; Brown was running his own campaign. And politically it was a very wise thing to do because he was the only state-wide winner that year on the Democratic ticket.

Fry: Do you mean a two-party winner, in the primary?

Outland: He didn't take the primary on the Republican ticket, but he came so darned close that he swept the final, whereas all the other state-wide Democratic candidates lost. As a matter of fact, George Miller, who was the leading Democratic candidate for lieutenant-governor, lost to Knight in the Democratic primary. Knight carried both parties.

Fry: Well, what about these big Democrats who were withholding their support from Roosevelt? Would you class them as being the established party liners, or can you divide it up that way?

Outland: I don't know if you can generalize on a thing like that. Some of the old-line people are loyal Democrats, and Roosevelt was the leading candidate and they stood by him. Others of them didn't, that's all.

Fry: I have some names listed here on the outline. Which ones of these were for him and which ones were holding back?

Outland: Well, George Miller was for him. Eventually, you know, he got Roosevelt's endorsement for lieutenant-governor.

Fry: Yes he did, but early in his January press releases Roosevelt said he wasn't going to line up with anybody. Do you know what finally brought him around to supporting Miller?

Outland: No, there were three or four men who wanted to run for the Democratic nomination for lieutenant-governor. Miller kept

Outland: emerging as a stronger and stronger one, and furthermore, he had the backing of organized labor.

Fry: I see.

Outland: Which may or may not have been the decisive factor, although I think it was probably the most important one. A man like Oliver Carter, if I recall correctly--

Fry: The state head of the Democratic party at the time--

Outland: And was neutral.

Fry: They're always neutral, aren't they?

Outland: They almost have to be if they occupy that type of position.

Fry: But, I keep picking up nuances that Carter was really more neutral than he had to be where Roosevelt was concerned.

Outland: That's almost an impossible question to answer. He was not anti-Roosevelt, openly at least. And I don't think he was underneath. He was a pretty straightforward guy.

Fry: The proof of the pudding would come in whether or not he funneled state Democratic funds into the Roosevelt campaign.

Outland: Well, technically and legally you can't do that on a primary campaign.

Fry: What about later?

Outland: Later on, yes.

Fry: Did he in the general election?

Outland: I'm sure he must have. But in the primary you legally cannot do that, although it's done all the time, both nationally and state-wide. But what was being done at that time was an attempt to squeeze out all but the strongest candidates because of cross-filing. Suppose you had five Democrats running in a district and one Republican. That one Republican might squeak through and get the nomination because all it took was more votes than the next guy, not an absolute majority.

Fry: And so what method did they use for the squeezing process?

Outland: They didn't use much of it in this campaign at all. They used it in congressional campaigns. They used it more in state assembly and senatorial campaigns when cross-filing was still possible. But cross-filing passed out with Pat Brown in 1958.

Fry: Well, the one speech I read from Carter said that they were going to try to put most of their emphasis, I guess, on getting one strong candidate in each congressional district and each legislative district. And he didn't mention anything about state-wide offices.

Outland: Well, this was true.

IV ISSUES

Cross-filing

Outland: You see, when I first ran for Congress in '42 there was cross-filing. There were five announced candidates for the Democratic nomination, including Jim McBride, who'd been in the state senate for two terms. I had **never** been in politics at all. Well, gradually the others dropped out except for McBride and the Republican candidate who cross-filed. And due to a series of very lucky incidents, I won the nomination.

Fry: With or without help from the state Democratic party?

Outland: What happened at that time was they had formed congressional district committees to endorse. I got the endorsement of three of the four counties in my district. The fourth did not endorse at all. So I had a three-to-nothing endorsement against McBride, who had been in politics for eight years. But this wasn't done too much for congressional offices later on. And then when Pat Brown came in as governor, cross-filing was abolished, although there's now a move to try to restore it.

Fry: Yes, I noticed that. Do you think it's a good idea?

Outland: No.

Fry: Why?

Outland: Well, to answer that, you have to start with a more basic question: Do you believe in a strong two-party system, a majority party to carry the ball, run the government, a minority party to (as they say in England, "Her majesty's loyal opposition") point out the mistakes and if they find enough of them, to replace them? If you believe in that, cross-filing is the worst

Outland: possible evil. If you say, "I believe in the man and not the party," then cross-filing is the answer.

Fry: What did you think of Roosevelt's position in 1950, that cross-filing was the root of the lobbying evil and caused control of the legislature by special interests?

Outland: That's very largely true. And I cross-filed both times in the third election, where I lost.

Fry: I noticed that one of the issues that Roosevelt would raise during the campaign was about the evils of cross-filing; and yet he did cross-file.

Outland: You're almost forced to.

Fry: I wondered if this was your advice?

Outland: No. I felt the same way he did, but I cross-filed too. However, to a certain extent this worked to his disadvantage because Warren cross-filed also, and while Roosevelt pulled a smattering of Republican votes, Warren got five times as many Democratic votes. And so when you add up the totals, you see, it meant a big advantage for Warren.

Fry: But Roosevelt didn't lose anything by cross-filing, and gained a little bit.

Outland: Free publicity.

Welfare

Fry: Yes. Well, I'm trying to think if we covered everything on the way the Democrats were split here. Who else was brought up for governor? The newspaper articles kept mentioning George McLain [leader of pensioners], who continued to threaten to file.

Outland: I know. I interviewed McLain in his office.

Fry: What about?

Outland: On his political plans. He's very cagey; he's a very smart guy and he had one of the most efficient business offices I've ever seen: hundreds of volunteer workers with files and adding machines and typewriters. Oh, he had the older people in his hand! He was holding off to see from where he could get the biggest support.

Fry: Did Roosevelt ever come out in a statement for McLain?

Outland: Not for McLain, personally--

Fry: Was he ever an ally?

Outland: I don't know about that, but he came out for better assistance for the aged. I imagine that Warren did too.

Fry: But Roosevelt came out for welfare handled and administered by the state, which had been the big ballot issue that McLain had won on two years before, then been beaten on again the following year.

Outland: McLain had won it one year but it was a mischief proposal. You see, McLain went further than that when he won because it not only put into the constitution so much a month for older people, but it also named the state head of the Department of Welfare.

Fry: Myrtle Williams, his friend.

Outland: Exactly.

Fry: Then it was put on the ballot again to undo this, and it was undone, and administration returned to the counties. So I was interested that Roosevelt would come out to again change to a state administration of welfare.

Outland: Well, he didn't include Myrtle Williams.

Fry: [Laughter] No he didn't. Then later on in his campaign, according to the newspaper clippings, he came out for federal welfare. In other words, welfare based on federal monies--

Outland: Federal assistance. Not a completely federalized program.

Fry: Did he mean state administration?

Outland: State-administered with increased federal funds, yes.

- Fry: He mentioned if he were elected governor he would go to Washington and lobby for it.
- Outland: Yes, that's right.
- Fry: Well, what was the response to this? Do you think it was a good idea at the time?
- Outland: Yes. I still think it's a good idea. As long as people continue to pour into California it shouldn't be just a matter for California taxpayers.
- Fry: Well, let's go on to some of these other issues. Maybe you remember the issues that gave you the most trouble.
- Outland: Oh, that's almost impossible. Some of the issues were straight personality things, which aren't issues but do influence campaigns, like [Senator Thomas] Eagleton's having been ill.
- Fry: Oh, that was just last week--McGovern's running mate who had to step down.
- Outland: I mean the fact like Roosevelt was constantly being accused of being a carpetbagger, a newcomer, as against Warren the native son. Roosevelt's divorce was thrown against him, too.

Carpetbagging

- Outland: The carpetbag issue had a rather interesting repercussion. He was speaking, I believe, down in Santa Monica where the Democratic candidate for the House of Representatives was Mrs. Esther Murray, who had been very active in politics. Before making his own pitch for candidacy, Jim was putting in a pitch for Mrs. Murray's election. Bear in mind he was always being, as I say, called a carpetbagger. And he was really waxing eloquent, and he said, "It's high time that we have a good liberal Democrat from the Eighteenth District of New York" [laughter].
- Fry: Oh no. I'll bet that hit the press.
- Outland: It sure did.

V SPEECHES

Outland: Jim really was a great orator. He was a better orator than FDR. FDR was a great reader of radio script. When he departed from his manuscript he tended to wander some and get lost, especially toward the end. The Yalta speech was terrible. I was right there when he made it. But he was an ill man at the time. But Jim, whose campaign, as you know, was based on a lot of street corner meetings and spontaneous answering of questions, had to handle himself very well, and he did.

Only once in a great while would there be one that would make me cringe a little. We had a meeting up here [in San Francisco] one noon, on the corner of Montgomery and California. The streets were all blocked off, a crowd as far as you could see, people hanging out the windows, and after he'd had his presentation, Jim then asked if there were questions. And there was this dear old lady up in the front row, who threw a curve ball at him. She said, "Mr. Roosevelt, what is your opinion about capital punishment?" Well, Jim cleared his throat, stalling a little bit, and said, "Well, that's a very good question. I'm unalterably opposed to capital punishment except for the most serious offenses" [laughter]. Well, nobody paid any attention to it.

Fry: Apparently he could handle almost any rough question that was put to him.

Outland: Oh yes.

Fry: In the campaign, did he plan the radio speeches as a significant factor in his campaign?

Outland: At the beginning he did. He had a weekly state-wide broadcast, and each of them centered around a particular topic, such as agriculture, labor, veterans, and so forth. Some of us persuaded him later on that there was far too much money going into this particular type of approach, and we didn't do very much of it later on.

Fry: Were these fairly long speeches?

Outland: Yes, they were. And most people don't listen to long political speeches.

[Interruption]

Fry: The newspapers mentioned that this ten-day experiment with the sound truck and so forth, going around to the small towns and small cities, was designed to create interest in his radio addresses. Does that mean that the radio addresses were to come later and that he was building up an audience for these?

Outland: They were to some extent simultaneous. This was when I was first getting into the picture. I didn't have anything to do with the sound truck. It was when they got the--you don't mean the big bus?

Fry: Not the bus; not the portable campaign center on wheels. This was just a sound truck, I think he actually rode in a car to these towns, and the sound truck was there that he climbed up on to address the crowd.

Outland: This was pretty much before I was actively in it.

Fry: Who wrote his radio addresses?

Outland: They were written by various members of the staff. I helped him on some. I helped him on his announcement speech. I helped him on some of the others. I'd had a little experience in this: I was on "The Town Meeting of the Air" six times and so forth. But we also had men on our staff who were well versed in the particular topics that he was speaking on and they put together the meat of it, and then together he and I chopped it, added to it, modified. So you can't say that any one person really wrote a particular speech.

Fry: Each speech was kind of a group process?

Outland: It was a group process, but he had the final say on what would be spoken.

Fry: What was your particular expertise in the speeches--anything special?

Outland: Well, no, unless it was education. He had one on education, which of course was in my field. I had worked for seven years in social work, so when he talked about welfare I was able to help on that. But mainly what I tried to avoid was in going over the speeches, the rough drafts, to avoid things that might be of a negative nature. For example, he was still being criticized as a carpetbagger. All right. He used, in a couple of speeches--one of them I didn't catch because his sister Anna caught it--he used a couple of times the word, "statehouse." Well now, we don't use the word statehouse in California to signify the capitol. Easterners do. New Englanders do. But you see, that itself was caught by one of the papers indicating that he didn't know much about California politics.

In other words, what I was trying to do mainly was help make suggestions more of a minor nature.

Fry: Rather than big content.

Outland: Rather than major content, that's right.

Fry: Did Warren pick up these negative things?

Outland: Not too much. Warren played it very smoothly as an incumbent should. He could stand on his record. Your person running against him has to take the offensive. Jim had to attack Warren's record on several things, and on some of them he found Warren quite vulnerable but others he stayed away from because Warren wasn't vulnerable.

Fry: Do you remember which ones?

Outland: No. I can't pin that one down, no.

Fry: One of the things he seemed to hit right from the very first was the growing unemployment in the state.

Outland: I don't recall this.

Fry: I wondered if his sister, Anna, helped in the campaign.

Outland: She came down to the office in Los Angeles on several occasions and I talked with her briefly, but I have an idea that it was more of the way she influenced him outside of the office than inside. But how much I don't know, and probably a great deal of it was constructive because she was and is a brilliant person.

Fry: But she didn't have any official capacity?

Outland: No, none.

Fry: Things like that could kind of cause problems. [Pause] You're nodding. [Laughter] Was that one of the problems in holding things together and keeping lines of communication open and knowing what was going on in your directorship of the campaign?

Outland: Yes, there were times when I wouldn't be informed of things that were happening that I learned about later, such as a person being hired on the staff whom I didn't know anything about, hadn't ever interviewed.

Fry: Were you responsible for sort of the treasurer functions?

Outland: Susie did more of that.

Fry: Oh, she did. I wondered if you had to pay someone you didn't even know was on the staff--

Outland: We had an official treasurer--a layman--who handled the funds. But from the standpoint of raising the money, Susie did a very good job at it.

VI CHARGES

Fry: I wondered about the charges in the campaign. Were you bothered with very many charges and attacks by Warren earlier in the campaign?

Outland: No. Warren played it very smart.

Fry: What about later on, toward the end?

Outland: He didn't attack Jim very much. When I ran in my second election, I never mentioned my opponent's name once, in any speech or write-up.

Fry: Because you were the incumbent?

Outland: That's right. When it would come to speaking about it I would say, "My opponent, whose name I can't recall--" On the other hand, in one of his pamphlets he mentioned my name forty-four times, which I felt was fairly good free advertising.

No, Warren played this one smart. For the same reason, of course, and logically, Nixon will not meet McGovern in debate. No, Nixon's a hundred percent right, politically. Only politically [laughter].

Fry: You mentioned Nixon and it reminded me of this: At the same time this was going on [1950] between Warren and Roosevelt, Nixon was fighting Helen Gahagan Douglas for the senatorship--

Outland: No, no--

Fry: Well, not in the primaries, but later, and at any rate the Red charges were applied. I wondered if this happened at all in the Roosevelt campaign, if Warren had made any reference to ultra-liberality?

Outland: A very little. He may have; he probably did, but in comparison to the Nixon-Douglas campaign, it was very minute.

Fry: Roosevelt seemed to attack Warren on such things as being a product of the Cameron-Chandler-Knowland [newspaper] axis. What did you think about that? Did you think it was fairly accurate at the time?

Outland: Well, I mean the [Los Angeles] Times, [Oakland] Tribune, and the [San Francisco] Chronicle were all pro-Warren people and anti-Roosevelt. Now, whether you want to use the word "axis," which has an emotional connotation to it, is something else. But it was an accurate thing. Now, to be politically expedient I would doubt that nine voters out of ten would know who Cameron was. They mostly probably know Knowland and some of them would know Chandler, but it's going over the heads of your average voter.

When I came up here once I had a couple of my students do a little study down at the corner of Kearny and Market, and ask every tenth person that passed if he would name the congressman from his district. One out of forty-something could.

Fry: So, you really had to keep the campaign on a fundamental level?

Outland: Yes. We didn't do it as much as we should have, but it has to be kept that way. Here's where Adlai Stevenson made his big mistake against Eisenhower.

Fry: Just two years later, too.

VII TECHNIQUES

- Fry: What about the role of television in this, which today is such an educator in campaigns?
- Outland: Well, as I mentioned when we were talking previously, San Francisco at the time had only two TV stations. Los Angeles--I don't know whether they were all in the city, but the Los Angeles area had about twelve. So what money went into TV went into Southern California. Furthermore, up here with only the two stations, the people who had TV were not the ones that were going to vote for Roosevelt anyway.
- Fry: It was still very much the upper class.
- Outland: This was not true in Southern California. I frequently went to some of Roosevelt's meetings and stood in the background, mingled with the crowd and tried to get reactions. We were in a little eastside neighborhood, very largely Mexican-American people. Quite a good crowd there. Jim was going over pretty well. And there was a boy, big-eyed kid about twelve or thirteen, standing beside me, and I said, "Son, do you live around here?" And he said, "Sure do mister." I said, "Where do you live?" He said, "The fourth TV aerial down the street." [laughter]
- Fry: So, it was still rare enough to be a landmark.
- Outland: Even in Southern California, that's right.
- Fry: Did you feel that Roosevelt's television appearances were an asset?
- Outland: He went over very well on television. He has a warm, affable personality, one that reaches people, speaks fluently, gives the impression (which is genuine I'm sure) of liking people, and they react in a friendly manner. That doesn't necessarily mean they're going to vote for him, but they do respond at the time. Now two weeks later there may be other things that will change their minds.

One of the things we know least about voting behavior is why a person votes the way he does.

Fry: Especially in California.

Outland: I taught this stuff for twenty years and studied everything I could find on it, and still don't know. There are too many complexities. Talk about the women's vote, talk about the Catholic vote, talk about the labor vote, talk about the veterans vote. I put up to my class this hypothetical case: here's a woman--O.K. woman. She lives in Boston--all right, New England. Her parents were born in Italy--Italian-American. She's a member of the Catholic church--Catholic. Her husband is an American in the American Legion --veteran. He's also an officer in the labor union--labor. Keep on a going. How do you classify her when you start to break down voters? As a woman? As a New Englander? As a labor leader's wife? As a vet? And so forth. And the cross-currents are such that politicians right now are bothered like the dickens on this.

Fry: How much analysis of voters was done in the Roosevelt campaign?

Outland: Do you mean after the election?

Fry: No, before. How much of this went on? You know today they use computers to figure out how people are going to vote.

Outland: Very little. We didn't have computers then.

Fry: What about a political analyst on the staff?

Outland: We didn't have what would be a political analyst in the terms used today. Remember this was twenty-two years ago.

Fry: Well, Roosevelt mentioned in one of his speeches in an off-the-cuff way about his own training in politics at the knee of his father and the knee of his mother, and I wondered if maybe he himself filled that role of political analyst somewhat.

Outland: No, that role was filled by two men principally, and by two or three others secondarily on the staff. It was filled mainly by Jim Farley.

Fry: For James Roosevelt?

Outland: Oh no. I thought you were talking about his dad.

Fry: I'm sorry, no.

Outland: No, no. Jim didn't have this. He had a lot of amateurs advising him, everybody from Dr. Doyle to his sister.

- Fry: Dr. Doyle?
- Outland: You were talking about him. Leo Doyle. Remember you said he was writing a book about him.
- Fry: Oh, he was the doctor in Berkeley, yes, who was writing a book in a comic book format about Roosevelt that was supposed to sell for a dollar.
- Outland: I never heard of it or saw it then. He and Anna had written this book on how to raise a baby, but that was before.
- Fry: It sounds like the Roosevelt book was a good idea, but I haven't seen any trace of the book yet.
- Outland: I saw one for a nickel once downtown. Holmes Bookstore, out there on the shelf. I wish I had bought it.
- Fry: Oh really? It did come out then.
- Outland: Oh yes, that it did, but it wouldn't have been selling for a nickel if it had much of a--
- Fry: Well, you said that Dr. Doyle was one of the political advisors. Who else and what sort of a political advisor was he?
- Outland: Just on a personal basis.
- Fry: Another one who was off the staff.
- Outland: Dozens of people in every part of California thought they knew how to run a campaign, and they all gave Jim free advice. The best story about Dr. Doyle and Roosevelt that I know of--this was before Jim was an announced candidate--Doyle asked him to come up and speak at one of the service clubs in Oakland, or Berkeley. I don't know which one it was. And Doyle took his little son down to the airport to meet Jim. The plane was late and they were operating on a split-second schedule anyway and Doyle was driving just as fast as he could around the curves to get to the meeting. Well, the little boy and Jim are sitting in back. Jim is studying his notes. Doyle was going pretty fast. Earlier, while they had been waiting for Jim's plane, Doyle had taken the little kid to his sister's, the boy's aunt who lived near the airport, and the aunt filled him up with popcorn, peanuts, soda pop and so forth. And about halfway there the little boy lost all of this, on Jim. [laughter] Well, they had to

Outland: lose some more time when they went to the Doyle home and Mrs. Doyle cleaned and pressed and sponged and did everything, but there was still an odor left.

After the meeting was over and everybody was relaxed, Doyle said, "Jim I'd like you to meet the president of my bank. He's an old Republican but he's a good guy and he'd like to meet you." So, they went down and Doyle explained why it was that there was still this strange odor on Jim's clothing. A couple of days later the little boy gets a savings deposit book with five dollars in it to start an account, saying, "You've done something to a Roosevelt that I've wanted to do for twenty years." [laughter]

Fry: Funny, I didn't run across that story in my newspaper research!

Outland: Oh, I don't think it was ever told. [laughter]

Fry: I'm sure it wasn't.

Well, who else were some of the major political-analyst types who were giving advice? Some of the main ones.

Outland: Oh, I don't know. We had in each county, of course, members of the county committees. I don't know if I could spell them out without listing a hundred or so and picking and choosing here and there.

Fry: What about members of the staff? Who seemed to be strategy types?

Outland: Well, each one had his own specialty. Milt Phinney, who had been the head of the Newspaper Guild in Los Angeles and who had been on the Los Angeles Daily News, which was the only Democratic paper of any size in California, was very good at the publicity part. Harold Lane, who was [Congressman] Chet Holifield's field secretary and who was in charge of Los Angeles County, was extremely valuable in Los Angeles. George Davis, of course, up here. I don't know as I could --I mean the list would be either two or three or endless in number.

Fry: I see. George Davis's appointment to the staff brought up some conjectures that perhaps this meant that an agreement had been reached with Truman.

Outland: No, there was never any, at least I never knew of any indication of this.

Fry: I had shown you Robert deRoos's article on March 30th, that said that the "Democrats are lining up solidly," and deRoos said that

- Fry: "Jimmy Roosevelt achieved this with a personal assist from President Truman through William Boyle, the national committee chairman." Is that true or false?
- Outland: It may be true, and I don't think he would have written it if it weren't, but I know nothing about it.
- Fry: Well, do you think that James Roosevelt did pledge his "word and honor" that he would not be a candidate for the presidency in '52 if he won here in '50?
- Outland: If deRoos quotes him to that effect, then it's probably true. But I don't know again.
- Fry: You didn't know anything about it?
- Outland: No.
- Fry: Why wouldn't you have known anything about it, because you--
- Outland: There were a lot of things I didn't know anything about.
- Fry: Well, that information would have come from James Roosevelt to you.
- Outland: It should have, yes.
- Fry: That was one of your problems then? One press story talks about, "A public declaration of love will unite the Democrats, it is hoped, at the Atherton estate of Mr. and Mrs. Burt Rosenbloom Saturday afternoon for those who have contributed a hundred dollars or more." Were the Rosenblooms important?
- Outland: I don't know who they were. The first time I saw the name was on there.
- Fry: I wanted to ask you about what sort of liability, if any, was Roosevelt's idea of opening trade with mainland China?
- Outland: It never became a special issue.
- Fry: It seemed a big issue in the Helen Gahagan Douglas campaign papers that I've seen.
- Outland: More perhaps. Jim didn't play this up very much.
- Fry: And apparently Earl Warren didn't pick it up then?

Outland: Not very much, no.

Fry: What about FEPC?

Outland: Jim was all for that.

Fry: Was this fairly big in the campaign?

Outland: It helped him among minority groups. But some groups that should have been very strong at that time were very apathetic. For instance, Los Angeles has and San Diego has and other places-- Northern California has now--a very large Mexican-American population. At that time they were just beginning to get interested in politics. But I don't suppose that one out of twenty-five even registered, to say nothing of voting.

Fry: Was there any big registration effort made?

Outland: Yes. And one man, who is now in Congress--

Fry: Oh, who's that?

Outland: His name doesn't sound Mexican at all. His name is Ed Roybal, and he was the head of the Democratic Mexican-American group in East Los Angeles. There were thousands upon thousands of them. I talked with Roybal and he was doing what he could, but they were just starting at that time.

Fry: What was your assessment at that time of how Earl Warren rated with minority groups?

Outland: I didn't know. I was so busy in Jim's campaign that I didn't have a chance to interview many of the people of the minority groups. Your colored people, those that were interested, were pretty much in back of Roosevelt.

VIII ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

- Fry: Another issue was reapportionment, along one-man, one-vote lines, in the state senate.
- Outland: Not at that time. Not very much. Almost none at all. That didn't come until considerably later.
- Fry: I noticed that kind of late in the primary Warren followed in some of the towns where Roosevelt had appeared, and in the valley in a May 5 press story, he had asked if they knew that Roosevelt was all for disenfranchising them because he's for reapportionment of the Senate and this would be a shame.
- Outland: This did not become an issue to almost any extent whatsoever.
- Fry: It is kind of interesting in view of Warren's later stand.
- Outland: Oh yes, later on it became a big issue.
- Fry: Did you have any problems particularly with newspaper publicity stories and their clearance with you and with Roosevelt?
- Outland: No. The man that was the head of our press department in Los Angeles, as I said, was a fellow by the name of Milt Phinney. Milt used to be head of the Newspaper Guild Chapter in Los Angeles and was pretty well known and pretty well liked, and had an in, you see, with the press more than some outsider might have had.
- Drew Pearson sent a man to me to consider to handle this job. I think he would have done a good job but he was an outsider and Phinney knew Los Angeles, so I picked Phinney instead to head it up.
- Fry: Were you a little bit afraid to take on someone who was Drew Pearson's friend?

- Outland: No. Drew Pearson and I are good friends. I have his picture hanging on the wall up here. Yes, I had Drew Pearson out here for lunch with Hayakawa [president of San Francisco State College] one day just a few months before he died.
- Fry: Oh, just recently then?
- Outland: Yes. The year before last.
- Fry: Do you remember anything about how James Roosevelt was able to capitalize on his family in the campaign? Did he actively try to bring them in on the campaign?
- Outland: No. Of course, his name alone did it. But if anything he tried to avoid just walking in his father's footsteps. There would be references from time to time which made it rather clear he was a relation to FDR.
- Fry: Well, at the time of that wedding of Buzzy Dall and Curtis Roosevelt--
- Outland: All those belonged to Anna Roosevelt.
- Fry: At that wedding I think Eleanor Roosevelt came out. I wondered if she made speeches or anything for James Roosevelt?
- Outland: I don't know. I had her up here once to speak to some of our students.
- Fry: During the campaign?
- Outland: Oh no. Before the campaign.
- Fry: So, this wasn't--
- Outland: This didn't enter into it, no.
- Fry: The other campaign vulnerability that he had to contend with was his wife.
- Outland: As I say, he forgot his wedding anniversary one year.
- Fry: And this was during this campaign, wasn't it?
- Outland: Yes. Another thing that bothered a little during the primaries was that Warren was capitalizing on pictures and publicity on his big family.
- Fry: His beautiful family, yes.

Outland: Rommie [Rommel Roosevelt] absolutely refused to pose for pictures. She wouldn't do it with the family at all. I begged and pleaded with her. Now, in the final campaign she did. A very nice picture of her and Jim and the three children, but in the primaries she wouldn't pose for them.

Fry: Well, they were having their troubles, I guess, in the primaries.

Outland: I didn't see very much of them. I was out in their home several times. She came down to two or three of the meetings and sat with Mrs. Outland. There was no overt evidence of trouble in this particular period. There was before and afterwards. But I saw none at that time at all.

Fry: So, this was all under the surface.

Outland: If there was any at the time it was under the surface.

Fry: Well, could you tell about what happened when he forgot her anniversary? That really did have an impact on the campaign.

Outland: Well, I had to call off a whole week's speeches while he took her to Palm Springs. I had to rearrange the entire itinerary.

Fry: Did he have any defense about his divorce and remarriage?

Outland: No.

There was one thing, you see, that he had to his credit, which he never tried to capitalize on too much and I admired him for it, but it would have been an asset if he would have used it right: he was Lieutenant Colonel in the Marines under Colonel Evans Carlson of Carlson's Raiders. He was another man who was going to run for the Senate then offered me his backing and died within two months after the 1946 primary. Jim risked his life two or three times to save men under fire and was really admired tremendously by all in the outfits in which he served. But he never attempted to make political capital out of it.

Fry: You couldn't get him to?

Outland: I didn't try to because you can state the facts on that and let them stand on their own.

Fry: Just the fact that it didn't come out too much in the press, is that what you mean?

Outland: I mean, had I been in Jim's place I wouldn't have wanted to say, "Look here, I was a big hero."

Fry: Yes. I guess you don't do it that way.

Outland: You don't.

Fry: You let someone else write the story. But that didn't happen?

Outland: Very little.

Fry: Well, the only other thing is the fact of your resignation from the campaign after the primaries.

Outland: I didn't resign. He asked me to leave.

Fry: Can you tell me why?

Outland: Why? I don't know.

Fry: And what had been the contention between you?

Outland: I don't know.

Fry: Just for a sealed record?

[tape off]

Fry: All right. In the interview I have two other Democrats here that I wanted to get on record from you as to their lack of support. One is John P. McEnery--

Outland: John McEnery was never enthusiastic about Roosevelt after the 1948 convention.

Fry: And you never did get him back on the bandwagon?

Outland: No. I don't mean that he went out and worked for Warren. He just sat.

Fry: What was his position?

Outland: At the time of Truman's campaign in 1948, he was vice-chairman for Northern California. I don't think he held any position in 1950.

Fry: According to newspaper articles he was an ex-vice chairman.

Outland: I think that's true.

Fry: There's another person, George Luckey, who in one article I read was referred to as the major opposition within the Democratic party.

Outland: Luckey was always opposed to Roosevelt because he wanted to be the nominee himself. He had never been too much in politics. He was from the Imperial Valley. Whether it was Imperial County or whether it was San Diego County, I'm not sure, Imperial I think. But Luckey at one time was making a lot of speeches and he was awfully anxious to get into the campaign.

Fry: So he was just ambitious and--

Outland: Luckey opposed Roosevelt. Luckey was more conservative in his political philosophies than Roosevelt. He was also personally ambitious. He was a perfectly honorable guy. He never did anything underhanded, but never got very far except with some of the more conservative members of the Democratic party in Southern California.

Fry: Did he manage to keep them from supporting Roosevelt in either work or money?

Outland: I don't know. I think he probably did. That would be my impression, but I couldn't verify that, and I may be doing him an injustice by even suggesting it.

Fry: Brigadier General Holdridge ran against Roosevelt in the primaries. Whose candidate was he?

Outland: He was Holdridge's candidate. You never heard more than just a smattering or two about him. His name wouldn't appear, I don't think, in any real write-up about the campaign. He didn't enter into it. Luckey's did. But, Holdridge's didn't.

IX LOOKING BACK

Fry: Then the final question is, if you had it to do over, what would you have done that you didn't do and vice versa?

Outland: Well, I can give you a real answer on that. I would never manage anybody else's campaign again. Estes Kefauver asked me to manage his presidential campaign. He was the best friend I had in the U.S. Senate. We went to Europe together, and he asked me in Chicago at the Palmer House if I would manage his campaign. This was in '52. I told him no and as much as I admired him and agreed with him that I wasn't ever going to manage anybody else's campaign because things that I say I know I can keep; but I can't keep somebody else's promises.

Fry: Did you ever have a top job in any other campaign after this?

Outland: Never wanted one.

Fry: So, your teaching at San Francisco State then was your primary concern after this campaign?

Outland: Yes. I was sent as a delegate to the convention of '48, and later I was asked by Alan Cranston to make the race for the U.S. Senate. I was interested enough to go to Southern California and found a lot of support among certain groups in San Diego, Pasadena, Beverly Hills, parts of L.A., but I didn't even go to the Fresno Democratic convention finally.

Fry: What changed your mind or what decided you against it?

Outland: Well, even after I'd had the pledged support of three of the other men who were going to run--

Fry: Oh, who was that?

Outland: Well, one was Manchester Boddy, no that was the previous--'46 was Boddy. One was Robert Hutchins. One was Peter Odegard.

Fry: Oh yes, from the University of California at Berkeley.

Outland: Yes. And one was the man who at one time was the head of the WPA in California and went back to Washington, Dewey Anderson.

Fry: So, you had their support and you still decided not to run. Why?

Outland: Well, I could have had several hundred pledged votes. Yorty had about thirteen hundred already pledged for the Fresno convention. What was the use of bucking that? He'd gotten way out in the lead. And he'd gotten the endorsement of organized labor.

Fry: Well, we'll put this together along with some of your papers and things to help explain some of your career in Congress.

[End of Interview]

Transcriber: Marilyn Fernandez
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WILL ROGERS, JR.
BEVERLY HILLS CITIZEN BUILDING
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA

March 4, 1949

Hon. George E. Outland
San Francisco State College
San Francisco 2, California

Dear George:

The studios have never been as idle as they are now. This is the worst possible time for anyone to try to get a position; and people who have been connected with them for twenty and thirty years are being dismissed. My advice to Miss Yee Ahtye is to stay away from this city of sin, for conditions here are very tough.

Just returned from a six weeks' trip to Washington. Just when we got the Senate to increase some appropriations for Indians, why along comes this filibuster, and it is now holding up all of the appropriation bills. The matter will soon be getting serious, as money for Navajo education runs out around the 15th of March; although by using other funds, they may be able to eke along until the first of April.

I think we Democrats can take the state in '50, if we can get together. I haven't talked to Jimmy Roosevelt yet; but I don't believe it is too early to start seeing if we can't line up a slate for our state-wide candidates.

Best regards,

Bill

Will Rogers, Jr.

WR/icg

The READER'S DIGEST

An article a day of enduring significance, in condensed permanent booklet form

February 1945

Public opinion — that means you and me — can help immeasurably in stepping-up Congressional efficiency

We Must Modernize CONGRESS

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ By George E. Outland ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Member of the House of Representatives from California

CRITICISM of Congress by the people is not new, but of late Congress has begun to criticize itself. Our national legislature has become sharply aware of the need of bringing its machinery up to date. More than 50 resolutions calling for reform were introduced in the 78th Congress, which ended in December, and reorganization along modern lines will be one of the chief concerns of the new Congress. The public thinks of Congress largely in terms of what happens on the floors of the Senate and the House. The real work, however, is done in committees, and it is with the committee system that changes must start.

Frank Knox, late Secretary of the Navy, was an extremely busy man. Yet when Congress decided to investigate a Navy contract, Secretary Knox was hailed up to Capitol Hill not once but four different times

Long a student of government problems, George E. Outland received his M.A. from Harvard and his Ph.D. in education in government from Yale. After teaching several years at Yale and at Santa Barbara (Calif.) State College, he was elected to Congress in 1948 as a Democrat from the 11th District of California; he was re-elected in 1944.

tell exactly the same story to four different Congressional committees! Jesse Jones is reported to have appeared 18 different times before 18 different Congressional committees — to deliver the same two-hour speech.

Today there are 47 standing committees in the House and 33 in the Senate; moreover, there are many temporary committees. No wonder the *New York Times* refers to "our hydra-headed Congress." Senator La Follette told the Senate last year that "hardly a day has gone by during the present long and arduous session of the Congress when I have not had to decide which one of several very important committees I would attend."

The Maloney-Monroney resolution, adopted at the close of the latest session of Congress, creates a bipartisan committee composed of six members from the Senate and six from the House to study the problems of reorganization and make definite recommendations at the end of 90 days.

There are several possible solutions to the committee problem. One that will appeal to the common sense of the American people calls for ten or a dozen joint or parallel committees of both Houses. Much time now wasted

could be saved and such an arrangement would enable the two chambers to work together with greater understanding.

However, reform will make little progress until the American people as a whole demand greater efficiency of their Congress. Reducing the number of committees would mean reducing the number of committee chairmanships. The prestige of a committee chairmanship is the climax in the career of a Congressman; there are few who will vote to reduce their own chances for such a position — and few chairmen who will vote to abolish the position already theirs. Moreover, each committee chairman is allowed extra clerical help; short-handed as each Congressman is, to become a committee chairman is to obtain a more adequate staff.

This problem of staff is becoming increasingly serious. One of the keenest students of Congress, Dr. George B. Galloway, chairman of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association, contends that of the 80 standing committees not more than six have staffs sufficiently expert to cope with and to evaluate the testimony of either administrative officials or lobbyists. My own committee on Banking and Currency must pass on all legislation concerning the Office of Price Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the many aspects of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Yet our committee has no attorneys, no special consultants, no expert to whom we can turn for evaluation of testimony, preparation of material, or legal interpretation.

Congressman Monroney of Oklahoma points out that each of 145 federal departments and bureaus employs more people than there are on the entire Congressional staff. For example, the Office of Indian Affairs spends more than twice as much to supervise the nation's Indians as it costs to operate Congress.

To meet requirements it would not be necessary for committees to create permanent staff additions. There is now provided by the Library of Congress a little-known Legislative Reference Service. This is composed of experts who are able to render research assistance on questions of importance that arise before various committees. Such a service could be greatly enlarged. Thus committees which from time to time needed greater staff help might turn to the Service, drawing from a pool of competent students of government problems maintained under impartial auspices.

Likewise a Constituents Inquiry Service under the Library of Congress would immediately remove from individual Representatives and Senators the burden of handling endless trifling requests, and demands which overwhelm them in a mass of detail and prevent them from adequately performing their major duties.

One Representative hurried back to his office to find 96 letters awaiting him, among which were the following requests:

A Chamber of Commerce wanted him to get busy "right now to lift gasoline and tire rationing."

A determined young woman demanded that he instruct the Army to transfer her boy friend from Africa to a service post she named back home.

A clubwoman wanted "some information on world production."

A politician wanted a portrait of the President personally autographed "from Frank to Willie."

The principal speaker at a political meeting wanted to know how long the war would last and how much it would cost.

"Taxpayer" wanted him to put an end "to lend-lease gifts to foreigners and other immoral people."

"American mother" urged him not to vote for postwar cooperation "unless they do what we say."^{*}

If you think this list is an exaggeration, I hasten to assure you that it is not. My own collection of strange requests already fills several folders, and is growing daily. Legitimate requests any Congressman is happy to attempt to meet. Those asking him to "please send me a rock from Chesapeake Bay to add to my rock garden" or demanding that he "see that sliced bread is restored to the American people or I shall vote for your opponent next time" are time-consuming, to put it mildly. All requests for information or accommodations, including many that are reasonable, could well be referred to a Constituents Inquiry Service.

Other steps are needed, however, to reduce the demands now made upon a Congressman's time. Placing all post offices under Civil Service would save the worry and energy now spent on nominating postmasters. Further time could be saved by the transfer of all Annapolis and West Point appointments to Civil Service or to the Academies themselves. The granting of self-government to the District of Columbia would remove a thorn from the side of many a har-

^{*} Associated Press article by Frank I. Weller in *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1944.

assed Congressman — and from the side of the city of Washington too!

Under existing procedure the first and third Tuesdays of each month are reserved by the Claims Committees in both House and Senate to hear private claims against the Government. Persons who have been injured by an Army truck or have some other personal injury claim against the Government present their cases. In the opinion of many Congressmen, the Claims Committees might well be abolished and an administrative agency to do its work set up. This would take away, as Senator La Follette points out, "the burdensome task of investigating petty claims and invoking the cumbersome procedure of passing private bills through the House and Senate."

Among the criticisms of Congress heard most often is that there is too little cooperation between our national legislature and the Administration. Sometimes the blame is placed on the "bureaucrats," sometimes on the New Deal; less often on a willful Congress itself. Here again Congress is aware of a problem to be solved within its own ranks, and the stirrings of solution are already noticeable.

Representative Kefauver of Tennessee suggests amending the rules of the House to provide for a question period at which heads of executive departments and independent agencies would be requested to appear and answer questions — somewhat like the question hour in the House of Commons.

One practical example of cooperation between the legislative and executive branches has already demonstrated its merit. The House Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds supervises the vast public housing and federal works program in war-congested areas. The first Tuesday

of each month there appear before it John Blandford, Jr., NHA administrator, General Fleming, FWA administrator, and the key assistants on their respective staffs. A mutual give-and-take follows. Chairman Lanham asks questions about particular complaints or problems that have arisen, and he gets frank answers. Such meetings have resulted in better understanding on the part of both Congressmen and administrators; potential friction has been averted and governmental efficiency has been increased. The example set by Fritz Lanham and his committee might well be followed by other committees in both Houses.

There are even plans afoot also by which Congress could improve its public appearance. Dr. Galloway suggests that more frank recognition be given of the fact that the important work of Congress is done in committees. Therefore, let the bulk of the calendar be given over to committee meetings, open to the public, and let Congress meet to vote only one night a week. Business could be cleared with dignity and decorum. Similarly Congressional debate, in Dr. Galloway's opinion, could be telescoped into one or two evenings a week, with Congressional leaders discussing legislative issues before their own visible audience and the radio audience as well.

Neither the problems facing Congress nor the solutions are limited to Congress; both are for the American

people as a whole to face. We shall never see our national legislative body modernized until the demand has reached the point where Representatives and Senators can no longer afford to ignore it. To this end there is much that we as individual citizens can do.

We can familiarize ourselves with the problems and proposed solutions. There is more fresh material available in books and publications. Once you have posted yourself, do not hesitate to let your Representative know that you are aware of needed changes, and that you are concerned with his awareness to them. It is easy to sit back and damn "bureaucracy"; the essential thing is to help bring about changes which will prevent bureaucratic domination in the first place.

Our Congress is not composed of supermen, armed with extraordinary powers of vision. Nor is it composed of "political panhandlers and trimmers." It is made up of ordinary men who are sincerely interested in doing the job which you sent them there to do. They work hard at that job. Your encouragement and your suggestions will help them to remodel Congress and enable it to function more efficiently.

Totalitarianism starts with the decline and neglect of the legislative body. The sensitiveness of the people to their Congress is one of the surest guarantees against the failure of democracy.



Christian Democracy and Full Employment

SPEECH
OF

HON. GEORGE E. OUTLAND

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, December 7, 1945

Mr. OUTLAND. Mr. Speaker, the first of next week, or the middle of next week, one of the most publicized measures that we have been discussing this year will be brought to the floor of the House, the full employment bill. In my remarks today I want to discuss some statements that have been made by various religious leaders of all faiths and denominations in which they express their hope that this House will pass this full employment bill in its strengthened, forceful form.

Continually, in recent months, I have been asking myself, what is the essential meaning of democracy, and how is it related to basic human rights and to freedom?

I am very much concerned with this issue, because so many strange things have been said of late, in these congressional Halls, in committee hearings, in the press, and on the radio, all in the name of democracy.

I was under the impression that those of us who have lived through two terrible world conflicts, both of which were fought to preserve democracy, were pretty well agreed as to the meaning of the term. But when I listen to so much persistent and apparently sincere oratory directed against the right to work as undemocratic—when I am repeatedly told that if this country undertakes to plan against unemployment and depression, we shall lose our freedom—well, I begin to wonder whether we really understand this democratic system with which we are blessed.

The tenor and theme of my remarks today has been aptly summed up by Secretary Vinson who told the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments:

It is a false dilemma which gives us the choice between full employment and free society . . . those who tell us that dep'ations are the price we pay for freedom are doing no favor to the cause of freedom.

Most of the opposition to the full employment bill has been based on this false distinction which places democracy and freedom on one side and full employment on the other. Let me illustrate with some of the more recent remarks made on this floor.

Recently the chairman of the committee considering this bill, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. MANASCO] told us:

I think if this bill is passed in its present form it would wreck our system of private enterprise . . . it will enslave the workmen of this country.

And another member of this same committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GOSSETT] stated:

I think this bill as written . . . would be just about as dangerous as the atomic bomb. . . . It would probably eliminate the Congress within a very few years. . . . Full employment, if at all possible, is possible only with a completely regimented economy . . . only under some form of totalitarianism. . . . Most of the opponents of this bill would prefer going hungry in the future than seeing American democracy sold down the river for a mess of pottage.

Mr. Speaker, let me repeat that last sentence: "Most of the opponents of this bill would prefer going hungry in the future than seeing American democracy sold down the river for a mess of pottage."

I want to concur with Mr. GOSSETT in that statement. So, in fact, would not most, but all of the sponsors of the full employment bill. But the issue I want to raise with you today is this—How long do you think American democracy will survive if large segments of the population are allowed to go hungry?

I am trying to be realistic about this democracy of ours. And it is when I am most hardheaded and realistic that I come to the conclusion that democracy is not compatible with mass unemployment. Full employment is a major requirement of democracy.

This is true in a double sense. Economically it is true because our democratic system of private enterprise depends upon markets and profits. And unless there is full employment there will not be enough purchasing power to support profits and markets, producers will have to turn to the Government or to monopoly controls, and the free competitive system will collapse. Much of the debate over the bill has been in these economic terms, and I do not need to elaborate the point here.

But it is also true in the much more fundamental human terms in which I am talking today that we cannot preserve our democracy if we allow millions of our citizens to go without means of livelihood, dignity, and self-respect.

Since none can speak so eloquently of these human values than those who have devoted their lives to working with men as individuals, I am going to talk today largely through the mouths of church leaders. The men of the church, indeed, have been among the most ardent supporters of the full employment bill. The measure has been officially endorsed by the major Protestant denominations represented by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, by the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Synagogue Council of America, the National Catholic Welfare Council, the United Council of Church Women, the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, and the Methodist Federation for Social Service. In addition, the most persuasive testimony we have had in the Senate and House committee hearings has been that of men like Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam; Rev. Bernard J. Shell, auxiliary bishop of Chicago and founder of the Catholic Youth Organization; the Reverend Monsignor John O'Grady; the Reverend Robert E. Lucey, archbishop of San An-

tonio; Rabbi Abram Ophir; Rabbi Stephen Wise; and Reinhold Niebuhr.

Typical of resolutions adopted by religious leaders is that of the Presbytery of this city of Washington on November 12, 1945. Because of its straightforward expression, I quote it here in full:

Whereas the Senate has passed the full employment bill with some amendments (S. 280);

Whereas the House of Representatives, through its Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, is considering the full employment bill (H. R. 2202); and

Whereas the bill has suffered unfortunate and slow treatment: Be it

Resolved, That we, the Presbytery of Washington City, express our concern as Christian ministers and laymen:

(1) That the opportunity for work be afforded every able-bodied man, which is his God-given right;

(2) That Government take its responsible place with industry and labor in the provision of jobs; and

(3) That the committee report out the bill with a strong vote, free of encumbering amendments.

Be it further known that we shall support, individually and collectively, this bill, which we consider to be a cornerstone in the building of a stronger and better world.

Why should the church be interested in anything so mundane as jobs or the economics of full employment? How does its concern with moral and spiritual values reach over into the field of national budgeting to prevent unemployment?

Simply because the right to earn a living is a prerequisite for both the Christian and the democratic way of life. Both are built around the concept of individualism. If Christianity is the moral framework for true individualism, democracy is no less the institutional framework for true individualism.

The emphasis is all on that word "individualism," a term that implies the right of every individual to realize his potentialities. It means equal opportunity for every man to make the most of himself.

Without preaching a sermon I believe I could show you that the underlying theme in Christ's teaching is a recognition and justification of the individualism which is at the very center of moral life. Jesus taught individualism in various ways. In pleading for love and forgiveness He was asserting the duty of every man to recognize and respect with all his heart as well as his intellect the

good first. It believes in equal rights for all, and understands that we progress insofar as we learn how to work together. It finds in love and good will the cohesive factor essential to social unity. Democracy likewise insists upon the worth of the human being, and recognizes the dignity of man. Speaking therefore as a Christian and an American, I regard the right to work as fundamental.

We hear a lot about the "natural rights of men," or "basic human rights." These are phrases that have become so trite, we seldom think about what they really mean. Yet we should think about them a great deal—because they have a profound significance, and a real bearing upon all of the important issues which come before this Congress.

In this modern world of ours the concept of the rights of men does not derive its significance from some obscure philosophy of natural law. Nor does it stem from the abstract doctrine of divine revelation. There is nothing obscure or abstract about the idea, because it flows directly from the ethical principle which I have described as the basis of both Christianity and democracy—the necessity that each individual should have the opportunity to realize his potentialities.

As a matter of fact, opportunity, freedom, human rights—all amount to just the same thing. It is that bundle of rights which we regard as fundamental which constitutes freedom. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, freedom to associate, freedom of elections, freedom from fear, equal opportunity to education and economic security, equality before the law, freedom of competition—all of these are considered inherent natural rights—and together they add up to democracy.

Now of all these inherent natural rights of man, the most fundamental is the right to work. I say this without hesitation. And I say it without involving myself in a classification of human rights in the order of their importance because I do not claim that it is more important for man to work than for him to worship freely, or speak freely, or have a representative government, education, and so forth. But I do claim that without the right to work, these other rights lose their meaning. And without the right to work man does not have the opportunity to develop his potentialities. Without the right to work man is not free. Again let us listen to our religious leaders on this point:

If man has the right to life, then he has the right to the means of life. To admit

the right to an end and at the same time to deny the right to the only means where-by the end can be attained is sheer folly. In the society in which we live, or in any other organized community life we can conceive, men live and can live only by their work; then it follows that man has a natural, inherent right to work. In the words of Leo XIII: "Each man has the right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure what is required in order to live in no other way than by work and wages." (Bishop Shell.)

There is no use in implementing (the individual's) rights if we overlook this basic right. The citizen has a right to the things that are necessary for life. For the ordinary wage earner this means a full-time job. (Monsignor O'Grady.)

The (bill's) framers realize that freedom to engage in free competitive enterprise is, in the long run, dependent upon another aspect of freedom; namely, the right of the individual worker to a job. A man who cannot get a job is not free. (Bishop Oxnham.)

It is clear enough in a society where the great majority of people support themselves from earned incomes that employment is essential to the means of life. From this it follows that for most of us the only alternative to a job is poverty and the dole. I do not have to describe what this involves in physical terms—in terms of hunger and disease and stunted development and broken bodies and lack of adequate shelter and clothing. These are too obvious for comment.

But what concerns me even more are the many ways in which unemployment chains not only the bodies but the spirit of men. As Rabbi Stephen Wise has said:

The main evils of unemployment are not material in nature . . . unemployment mean(s) spiritual serfdom. . . . No boon or dole under whatever form or name can free men from the humiliation and corruption which idleness inevitably causes.

Apparently, Mr. Speaker, this is not too obvious for comment. One of the principal arguments made by the opponents of the full employment bill is that the guaranty of the right to work would undermine men's characters. This argument was skillfully phrased by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Gossett] when he said:

Were it possible to guarantee every person a job, to guarantee everyone security from hunger and want, would such be desirable? Would not such guaranteed security rob the average American of his finest attributes: initiative, thrift, resourcefulness, self-reliance?

ance, pride in achievement? To empty a man's backbones, even if you fill his stomach, is to do him an irreparable injury. Moral and spiritual values are, after all, our greatest source of strength and security.

Mr. Speaker, it is precisely because I am so concerned with these moral and spiritual values that I am talking to you so earnestly today. Therefore, I ask you to consider with me what unemployment really does to some of these values. And again I speak with the words of some of America's greatest spiritual leaders:

Unemployment makes men useless, not wanted. (Bishop Shell.)

The bruised knuckles that have knocked at door after door seeking a job may heal, but the hurt in the heart of a self-respecting man who has denied the opportunity to earn his own living with his own hands and brain seldom heals. (Bishop Oxnham.)

(Unemployment) is a threat to morality and character. It creates despair and resentment among the old, postpones marriage and family life among the young, breeds delinquency and crime, encourages antisocial attitudes, and fosters racial and religious prejudice. (Rabbi Ophir.)

Unemployment . . . reaches in its corroding effects far beyond the circle of . . . immediate victims. It menaces the texture and fabric of society and threatens its prime basis, the home and the family. Wives and children have no respect for a husband and father who does not have a real job while others do. (Rabbi Wise.)

Unemployment makes men live in fear and, ultimately, hate. While mass unemployment endures men are in desperate competition with each other. (Bishop Shell.)

Those who are not employed hate those who are. Those who have work do not enjoy the fruit of their labor because they fear the hatred of the jobless of today and know that they themselves may be among the jobless of tomorrow. The cancer of unemployment generates contempt, hatred, and fear. However unreasonable, it incites class against class, people against people, race against race, creed against creed, one generation against another. It destroys the national cultural capital, which must be transmitted by education or perish. It throws its dark shadow upon generations to come and gnaws at a country's life core. (Rabbi Wise.)

Economic want militates against human well-being and fills man with harassing preoccupations and anxieties. It seriously hampers his efforts toward achieving his union with God. There are exceptions, but for the majority of men the consequences of material want are stunted lives and stunted souls. The continual fear and uncertainty of those whose daily bread is insecure impedes the growth of the soul. The most appalling and crippling effects of economic insecurity are not in the bodies but in the souls of men. (Bishop Shell.)

Assurance that all the facts about full employment and opportunity will be gathered periodically for the use of all.

Assurance of stability and consistency in public policy, so that enterprise can plan better by knowing what the Government intends to do.

Assurance that every governmental policy and program will be pointed to promote maximum production and employment in private enterprise.

Assurance that priority will be given to doing those things first which stimulate normal employment most.

Mr. Speaker, I think that enough attention has not been given to the very significant fact that under the full employment bill, direct governmental action to create jobs would be undertaken only if and when private enterprises fail to provide full employment. Those who feel that free private enterprise is equal to the task will have full opportunity and every encouragement to demonstrate this to be the truth; they have nothing to fear from Government intervention.

But suppose that private production does not measure up? Suppose there are certain deep-seated imbalances and maladjustments in our economic structure which make it impossible for the economic mechanism automatically to keep going in high gear? It is only in such a case that the full employment proposes Government action. And such Government action would take the form, not of edicts from above, but of policies decided upon by the people through the democratic process of lawmaking.

This is why the language of the bill is devoted, not to spelling out the specific steps that should be taken, but rather to outlining a procedure for making that lawmaking process more effective—effective in the sense of reflecting more adequately the will of the people.

The will of the people, expressed through their freely elected representatives, can hardly be termed totalitarianism. Actually the most striking aspect of the bill is its reliance upon constitutional processes to plan for the Nation's welfare. (Bishop Shell.)

You have only to read the bill to see how it concentrates upon these "constitutional processes." It is directed primarily at more effective legislative procedures, and more intelligent and coordinated congressional programming. It establishes machinery for setting national goals, collecting all relevant information, appraising the toolkit of Fed-

eral policies for influencing the economy, and knitting all of these together into an integrated national economic policy. In so doing it throws the spotlight of responsibility upon Congress as the representatives of the people.

And it is important that the finger of responsibility should be thus openly pointed, because there is so much at stake. I repeat what I said before, that it is not only the vital right to work which is at stake, but also all of our freedoms, and our democratic system.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gossett) has wisely admonished this House in these words:

Let us work to preserve in peace the things we fought to preserve in war. . . . Let us examine with care any proposed legislation that would make revolutionary changes in the American way of life. Otherwise, gentlemen, we will wake up one sad morning to find that American democracy was just a glorious experiment.

I would supplement these excellent words, however, with the reminder that society is always changing, and that the essence of democracy is not to stand still, but to ensure an orderly process of change. It is precisely because we want to avoid revolution that we must take constructive advance action to avoid these catastrophes that lead to revolution. And of all the forces making for revolution, none is more potent than mass unemployment.

Again the words of the church leaders are pertinent:

Given full employment, and assuming the maintenance of civil liberties, there is no reason why the American may not pass through this day of fundamental transition without violence and with full respect for the orderly processes of democracy. (Bishop Oxnham.)

This bill is not, as some of its critics charge, a step in the direction of collectivism. It is, on the contrary, the kind of measure which will insure that our free economy will function in the direction of security for all of our citizens. It will, therefore, help to avoid the kind of economic crises out of which collectivism emerges. (Rheinhold Niebuhr, Union Theological Seminary.)

This country need never fear communism as long as it provides a decent living for the people. Communism does not flourish, it is not even desired, where justice and charity prevail in the social order.

A nation that is ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clothed in any considerable part is a fertile ground for the cure of totalitarianism. People bound down by misery and want; people weighed down by grinding poverty and harrowing fear are easy prey for the

widely advertised security of totalitarianism. . . . If this Nation is ever destroyed it will not be by foreign enemies, but by poverty and wretchedness within. (Bishop Shell.)

A man who cannot get a job is not free comes resentment, and the easily phrased economic panacea of the demagogue becomes attractive. It is in such souls that the seeds of revolution find warm soil. (Bishop Oxnham.)

The working classes, informed and articulate, will no longer endure the economic servitude to which many were subjected in the past. If capitalism in a republic does not permit them to work, they will sacrifice private ownership for state tyranny and trade liberty for bread.

Strangely enough, those who most heartily fear and hate socialism are the very ones who, by the injustices of their reactionary policies, drive the people to the desperation of the all-powerful state. (Archbishop Lucey.)

Mr. Speaker, when the President of the United States originally requested that

we pass full-employment legislation, this country was at war. However, even then the need for action was apparent. Now, with reconversion upon us and with the rolls of the unemployed mounting daily, that need has become acute. We cannot afford to wait, to wait until our streets are filled with sellers of apples, our freight trains thronged with transients, our local relief agencies wilting under their loads. From every standpoint, economic, social, moral, we must enact strong, forceful legislation designed to bring about conditions of full employment in this democracy of ours. Our economists have told us of the need—now our religious leaders tell us of that same need. Let us not be drawn into passing half-way or quarter-way measures. Let us give hope for the future to the American people by overwhelmingly enacting a decent, strong, full-employment bill.

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Progress in the California Physicians' Service

Speech of
Hon. George E. Outland
of California
in the
House of Representatives
June 29, 1946

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SPEECH
OF

HON. GEORGE E. OUTLAND

Mr. OUTLAND. Mr. Speaker, more than 2 years ago, on March 20, 1944, to be exact, it was my privilege to discuss on this floor the background, development, and achievements of the California Physicians' Service. I pointed out at that time that this whole subject of group medical care and health insurance seemed fated to always be discussed with a maximum of heat and a minimum of light. I mentioned that it was my firm conviction that the leaders in the medical profession of this country should be taking an active lead in the planning for more adequate health facilities for our people.

This afternoon I want to discuss some of the progress that has been made in the work of the California Physicians' Service, as well as mention other developments in different parts of the country. I emphasize today, as I emphasized 2 years ago that my remarks have no connection whatsoever with any legislation that has been proposed either in this House or in the Senate; I am not here to comment upon the merits or the demerits of the many suggested health bills with which all of us are somewhat familiar. My remarks are to be directed solely to what I personally believe to be a genuine contribution to health planning in America, and especially to the outstanding achievements of the doctors of my own State of California.

Two years ago in my discussion of California Physicians' Service I pointed out that the doctors of medicine in California 701978-17834 (3)

nia had banded together voluntarily to offer to the people of the State the opportunity of budgeting their medical, surgical, and hospital costs. While the entire operation of California Physicians' Service is not actually an insurance business there are some of the same elements about it that we generally look for in insurance. Principal among these is the element of a pooled fund. The subscribers to the service—the patients—put in their monthly contributions and the doctors render the service and agree to take as their payment only that amount which is actually earned. The doctors are the underwriters of the fund; if there is not enough money to pay them what their services would normally command, they take what is available and accept that as full payment for their services. This type of underwriting is designed for only one purpose and I believe we should pay tribute to that one underlying motive. It is a motive of public service, regardless of the financial return to the doctors.

While we must admire the unselfishness of these doctors in their willingness to provide professional service and think about financial return later, we must also look at the practical side of what this attitude means.

In the case of California Physicians' Service it means that we have in one group a large number of doctors—more than 7,000 in this one State—who have established a system of service which is available for public as well as private bodies. This group has already entered into two contracts with departments of the Federal Government—the Federal

Public Housing Authority and the Farm Security Administration. These contracts have meant a cooperative working agreement between Government on the one hand and private professional men on the other. While I would not venture to say that these contracts have been 100 percent satisfactory in all respects, I am thoroughly satisfied that the net result of these agreements has been the provision of high quality medical care which otherwise would not have been available. Both Procurement and Assignment Service and the Federal Public Housing Authority have gone on record as commending California Physicians' Service for providing a needed medical service in the housing projects in California during the emergency.

The point is that where you have a cooperative group of doctors banded together in their own organization you can deal collectively with this group for the provision of needed medical services which otherwise might not be furnished. And it is a big step in the right direction.

The finest example of such dealing that has come to my attention for many months is the contract recently executed between California Physicians' Service and the Veterans' Administration for the provision of medical care for service-connected disabilities. The new Administration of the Veterans' Administration found itself confronted with a tremendous accumulation of service-connected disabilities which could not possibly be handled in the hospitals and facilities now operated by the Administration. Greatly to the credit of General Bradley and his chief medical officer, General Hawley, the Veterans' Administration

acted without delay to see to it that the veterans received their out-patient care. Contracts were signed with California Physicians' Service and Michigan Medical Service, and other State-wide groups of doctors organized on a similar basis. Under these contracts the doctors in the organized group provide the medical services authorized by the Veterans' Administration and the Administration takes care of the payment for such services.

The net result of this agreement is that the veterans are receiving the care to which they are entitled—and they are receiving it at home from their own family doctors. They need not be institutionalized. They need not travel to veterans' facilities which may be inconveniently located both for the veterans and their families. They need not undergo any great measure of restrictive paper work. They merely go to their own doctors on proper authorization and receive the care they need and to which they are entitled.

This phase of the program is new. It has been in existence for only a few short months, but it has already proved itself capable of meeting this pressing problem and of assuring our returning veterans that their medical problems will be promptly, adequately, and efficiently handled.

When the program was first put into effect, Gen. Omar Bradley paid tribute to the doctors of California for their part in making this care available to the veterans. He said, and I quote:

I want to congratulate the physicians of California on the excellent manner in which

the medical profession of California is co-operating in rendering care to the veterans. After the program had been in effect for a short while, Gen. Paul R. Bradley, chief medical officer of the Veterans' Administration, paid a further tribute to the doctors and to the entire program. He said, and again I am quoting:

I heartily approve of the care that is being rendered to California veterans by the medical profession in that State. I believe that California Physicians' Service, as an agency of the California medical profession, has made possible in a very short time immediate and efficient medical care to the veterans of California.

From the veterans themselves we have had similar expressions of approval. I will quote only one at this time, but similar statements have been made elsewhere and they all add to the growing volume of evidence of the effectiveness and practicality of furnishing medical service to the veterans on this home-town basis. The man I am now quoting is Dr. Burchell Henning, of San Francisco, a private practitioner, who serves as chairman of the medical advisory board of the California State Department of the American Legion. Dr. Henning says, and again I am quoting:

The agreement between California Physicians' Service and the Veterans' Administration is a forward step in prompt care of veterans with service-connected disabilities. The Veterans' Administration cannot maintain doctors and hospitals in every community in the State, but this agreement makes it possible to extend medical and hospital service to these veterans in their own towns. The advantages to the veteran and to his whole community are obvious.

Without elaborating further, I believe we have here ample evidence that this form of cooperative action by the doctors of California has gone a long way toward meeting a serious problem for the returning veterans to whom we all owe so much. I will add only one more thought before going on to another subject. The doctors of California have met the challenge of medical service to the returning veterans in splendid fashion. More than 1,000 doctors have joined California Physicians' Service in the past 6 months, many of them being veterans themselves. All of them have agreed to take care of the veterans under this new program. To me, this is a wonderful example of forward-looking planning in the health field.

Now, on another front—the farm front—we find this same cooperation acting for the health interests of our citizens. We have often heard it said that our rural residents are so far removed from the metropolitan centers that they cannot secure adequate medical care. We have heard our farm neighbors referred to as the forgotten men in an economy which centers around our large cities. True, our farmers are removed from some of the facilities of the cities but in the matter of medical care I am proud to state that California Physicians' Service has again shown itself interested in and willing to provide adequate medical, surgical, and hospital care for the farmers.

Within the past 6 months there has been signed a contract between California Physicians' Service and the State Grange of California for the provision

of this care. The contract is a practical document, based on a progressive 3-year program, to start with medical services on a moderate supply basis and to increase the scope of the coverage as time goes on, as experience is gained, and as the farmer members become accustomed to the high quality of medical service they will receive under this plan.

Our farmers have long since gathered together in producer cooperatives. Now they are contracting with another producer cooperative—this one operated by the doctors, for the benefit of the grange members. This is the first example to my knowledge of such a contractual arrangement. Time alone will tell the story of its success but I am sure that where two cooperative groups such as the farmer and the doctors agree on the basic principles of service, the program must push ahead. I can see no failure in a plan of this kind; only success for all concerned.

Indicative of the reception of this program by the grange, let me quote you from the message of Mr. George Sehlmeier, master of the California State Grange, to his members. Mr. Sehlmeier said, and I quote:

We urge that you and your grange give this plan immediate consideration . . . it should not only result in building our membership but at the same time will bring medical care and hospital service to our members at reasonable cost.

At a grange meeting in one California county, Mr. Sehlmeier expanded on his previous statements and pointed out how the freedom of action of the individual members would be preserved under this cooperative movement:

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The hospital and health care plan worked out between the State Grange and California Physicians' Service would be . . . a purely voluntary group contract. Our grange members would be free to subscribe to . . . the system or not. There would be no involuntary assessment of the entire membership.

In the second place, this plan does not limit its beneficiaries in their selection of physicians or hospitals but gives them free choice of more than 7,000 physicians and surgeons in every part of the State and of any licensed hospital in the State.

Recently Mr. Sehlmeier stated that—and I quote:

This is the first time in California, or any other State I know of, that a cooperative arrangement has been made providing for a prepaid medical service to farm families over the area of an entire State. We have high hopes for its success.

In publishing that statement, the editor of the Grange News added his own editorial comment, stating that—

The eyes of the Nation are on California again. That the California State Grange is again about to set the pace for others to follow is shown by requests received by the Grange News from the National Grange Monthly and other Grange publications in the East and Midwest, asking for news releases on the progress the prepaid medical plan is making here.

These statements are sufficient to show the interest in this program by the farmers of California who are affiliated with the State Grange. There are about 30,000 of them, and together with their families they make up a group of about 75,000 people. Their medical care and hospital service contract with California Physicians' Service indicates once again how

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the problems of furnishing prepaid medical and hospital care can be met on a group basis and on a voluntary basis. If this plan is successful, and I believe firmly that it will be, I anticipate that it will spread to many other States.

I could go on at great length with similar examples of the progress of California Physicians' Service. For instance, one of the large oil companies of California which has long maintained its own medical care program for its employees, has recently arranged with California Physicians' Service to provide medical and hospital care for the families of these employees. Here again we see a group movement made possible by an organization of professional men on one side anxious to provide the best in medical care for the people and willing and able to deal intelligently with an employer who is likewise anxious to provide for the health care needs of his employees and their families.

I need not go any further on this line. There are many examples that could be given but I think the ones mentioned are sufficient to indicate the pioneering spirit of the doctors of California.

These are some of the new developments in prepaid medical care in California. It is worthwhile also to look at the progress of the regular program, the prepayment program that has been operating since 1939. In my address to this House 2 years ago I dwelt particularly on this regular program and I would like now to bring that information up to date. In the past 2 years California Physicians' Service has doubled its membership. Today it is serving more than 228,000 beneficiary members. This number is still

too small for a State the size of California but this rate of growth, which has come about despite the heavy labor turnover during the reconversion period, indicates that this prepayment medical care service is really geared up to go places today.

The initial period of groping and feeling the way has passed. The trial and error experiments of the early days are over. Today California Physicians' Service has a workable program, beneficial to the public and acceptable to the physician, a program which is daily demonstrating its value in terms of increased enrollment.

Before closing I want to point out that California is not the only State where progress of this type has been made. We know that there are similar medical cooperatives in 29 States today. Some of them are still in their infancy but all of them are dedicated to public service and all of them command our respect and admiration. California is by no means the largest of these. The largest is doubtless the Michigan Medical Service, which has long served the people of Michigan and which today has enrolled in its service about one person out of each six in that State. In Massachusetts we have the Massachusetts Medical Service, a thriving and lusty infant which has captured the public mind and is spreading rapidly in that State. We have other plans in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio—the list is too long to read here. In some of the more sparsely settled States we also have prepayment medical care plans. One was recently started in Montana, another in New Mexico.



Today there are more than 3,600,000 people enrolled in the voluntary sickness-insurance plans. This is just about double the number enrolled a year ago and the rate of growth of these plans is now assuming large proportions. In fact, these medical cooperatives have grown more in their early years than the Blue Cross plans, with which we are all familiar, grew in a comparable period at their inception.

I should point out that it is a tribute to the doctors of several of the larger States that they have given freely of their time, their money, and their experience to help out their smaller neighbors. This is true with California Physicians' Service and it is likewise true with Michigan Medical Service, Massachusetts Medical Service, and others. The movement toward cooperation exists not only within State borders but crosses over State lines to effect a national cooperative movement which is snowballing right now and from which we will hear much more in the future.

A few months ago I read with interest of the national medical-care program sponsored by the American Medical Association and its constituent State medical associations. It proposes that the 48 State medical associations take the lead in establishing their own State-wide programs of prepaid medical care insurance, and then, through the central office facilities of the American Medical Association, put into effect a reciprocal agreement between the State plans for the benefit of the members, the public. This plan allows each State to develop its own program on the basis of the actual needs and requirements in that State.

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When this is done, there is provision for the interchanging of membership benefits between the States, so that the member from California who is injured in New Jersey will receive the same medical and hospital care there that he would receive if he were at home.

This movement is still new but I believe it indicates a real desire on the part of the medical profession to serve the public. As an example of this desire, may I quote briefly from an address given in Los Angeles on May 7 of this year by Dr. Philip K. Gilman, president of the California Medical Association? Doctor Gilman said, and I quote:

Today medicine realizes that the public is the master of us all and that what is good for the public is good for medicine.

That statement points the way toward improved medical-care plans for the benefit of the public. Further, it shows an attitude on the part of the medical profession which of necessity must lead to an even greater public service by doctors of medicine than we have witnessed in the past. It is unfortunate that a few medical men have sometimes given a different impression to the American people.

It is under a policy such as Doctor Gilman has outlined that the State medical associations, acting through the American Medical Association, have set up their Nation-wide pattern of prepayment medical service.

This service has two primary functions. One is to aid and assist in the establishment of prepayment medical-care plans in all those areas where such plans do not already exist. The other is to serve as a clearinghouse between the various State or regional programs. Under this

project a member of a State prepayment plan in California would be honored as a member of the Michigan plan if he happened to be in Michigan and to require medical, surgical, or hospital service there and then. This type of reciprocal agreement will be spread from State to State, from region to region, resulting eventually in what will actually be a Nation-wide service operated on State or regional lines for the benefit of the people in that State or region.

We cannot hope to achieve immediately uniformity between widely separated States in the matter of health-care needs of their people. But we can achieve a working arrangement such as associated medical-care plans, is developing, so that our people may move around as freely as they desire and may count upon receiving the same benefits away from home that they would expect in their own front yards.

I salute this Nation-wide movement of the American Medical Association and its constituent State medical associations and I salute particularly the part the physicians of my own State of California have had in helping to develop this movement. It is through organizations such as this that the benefits of modern medical science can and will be applied to all of our people. It is through organizations such as this that our people will become educated to the availability of high-grade medical service on a budget basis. And, finally, it is through organizations such as California Physicians' Service and its fellow State-wide plans, together with their own national organization, that the best in medical science will be brought to all of our people under a cooperative, voluntary plan.

I have always contended that the medical profession has a responsibility, a serious responsibility in leading the way toward an America where health care is available to all citizens. Without criticizing any other suggestions, without even commenting on other plans, I do believe that such work as is now being done by the California Physicians' Service is a bright beacon. The progress already made is a most hopeful sign of what we can expect in the future. I am proud to call to the attention of Congress and the American people this excellent work that is going on in California under the leadership of the medical men and women in my State.

Mr. SMITH of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OUTLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. SMITH of Ohio. What is the method used in entering into those contracts with the United States Housing Authority? How is it done? Is it a voluntary proposition?

Mr. OUTLAND. That is correct.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OUTLAND. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. JUDD. I want to commend the gentleman from California for bringing this to the attention of the House. I believe the answer to the admitted inequity in the distribution of medical care is to be found along the lines of the experiments in the gentleman's State, and the experiments in Michigan and in my own State as well as several others. By your experiment in California and our experimenting in Minnesota and others in

Michigan with voluntary systems, we can develop experimental data on which we can work out a sound actuarial program of medical care which I believe will give a better way of solving the difficulties that we all know we face than any other system I have seen. I congratulate the gentleman.

Mr. OUTLAND. I thank the gentleman very much. In view of the gentleman's wide experience in the medical field I should like to make an additional comment. Does not the gentleman from Minnesota feel that the experience which is being gained through what may be termed "the trial-and-error method" in California, in Michigan, in the gentleman's own State, and in other places there is being laid the basis for what will eventually be an increased health service for the American people on a sound basis, cooperatively worked out between groups and individuals on the one hand and the medical profession on the other?

Mr. JUDD. Yes; because the practice of medicine is so personal and intimate that if there is not the wholehearted cooperation of the doctor—I do not care what the system looks like on paper—it will not work. If the doctors, the community, and the Government organization work together in formulating the plans and it is mutually agreeable, it has a good chance of being successful.

Mr. OUTLAND. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. JUDD. In my experience the system will work if a doctor is working for the patient. If the doctor is working for the Government, then it does not work. For some reason or other

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What I have felt we ought to do in this whole problem is do the thing that a scientist or a physician does when he makes a new discovery. He has a remedy that he is convinced is good and it will cure this or the other disease, but he does not try it out on himself. He first tries it out on the guinea pigs and the rabbits and the monkeys, and then he gets some volunteers before he tries it out on himself. I do not know whether this system will work. So we should try it out in some county or some municipality rather than in one fell swoop try it out on the country as a whole.

Mr. OUTLAND. I agree with the gentleman, but I trust that he does not place the citizens of California in the category of guinea pigs.

Mr. JUDD. But if it was done on the outside and superimposed on them in that manner it would ultimately lead to the correct solution.

Mr. OUTLAND. I want to say one thing further. When I was in California I was a member of the Health Service which was rendered by the California Physicians Service, and to me it was an excellent way by which I could budget monthly to take care of the health needs of myself and my family, including an emergency, such as hospitalization. There were additional provisions in the California Physicians' Service for it, and I am sure the gentleman knows that this

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movement has already spread to a great many other States outside of California. I think there are about 20 now that have various plans.

Mr. JUDD. To me this is one of the geneses of this form of government. It should not be imposed from the top. In all of the 48 States you can have trial and error, and until we know what is sound and what is unsound, as we do in education and as we do in medicine, we ought by all means to keep decentralized the system where we can carry out such experimenting in order to make sure that the ultimate system adopted for the country will be sound. I thank the gentleman for bringing this to the attention of the House.

Mr. SMITH of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, as I understand this program is expanding; it is growing.

Mr. OUTLAND. That is correct. It is expanding and growing, I will say to the gentleman from Ohio, not only in California but other States are experimenting along the same line as I have tried to point out.

As I said in response to one of the statements of the gentleman from Minnesota, to me it is a very healthy omen, a very good sign that the medical profession itself is waking up to its responsibility in regard to more decent care for the American people.

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An article a day of enduring significance, in condensed permanent booklet form

Write to Your Congressman— But Do It Right

Condensed from Liberty

George E. Outland

Representative in Congress from California

As told to Don Wharton

THE 435 members of the House and the 96 Senators are about as diverse a lot of men and women as could be got together. But around ten o'clock in the morning they are all doing exactly the same thing—reading the mail. Congressmen may miss committee meetings, absent themselves from the floor, fail to show up for roll calls and votes. But they always read their mail.

Mail is delivered to Congress four times each weekday, twice on Sundays and holidays—at the rate of 60,000 letters a day. One member recalls that 40 years ago his father, then in Congress, answered all his mail in longhand with the aid of one secretary. Today almost every Congressman has a staff of three or four persons. In 1907 the Congressman from a large city district in the Middle West received an average of 12 letters a day. In 1946 this district, despite the fact that its population has declined, sends its Congressman 125 letters a day.

About four letters of every five Being a Congressman is a two-way

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THE READER'S DIGEST

proposition. Your Congressman not only represents his district in Washington but also Washington in his district. The mail reveals to him what issues need clarification back home as well as what issues he himself needs to bone up on.

For instance, Representative John Sparkman of Alabama tells me that, in December, mail from his district showed widespread dissatisfaction with demobilization and antagonism to universal military training. Sparkman, a member of the Military Affairs Committee, knew he had more facts than most of his constituents, and when he got home for Christmas he made four speeches on those subjects. His talks helped to formulate an enlightened opinion in his district. If Sparkman had simply voted the way his district wrote, that might be *democracy* in a crude form, but what he did comprised *representative* government, working two ways, not one.

Congressmen are not mere tabulating machines. They do not sort their letters in two piles and vote for the heavier pile. One thoughtful letter will outweigh half a dozen which simply say "vote for this" or "vote against that." One spontaneous outburst on your own stationery is worth a hundred mimeographed letters or newspaper clippings in some write-your-Congressman drive.

Multigraphed telegrams are a dime a dozen. One day last year I received five identical telegrams from officials of the same organization threatening to work against me in the forthcoming

ing elections unless I voted against a certain bill. I wrote them that one telegram was enough and that threats did more harm than good, whereupon I received five identical apologies.

Don't waste your time signing canned letters, or copying letters someone has prepared. A Congressman's secretary can usually tell when a letter is part of a pressure-group campaign. Sometimes the writers forget and enclose the communication in which they were urged to write. In one case the writers had taken pains to make all letters appear individual, but the telltale mark was there: the same word misspelled the same way in every letter.

How does Congress actually react to heavy mails on a disputed issue? One old-timer around the Capitol made a study of the 13 issues which in the past 25 years had brought in the heaviest mail. On nine, he found, Congress voted in accordance with the majority mail opinion: woman suffrage, the League of Nations, prohibition, repeal, and other questions. On two issues, lend-lease and selective service, the opinions varied from section to section; but in general the members "voted the mail" of their own section. On two issues Congress voted contrary to the mail demand: the Townsend Plan and lifting the arms embargo.

The power of the mail was dramatically demonstrated in the summer of 1940 after the President let it be known he wanted Congress to go home. Immediately people began

WRITE TO YOUR CONGRESSMAN — BUT DO IT RIGHT

writing in, demanding that Congress stay in session during the war emergency — and Congress stayed. If anyone should ever doubt the value of mail from home, let him recall that prolonged session during which Congress passed bills initiating both our two-ocean Navy and selective service.

At the peak of its activity the Truman Committee investigating war production was getting 200 letters a day. Some of its biggest cases were started by people who said, "I'm going to write my Congressman about that" — for example, the notorious case of labor and material waste at the Norfolk Navy Yard.

Perhaps the most striking example of the influence of letter writers was the case of the so-called Pensions for Congressmen bill. It passed both houses, was signed by the President and became law. Then the deluge started. From all over the country letters poured in, protesting. And what did your Congressmen do? They hurriedly passed a bill rescinding their action.

Your letters can be similarly effective on the even more important issues of 1946. One member, in Congress for ten terms, says the letter that counts is the one that shows your Congressman three things: *it's you yourself writing, you know something about the subject, and you have done some thinking. If every voter wrote one letter like that once a year I believe we'd have a 50 percent better Congress.* State your reasons for favoring or opposing a

measure. A member is far more interested in your reasons than in your position. Letters pro and con without reasons are suspect.

Address your letter to the Representative from your own district. Nothing is gained by writing the same letter to half a dozen different members. However, if you feel deeply about some bill and want to write more than one letter, then write your Representative and the chairman, or some other member, of the committee considering it. If you don't know what committee it is, simply ask your Congressman.

When possible, make your letter apply to the local situation. Tell your representative how a national issue affects your community, your business, or your family. Be specific, frank, factual, natural. And be sure to sign your name and address clearly. Letters without addresses are disregarded.

A large trade association recently told its members that we should be addressed with due respect, "The Honorable John Doe, M.C." or "The Honorable Richard Roe, U.S.S." That's dubious advice — probably there aren't half a dozen men in Congress who care how a letter is addressed. Huey Long was the only member who ever publicly complained about what was on the envelopes. He once spoke of people putting, after his name, the letters S.O.B. When another Senator explained that meant Senate Office Building, Huey replied: "That ain't what my constituents mean."

THE READER'S DIGEST

Marking letters on legislation "personal" or "confidential" defeats your purpose, sometimes delays reading, inevitably annoys your Congressman. Don't register letters and don't telegraph unless time is really short. Telegrams actually make less impression than good letters. Don't enclose stamps for reply; our answers are franked.

Avoid enclosing editorials from newspapers, confusing state with federal issues, threatening your Congressman with the loss of your vote, making impossible requests. It is futile to ask him to pledge himself to vote a certain way on a bill. By the time it goes through committee, debates and amendments, it may have little resemblance to the original measure. Your reasons for voting against a bill newly introduced may turn out to be reasons for favoring the bill that is put to a vote.

You've probably heard people say with a superior air, "No, I never wrote a letter to a Congressman." Let's give that attitude a little thought. Back in the summer of 1941 the pressure against the extension of selective service almost caused the nation to lose its Army on the eve of Pearl Harbor. We were saved by one vote — the final tabulation in the House being 203-202.

This crisis would have been entirely avoided had more Representatives been supported by letters from home to offset the flood from anti-draft sources. Several dozen forceful letters — *no more than that!* — from each of 50 districts, and the outcome would never have been in doubt.

In the months and years ahead there may be another crisis similarly fateful. We shall come through it more easily if you know how to write your Congressman, *and write him.*

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Earl Warren Oral History Project

Langdon Post

JAMES ROOSEVELT'S NORTHERN CALIFORNIA CAMPAIGN, 1950

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry



Langdon Post

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Date of Interview: July 31, 1972.

Place of Interview: Langdon Post's home, 2682 Filbert Street,
San Francisco, California.

Those Present: Mr. Post and the interviewer.

Rough transcript sent to Post for review: April 15, 1975

Transcript returned, with corrections, to this office: April 6, 1976.

The primary purpose of this interview with Langdon Post was to document James Roosevelt's gubernatorial campaign against Earl Warren in 1950, but his other accomplishments are at least alluded to so that his larger significance would not be entirely lost to the oral history process. These include his election to four years in the New York State Assembly as a prime sponsor and supporter of Governor Franklin Roosevelt's legislation, his service in Washington with Harry Hopkins during the First Hundred Days of the Roosevelt administration, and his work as chairman of the New York City Housing Authority under Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia. His efforts for decent housing became a lifelong commitment, on the national scene as well as in California, and in unofficial advocacy capacity as well as under the aegis of public office. After managing Roosevelt's 1950 campaign in Northern California, and the successful 1952 California primary campaign of Estes Kefauver, he managed a chain of labor newspapers until 1961. And from 1963 to 1965 he was the western representative for the Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation.

On July 28, 1972, a short conference was held to agree upon topics for the recorded session. Three days later work started with the tape recorder on the generous-sized mirror-top coffee table that reflected occasional puffs of light fog floating past the tall windows. The view that afternoon was breath-taking from this second-floor living room, which had glass on three sides of an extension that seemed to hang over the housetops of the Marina, the better to encompass the Palace of Fine Arts, the Golden Gate, and Russian Hill. The day seemed radiant indoors as well: the bright blue rug under the table was vibrant, and the gold flowers and a larger blue rug in front of the fireplace added to the brilliance. Two built-in couches on either side of the table probably doubled as guest beds, for the Posts--Langdon and "Miggs" (Margaret)--are, to judge from photographs and other memorabilia warmly autographed, friendly and outgoing people. Six feet of American Heritage magazines bespoke their interest in things historic.

Mr. Post is a square-jawed, pleasant man who appears big and smiles frequently in conversation. He either answers questions candidly or openly refuses. He was apologetic over his dim memory on issues, but his recall was sharp on personalities and mechanics. There were some interruptions, all too typical of those day-to-day problems shared by all. A call from the garage where he'd left his car to be repaired: the cost estimate was obviously distressingly high but the motor was already torn apart; the teen-age neighbor boy, working in the garden, required a demonstration of how to distribute snail pellets, and later, a hurried call to halt cutting back the pansies lest they be eliminated altogether. Since this took place two stories below, Mr. Post's vigor was apparent in his repeated climbs back to the living room.

Mr. Post went over the rough-edited transcript, added a piece of information here and there, and returned it to this office for final typing. He complied with all requests for appendix material and, after some gentle prodding, hunted up a photograph that could be used as a frontispiece.

This, then, is a story focused on only a year in the life of a man who has left his imprint on a longer span of history and on a larger society than just California's. The documentation of the life of Langdon Post is a task that still remains.

Amelia Fry, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

7 April 1977
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

LANGDON W. POST
2682 FILBERT STREET
SAN FRANCISCO
CALIFORNIA

To: James Osmen

From: Langdon W. Post

Subject: Biographical Outline

Most of my adult life has been spent in the reporting, interpreting and, at times, molding of public opinion.

For five years after graduation from Harvard, 1923, I served as a reporter, motion picture and dramatic critic for the Morning and Evening Worlds of New York City.

In 1928 I was elected to the New York State Assembly, the first Democrat to carry that particular district in thirty years. During the next four years I served in the Assembly, personally sponsoring and steering some of the then Governor Franklin Roosevelt's major legislative program, particularly that dealing with housing and public utilities.

In 1933 I went to Washington and served the Roosevelt Administration during the new famous one hundred days as Deputy Administrator of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration under Harry Hopkins. My principal job during that period was traveling throughout the country contacting public officials helping to lay the base for a wholly new relationship that was to be built up between the Federal Government, the Local Communities and the individual citizen, the base upon which eventually rested the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier and the Great Society.

In August of that year I returned to New York to run for Borough President of Manhattan on the Fusion Ticket headed by Fiorello LaGuardia. I was defeated by a few hundred votes but was appointed Tenement House Commissioner by Mayor LaGuardia in January 1934 and, shortly thereafter, Chairman of the New York City Housing Authority, the second such agency in the country.

As Tenement House Commissioner I took over a Department which was created originally to improve the living conditions of the millions living in the slums of New York and to defend them against the greed of unrestricted speculation and which had degenerated into a moribund city agency, not only unwilling to enforce such laws as then existed but actually exploiting them for venal and political gain.

During the next four years we succeeded in getting the State Housing Laws drastically amended, both as to standards and enforcement procedures, with the result that, by the end of LaGuardia's first term, we had eliminated thousands of unsanitary and dangerous slum tenements, either closing them up, demolishing them or forcing the owners to bring them up to the new rigid standards.

This was as much a selling job as it was administrative; for in the beginning we were met with an indifferent public, a somewhat hostile press and a bitter opposition of angry owners of slum tenements and bankers holding mortgages on them. But in the end we had aroused the public, convinced a large part of the press and gained much cooperation from the majority of the banks. The owners, understandably, remained angry.

During this same period the New York City Housing Authority built the first public housing project in the country, established the constitutionality of the housing authority law and issued the first housing authority bonds in the nation.

This again was first met by almost unanimous opposition from the press and financial interests, but in the end we won over a considerable part of the press and some important segments of the financial world, particularly one or two investment houses which later pioneered in the financing of housing authority bonds to the end that they have become prime investments throughout the country.

From 1938 to 1940 I toured the country for the United States Housing Authority helping to stimulate community interest in the 1938 federal public housing law and assisting the communities in setting up housing authorities without which they could not take advantage of the law.

From 1940 to 1947 I was Regional Director for the United States Housing Authority, later the Federal Public Housing Authority, in charge of all the eastern States. When I first came out there were just five local housing authorities in the region. When I resigned there were more than a hundred and fifty. Although during the war it was not necessary to work through local housing authorities, I was, and still am, a firm believer in having communities share in the responsibility of the administration and operation of federal activities and, wherever possible, I made it a point to persuade local communities to create their own housing authorities so that they might assume the responsibility for the operation of the housing developments which, by 1947, totalled several hundred with more than 350,000 families.

In 1950 I was northern California manager for James Roosevelt's unsuccessful campaign for Governor and in 1952 manager of Estes Kefauver's successful campaign for the California delegation to the Democratic National Convention.

From 1955 to 1961 I was managing editor of a chain of labor newspapers, the circulation during that period increasing from 40,000 to 90,000 and the papers being the recipients of many awards from the National Labor Press Association, receiving in one year eleven of the twenty seven awards given out.

From 1963 to 1965 I was western representative for the Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, my job being to stimulate financial interest for the Foundation among organizations, individuals and news media.

I ASSEMBLYMAN IN NEW YORK
(Date of Interview -- 31 July 1972)

Fry: Why don't we open with where you were born? New York?

Post: I was born in New York City. 1899.

Fry: What did your father do?

Post: My father was a lawyer. As a young man he wrote; he published two books, those Harvard stories which were quite popular and another one which was a romance about the War of 1812.

Fry: Oh, then he was a fiction writer. These weren't legal treatises.

Post: No, no. But he didn't do any writing after he graduated from law school, I don't think. And he was a lawyer.

Fry: So you came by your writing, then, with a certain amount of genes in your system. Did you go to public school in New York?

Post: No, I didn't. I went to school in Massachusetts, at St. Mark's. St. Mark's was the father of Groton, where Roosevelt went. The founder of Groton, Dr. Peabody, taught at St. Mark's before establishing his own school.

Fry: Oh really. Was this a prep-school?

Post: Oh yes it was. It is one of those "exclusive" schools. I think they've gotten less exclusive now, but yes it was. It was a private school.

Fry: You stayed in that and then went right on to Harvard?

Post: No, from there I went into World War I. I was in the First Division of the A.E.F. And then after the war I went to Harvard.

Fry: When you were at St. Mark's what sort of studies were you mostly interested in?

Post: Nothing in particular. I was just interested in getting through with a degree. We weren't specializing in anything at school.

Fry: Do you mean that it was a broad and general education?

Post: Yes. It was like a high school. It was just like a high school, really. There was no special thing: history, languages, mathematics, and so forth.

Fry: Did you have a fairly liberal political background? Was your father--

Post: No, my father was a "black-legged Republican." Well, I think he did vote for Teddy Roosevelt, but I think he was very doubtful about it when he did.

Fry: A progressive--

Post: Yes.

Fry: When you were at Harvard what did you major in?

Post: I majored in English and history.

Fry: Does this mean that you did some writing at Harvard?

Post: No. No, I didn't.

Fry: No Lampoon articles?

Post: No. No Crimson, no Lampoon; that's right.

Fry: Did you go on to get your law degree?

Post: No, never. When I graduated and left college I went into numerous things that were of no great interest, in oil in Oklahoma for a little while, and then I was down on Wall Street trying to sell bonds. I got interested in theatrical productions. Finally I ran for the assembly in 1927 and was defeated (the assembly for New York) and then I ran in 1928 and I won.

Fry: You were pretty young then.

Post: I was twenty-nine when I won.

Fry: Didn't I see something downstairs in your study that you showed me that indicated you were an anti-establishment candidate?

Post: Yes, anti-Tammany. In the beginning I wasn't, but after

Post: I'd been there about four years, the Seabury investigation came up and I voted to continue it, and Tammany Hall, as a result, denied me a nomination. I ran independently and I was defeated.

Then a few months later when [Franklin D.] Roosevelt was inaugurated, I went down to Washington and was with his administration for a few months as a deputy to Harry Hopkins. In July or August, I came back to New York to try and see if I could get certain endorsements from Seabury and the newspapers to run for mayor. The man at that time who fortunately wanted to run for mayor was a man by the name of [Fiorello] LaGuardia. After some discussion among the New York World-Telegraph man-- Roy Howard--and Seabury, they finally decided that LaGuardia should run--and he did, and I ran for president of the Borough of Manhattan. I was defeated in that.

LaGuardia appointed me tenement house commissioner and then also chairman of the New York City Housing Authority. I served in those two offices for four years.

Fry: May I break in and back up for a few months, back to when you were working under Harry Hopkins?

Post: Yes, go ahead.

Fry: What were you doing?

Post: In the Federal Emergency Relief Administration: they were just beginning to establish it. It later became what was known as WPA, the Works Progress Administration, but that was changed to WPA after I had left. My job, really, was travelling around the country trying to get the governors and so on to cooperate with us on it. It was a brand new idea. It stepped into a breach; a vacuum, really, was what it was. It was to provide funds to the states to put people to work.

And then of course, it became obvious that the only way to do this thing was for the federal government to step in and do it and then they'd get it done. So, they tabbed it the WPA, but that was after I left.

Fry: Were you in on the formulation of this plan?

Post: Yes, yes.

Fry: And who else was in on those early conferences?

Post: Raymond Moley, who was a very bright guy, and who was the fellow who became the governor of Puerto Rico? [Rexford] Tugwell. Adolf Berle was another one.

Fry: So, at any rate with these very interesting people, you arrived at the conclusion that the federal government had to form the WPA, or was that already a given at the time?

Post: No, no. It was obvious that the states had no money to do this, so we tried to do it through the states by providing them with funds, but the states were suspicious for one thing, and they didn't want the government to look over their shoulder and so forth. So, by the time I left they were just coming to the conclusion that the only way to do this was for the federal government to move in immediately and do it, directly, which they did. That turned out to be the Works Progress Administration, which should be delineated from the PWA, which was the Public Works Administration that was administered by Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes.

Fry: Yes, and that was quite different. As you went around talking to the governors, what were some of the fears and reservations, on their part, of such a program?

Post: Well, to a large extent, they were afraid that the government would be stepping in and taking over their prerogative and they weren't sure whether they wanted to do it. As you know we had sectional things that go on: the South was in one direction and the West in another and so forth. Then it was difficult to get them to move, and the point was that we at that time were thinking in terms of tomorrow and not the day after tomorrow or next month because the people were on the streets selling apples and the problem was a really immediate one.

So, the only answer to this thing was not to wait until the governors and the state legislatures and everything would pull it. It came around to "move in quickly." That's why the WPA--they call it.

Fry: You were in there then in some of the most interesting days.

Post: Yes, those hundred days were one of the most interesting parts of the whole thing.

Fry: Did the reservations about WPA fall into party lines at that time?

Post: Yes, to a degree. But of course Roosevelt had the congress pretty well under control, most of the members being scared to death, not knowing what was going on. Roosevelt was throwing new things at them day after day; the Republicans practically folded up. They opposed and criticized and so on and expressed their doubts, but they really weren't an organized opposition of any sort.

Fry: As you went around primarily to talk to the governors, did you also manage to do anything for grassroots support, such as seeing newspaper owners or--

Post: No, no. Well. Yes, yes.

Fry: Today you would interview on the television talk shows.

Post: Yes, that's right. I saw a few newspaper people, yes, I did do that, but not too much; mostly with the governors.

Fry: Were you getting what we would call "feedback" today, and certain concessions that might be made in the final plan in order to gain support?

Post: Not particularly, no.

Fry: You were there then, to primarily explain it to them?

Post: Yes, to explain and sell it to them and see what they thought. In some cases it had to go through the state legislature, and we weren't waiting; we couldn't afford to wait for that.

Fry: Can you describe what it was like to work with Harry Hopkins?

Post: Well, at that time it was a pleasure. I had known him quite well in New York and he was a very simple person, really. We knew each other and got to know each other very well, and it was not difficult to work with him at all. When he asked you to go do a job, he asked you to go do it and that was it. He wasn't pulling any punches on it and he gave you all the leeways as far as I was concerned, all the way through. I had no problems with him at all.

Fry: Was he open and uncomplex?

Post: Oh yes, very. He wasn't a subtle person at all.

Fry: You emphasized "at that time." How did he become later on?

Post: Well, I left Washington and went back to New York and I saw him from time to time. But frankly I think after the first four years he was WPA, when eventually you know he moved into the White House, he lost some of his individuality. And I think that, like all people who get into positions like that, he lost contact, the common touch, more or less. It may not have been his fault because he was tied so tightly into the White House, but he was very difficult to get hold of or in touch with or see or anything of that sort.

I don't really want to criticize him because I was very fond of him and still have fond memories of him.

Fry: But the days of Harry Hopkins as the open, frank person were gone.

Post: Yes, I would think so.

Fry: Well, I guess that White House insularity is pretty difficult to combat.

Post: Yes, very difficult to overcome.

Fry: My last question on this before we get into our Warren period is, did you work with Franklin Roosevelt? Do you have anything that you can tell us about working with him?

Post: While he was governor I saw a great deal of him and I carried some of his legislation. One particular one was the utilities, which we didn't get very far with because we had a Republican legislature.

Fry: What kind was that?

Post: We wanted a tighter control on the Public Service Commission.

Fry: From the commission, you mean?

Post: Yes. Well, I can think of--that particular one that I was instrumental in was to get much stricter, what they call tenement house law, laws regarding tenement house buildings in New York City. But that really wasn't a part of his thing, that was more or less my own.

Fry: And that was regulation of how many people could live in one tenement?

Post: That was one thing, and fireproofing the buildings and various physical, stricter building codes.

Fry: How did you get interested in housing? This later became a large part of your career.

Post: Well, it got started when I was in the legislature. I forget who it was that talked to me first about the tenement house laws, but in any event I introduced the most strict laws to strengthen the existing tenement house laws, and I got interested in that way.

The next time I really got interested was when LaGuardia offered me the tenement house commissioner in New York, and obviously that was leading to it.

Fry: That choice for your appointment may have been on the basis of the work that you had done on this--the legislation?

Post: To a degree, yes. Because he frankly asked me what I would like to do after he got elected, and I suggested that and he appointed me then.

Fry: Today the whole complex of urban housing problems has become so predominant that it is interesting that you were working in this forty years ago.

Post: Oh yes, I was very, very early in it, and I really had a considerable part to do with helping to draw the federal legislation, what they called the Wagner-Steagall Act.* I was very close to Bob Wagner on that. In New York City we built the first public housing project in the country. It was a little one but it was the first one. Then we followed that with several others, and I did a good deal of lecturing throughout the country on the need for public housing and so on.

Fry: Did you do any writing on this?

Post: Yes, to a degree. As a matter of fact I published a book called the Challenge of Housing.

*Wagner-Steagall Housing Act 1937, established the U.S. Housing Authority.

Fry: Who published that?

Post: Farrar & Reinhardt, published in 1939. It wasn't a best-seller. I left the LaGuardia administration about 1938; I fell out with LaGuardia.

Fry: What did you fall out with LaGuardia over?

Post: Interestingly enough it was kind of a personal affair in a way. We had a counsel, lawyer counsel, to the Authority who LaGuardia, for one reason and another, took great exception to, and I liked him very much. I was very fond of him. He was a personal friend and he was also a very pleasant guy. And LaGuardia ordered me to fire him and I wouldn't do it. It was as simple as that. So then he said, "You're out." He wanted me to resign and I said that no, I wouldn't resign. But unfortunately my term had expired, so he put somebody in my place.

That man who was an attorney for us was a man by the name of Charles Abrams, who later became one of the most outstanding authorities on housing and wrote a great many things on it. He published numerous books and was with the United Nations going abroad to many countries on housing advising. He went to Ghana, he went to India, and several places. He became very distinguished, but he's dead now.

But that was the primary reason that we fell out. I think that possibly another was that he felt that I was getting too much publicity and perhaps not giving him enough credit for the housing and whatever it may be. The main point that he put his finger on was this Charles Abrams thing.

Fry: Do you think that there was anything political in his dislike of Abrams?

Post: No, I never could find out just why he didn't like Abrams. I think it may have been because I appointed Abrams and hadn't discussed it with him. That may have been something to do with it. I never did find out why he didn't like Abrams, but he didn't. He was very bitter about it.

Fry: Is that when you went to take over as the Western Regional Director?

Post: Yes. About a year after that, 1940 it was, I came out here. I was the Regional Director, at that time, of the Federal Public Housing Authority. That was a new organization that was created under the Wagner-Steagall Act, of which Nathan Strauss was the first head. Then later it became the United States Housing Authority, after the war.

Fry: I have a simple question to ask you: were you mainly providing federal funds for public housing?

Post: Yes.

Fry: Who owned the houses?

Post: The local housing authorities. We provided the money to the local housing authorities, and the local housing authorities sold their bonds and they were guaranteed by the federal government. They sold their own bonds to the general public.

Fry: So, it was the federal money backing the bonds.

Post: Yes, it was federal money backing but it was the local authorities that built them, ran them, and raised the money with the guarantee of the federal government.

Fry: Was a point of conjecture within the Federal Public Housing Authority how much power the local housing commissions should have?

Post: Well, to a degree that's true, since the federal government was the guarantor. First they had a contract with the local housing authorities, then they had to approve the issuance of all the bonds, and so on. To the extent that they had that kind of approval, the federal government had a real hold on the housing authorities. They really did, no question about it.

But it really never raised a local issue, particularly because the relationship was directly with the local housing authority and the federal government. They didn't have to go through the city or the state or anything like that. So, it really was not a great problem at all as far as the relationships were concerned.

Fry: Now, forty years later, you hear a lot of controversy on whether the poor are represented on planning for urban housing programs. Did you have any of this then?

Post: No, none of that at all. The local housing authorities had five members and, generally speaking, appointed by the mayors of the cities. Or in some instances we had county authorities and they were appointed by the county board of supervisors. But the appointments were political, and in a general way, they were made up of a fairly decent cross section of men and women. There were no pressures to get poor people into it at all.

Fry: But you did get a lot of housing built?

Post: Yes we did. Of course the war came along fairly shortly after we really had had this Federal Public Housing Authority Act, the Wagner Act. And we moved right into war housing; war housing was just a hurry-up operation, and it was federal government money. It wasn't bonds issued by the local authorities. We worked through the local housing authorities and used them, particularly in my region because I was insisting on working through local housing authorities because I felt very strongly about it. But the money was the federal government's. We turned it over to them and they watched it carefully and so on. I would get the contract for the building.

Well, you've seen some of that. It's all gone now, like up in Marin City for instance. Do you remember that? And then Hunters Point, we built all those. They were purely temporary and were never intended to be anything else. I'm happy to say that although we just poured them into Richmond, there isn't one left in Richmond. I don't know how many are left at Hunters Point, but very few I think. And at Marin City there aren't any left; they're gone and in their place now is permanent housing.

Fry: It is always a problem to relocate the people who can no longer be put into this certain number of square blocks because the new housing is not as dense as the old was. Were you satisfied with the way the problem was handled?

Post: Well, of course, the problem was relatively simple in the early days because we didn't run into all these problems. It was a question of building houses and getting people into them, which we did. But now, of course, we've got it supposedly integrated with the urban redevelopment way beyond just public housing for the poor people, and that has become an issue in many cases because sometimes the urban redevelopment has not considered public housing as a part of their job. In some instances they have

Post: simply torn down the houses, and the poor people who were living there, in that area, never got back in. To that extent, of course, it's become a very different situation, very different. And of course now they have many different ways of taking care of the low income people besides merely building houses. Then also I think we hurt ourselves by building these great big high things.

Interestingly enough, I read an article about five or six months ago which was a survey of all the public housing that had been built, and in their conclusion they said that they interviewed a number of people and had come to the conclusion that the two best public housing projects, from the point of view of livability and maintenance and the tenant relations and so on, were First Houses in New York and the other, Harlem River Houses in New York, both of which were mine. [Laughter] I got kind of a satisfaction out of that.

Fry: Very good.

Do you want to continue and proceed chronologically, after you were Western Regional Director?

Post: Yes. Well, as Western Regional Director I was terribly busy getting housing for the places where the industrial pressure was the greatest: Marin City, where there was a ship building area; Richmond in the same way as Kaiser grew; Vancouver up in Washington across from Portland, that was another Kaiser operation; down here at Hunters Point was, of course, the Navy yard, and those things had to go up in a hurry. And so we just built them as fast as we could. We were just plain busy getting them done, and I can only say that I think we did a good job in the way of getting them done. As far as the plans were concerned, they were all the same kind of plan; we just had a set plan drawn up and there they were. There was nothing new in the way of architectural work or laying out anything. We didn't crowd them in too much. Well, you've seen them; they were barracks-like.

Fry: Yes. Utilitarian housing which probably served the purposes--

Post: Yes. The problem was that we had to throw them up as fast as we could, and we did. I think we built, in this western region, about 150 thousand of them.

Fry: Well, the pressures in private housing, as it's mushroomed

Fry: all over California in the last twenty years, have been such that it has been uneconomical for contractors to pay much attention to niceties like architectural planning.

Post: Yes, I think that's true.

Fry: So, I was wondering if in public housing you were ever able to do much work on environmental and housing design aspects?

Post: Before the war there was a good deal, and after the war I think they--of course, I was never in it after the war--but I think on the whole, they've done some experimenting. I think that first of all, they started building these great big high things and they decided that was not what they wanted. So they've come down now to what you see in San Francisco, the most recent ones that are being built, which are quite nice looking. They are only about two or three stories high you know, and they are liveable. They don't have the elevator problem, for instance, messing them up, running them up and down, so I think they've learned a lot.

And also, I think they're trying to get away from building the ghettos. That's one of the problems that we had, with the ghettos thing. Another problem, which is obvious: when we first went into it, sooner or later, of course, a poor family went in and before you know it some of them had improved their situation and you had to throw them out. And so, what you would end up with finally was always the lowest income and as they improved their situation they got out of the public housing and the lowest of the low income stayed in. I don't know that you want to go into that subject so far.

[Interruption.]

Fry: I think we were just winding up our discussion on California public housing. One other thing I was going to ask you there was: With the federal government playing such a large role in public housing, what was left for the governor's office to do?

Post: Well, after the war they went back to the principle of lending the money to the local housing authorities. And actually the governors had very little to do with it and the mayors had little to do with it, except for the fact that they appointed the members of the housing authorities.

Fry: The mayors did?

Post: Yes. But once the members were appointed, their main responsibility, sole responsibility, really, was the federal government, who was guaranteeing their bonds.

Fry: In other words, line of authority and policy-making bypassed the state level?

Post: Yes, it really did. Curiously enough. It was a curious thing. It actually was a state agency. The members were appointed by the mayor, but once they were appointed they had a great deal of independence.

Fry: So, you didn't have much interaction, then, with Governor Warren?

Post: No, we didn't.

Fry: I wondered if there would be any time when he might have been in a position to oppose, or expedite, or investigate?

Post: No, he didn't. He didn't interfere in one way or another, not a bit; I'll say that for him. And I don't know any other place where they did. My jurisdiction, for a little while, was all the way from the State of Washington down to the State of Arizona, and we didn't have any problems with the governors at all.

Fry: This went on until 1947, and I noticed that you mentioned in your article a public housing proposition in California.

Post: Yes.

Fry: What was that for?

Post: That was a constitutional amendment which we undertook to try to get the state government actually into the business of providing funds for public housing. And Warren came out against that, very definitely, and we got licked on it.

Fry: This was for direct state appropriations for public housing?

Post: State aid. Yes, I forget whether it was state guarantees of housing authority bonds or whether it was actually a direct fund from the state. I think it was a state guarantee, if I remember correctly.

Fry: And Warren came out publicly against this?

Post: Oh yes. Yes, very definitely.

Fry: Do you know what his reasons were?

Post: I think he felt that the federal government was in the picture and he didn't see why the state had to--I think he just didn't want the state involved in it. I forget just what his specific reasons were, but I know he didn't want to get the state involved in it.

Fry: And that was when you were still regional director?

Post: No, that was afterwards.

Fry: Oh, I see. So, when you said, "We wanted to do this--" who was "We"?

Post: Just those that were interested in housing. The housing authorities, for instance, the various housing authorities throughout the state. And I was still interested.

Fry: And then what did you do between 1947 and 1950 when you were working for Jimmy Roosevelt on his campaign?

Post: I was interested in home building, on the basis of modular homes, but I didn't get anywhere with it. We started down in Monterey, and like most of those things, they've never gotten very far and we didn't either. So, we pulled it out.

Fry: What was this: Private, low-cost housing?

Post: Yes. Well, supposedly low-cost housing, but no, we weren't building for the poor. We weren't building for the poor by any means. It was expensive. You can't build for the poor without subsidies, and they weren't subsidizing private enterprise at that time for public housing. Now they do.

Fry: But the modular idea was fairly new then?

Post: Well, it was, and it grew out of the fact that that was the way we built our war housing, on a modular basis.

Fry: By simply adding units when needed.

Post: Yes. I thought we could translate them, but we didn't succeed in doing it.

- Fry: Then, in 1946 you were active in [Robert W.] Kenny's* campaign, you told me and--
- Post: I was only active because I was very interested in it, but at that time I was still with the federal government.
- Fry: You raised some funds for Kenny?
- Post: Yes.
- Fry: This was one of his problems: I understand that apparently some of his funds dried up. But you were able to raise some money for him?
- Post: I raised some money for him, yes. But I didn't do much of anything else except sit with him and talk with him, because he was abroad part of the time. So that was an abortive campaign.
- Fry: It was a strange campaign.
- Post: Yes, it was.
- Fry: Who did you get to back him?
- Post: Well, I'd rather not say.
- Fry: Bill Malone was his campaign manager?
- Post: I don't think Malone got very much involved in Bob's campaign, if I remember correctly; I don't think so.
- Fry: Can you hazard a guess as to why he didn't stay in the country and risk a real battle?
- Post: I don't know. I never found out about it at all. I never found out from him at all as to why he did that.
- Fry: Was there talk of Jimmy Roosevelt possibly running for senator in 1946?
- Post: No.

*Became Attorney General of California in 1942; in 1946 ran against Earl Warren for governor and lost.

Fry: Or governor? Were you aware of anything like that?

Post: No. No.

II GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN IN CALIFORNIA, 1950

Fry: Okay then; why don't we move on to the 1950's campaign?

Post: Yes, yes. I think that might make sense.

Fry: We might start by learning how Jimmy Roosevelt got in as a candidate.

Post: Well, I'll tell you, I think you're going to talk to him.

Fry: Yes, that's right.

Post: I think I would ask him more on that. I could tell you that I think the influences were down in Los Angeles because he never talked with me about it at all until he actually decided that he was going to run. And all I did was express the feeling that I was sorry he was going to be a governor candidate because I thought he ought to run for state senator and build himself up. But he had decided that; I think Susie Clifton had a great deal to do with persuading him, and I don't know who else did. But I had nothing to do with his decision to run at all.

He was state chairman of the Democratic party, you know, prior to that. And as state chairman, he'd gone around the whole state and had gotten a lot of acquaintances as a result of that. I think that gave him the idea that he had established sufficient groundwork to do it, but it obviously wasn't.

Fry: Well, that's a fairly behind-the-scenes decision, actually, isn't it?

Post: Yes. Well, at that time you know, there was cross-filing and that always made it difficult.

Fry: Did he consider cross-filing?

- Post: Did he? No. It wouldn't have done him any good to begin with, and in the second place he was violently against it. He'd heartily come out against it so he couldn't cross-file. And of course, Warren was all for it. You see, Warren was a great nonpartisan. He was a Republican at the right time--in national politics--but in California politics he was a great nonpartisan and played that game very cleverly.
- Fry: If you were a Republican, I guess you almost had to be bipartisan in order to win because the registrations were against you.
- Post: That's right. No question about it.
- Fry: Do you want to discuss the other people who were in the campaign?
- Post: Yes. I looked up these names to call them off to you. You know, they really don't mean very much. I'll take this out and give them to you. [Gives list of names to Fry.]
- Fry: First of all, what was your official position in the campaign? You were state manager?
- Post: I think I was "Northern California manager."
- Fry: And that means that George Outland was--
- Post: He was the state director; I guess that's what they call it.
- Fry: Was Susie [Florence M.] Clifton Southern California?
- Post: Southern California, yes.
- Fry: What was Glen Wilson's position?
- Post: Glen Wilson had kind of a personal relationship with Jim. He went around with him everywhere. He was kind of a personal advisor and assistant and helper. Glen became quite active in various campaigns after that.
- Fry: California Democratic candidates?
- Post: Yes, yes.

List of COPE Endorsers

Judge Lyle Cook

Judge Sam Gardiner

Judge Frank Rose

Nancy Strowbridge

Vera Schultz

Judge Monroe Friedman

Sammie Hayden (Dinuba)

Lionel Steinberg

H. R. Quinnly

Bert Coffey

George Davis

--provided by Langdon Post

Fry: What candidates would that have been?

Post: Well, I don't remember all of the ones, but I know he was interested in a number of them.

Fry: Do you remember who was handling the publicity, the newspaper stories and so forth, on the local level?

Post: We had a firm up here--they didn't do very much and they were purely San Francisco. I don't think they are in existence anymore. I'm quite sure they're not. Van somebody. Then there was a man who did a good deal of--supposedly the brains of the organization, so-called. And I remember I told you about him the other day but I cannot remember his name and my wife couldn't remember his name.

[Interruption]

Fry: You were just saying that one person was the brains of the organization. Did you mean of the whole campaign organization or the publicity organization?

Post: Oh, the publicity. He really didn't do us much good. He had exaggerated ideas and fancy ideas and somewhat exhibitionist stuff. I don't think he was of great help. But I can't think of his name.

Fry: Well, I think we can probably get that if I talk to persons in Southern California. But I would like to know what sort of ideas he had which were not followed out especially.

Post: Well, he had some crazy thing which he sold to Jim of building a tremendous housing project up in the mother lode country, up in that area, bringing the poor up there, which was the silliest thing I've ever heard of. Things like that.

I think, actually, he left the campaign before it was over.

Fry: So did Mr. Outland. I was talking to him Friday.

Post: Oh, did you meet him?

Fry: I did meet him.

Post: Well, didn't he give you the name of that fellow?

Fry: No, he didn't because we didn't get that far in our discussion then. I guess Mr. Outland did run the campaign through the primary.

Post: Yes, he did. That's right.

Fry: Did you have any problems working with him?

Post: No.

Fry: Because apparently Susie Clifton did.

Post: Yes, she did. He and Susie did not get along, and I think that was one of the reasons that he finally left, among other things. No, no, I had no problems with him at all. It seems like there were things that we disagreed on, but no, the answer is that I didn't have any great problems with him at all.

Fry: How strong was James Roosevelt as the leader of his own campaign?

Post: Oh, I think he led a great deal. A great deal.

Fry: So, that in points on campaign strategy, and issues that were decided upon to push, I could probably ask him about what things were considered and--

Post: Oh yes. He had a string around all of us and he was calling the shots completely. There's no doubt about that. He organized the campaign.

Fry: What other pros did you have besides the ones who sent out press releases? What about radio?

Post: Well, this was done, to a large extent, from the south. I did a little of it up here, radio, and of course when we went from town to town our contacts would make arrangements with the radio stations and Jim would go over to it. So, we had that kind of a thing. But the actual placing of radio spots and that kind of thing was all done down south.

Fry: And was this done by a firm down there?

Post: Yes, yes. That's this firm that I was talking about. And then I think they shifted to someone else.

Fry: Was this very much a southern-oriented campaign?

Post: Yes, I would think that it probably was. Jim was up here quite a lot, but on the whole most of the votes were down there, and I would say that he concentrated mostly on the south. He took the bus down there on several occasions.

Fry: What bus?

Post: You know. I showed you the picture. The campaign bus. They took it down south on several occasions.

Fry: I believe Oliver Carter was Northern California Democratic chairman at the time, up until about September.

Post: That's right.

Fry: I don't think he was wholeheartedly for Roosevelt, right?

Post: He was not because actually, if I remember correctly, he was seriously thinking of running himself. And so he was not a bit helpful in the primaries, obviously, and in the finals I don't think he helped a bit. In fact, I don't think I ever heard the man give a speech for Roosevelt.

Fry: Well, he was mentioned in the columns as one of the potential candidates, early in the campaign.

Post: Yes, he was. Definitely. He definitely wanted to run. Then Jim came along and kind of pushed him out, and that he didn't like.

Fry: And then he was appointed judge later.

Post: Yes.

Fry: What about some of the others who might have been considered for running at the time. Do you remember them at all?

Post: No, I don't remember a single name outside of Carter.

Fry: Was it too early for Pat Brown?

Post: Yes.

Fry: Let's see, at that time he had not yet become attorney general--

Post: That's right. No, I don't think Pat had any ideas other than the attorney general and there was no problem there.

Fry: And Helen Gahagen Douglas, who ran for senator--

Post: She kept completely clear of the Roosevelt campaign. We never could get her involved in it at all. She stayed well away from it.

Fry: Why was that? Warren kept independent in his campaign because he wanted to preserve his bipartisanship and didn't want to be attached to either a Republican or a Democrat; but she wouldn't have that reason.

Post: No, and I think the reason was that she wanted to run on her own, and maybe she thought--I never really found out exactly why we never could pull the thing together--but generally speaking, I think she felt that Jim was never going to help her a bit, and might do her some harm. I think maybe that's what she felt.

Fry: You mean in throwing votes away?

Post: Yes. Well, not throwing votes away, but she thought that if they worked together she wouldn't gain anything by it.

Fry: Was there an ideological difference?

Post: No. Do you mean philosophically?

Fry: Yes.

Post: No, not a bit. Not in the slightest. It was just purely a political thing, and she and her management just felt that they didn't want to get involved with Jim at all. Jim didn't feel that way, but she felt very strongly that Jim wouldn't help. And I don't think she was right. I think they would have done better if they had pulled together. But I think she felt that Warren was so much stronger than Nixon that she didn't want Warren attacking her. Of course, Warren didn't attack anybody as a matter of fact. He's a curious guy.

Fry: Yes. You brought that out in your article, that he really shies away from any controversial--

Post: Yes, yes.

Fry: But I thought he attacked Jimmy Roosevelt in this campaign.

Post: Well, yes he did, as any opponent would, of course. But

Post: it wasn't a personal thing. I'll say that for Warren. He never stooped to personalities, as far as I know, in any of his campaigns.

Fry: Did people like yourself who were signing on with Roosevelt before the campaign really got underway see Warren as the big threat that he turned out to be?

Post: Big threat to what?

Fry: In getting so many votes. [Laughter]

Post: No, I didn't think so, except of course, when I saw that because he had won both the Democratic and Republican primary in 1946, it was obvious that the man had a great pull from both sides. And there were a certain number of Democrats that either sat on their hands during the campaign or came out for Warren, and well, I thought he was very strong. I thought he was very strong. At least, after the primaries I felt that we had very little chance. We worked awfully hard but I didn't think we were going to win. But I didn't think we were going to get licked by a million votes either. We took a terrible beating.

Fry: I look back on this now, and it seems that when labor met and voted to support Roosevelt, this might have given you some cause for encouragement.

Post: Well, yes to the extent that if they hadn't endorsed him it probably would have done him more harm. Labor's endorsement is always nice, but they don't tell their people how to vote, and even now I think that labor's endorsement means less and less all the time.

The organized labor members are getting to be pretty reactionary, themselves, you know. They're pretty right wing, many of them, not necessarily the leaders, but the rank and file. Oh, you know, they own property now and automobiles. They have everything. They're fairly affluent. And they're not about to let anybody come into their province, if they can help it. So, they tend to be Republicans. Whether they are actually registering as Republicans or not, I don't know.

Fry: But in the forties a lot of old labor issues were still unsettled and Taft-Hartley was a very live issue in 1950.

- Post: Yes.. No question that the labor endorsement meant more in those days than it does today. And it did help, no doubt about it. We got a little money from labor. One of the most active labor organizations are the operating engineers. And they had an airplane that we took Jim in all around the place. They lent Jim the airplane that they had. He did a lot of travelling around the state in that.
- Fry: Do you think that the action of Earl Warren, in letting the anti-hot cargo* legislation pass without his signature, had an effect on the labor vote?
- Post: No, I don't know. No, I don't think so.
- Fry: Another issue may have centered around George McLain and the Townsend Act on welfare administration and amounts for pensions.
- Post: That's right. And McLain came out for Roosevelt, very strongly. Roosevelt did, I think, get it. McLain's endorsement lent as much, I think, as the labor endorsement. He was quite a character, McLain. He was a very strong man. He had genius for organization, and he had these elderly people just eating out of his hands, you know.
- Fry: Were they able to spend their time ringing doorbells, by the way?
- Post: To a degree they did, I think, yes. To a degree, they were very helpful.
- Fry: And do you remember if Warren attacked Roosevelt for supporting McLain?
- Post: No, I don't think he did. It was not a personal thing. Again, my memory is so bad that I would hate to say whether he did or didn't. But, I don't think so.
- Fry: This was right after McLain had gotten the constitutional amendment through to put social welfare all under the control of the state and put in his choice, Myrna Williams as its head.
- Post: Oh, yes, yes, yes.
- Fry: That was in 1948, and then in 1949 another ballot measure appeared undoing all of this, which Warren backed and

*Secondary strike or boycott.

Fry: it was successful, so he did win in the long run there.

Post: That's right, I remember that.

Fry: It seems to me that the upshot of all this might have been a very great organization under McLain.

Post: Yes, it could have been.

Fry: Because he'd had a campaign in 1948 and another one in 1949.

Post: But, of course, the interesting part is that we've got a bill now that has passed the senate and the assembly, I think, putting it back in the hands of the state. And Reagan is going to veto it.

Fry: [Laughing.] Yes. I thought, "Great shades of McLain."
[Laughter] Well, at any rate, I'm trying to get an assessment from you, a feel for McLain's organization as a force to be reckoned with.

Post: Well, there's no question that there was a force to be reckoned with, and I think we were very fortunate to get his support. It obviously wasn't sufficient. But McLain's endorsement and so on was a great help.

Fry: Can you give us a picture of what the main planks of support were for Roosevelt, both in terms of political wallop and money?

Post: Well, from the point of view of money, he really got very little money, very little money. I can't remember who it was that gave us--I think we had two \$5,000 contributions up here in the north, and that was the biggest deal. Down south there was some, but I really can't give you the answer to the money. Outside of those two \$5,000, I don't think there was much of anything.

Fry: Well, let's see. According to my notes, there were two big ones reported for the state record, which only has to include money directly contributed to Roosevelt's campaign; none of his other campaign money contributions would have been included. One was Lou Bronstein and the other one was Joe Shane, and they were each for \$12,500. It looks like both together, they made \$25,000.

Post: Yes, but I didn't know it was that much. I remember Joe Shane. Now, that's a name that I had forgotten all about.

Fry: Who were these people? Were they Northern California people?

Post: No. They were Southern.

Fry: So, probably someone from down south would know more about them. What business were they in?

Post: I think Joe was with public relations. I don't remember. I don't remember at all. I should know; I know him but I just don't remember.

Fry: And up north did you say that you thought that there was a \$25,000--

Post: Oh, not a twenty-five. Two people gave five thousand. A man [newspaper publisher] called Sheldon Sackett gave five thousand. I forget who the other one was that gave five thousand. But, we didn't get money from the usual Democratic sources; if I remember correctly the Hellers [Elinor and Edward H.], for instance, didn't give us anything.

Fry: Who else were the usual sources?

Post: Well, in those days--

Fry: This was before the days of Ben Swig.

Post: Yes. To a degree it was. Ben was here, but--I'm not sure Ben didn't give us some money.

Fry: Oh, he might have. This may have been his virgin voyage.

Post: Yes, I think maybe he did give us some money. Gosh, I think George Davis did give us some money, but I don't think it was a great amount, five hundred or something like that. The operating engineers gave us some money, but I don't know how much. They gave it directly to Jim, down south. I just don't remember. The whole thing is over twenty years ago and as I told you when I started that my memory is completely blank on the thing.

Fry: I am straining my mind, to sit here and try to figure out who would be the most logical people to do this.

Post: Jim probably would remember, and Susie Clifton has a better memory of it than I have.

- Fry: Well, what about his own funds? Did James Roosevelt have a lot to offer from his own pocket?
- Post: No, no. That he did not. And how much he put in of his own, I really don't know. I don't have any idea. But he wasn't able to put in a great deal, that I know. He may have borrowed some from a bank or something and then ended up in debt on it, but I'm not sure of that.
- Fry: I wonder if you could give us some assessment of how the northern support varied from the southern support? Susie Clifton, over the telephone, mentioned to me something about there being more problem with the north, particularly after the primaries, than there was in the south. Was this your impression?
- Post: Funny, I don't remember that. Maybe to the extent that the so-called "regular" Democratic organization in San Francisco was of no help to us whatsoever. That was the Malone organization. I don't think that we had any great difficulties with the regular organizations in the rest of the state. Alameda, Oakland was for us, with Monroe Friedman as the chairman--I think he was the county chairman for Alameda. As a matter of fact, we carried Alameda County. I think it was the only county we did carry.
- Fry: Oh, you didn't carry San Francisco?
- Post: I don't know whether we did or not. I don't think so.
- Fry: Did Monroe Friedman have something to do with any other county organizations?
- Post: No, no, he was purely an Oakland man.
- Fry: Did you have a particular person who worked with the non-urban counties? I mean, counties besides San Francisco or Alameda or Los Angeles?
- Post: Yes, I did. I was the contact with all the counties in the north.
- Fry: And what luck did you have with them?
- Post: I would say that, generally speaking, they were very enthusiastic, they were enthusiastic about his candidacy, and I think they did all that they could. But none of

Post: them were strongly organized. There was no such thing as a Tammany Hall in any of these places. And none of them were indifferent, such as Malone was, or sat on their hands. I think they were interested to help. But they just didn't have the muscle.

Fry: Are we talking about the regular Democratic county committees?

Post: Yes, yes. So, I think they did what they could. We didn't have any special committees set up because we didn't get help from the regulars. But generally speaking I think we had friends. We had Contra Costa; that was George Miller's organization. We had Oakland and Alameda, that was Monroe Friedman. We had Marin, that was Sam Gardiner's bailiwick. We had San Mateo; I forget who the chairman was there--Frank Rose helped us very much there. He was very active and I'm not sure whether he was chairman there or not. I don't think he was, but he was very close to the regular organization at San Mateo. And in all of them, I would say that they were for us but they didn't have the muscle of the organization to do anything.

Fry: And what about county money? Did they have to raise their own money for their particular efforts?

Post: Yes, yes. And that was another problem. We had no money to give them. That was another problem that didn't help at all.

Fry: Did you get much help from money that had been raised by the State Democratic Central Committee?

Post: No. I don't think they raised anything. No. The state committee did nothing. Now, I make that statement because I don't remember that they did anything. Now, Susie may have another feeling on it, but in fact, I don't even remember who the state chairman was at that time. I'm not sure that it wasn't Bill Malone, but I don't think it was.

There was another man down in the south, I can't remember his name, he's a lawyer and a very nice fellow and he's been active in politics ever since. But you'll get his name when you go down there. I think he gave some money. Eugene Wyman--that's his name. I think he became national committeeman at one time, afterwards.

Fry: The state Democrats, then, must have been putting all their efforts into some other campaign?

Post: No, they didn't put their efforts into anything. They just didn't pretend to collect any money. Everybody ran their own campaign and the state didn't--if I remember correctly, the state committee contributed nothing. Warren ran his own. I don't think the state Republicans gave him much help. And as I say, he ran all by himself and he had no intention of going in with anybody. He played the nonpartisan business and he was successful; he won.

Fry: Yes, I think that [Democratic candidate for attorney general, Edmund G.] Brown even had some sidewise glances of support from Earl Warren in 1952.

Post: Yes, he might have.

Fry: At least Warren wasn't going to fight him because I guess Warren, for sure, didn't want [Frederick N.] Howser to continue in office.

Post: Yes, that's right.

Fry: Now, George Miller was running very closely with Roosevelt.

Post: Yes, he did. He hooked on with Jim and they campaigned the whole state, in the primaries and in the finals.

Fry: Did they campaign in tandem?

Post: Oh very much. Often they were on the bus together. Oh yes, they were very close.

Fry: Why don't you tell me about that bus and who got the idea for it?

Post: I got the idea. It was my idea.

Fry: What kind of a vehicle was this marvelous thing?

Post: I wish I had a picture of the whole thing, but it was a big one. I'm sure it's in the newspapers. I think it was as long as this room, and it had very comfortable chairs in it, and a little desk and everything up in the front. And we'd stop and take on some of the members of our committee in the various places where we went to. They'd ride down from one place to another with Jim and that kind of thing. And then he spoke, as you saw, from the rear platform.

Fry: The podium.

Post: Yes, yes. It made quite a hit, as a matter of fact. It was called the "Roosevelt Special" and it was quite a publicity stunt, really. It was photographed wherever it went, and he had a good many stories written about it in the newspapers and that kind of thing. It was very useful. Instead of doing it by train, which is the way they used to do--run a train of special cars or something down the Southern Pacific, both ways--we were able to go into all kinds of places. But it was very much like that. It was nothing as big as a train car, but I would say that it was half the length of a regular passenger car, pullman car, you know. And it was the same idea, only we could go to all kinds of places which the trains couldn't go to.

Fry: Did you use it also in the big cities?

Post: Oh yes, yes. It went all around down south. It got quite popular down there. It was helpful, I think, in getting crowds.

Fry: Who was the front man up north here, in preparing a community for the arrival of the bus?

Post: I was. I organized it, but of course, I got our own committees and so on, in each place to do the local work on it, getting newspaper coverage and radio coverage--they would get radio time for Jim to go on, and that kind of thing; it was all done locally. But it was coordinated by my office up here.

Fry: Was that radio time pretty expensive?

Post: Oh no. Most of it was free. He was visiting there and they wanted him. The only thing at all that we really had to pay for was radio spot announcements towards the end of the campaign.

Fry: Are you talking about toward the end of the primary?

Post: Well, both. But as far as the local campaign was concerned, particularly when we'd go to Fresno and Bakersfield and places like that, we didn't have to pay for anything. Of course, it was news.

Fry: Sure. So that bus probably paid for itself.

- Post: Oh yes. Over and over again. I forget what the bus cost us. I think, altogether, about \$2,000.
- Fry: Oh, it was that low?
- Post: Yes.
- Fry: Where did you get it? Was it new?
- Post: I think I picked it up somewhere down here on Third Street. I was going down in the car; I saw the darned thing and this idea occurred to me. I stopped to find out if we could get it, and we did. It was in sort of a junk yard, if I remember correctly.
- Fry: Then you had to fix it up so that it had a desk and everything, is that right?
- Post: Yes, that's right.
- Fry: I was visualizing you or Roosevelt sitting at the desk in the bus. Who was writing the speeches?
- Post: We didn't write any speeches. Very seldom. I think Jim, on certain occasions where he had a dinner or something and a lot of people were going to be there, I think he did have speeches written. But generally speaking, he spoke off the cuff. I think we had a few speeches that dealt with specific subjects that we wanted to get over. And I remember that there was one that I wrote, but I can't remember what it was about.
- Fry: Do you remember any of the specific subjects at all?
- Post: No. Frankly, I don't even remember the issues that we had.
- Fry: I wondered, for instance, how you combatted the impetus of the Korean War and Warren's insistence that "now we're back at war and let's all pull together and let's not have a divided state and everybody vote for me."
- Post: Well, the Korean War actually was not an issue. It was nothing like Viet Nam, nothing like it.
- Fry: Oh yes. I'm sure it wasn't.
- Post: As far as the Korean War was concerned, it really didn't enter into the state campaign at all, if I remember correctly. I don't remember it at all. Now I may be wrong.

Fry: No, I think you're right. It did not enter directly into it. But I thought that in some of the statements and speeches I've read of Warren's, I detected a repeat of his campaign statements right after Pearl Harbor, when World War II was starting and he was running for governor: "Now we are in war again and let's not change horses in the middle of the stream."

Post: Yes. Frankly, I cannot remember the Korean War being used as any issue at all, any way, shape or form.

Fry: The other problem was that California, because of the war and the postwar boom, was in very good shape financially. This must have been one of your greatest disadvantages.

Post: Yes. Of course it was. I honestly forget what our issues were. I really don't remember.

Fry: As an off-the-cuff speaker, how was Roosevelt?

Post: Very good.

Fry: How did the crowds respond?

Post: The crowds responded very well. His crowds were much bigger than Warren's.

Fry: Oh really?

Post: Oh yes. No question about that because Warren didn't do a great deal of visiting around like we did. But where he did, they weren't responsive at all because Warren wasn't an exciting speaker, you know. And Jim sounded exactly like his father.

Fry: Oh really?

Post: Oh yes. Extraordinary. And, of course, his father was still in people's minds.

Fry: Yes, he sure was.

Another thing that we haven't talked about was Jim's problem that was left over from the 1948 convention, when he backed Eisenhower and some of the Democratic bigwigs were mad at him still for that. Isn't that right?

Post: That was an issue, yes, but I don't think it made any difference in the campaign here.

Fry: I wonder if that was why Malone was cool towards him?

Post: No, I don't think so. Malone was cool because he pushed out Ollie [Oliver] Carter and--I don't know; I forget just why Malone was so darned cold. It may have had something to do with the Eisenhower thing. But unless Malone is running the show, he isn't going to play the game with anybody. He wasn't about to run the show up here, and I think that was the reason. They were all Ollie Carter people: the Hellers and the Malones and so forth, and when Jim came into the picture, they pulled out.

Fry: The Democrats seemed to just hand these elections to Warren during this period.

Post: Yes, we did. There's no question about it.

Fry: Did you have any problem with the Democrats organized for Warren in the north?

Post: I don't know whether it was the Democrats for Warren in that campaign or not. Nothing like the one that was organized against [Jesse] Unruh.

Fry: Against Unruh?

Post: Do you remember a few years ago when Unruh ran against Ronald Reagan?

Fry: Oh, that was two years ago, in 1970.

Post: Yes, two years ago. And there was quite a group of Democrats who actually came out for Reagan against Unruh, which I could never understand. I can understand their not being for Unruh, but I don't see why they had to come out for Reagan. Anyway, that's another thing and I don't know what they're talking about.

Fry: But our state now, and also then, had some very conservative Democrats in it.

Post: I imagine that there probably were, but I don't remember whether there was a committee. I don't think there was a committee for Warren. Now there may have been. As I said, my memory is terribly bad.

Fry: There was a Mr. McNutt, a Democrat in Southern California, who was doing something for Warren's campaigns and I thought maybe there was a counterpart up here.

Post: Yes, I think he was. No, I don't think so. I know the Hellers did not come out for Warren or anything like that.

Fry: Do you remember the visit by Eleanor Roosevelt during his campaign?

Post: No, I don't. I know she did come in but I don't remember it at all.

Fry: You don't remember her being on the bus or anything like that?

Post: No, she wasn't on the bus, that I know.

Fry: I wondered if her visit was considered an asset at the time?

Post: Oh yes. Oh sure.

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Fry: I think that's everything except a few things that I wanted to pick up from your article* that I felt were kind of important to follow up on. First of all, would you like to tape record your general view of that article now, and then we can go into some of the specifics?

Post: Well, the article paints Warren as a real reactionary. And I think justifiably so. But when Warren went to the Supreme Court he completely put on a whole new suit of clothes and became an entirely different person. I could see nothing in the time that he was governor, or certainly as attorney general, that would indicate the kind of philosophy which he showed when he was on the Supreme Court. I considered Warren as quite a reactionary person, as governor. And I think most people did. I don't think Eisenhower had any idea what he was taking on when he appointed him. I don't think he had any thought that Warren was going to turn out to be the kind of thorough liberal that he turned out to be.

I don't think, as governor he would have taken on seventy-five percent of the things that he did on the Supreme Court. I don't think he could have as governor. He was a political animal as a governor and apparently, when he was Chief Justice, he suddenly reverted to what may have been basically his own feelings. But as a governor and as a politician running for office, he just didn't feel that he could support some of the things that he may well have felt strongly about. I don't know. He's an entirely different person. And I think everybody will agree with that.

Fry: One thing that interested me a lot was your remarks on the utility commission and their--

Post: Yes, public utility rates?

* See interview appendix for copy of article.

Fry: Yes. You talked about Warren really not going to bat for the consumer. If you can find that passage, we might read it. And you say that--

Post: [Reading from his article] "Warren has also been a liberal on public utility rates. Since the end of the war, many millions of dollars have been added to consumers' bills without a whisper of objection from the governor. Although every realist in politics knows the powerful pressures that are constantly put on public utility commissions, there is no evidence that Warren had done what any really liberal governor should do and vigilantly watch to see what was happening. It is characteristic and disturbing that when, shortly before election day in 1950, an increase in telephone rates was announced, it was hastily pigeonholed by the commission and brought up for approval about a year later."

Fry: Was it approved about a year later?

Post: Yes. I think it was later, yes.

Fry: Along with that, I wanted to ask you about an event in Earl Warren's first appointment to the Public Utility Commission. I wondered if you remembered his appointment of Pete Anderson, whose real name is L. Harold Anderson; I think he was a city engineer from Palo Alto with very few political connections.

Post: I don't remember him.

Fry: Because in that appointment Warren apparently made a permanent enemy of Charlie Blyth, who pretty much tried to control the public utilities at that time.

Post: Yes, that's right.

Fry: Did you know the man who succeeded Anderson? His name was Richard E. Mittelstaedt.

Post: No. The name is familiar but I don't recall it.

Fry: I wondered if you had any opinions on either of these two men.

Post: No.

Fry: But you mean that the public utility actions in the meantime apparently went unnoticed by Earl Warren and

Fry: that he, as governor, was not vigilant?

Post: No, that's right. Whenever he possibly could, he avoided every issue, if it was at all controversial, if he could get away with it. He was no crusader of any sort, shape or form, such as he was in the Supreme Court.

Fry: One of the would-be crusades that remains ambiguous in our research efforts is his [Fair Employment Practices Commission] FEPC effort. On the one hand he did come out against FEPC when it was on the ballot, but he did put a bill in the legislature, which he said was less--

Post: Yes, I've got it here. "It's incredible that his conscience is showing on one or two occasions such as the popular referendum on the state Fair Employment Practice Act, which he had recommended to the legislature with the full knowledge that it would never get out of committee, and which he refused to endorse when faced with it on the ballot."

Fry: How did you know that he knew it would never get out of the committee?

Post: Well, as I remember correctly, the legislature was Republican at that time, and I think he controlled it.

Fry: Now, this is something that we've been trying to tie down because it took so long, so many years, for FEPC to pass finally in California; it was up in the 1960's before it finally passed, under Governor Brown.

Post: Yes, yes.

[Reading from article on Warren] "Warren is of mediocre intelligence," and you know at that time, I really think he was. [Laughter]

Fry: A number of people say that his strong point on the Supreme Court wasn't as a great intellect, it was his ability--

Post: --his ability to pull them together.

Fry: That's right, and see--

Post: And probably his brilliant young clerks were the ones who wrote the opinions.

Fry: They may have, except wasn't he supposed to have written the Brown decision opinion himself?

Post: I don't know. In all fairness, I really don't know.

Fry: It reads very simply and straightforwardly.

Post: Yes.

Fry: The other things that I'm so intrigued with in your article is the reference to the Knowland, Chandler, and Hearst triumvirate. There are a number of people who have told us about this, and the thing that puzzles me is that Warren was in sort of open warfare with Hearst in 1936, in that presidential campaign.

Post: I've forgotten. Was he in 1936?

Fry: Yes, in 1936.

Post: Was he attorney general?

Fry: No, it was when he headed the California Republican delegation at the national convention, a delegation that was anti-Hearst. And I guess he was sort of in the Hearst enemy camp.

Post: I may have been wrong on that, but I don't think I was.

Fry: On the other hand, he seems to have gotten good press from the Hearst newspapers, even after that.

Post: Yes, I'm sure he did.

Fry: I just wanted you to expand on that.

Post: No, I can't. I just don't remember, I'm sorry. I don't remember.

Fry: You mentioned, too, in the article, in the field of the California Water Plan, that when he was attorney general, as a member of the State Water and Power Authority, he cast a deciding vote against state assistance to federal development of California's water resources. That brings up a question of how he stood on that 160-acre limitation, which usually was necessary for federal assistance.

Post: I really don't know what his stand was on that.

Fry: Do you know much about organized crime in California at that time? I'm intrigued with the thing that you pointed out about two members of the crime commission being connected with the Santa Anita Race Track. I brought along a couple of copies of the final report of the Special Crime Study Commission of Organized Crime--one of them is 1950 and one is 1953, in May. I wondered if you knew which commission it was that conveniently was disassembled.

Post: No, I don't.

Fry: I am going to be talking to Warren Olney III about the crime commission and I wanted to ask him about the specific commission members, and I wondered which--

Post: Yes, he can give you the real story on that.

Fry: Well, can you tell me which ones on the crime commission were members of the Santa Anita Race Track?

Post: I don't know. The counsel had two very distinguished people, [Arthur] Sherry and Warren Olney III.

Fry: Yes.

Post: I can't tell you who they were.

Fry: Now, here's the later commission report for 1953 with names of commission members.

Post: [Looking at crime commission report] Oh, Tom L. Storke, he was a good guy. I just don't know, I'm sorry, who were members of the Santa Anita Race Track.

Fry: Let's see, was there anything else that came to my mind as I read this? Oh, do you have a story, for instance, of Earl Warren being approached to endorse the FEPC?

Post: No, I don't know whether he was. Do you mean the FEPC constitutional amendment?

Fry: Yes, the constitutional amendment.

Post: I don't know whether he was or not. All I can say here is that he refused to endorse it when it was on the ballot. No, I don't know whether he was approached, and if he was, who did it.

Fry: You were a very interested observer at this time, and one of the questions that we're eternally trying to get at is Earl Warren's relation to the legislature. Was he a sort of hands-off governor who believed in the division of powers, or was he someone who really did try to control it to the extent of getting particular programs passed or scuttled?

Post: Well, I'll tell you again, I think he was a cautious guy. I don't think he intended or pretended or put on any show of being a boss of the legislature. I think he was very shrewd and the things that he wanted to control and wanted badly, he got, as far as the legislature was concerned. He either got it bottled up or he got what he wanted. But I don't think he made any great demands; I don't remember his ever being in any great fights with the legislature. I think he was a very shrewd kind of undercover person. That he could get pretty much what he wanted out of the legislature there's no doubt. But the point is that he never attempted, he never wanted anything, or if he wanted something seriously, he let the legislators do what they wanted as long as they didn't bother him.

Fry: Do you think that he had specific legislators who helped him?

Post: Yes, but I can't give you the names. Yes, I'm sure he did. Every governor does, really, when you come right down to it. But if I remember correctly I'm quite sure that he had a Republican legislature the whole time.

Fry: That's right, he did.

Post: And the Republican legislature in California was even more conservative than he was.

Fry: And the statistics on how many of his bills lost through the years were low.

Post: Yes, and that's one of the reasons that he would put in his messages in the early days, his annual message, some of the most liberal, progressive things you ever saw in your life and get us liberals all excited; but then he never did anything about it. He was perfectly certain that he was not going to bother with them. He never fought for them. The boys in the legislature didn't make any great fuss about it because they knew he really wasn't serious, so they forgot it.

Post: He was against controversy. He never tackled anything controversial, unless he was absolutely forced to. [Interruption.]

Fry: I have a question on the tip of my tongue that you may or may not be able to address yourself to. You are saying that Warren didn't really crusade with the legislature in really trying to put things through. How does this compare with your prior experience with Governor Franklin Roosevelt and his New York legislature?

Post: Now, that's very interesting because Roosevelt's legislature was Republican, too. Roosevelt was always fighting. But of course Roosevelt was a Democrat and he didn't have any ideas of being a nonpartisan; he never thought of it. He was out to make a name for himself. His predecessor, Al Smith [Alfred E. Smith] had a great reputation as a liberal, and Roosevelt just went out for it. As a matter of fact, he did exactly what Al did; he used the Republican legislature as a whipping boy to augment his own ideas. Roosevelt was a good liberal, as a governor. Not nearly as way out to the left as he was when he became president, because as governor we were moving into the Depression, and of course, we got into it, very deeply into it, before his term was up.

But it's really a comparison because, as I say, Smith was nothing like Warren. Smith would advocate almost anything because he knew the Republican legislature was going to kill it. So he became a great champion. Now if Smith had had a Democratic legislature, what he would have done with it I really don't know. And whether Roosevelt would have been less progressive with a Democratic legislature, I don't know, but I don't think he would have.

Fry: Well, this parallels what you were saying about Warren, that he also proposed things which he knew the legislature would dispose of?

Post: That's true. My feeling is that he was hypocritical about it, that he wasn't out to use the legislature as a sounding board for his ideas because he never fought for them.

Fry: I'm not understanding the difference between Roosevelt and Warren. Do you mean that on the other hand Roosevelt used the legislature as a way to espouse ideas in order to develop grassroots support?

Post: Well, yes, that's one of the reasons. And the other thing is that Roosevelt, being a Democrat, would propose things that he was pretty sure the Republicans would not pass. But I'll say this, if they had passed them I think he would have been delighted. I doubt very much that there was anything that he proposed that he really wasn't anxious to get--such as Warren did. Roosevelt went out for everything that he suggested. He really went to the people on it. He really fought for it. There's no question about it.

Fry: And if some of Warren's more liberal measures had passed, he might have opposed them?

Post: [Laughing] I wouldn't be surprised if he would.

Fry: He would have lost the support of the Knowland, Chandler--

Post: Yes, he probably would have. I don't know. He may have even had an understanding with Knowland and Chandler that he was going to be for these things, but "you know, boys, they're not going to get it and it gives me a nice liberal thing. I still hold my Republican thing and I pick up some Democratic votes for it," that kind of thing. He was very shrewd.

Fry: Well, you mentioned in your article that the liberal measures that did pass, such as prison reform, health insurance, school bonds, and hospital programs, were actually the result of a lot of pressures for this. Take for instance, health insurance, which was probably the most controversial: who pressured for that outside? The CIO had their own bill in and--

Post: [Reading from his article] Oh yes, here it is. "Warren has never felt guilty. The best example of this is the compulsory health insurance bill, which he sponsored but which has been bedevilling him ever since. When he first advocated this measure, there was no doubt that it was a popular issue. He would never have espoused it otherwise. When he discovered the hornets' nest that he had uncovered, he began to run for cover and had it conveniently killed in committee. He had taken the leadership in that fight and carried such leadership on such a militant basis that there was no question that he could have won. But the doctors and his other advisors persuaded him to abandon it, and as a result, he was in the ridiculous position of being a reluctant champion of one of the most controversial issues in the country, with no real desire to carry the torch. If Warren has one out-

Post: standing characteristic, it's his aversion to controversy and his strong distaste for crusading." And that was really true. As a governor, there's no doubt about it. You never thought of him as a fighting governor at all.

He was a governor, which I think I mention here at the end, of a state that was growing in population and wealth. He had no problems, financially, and he wouldn't create any. I think I pointed that out about the school bonds, for instance. He was against them. He balanced the budget; that was his proudest achievement, I think.

Fry: Something like the prison reform benefits a group that traditionally has no constituency. It's one of the most difficult areas in which to get any progress, and at that time I wondered if there were people in your circles who were pressing for this. Or do you know of any that were in the state that were pressing for it?

Post: I wish I could remember it, but I don't remember the prison reform. I remember these others to a degree, but the prison reform one I don't remember at all.

Fry: Were you aware, at all, of the controversy over whether to use the reserve fund? With all of the state revenue that was coming in, a reserve fund was set aside and Warren guarded it like a lion. He called it the "rainy day fund."

Post: Yes, I remember that. He wouldn't touch it.

Fry: Yes, right. I think the man who later ran on the Democratic ticket for governor in 1954--

Post: Dick Graves.

Fry: Dick Graves tangled with Warren on that.

Post: Yes. Well, Graves had about as much of a chance of beating Warren as I would have. Graves was a pretty confident sort of a guy.

Fry: Do you mean for governor?

Post: Yes.

Fry: Well, yes. He had an easier man to run against, actually. He had Knight.

Post: Oh yeah, but he couldn't touch Knight.

Fry: At that time Knight was getting pretty nonpartisan himself.

Post: Oh, sure. Knight was a really smart politician, too.

IV ADDITIONAL PEOPLE IN THE 1950 CAMPAIGN

Fry: The other question which I meant to ask you back at the beginning of the interview, was about Dr. George Outland's chairmanship of the 1950 campaign. What sort of a campaign chairman was he? How tight a control did he have of the campaign?

Post: Well, let me say this: Jim [Roosevelt] ran his own campaign. There's no question about that. And George's big job, really, was the administrative end of it. And he wasn't a very good administrator.

Fry: Was he more of an idea man?

Post: I guess he kind of thought he was. How good of an idea man he was, I really don't know. You see, he worked down south and I worked up here. And I really don't want to say too much about it. He had some emotional problems, you know. He really did. He almost had a nervous breakdown a couple of times. So, there were those problems. He really was emotionally unfit for this kind of a job. He really, honestly, was.

Fry: He had just finished his second term as congressman from Santa Barbara?

Post: Yes, that's right.

Fry: And I guess, I don't know what happened, I assume he just didn't run again or he was defeated.

Post: I think he was defeated, if I remember correctly, yes. He was emotionally unfit to take a responsible job like a big campaign. He was a good congressman. Of course, there he could run himself and have no problems.

Fry: Yes, and that's not an administrative position, actually, except to run your own office.

Post: No, no. That's right. He was a good congressman. But, he was too high strung.

Fry: And how was he at delegating?

Post: Not very good. Of course, he couldn't do it with me because I was too far away, and I was raising most of the money myself up here for my own stuff. I didn't contribute anything to the television or the radio statewide, or anything of that sort; but for our own day-to-day operation, we were running our own. So, he didn't bother me, but I knew he wasn't able to delegate down in the South in the office he was running, and I think that's where he and Susie [Clifton] got all messed up. You haven't talked to Susie yet, have you?

Fry: Not yet.

Post: Well, I don't think George is going to talk bitterly about anything. Did he with you?

Fry: No, he was very affable.

Post: He's a very nice fellow.

Fry: Yes, I could see how he'd be a good campaigner on his own because he does have a very affable personality.

Post: Yes, he is, yes. He's an outgoing type of guy.

Fry: But he intimated that he was never happy with the things that were going on in the campaign and the way money was being spent and things like this.

Post: Yes, that's true; I know he was.

Fry: And he was always complaining, he said, to Roosevelt.

Post: Yes, he was very unhappy about that kind of thing. But as I say, that was all done down there and I wasn't involved in it at all.

Fry: So really, you were kind of free up here.

Post: Oh, completely.

Fry: As long as you raised your own money, no one bothered you?

Post: That's right. For instance, down there they thought this bus thing was the silliest thing they ever heard of. But since they didn't have to pay for it I did it anyway. And then of course when it was equipped and we started using it, then they were hollering for the bus to come down to the South to campaign.

Fry: Oh, I know someone I didn't ask you about. What about the Roger Kents? Don't they always contribute?

Post: I don't think Roger gave us any money. He may have given us some. I don't know. He didn't help us on anything. I remember that. He really didn't give us any help, but he wasn't bitter, or anything, about it. I don't think he gave us any dough. I really don't, but I may be wrong. I wish I could remember who did give us some money, but I just don't know.

Fry: I was trying to think of any large, wealthy interests--not necessarily families. Any particular industries that were interested in Democrats at that time? Like aircraft, or any of the postwar firms?

Post: No, I don't think so.

Fry: What was Kaiser?

Post: Well, I know we didn't get any money from Kaiser, unless Jim did down there. I know we didn't get anything up here. I think Ed Pauley may have given Jim some money, I'm not sure about that.

Fry: Oh yes, he was a Democrat.

Post: Oh yes. And he was very rich.

Fry: He doesn't strike me as a Roosevelt-type Democrat.

Post: He was a great Franklin Roosevelt Democrat. And of course he became pretty conservative himself as he went on. He got rich. But I'm not sure whether Ed gave Jim any money or not. He may very well have, but I'm not sure.

Fry: Well, I'll ask Mr. Roosevelt.

Post: Oh, he'll tell you frankly who gave him money.

Fry: It's never as interesting a question for the Democrats as it is for the Republicans, because Democrats have so little money.

Post: Although I think recently it has been. When I think of the money that is necessary now to run a campaign, I'm absolutely astonished. I don't know where they get it. I just don't know how Tunney can pick up a million and a half dollars to run his campaign. I don't know where it came from. Who does it?

Fry: Do you think the new campaign reform legislation is really going to help us know where the money comes from?

Post: Oh, I think so, yes.

Fry: Do you think it will really be reported?

Post: I think so. It is now.

Fry: It's supposed to be.

Post: Well yes, they're putting it out now. You see it. Yes, I think so.

Fry: Is there anything in summation on the whole campaign that you can think of?

Post: I can only say this. I think we ran as good a campaign as we could have. There weren't any really vital issues. We were in a whole period of prosperity. The state was in very good financial shape. When you have an affluent electorate, they're not terribly interested in really progressive measures unless they really affect them personally. And so, the incumbent almost always has a tremendous advantage on that. I don't think it mattered who would run. I don't think it would make any difference. I think Jim put on as good a campaign as he possibly could have. I just don't think anybody could have beaten Warren, because the public wasn't ready to put him out.

I mean, Ollie Carter [Oliver Carter] couldn't possibly have put on as good a campaign as Jim did. In the first place, he just didn't have the name. Let's not forget that Roosevelt's name was magic then; it really was. It was at that time and still is to a certain extent. But I don't know of anybody that could have come anywhere near doing the kind of job that Jim did. Some of them might have gotten some more money than Jim did, but I don't know.

Fry: When I was looking through the Helen Gahagan Douglas papers, there were knockdown, dragout, red-hot issues

Fry: in that 1950 campaign because Nixon was attacking her as being red and all this. Was James Roosevelt put through any of that? Was he vulnerable on any of that? How liberal had James Roosevelt been?

Post: Oh, he was liberal. No, he wasn't attacked. You see, Jim hadn't held any office. He had just come out of the army, practically. And the only thing he'd held was the chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. As that, he had done nothing which would harm him. No, he was not vulnerable and he never was attacked. And, of course, Warren wouldn't play a game like that.

Nixon is a gutter fighter and always has been. It was just wicked what he did to Helen Douglas, really awful. That's one of the reasons that I don't care what he does as president, I still hate the guy; yet I've got to admit that he's been pretty smart on some of the things he's done.

Fry: I know, and that's a real dilemma. Well, I wonder if the Nixon-Douglas campaign crowded out newspaper inches from the Roosevelt-Warren campaign?

Post: I don't think so, no.

Fry: What about billboards? Did you use billboards much? I think in the Helen Gahagan Douglas-Nixon campaign, Nixon did make use of billboards.

Post: You know, I don't remember whether Jim had a billboard, I swear. That's a very good question. I don't remember whether he did.

Fry: You know, there is no evidence for things like this usually, historically. Billboards and radio programs kind of self-destruct after use and a historian never knows what use was made of them.

Post: I swear I don't remember if he had any billboards, but I may be wrong.

Fry: You need a good slogan, I guess, if you have a billboard.

Post: I swear I don't remember if he had any billboards, but I may be wrong.

Post: Yes. Well, they could have played the name of Roosevelt at that time on the billboard, I think.

Fry: He had a slogan didn't he? Something like, "ideal"-- not Truman's Fair Deal, but something else?

Post: I forget.

Fry: I'd like to go on into your work in the fifties. I noticed that you had a foundation, the Eleanor Roosevelt--

Post: The Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, yes. Just for about a year. And I was editor of a group of labor newspapers for a few years.

Fry: What labor newspapers were they?

Post: Well, it was called the Olympic Press, and they were at various places. I had one for Vallejo and one in Fresno and one in Bakersfield. They were unions that subscribed. And let's see, I had the Vallejo paper, the Fresno paper, a Contra Costa paper--

Fry: Not Alameda?

Post: No. No, there was another paper, a labor paper down here. And not San Francisco, San Mateo and San Jose. And then one way up in Redding.

Fry: What did you publish?

Post: Purely labor news, the local labor news, using individual names and that kind of thing. And all the papers would carry a certain amount of statewide news in each paper, but generally speaking, it was confined to local news.

Fry: And this was paid for, more or less, by the unions?

Post: Oh yes, they subscribed.

Fry: And that was your income?

Post: Yes.

Fry: You didn't use ads?

Post: Oh yes, we had ads.

Fry: And then you had stringers in each of these areas that would turn in local news?

Post: That's right.

Fry: How often did they come out?

Post: It came out once a week.

Fry: Does this still go on?

Post: You know, I think it does, but I'm not sure.

Fry: What did you do, sell it?

Post: No, no. I didn't own it.

Fry: Oh, you were the editor.

Post: Yes, I was the editor.

Fry: How did it relate to things like the Alameda County Labor Council?

Post: Well, the Alameda County Labor Council had its own paper, so we didn't relate to them at all.

Fry: Oh, that was why you weren't in Alameda County.

Post: Yes, yes.

Fry: So, this was for the counties that didn't have union-organized papers?

Post: Yes. For instance, San Francisco had its own.

Fry: I see. In elections that occurred while you were editor, were you able to take political stands?

Post: Yes, but generally speaking I didn't have any problems because my political stance and labor's political stance were always the same. So, I didn't have to pull my own punches on it at all.

Fry: I wondered if this gave you any particular political clout in California's scene?

Post: No, not very much.

Fry: Then, after that did you retire or did you--

Post: No, then I went with the Job Corps and I was with them for four or five years, then I retired from them.

Fry: What were you doing with them? Were you running the San Francisco office?

Post: No, no. I was just a subordinate. I wasn't running the show at all. I was sort of a field representative.

Fry: In California?

Post: Well, in the western regions.

Fry: What did that entail?

Post: Generally speaking, we worked with the state employment office, now called the--

Fry: State Department of Human Resources?

Post: Yes, that's right. We worked with them locally and our big job, of course, was recruiting and then placing. We were continually trying to get campaigns for recruiting. Recruiting was supposedly done by the State Department of Employment, but they didn't have the money or anything to really do much, so we had to provide that. And we had to provide the ideas and the push and the initiative and all of that. And then on placement we had to try and do the same thing: go to different places, employers, and so on, to take these kids on.

Fry: Did training come under you?

Post: No. We had training to a degree, but then the actual training was done up in camps. The camps were responsible for the training. The only thing that we had to do was to see that the camps were training them properly and training them for the things that they had a chance to get a job at, and that kind of thing. My job was, to a large extent, to inspire the local communities to do the jobs.

Fry: Which is reminiscent of your work with housing all of your life--

Post: Yes, yes. Except in the housing thing the local housing authority people actually were appointed to do that job,

Post: so the housing thing was somewhat easier.

Fry: --or your work selling the WPA idea to the governors.

Post: Yes, yes. And the thing in the housing was to sell the community the idea of creating a housing authority; that was another thing we had to do, to sell it first. And then once it was sold, that's all we had to do; so obviously the community was going to do all it could to make it work.

Fry: Well, I guess one of the things that we need is a bibliography of things that you've written, if you have one. Do you have anything like that written down?

Post: No. There was that [article] and I did a few pieces for the New Yorker years and years ago. I haven't done a great deal of writing as a matter of fact, except for writing speeches and so on, but I haven't kept those. The only book I've written is the Challenge of Housing; I must have a copy of it around here somewhere, but I'll have to dig it up.

Fry: Who did you write speeches for besides Jimmy Roosevelt?

Post: Well, I did a great deal of writing on my own.

Fry: For your speeches.

Post: As I told you, I ran for president of the Borough in New York and I ran for state controller in New York state on the labor ticket once. So, I've been doing my own. And then, of course, I was doing a great deal of speaking in my job trying to sell the idea of housing for the public and so on. So, I have done a great deal of speaking and I've written a great number of speeches, but I haven't really written an awful lot of magazine stuff.

Fry: What were your New Yorker articles about?

Post: Oh, I forget.

Fry: Was it a series?

Post: No, they were just humorous. It was just certain things that came to mind and I'd send them in. They were supposed to be humorous and I guess the editors thought they were

Post: or they wouldn't have published them.

Fry: Well, now you've got me curious. Do you happen to have the dates of those?

Post: I don't have the slightest idea.

Fry: What about the decade?

Post: It was sometime in the twenties.

Fry: While you were in New York?

Post: Yes.

Fry: All right. Well, it is getting near your dinnertime. Thanks so much for making time for this effort.

[End of Interview]

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WARREN: THE MYTH AND HIS RECORD

WHAT MANNER of man is Gov. Earl Warren of California, the Presidential candidate who now seems most likely to be put forward if Eisenhower and Taft should become hopelessly deadlocked?

That he is an effective politician goes without saying. In 30 years he has never been out of office, or lost an election except when he ran for Vice-President with Dewey in 1948. He also has a reputation as a liberal and an independent. Is it deserved? In Al Smith's phrase, let's look at the record.

Warren was born in the San Joaquin Valley, was graduated from the University of California and its law school, and almost immediately afterward entered the office of the District Attorney of Alameda County, across the Bay from San Francisco. Backed by Joe Knowland, owner of the *Oakland Tribune*, he was elected successively as Alameda County District Attorney, State Attorney General, and in 1942, as Governor, carrying every county in the state but one. In 1946, he ran again, and by cross-filing he got the nomination of both parties. In 1950, he was elected for a third time, defeating James Roosevelt by more than a million votes in a state where Democrats outnumber Republicans three to two.

You would assume that a man capable of such a series of sensational successes must be personally popular, and probably liberal and independent. Yet his possession of these qualities is doubtful, to put it mildly.

As to his independence, he owes a great debt to Knowland, Northern California's most powerful political figure, to Norman Chandler of the *Los Angeles Times* and to the Hearst interests. He appointed Knowland's son William to the US Senate. Contributions to his campaigns have come from many of the most powerful reactionary forces in the state.

Between national elections, Warren talks a lot about loyalty to the people, regardless of party. In Presidential

by Langdon Post



Earl Warren

years, he goes back into the Republican fold. This so-called "non-partisan-ship," growing out of a vicious cross-filing system though popular in California, has actually, by blurring the lines of party responsibility, helped to make that state one of the most lobbyist-ridden in the country.

As for Warren's liberalism, neither as District Attorney nor as Attorney General did he show any. He used his position to block the appointment of Max Radin, one of California's most brilliant jurists, to the Supreme Court, and gave no reason for so doing. It was well-known, however, that Radin's outspoken advocacy of the New Deal was anathema to Joe Knowland and the Republican hierarchy, who were already engaged in a red-baiting campaign, and Mr. Warren undoubtedly obliged.

During the same period, as a member of the State Water Power Authority, he cast the deciding vote against state assistance to the federal development of California's water resources, stating at the time that he was opposed to such federal activities on the grounds that they encroached upon the rights of private enterprise. As Governor, after the Central Valley Authority project was well under way, and had become extremely popular, he switched his position and gave some lip service to its efforts.

On another occasion, Warren issued a ruling that 13,000 American citizens, migratory workers on California farms, were not entitled to vote, on the grounds that they were transients and not real citizens in the true sense of the word even though they complied with the registration provisions of the election code. This ruling, fortunately, was reversed by the State Supreme Court, which reversal only added to the belief that Mr. Warren was a captive of the big interests, the Associated Farmers of California being among the largest of them.

It might be argued that only after he became Governor did he really start seeking liberal support, and that up to that time he was cast in his true role, that of

a reactionary Republican under the domination of the reactionary forces of the state.

When he became Governor, however, Warren began to talk like a liberal and he has been doing so ever since with such success that half the liberals in the state think he is on their side, and some of the Republicans are worried that perhaps he is. Their worry is needless.

On the matter of water power, while he was talking like a liberal in California, his state engineer, back in Washington, was testifying against the Central Valley Authority. His appointee to the Senate, William Knowland, was equally reactionary.

On public-utility rates, Warren has also been illiberal. Since the end of the war, many millions of dollars have been added to consumers' bills, without a whisper of objection from the Governor. Although every realist in politics knows the powerful pressures that are constantly put on public-utility commissions, there is no evidence that Warren has done what any really liberal governor should do, and vigilantly watched to see what was happening. It is characteristic—and disturbing—that when, shortly before election day in 1950, an increase in telephone rates was announced, it was hastily pigeon-holed by the Commission and brought up for approval about a year later.

While he has some friends among labor leaders, as is inevitable after 12 years in office, they have become fewer as his attitude has become clearer. He endorsed the Taft-Hartley Law. He refused either to sign or veto the state anti-hot-cargo bill, which denied labor the right to refuse to move products declared to have been produced under anti-labor conditions, and thereby permitted it to become law. He signed a bill protecting company unions; he helped repeal the pension amendment, passed by referendum in 1946 which, although defective in some administrative provisions, was nevertheless a vast improvement on the old statute; and he decontrolled rents in 1950 when the housing shortage was still acute. Although he professed to favor the State Crime Commission, he then suddenly reversed himself and let it die, just as he was entering upon a campaign for reelection. (Oddly enough, two of the five members of that Commission were directors of the Santa Anita race track.) After getting national liberal approval by fighting the loyalty oath for the University of California, he proceeded to obtain passage of a loyalty oath for *all* state employees.

Though he denounces race discrimination, he never really tried to get a Fair Employment Practices Act through the state legislature, and he declined to endorse such a measure as a referendum. He testified before

a Congressional Committee that the American-born Japanese were more dangerous than the alien generation, and it was only public pressure that made him retreat from his stand against permitting the return to California of members of this race who had been so brutally evacuated at the beginning of the war.

Not much can be said in defense of Mr. Warren as a liberal in action. Practically all the liberal or progressive legislation that has marked the history of California in the past few years, such as old-age pensions, expansion of workmen's compensation benefits, unemployment insurance, school bonds and the hospital and prison programs, has been thrust upon him, and none of it has emanated from any militant leadership on his part. Most of his voluntary excursions into the field of progressive legislation have begun and ended with paragraphs in his annual messages to the Legislature. He has been caught with his conscience showing on one or two occasions, such as the popular referendum on a state Fair Employment Practices Act, which he had recommended to the Legislature with the full knowledge that it would never get out of Committee, and which he refused to endorse when faced with it on the ballot. He took the same position on a public-housing referendum in 1948; and the anti-hot-cargo bill, already mentioned, which got to his desk only because his boys in the Senate were asleep, caught him quite unawares.

Warren has never fought militantly for a single piece of the progressive legislation that he has advocated. The best example of this is the compulsory-health-insurance bill which he sponsored, which has been bedeviling him ever since. When he first advocated this measure, there is no doubt that it was a popular issue; he would never have espoused it otherwise. When he discovered the hornet's nest that he had uncovered, he began to run for cover and had it conveniently killed in Committee. If he had taken the leadership in that fight and carried such leadership on a militant basis, there is no question but that he could have won. But the doctors and his other "advisers" persuaded him to abandon it, and as a result he is in the ridiculous position of being a reluctant champion of one of the most controversial issues in the country, with no real desire to carry the torch. If Warren has one outstanding characteristic, it is an allergy to controversy, and a strong distaste for crusading.

He is probably proudest of the fact that he has carried the state on a pay-as-you-go basis, a policy that has delighted the Chamber of Commerce and resulted in stagnation to a state building program supposed to meet the needs of an area that has grown faster than any com-

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parable one in the history of the country. It took five years, after the war, before he was willing to recommend a school-bond issue, in spite of the fact that the state's population had grown almost 40 percent in the years during the war. Roads, prisons, hospitals and all other necessary facilities of government are the victims of this reactionary policy; and as a result California is today operating under the largest budget of any state in the union and is probably farthest behind in the race to meet its needs.

All this being true, why is it that Warren can carry the state with such enormous majorities? The answer is reasonably simple; you can find its parallel throughout the history of our country.

In the first place, political parties are increasingly impotent, and leadership therefore depends more and more upon an outstanding individual in whom the people have great faith, or upon barrels of money used to manufacture such faith. There has been no such money for anyone else and no other such individual in California since Warren took office in 1943.

In the second place, at least 90 percent of the California newspapers are Republican and aggressively pro-Warren.

Third, California, since Warren became Governor, has grown in population and wealth far beyond the dreams of all the local Chambers of Commerce rolled into one. Money has poured into the State Treasury year after year, economic pressures have been practically non-existent—the Korean War having nipped an incipient one in the bud—and the people have been enjoying a prosperity and a sense of security reminiscent of the halcyon period that elected two of America's most mediocre Presidents. Things have been wonderful in

California and there has been no reason for a change. Why rock the boat? "This guy Warren is all right. He's honest, he's a fine family man, he'd like to do a few more things for us but that lousy legislature and those crooked lobbyists won't let him." So goes the popular feeling, and Warren, like Coolidge, or perhaps even more like Hoover, rides in on the wave. He could be Governor of California just as long as prosperity, his health and party impotency continue.

If, then, Warren is nominated, what kind of a candidate will he make? In many ways, the most ideal one the Republican Party can dig up to beat a scandal-ridden Democratic Administration, especially if the charge is true that it has grown soft and arrogant after 20 years in power.

Warren is of mediocre intelligence, non-controversial and fantastically successful at the polls. He is philosophically adjustable to any given situation, speaks progressively, acts conservatively and takes advice and guidance willingly. Given competent men to write his speeches and shrewd men to do his thinking, he will constitute the Democrats' most formidable opponent. He will, if permitted, conduct a gentlemanly campaign which will confound his enemies, create little animosity and less enthusiasm.

If elected President, he will appoint as his aides the most respectable men in his party, a majority of them competent, and will permit them to run the show for him. He will try to continue the present foreign policy much as it is; if it works, and if prosperity continues throughout the nation, he will be almost unbeatable in 1956.

He is just what the doctor ordered for the Republican Party and if they should pass him up, they are missing a real bet.

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Regional Oral History Office

Earl Warren Oral History Project

James Roosevelt

CAMPAIGNING FOR GOVERNOR AGAINST EARL WARREN, 1950

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry



James Roosevelt

James Roosevelt — FDR's Last Surviving Child

Los Angeles Times

Newport Beach

James Roosevelt, 83, eldest son of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and a former Los Angeles congressman, mayoral candidate and U.N. delegate who survived several controversial business and political endeavors, died yesterday at his home in Newport Beach.

Mr. Roosevelt, FDR's last surviving child, was under the care of a private physician and died of natural causes, according to the Orange County Coroner's Office.

Mr. Roosevelt did not seek elective office until after he had worked in jobs ranging from laborer in a Canadian paper mill in 1926 to Boston insurance salesman in 1937 and Hollywood movie mogul.

Mr. Roosevelt became state

Democratic Party chairman in 1946 but lost the post after attempting unsuccessfully to persuade Dwight D. Eisenhower to oppose President Harry S. Truman for the 1948 Democratic presidential nomination.

Mr. Roosevelt was active in fund-raising efforts to restore President Roosevelt's yacht, the Potomac, which was rescued some years ago by the Port of Oakland. He served as chairman of the board of the Association for the Restoration of the Presidential Yacht Potomac.

While serving as congressman from Beverly Hills from 1955 to 1966, Mr. Roosevelt unsuccessfully ran for mayor of Los Angeles in 1965 against Sam Yorty.

Throughout his multiple, colorful careers, Mr. Roosevelt's political and business clout came under intense scrutiny.

For example, after making 200 speeches and managing his father's 1932 presidential campaign in Massachusetts, Mr. Roosevelt, who was then a junior at Harvard, became a key figure in parcelling out federal jobs to supporters and was dubbed "czar of Massachusetts patronage" by Time magazine.

Later, while serving as U.S. ambassador to UNESCO, Mr. Roosevelt became a vice president and director of Investors Overseas Services, a company in Switzerland that collapsed amid fraud charges against some of his associates, including fugitive Robert L. Vesco and Bernard Cornfeld.

The Securities and Exchange Commission dismissed a lawsuit against Mr. Roosevelt after he signed a 1973 court order pledging not to violate securities laws. He acknowledged no wrongdoing.

In 1969, Mr. Roosevelt's third wife, Gladys Irene Owens, stabbed him during a violent argument at their Geneva home.

In 1987, Mr. Roosevelt traveled to Capitol Hill to defend his 1.8 million-member National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare. The organization allegedly used "scare tactics" to solicit millions of dollars by mail from the elderly, but Mr. Roosevelt defended it, saying: "Our cause is a good one; our methods are honest."

Mr. Roosevelt stirred resentment among Democratic Party loyalists by heading Democrats for Richard Nixon in 1972 and endorsing Ronald Reagan in 1984.

Mr. Roosevelt leaves his fourth wife, Mary, and seven children.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Date of Interview: Monday, August 7; Tuesday, August 8; and Thursday, August 10, 1972.

Place of Interview: In Mr. Roosevelt's office, Beverly Hills, California

Those Present: Mr. Roosevelt and the interviewer

In August of 1945 James Roosevelt, returned from the war, chose California for his political base. After a brief interlude with the film industry, he took up his pre-war insurance brokerage as his main economic activity and, in rapid succession, first headed an intellectual-artistic-political action group (the Hollywood Interculture Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions), then became California's Democratic National Committeeman, and, in 1950, ran against third-term Earle Warren for governor. Like others before him, he was beaten, leaving it for historians to ponder whether any Democrat could ever have cracked the iron-clad fusion of Warren's non-partisan coalition in his gubernatorial races. (Although registered Republicans numbered in the minority, the cross-filing procedure then in effect filled state ballot boxes with Democratic votes for Warren in the primaries.) Four years before Roosevelt's challenge Warren had actually won both party primaries, a feat reducing the general election to a ritual of inevitability. The gregarious son of the late president at least won his own party's nomination in 1952, and two years later he bettered that record by gaining the twenty-sixth district's congressional seat, which he held for eleven and one-half years.

This interview focuses on those California years before Roosevelt went to "the Hill" and before his former rival donned judicial robes and took his seat three blocks away as Chief Justice of the United States.

A final, fourth session with James Roosevelt was agreed to, one that would cover those Washington years and the corresponding period of rising Democratic activity in California. An exceptionally well-qualified interviewer at UCLA had generously volunteered his time and expertise to tape that session, but the progress of his own research soon had him scrambling against a deadline for completion of his manuscript on that era. Regretfully, all agreed that the Congressional career of James Roosevelt must go unrecorded--temporarily, we hoped.

In the meantime, the present interviewer had picked up a sidelight to Roosevelt's Washington years from no less than the then-retired Chief Justice. During lunchtime conversation in Earl Warren's chambers, he recalled that, even though he had come close to winning the Democratic nomination again in the primaries against "Jimmy," the Republican non-partisan did not dare to rest on those votes for what looked like (and was) a shoo-in victory in November. He continued a hard campaign. But a very few years later, it was different, he said.

Warren motioned out the window toward the capitol, the scene of some of his toughest battles when he was Chief Justice. There, he said, when Congressional criticism arose, Jimmy always came to his defense--even when few others from the California delegation did, even when there was no political gain in it for Jimmy, and even when, he supposed, no one had asked for his support. He had always felt warm toward the former rival for office, he said, breaking off with a laugh and adding that Jimmy gave him the third term as governor because his strategies during the campaign were so ill-conceived. "He couldn't have helped us more!" was the gist of Warren's thumbnail election analysis.

In the interview, James Roosevelt comes close to echoing the the Chief Justice's appraisal.

The interview was held in Roosevelt's informal and spacious suite of offices in Beverly Hills, California. He had received a chronology of news stories on the 1950 campaign but had had little time to study it; this was in the late summer of the Nixon-McGovern presidential campaign and Roosevelt had just made the decision (but not the announcement) to lend his name and support to Democrats for Nixon.* His telephone rang often, and many of

*According to the interviewer's notes, taken down immediately after the interview, Mr. Roosevelt explained the reasons for his decision to jump party lines, some of which were carried in news stories later in the campaign. In essence, he noted that McGovern had bumbled his campaign and could well bumble the presidency, which would be ruinous for the Democratic party. "I'm not so sure the Democrats deserve to win [with McGovern]," he said. He and McGovern had both been in the Congressional Democratic study committee, where McGovern often made ringing liberal statements in committee but did not carry through on the floor, paradoxical behavior that happened repeatedly, he said.

Furthermore, Nixon had taken positions that a Democratic president could not take and survive politically--like his visit to the Peoples' Republic of China. Roosevelt felt it was better

the calls he had to take, but he was able to jump back and forth between 1950 and 1972 with enviable mental agility.

Now that he was near the age of his famous father in his last years, James Roosevelt's physical resemblance to the president of 1944 was marked. The instantly recognizable Roosevelt smile could still fill a ballot box; and reminiscent of FDR's fielding reporters' questions was his son's handling of some interview queries: a barely detectible current of self-protection underlay our friendly and informal conversation. Yet the amount of recall that he exhibits here would indicate that he tried sincerely to answer all the questions, in spite of interruptions and his limited preparation beforehand. He was affable, hospitable, and always apologetic when a call intervened. His letter the previous week had assured us, "I look forward to being of as much help to you as I possible can," and he was.

By the time we agreed to forego recording the fourth session and continue with the emendation and correction process, he was moving most of his operations to the Newport Beach-Corona del Mar area. The transcript was sent to him early in 1975, and although it arrived at a time when his schedule was admittedly more hectic than usual, he returned it by the end of the year with corrections noted on those passages of which we were not sure.

In the meantime, transcripts from others in his campaign--Florence ("Susie") Clifton, Langdon Post, and George Outland--were also in the finishing stages, and their papers provided the

for the Democrats to "set up the pressures" so that President Nixon would have to continue to make relatively liberal decisions, rather than to have a disastrous Democratic administration in office. So, he said, "some of us will support Nixon and be in a position of influence after he wins." And what about the old axiom that, in politics, influence comes with favors yet to be granted, not past aid? Roosevelt answered that he saw Nixon as very sensitive to his role in history (this was several months before the revelation of the White House tapes that did, indeed, prove Roosevelt's assessment) and that Nixon would do anything to go down in history as a president who did "all the right things." And, Roosevelt added, those things are liberal things. Looking over all the issues on which Nixon is likely to take action--welfare reform and ending the Vietnam War were among those he ticked off--about all the liberals might lose is a more effective tax reform, he said, adding, "But we will get something." In welfare reform, Nixon could probably get it easier than a Democratic president. Roosevelt felt that efforts should be made to assure a Democratic senate and house, and that Democratic campaign funds should be channeled into those races. A. R. Fry.

relevant material appended to Roosevelt's interview, in lieu of his own papers, which are deposited in Hyde Park, New York.

Here, then, is James Roosevelt's story of himself as liberal Democratic leader and gubernatorial candidate in California.

Amelia R. Fry, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

28 February 1977
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

From Who's Who in America, 38th edition, 1975-1976

ROOSEVELT, JAMES, financial cons.; b. N.Y.C., Dec. 23, 1907; s. Franklin Delano (31st pres. U.S.) and Anna Eleanor (Roosevelt) R.; grad. Groton Sch., 1926, Harvard, 1930; m. 2d, Romelle Schneider (div. 1955); 3 children; m. 3d, Gladys Irene Owens, July 9, 1956 (div. Sept. 1969); 1 son, Hall Delano; m. 4th, Mary Lena Winskill, Oct. 3, 1969; 1 dau., Rebecca Mary. Ins. Broker, 1930; organizer Roosevelt & Sargent, Inc., Boston, pres. until 1937, resigned 1938; in motion picture industry, 1938-40; reentered Roosevelt & Sargent, Inc. as exec. v.p. establishing west coast office, 1946; pres. James Roosevelt & Co.; mem. 84th-89th Congresses, 26th Cal. Dist.; U.S. rep. to UNESCO-SOC 1965-66; pres. I.O.S. Mgmt. Co., 1966-70, financial cons., 1970—; pres. IOS Devel. Co. Ltd. Democratic nat. committeeman, 1948-52; Democratic candidate for gov. Cal., 1950. Pres. Eleanor Roosevelt Cancer Found.; bd. dirs. Nat. Found. Served from capt. to col., USMCR, 1940-45; brig. gen. Res. ret. Decorated Navy Cross, Silver Star. Clubs: Metropolitan, Harvard (N.Y.C.). Author: Affectionately, F.D.R., 1959. Home: 27 Point Loma Dr Corona Del Mar CA 92625 Office: 321 S Beverly Dr Beverly Hills CA 90212

I 1945-1950, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND NATIONAL COMMITTEEMAN
(Date of Interview--7 August 1972)

General Evans Carlson: Mao Militarist and
California Politician

Fry: All right, why don't we start with when you re-
turned from the Marines? That was in 1945.

Roosevelt: Yes, that's right. I came back and was discharged
on October of 1945.

Fry: I wonder if the reason you became head of the Demo-
cratic State Central Committee so fast was partly
because Colonel Evans Carlson, under whom you were a
lieutenant colonel, was also being considered for
governor at about the same time (in 1946 early,
according to Bob Kenny's autobiography).*

Roosevelt: Well, actually Colonel Carlson (well, he was then
General Carlson at the end of the war) had been very
badly shot up in the Okinawa campaign and was in the
naval hospital at San Diego, and there was talk of
his running for political office, but it was more
as a tribute to him as a war hero. He was married
to a lady who was frankly and openly a member of
the Communist party. As soon as this became known
(and it became known that his political views were
not very different from hers) the whole idea of his
becoming a Democratic candidate never was seriously
considered by anybody. Actually I think in the
election of 1948 he ran as a Communist candidate,
an official Communist candidate; I thought he was
nominated for the United States Senate. I think he
died in 1949.

*My First Forty Years in California Politics: 1922-
1962, Robert W. Kenny [n.d. ca. 1968], photocopy.
Copy in The Bancroft Library.

Fry: Yes, I think he died very early shortly after this.

Roosevelt: So it must have been the election of 1946 or 1948.

Fry: It could have been 1946. Kenny's biography says that he died within the year of 1946.

Roosevelt: Well, that's probably correct and in which case he was the Communist candidate for the United States Senate in that year, to the best of my recollection. So, I think it would be erroneous to say that he was really ever considered to be a candidate on the Democratic ticket.

Fry: And this was the famous Carlson's Raiders that you had both been in in the Marines?

Roosevelt: Yes. I was General Carlson's executive officer in the Second Marine Raider Battalion and then in 1943 I came back and organized the Fourth Marine Raider Battalion, of which I was the commanding officer. So of course we had considerably continuous contact all during those years, and I admired General Carlson tremendously, not only for much of his political philosophy, which I considered to be a human philosophy, but because of his leadership qualities, which were very great. He had little or no regard for the hierarchy in the Navy Department and to a lesser degree in the Marine Corps at times, but he was a close friend of my father and they corresponded quite frequently. There was considerable jealousy on the part of Marine Corps officers because of his ability (I think frankly sometimes through the President's intervention) to get different ideas and better equipment for his men from the naval establishments.

Fry: What do you mean different ideas?

Roosevelt: Well the whole concept of fire power in guerilla tactics was adopted by the Marine Corps eventually and really started with General Carlson. He in turn acquired these tactics by observation when he was an observer sent by the Navy Department to accompany the Eighth Group Communist Army in China when they were fighting the Japanese. And he became a great believer and a great admirer and, of course, became well-acquainted with the men who are now the leaders of Communist China.

Fry: You mean like Mao Tse Tung?

Roosevelt: Like Mao. And Edgar Snow for instance was a great friend of General Carlson's. As a result of this he also adopted--I wouldn't call them communist ideas but I would call them the best of the democratic ideals as applied to contemporary politics.

For instance, when we recruited men for the Raider battalions--and they were all volunteers--he would always say to them, "I don't want a man who doesn't know why he's fighting and what he's fighting for." And the battalion under his leadership, and later on the regiment, tried to indoctrinate that into every man; that you could not be a good fighter unless you believed in something, and knew what you believed in, and why. So, he would hold seminars in the battalion.

Once a week we would have a discussion of particular subjects of contemporary interest, the pros and cons. And then we would take a vote on it at the end. For instance, you may remember that there was a proposal during the war that no one should earn more than \$25,000 a year because there had been a revelation that some of the railroad presidents were making better than \$100,000. Everybody else had price controls and wage controls and so the proposal had been made that everybody be restricted, during the war, to not more than \$25,000.

We debated this issue one afternoon or one evening and the vote ended up about ninety-nine to one against the proposal, on the ground that these men, who all came from not poor necessarily, but low income families, who were all young, all said, "We never want the opportunity of a young man in America to be proscribed and therefore we will not vote for this, even in wartime." And this shook General Carlson very much because he felt that it was an equitable thing to do in wartime, and he was rather shaken that the young people in the battalion wouldn't go along with it.

Fry: How interesting though that he learned his tactics under Mao, whose own methods are just now becoming known to us.

Roosevelt: That's true, but the whole success of the Raider battalions was built on these methods and carried to the point. For instance where the dislike was of most of the then Marine Corps ideas and simply the brass, we for instance made no differentiation between the officer and the men. The officers got into the chow line with the men; the officers didn't have a separate chow line. The officer had to sleep in exactly the same conditions as the men; they were not allowed to have tents when the men didn't have tents. We had to undertake to do everything that the men had to do. The men weren't sent off with the petty officers to go on a march; the officers, all of the officers had to participate exactly as the men.

There were practically no privileges for an officer over what was granted to the men. There was a belief of some of the Marine Corps brass that the discipline couldn't be tough enough. But Carlson always said, "You never can enforce discipline unless the men believe in you and as an officer. And the way to make them believe in you is that you share everything that the men share. Then they will be happy to follow your leadership because you will have demonstrated it." And that's the only way to have leadership in wartime in the disagreeable conditions that we had to live through in the South Pacific.

Fry: Did he also have the rules of behavior for his men? Mao developed some rules--I think there were seven rules and ten principles or something like that--such as you never take anything from anyone whom you conquer in the countryside without paying for it. There were a number like that.

Roosevelt: Yes. Without spelling it out quite that way he got this across. For instance, when we occupied Makin Island in the indoctrination period before we made the raid, the great emphasis was laid upon the treatment we must give to the native islanders whom we knew lived on the island, and this was carried out so well that when we finally left the island and left seven or eight men behind, the islanders tried to protect these men from the Japanese. The fact that they were not finally successful was not the natives' fault; they were completely won over to our side by

Roosevelt: the treatment that they got from the Marines in contrast to the treatment they were getting from the Japanese.

Fry: When you and he both returned and both were in California, how did this begin so that you became so active in civilian political matters?

Roosevelt: I would say that it had no connection at all. Colonel Carlson went to live in Northern California, and his devoted political followers as against his military group were much more to the left than I was at that time. We were not really ever closely allied in a political way at all.

Becoming State Democratic Chairman: The 1946 Election

Fry: What did you first do to lead, then, into the chairmanship of the Democratic party?

Roosevelt: Well, I guess I had a natural interest in politics, and because of this and because of the difficult times that the Democratic party was having in California in those days, it seemed like a good opportunity to do a public service by getting into politics, and I was able to do it on two fronts: one, to work within the Democratic Party itself; and I became a member of the Democratic Central Committee and was elected to that. And then from that somehow I naturally progressed into the state level. When the chairmanship came to the south, that was when I was elected chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee in 1946. Of course I want to point out at the same time I was working with another group who were known, I can't exactly remember the name for it, committee for the arts, sciences and professions.

Fry: It's HICCASP. [Hollywood Interculture Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions.]

Roosevelt: Yes. It sounded like a hiccup. But it was largely made up of people in the artistic professions: actors, some producers perhaps, but mostly actors and members of the actors' guild and people generally in the arts. And we had some rather interesting members in those days. Ronald Reagan was one of our members.

- Roosevelt: Olivia deHavilland was one of our members. I understand that Mr. Reagan says that I misled him into joining the group, that he didn't really believe that he ever would have joined if he hadn't been misled at that time, which is rather interesting because at that time he was a Democrat. It's too bad he was misled. I would prefer to think he was not misled but that he was more liberal in those days than he later found it convenient to be.
- Fry: Didn't he have other liberal activities in those days?
- Roosevelt: Yes, as you remember he became president of the Screen Actors' Guild, and therefore was quite liberal.
- Fry: So you were saying that the Democrats were not in good shape and you had become state chairman of--
- Roosevelt: I really think it was sort of a vacuum more than anything else. The Democratic party was quite in disarray and the people who were seeking public office such as former Governor [Edmund G.] Brown [running for attorney general] were not really running as Democrats anymore, and there was a tight control over the Democratic party at that time by the so-called conservative wing of the party. It was an effort on our part to break that on the theory that this was really an alliance with the Republican party and that the Democratic party would never be an effective opposition party to the then-dominant Republican party until we made a difference between Republicans and Democrats.
- Fry: That year of 1946, how was Bob Kenny selected to run for governor? We have stories of the meeting held about March 4 in San Francisco for the selection, where there were others who were being considered for governor, as well as other statewide posts.
- Roosevelt: Well, I think again that Bob Kenny was the best known and at that time he was a definite liberal, but at the same time there was a vacuum and no one else really wanted to run as an out-and-out Democrat beyond any question.
- Fry: What about Oliver Carter? Did he want to run?
- Roosevelt: I think he was talked about. I always felt that Judge Carter was a fine man but that he never really had a taste for wanting to run for a statewide office.

Roosevelt: I think his heart was set on the judiciary.

Fry: Even that early?

Roosevelt: Even that early, and that he wanted to be an important enough figure to deserve judicial appointment; but at the same time I really don't think his heart was into running for statewide office.

The "Warren Party"

Fry: How was Warren's strength assessed then by you and the other Democrats?

Roosevelt: We all knew that he was a master politician and that he had succeeded in building what might be called a "Warren party," which included enough of the Republican party (who were not always united behind him as I'm sure would be evident from newspapers and other things of that time) but I think that he attracted liberal elements of the Democratic party. He convinced the conservative elements of the Democratic party that certainly he was preferable over any other Democrat they could think of, and he really built a Warren party straight across the board.

And of course he was helped at that time by the fact that we had what was known as cross-filing in the state so that in those days you could pose as both a Democrat and a Republican and show how you had a foot in both camps and that you were the best of both. And he did it in a masterful way. He had a good public record. As you know he was the attorney general of the state and before that he had a good record. I believe he was the district attorney for his county, Alameda County. So that all in all, he was an effective governor without any question of it.

We all had to recognize him and know it. But of course in that period there was little doubt not only what I would call--let me put it this way: effective opposition to Warren was destroyed because of this tactic, which failed to bring to the attention of the great population of California the basic things that were not getting done and not being faced, which would become very serious problems later on.

Fry: Do you remember if his stand on health insurance, which created a lot of Republican doctors' opposition and some Democrats too, was anything that the Democrats could use in their campaign?

Roosevelt: Well we always used it in a slightly different way. We always felt that this was again a good example of his political mastery. He was for a much broader medical program than most of the doctors wanted to support, but he always very effectively saw to it that it never came to pass. At the last minute it would be held up by some kind of maneuvering, usually by Warren people in the legislature so that he never really lost in the ultimate support of the vast majority of the doctors, who I think were quietly informed that this was good politics but don't worry because it isn't going to happen. And it never did happen under Warren leadership at that time.

Fry: It was killed in committee and then it was put into study and so forth.

Roosevelt: They had a Republican legislature at that time, and it was always very hard to believe that if he had really wanted it he could not have gotten it out of the legislature because anything that he really wanted he usually got out of the legislature. So the suspicion was, let's say that he recognized it as a good political issue but he didn't want it discussed. And I think one should give him credit for the fact that he foresaw that something along these lines was certainly going to happen. So in that sense maybe he was ahead of his times; but he also was politically smart enough to not want it to happen until it was politically acceptable, and it was not then, except to a minority of the doctors.

Fry: Whitaker and Baxter were hired then by the doctors to fight this, which they did very effectively. Don't you think that this is a good indication that this was considered a very serious threat by the doctors?

Roosevelt: I think there's no question about it, that it was pretty well recognized that, once it was fully understood, it would have wide public support and that the best way at least to postpone it was to hire what I guess one would have to say was the best public relations firm available at that time, to keep the

Roosevelt: public from really understanding and prevent anything from happening to make it a reality.

Trying for a Democratic Coalition

Fry: I wanted to ask, too, about the Senate race in 1946 because my notes say that you were approached to run for the U.S. Senate against Bill Knowland in 1946 and you declined. Why did you decline?

Roosevelt: Who was the Democratic candidate in 1946?

Fry: Will Rogers, Jr.

Roosevelt: Well, primarily because I wanted to live in California. I had just come back from the war, and to pick up and move to Washington was a move that I didn't want to make at that time. I felt I had to rehabilitate myself into a good civilian position and stay put in a place where I really wanted to live the rest of my life, and that was California. To pick up and go to Washington was something that didn't appeal to me.

Fry: I think too that I picked up information from Who's Who that in this year you were moving back into an insurance business here. Is that right?

Roosevelt: I've always had an insurance company out here, and my partner died about this time so that I had to reorganize my business also. I think on your notes that you'll find that Governor Warren used the phrase that I was "unemployed," and in a sense he was right because I had always been self-employed in my own firm as I am today. I have always liked the freedom of being more or less self-employed. My experience at being employed by somebody else was not a very happy one.

Fry: While we're on this let's just go ahead to one more question on 1950 because in my research in the newspaper files, one of the San Francisco newspapers had printed a facsimile of the ballot with all of the governor candidates on it, and yours was the only one that didn't have an occupation listed on it. I also noticed that they had to reprint a lot of ballots

Fry: because they had you listed from some strange place in California that I've never heard of before, which had to be corrected. [Laughter] I wonder if you really didn't put down an occupation when you were vulnerable on that point, or if the newspaper had gotten hold of one of the few ballots that had a blank there?

Roosevelt: No, that year I did not register any occupation for the very simple reason that I felt that if I put myself down as a businessman I would have to go on explaining and be on the defensive as to what kind of a businessman I was. As you noted, later on in the campaign I was attacked as a businessman on the theory that the business that I conducted was the insurance business that was subject to attack, so they really contradicted themselves. I was and had been an insurance man most of my life, but when I wasn't an insurance man I had been in public service with my father as an official of the federal government. Therefore I felt that the honest thing to do was not to claim to be anything you hadn't clearly established as being easily understood by the people. And if they wanted to attack me as having no so-called profession, it was better than what most people were putting on the ballot, which was intended to look appealing to the public rather than revealing. So I just decided that the best thing to do was to be honest and to say nothing.

Fry: Let's go into your leadership in HICCASP. Can you give us the purpose of this organization? Was it primarily a political job for you?

Roosevelt: Yes, it was primarily an effort to get the more intellectual part of the community to join the general liberal objectives of the Democratic party. The basic society had been formed by a very famous sculptor. [Pause.] I'm going to have to ask your help on this. Oh, Joe Davidson. It had been started by him (whether it was started in 1944 or 1940 I'm not quite sure) to enlist the professional, intellectual, and artistic community for my father. And they had then started a West Coast branch which, when I came out (and I wasn't sure what I wanted to do immediately after leaving the Marine Corps) asked me if I would become the organizer for the West Coast. Frankly, I took this on as an interim job because it appealed to me idealistically and it gave me some income which I needed at that time, and so I decided to do this and enjoyed

Roosevelt: it very much. It did organize the liberal community in the arts, sciences, and professions to a very great degree, and people like Olivia deHavilland and others were very effective in their political work.

Fry: I'm going to ask you kind of a personal question: I wondered if your father's sudden death had any effect on your enthusiasm or determination for public service? Did it change it in any way?

Roosevelt: I think probably I would not have been so personally active if my father had still been president. In other words I don't think I would have run for public office so soon; I think I would have devoted much more of my time into working directly with him, if he had been alive at that time.

Fry: In the 1947-1948 movement for Henry Wallace and the Progressives, there emerged a number of factions in the Democratic party, as there always does [laughter], and I wondered if you could sort out what the main struggles were there? I'm going to read here some notes that I took as a background for this question. Newsweek said that your role as the Democratic head in California at that time was "trying to keep peace and bring some unity out of the Bob Kenny left wing and the [Ed] Pauley right wing." Then there's another theory that said, "It appears that the Progressive Citizens of America and the Americans for Democratic Action are struggling for leadership of the liberal wing of the Democratic party," and that you were extending your energies to keep peace between the two. Can you please draw me a picture on that?

Roosevelt: I could hardly be called a peacemaker! It was very clear that I was not at that time a very great follower of the so-called Pauley wing of the party, with which Mr. Mayock* was very closely associated. And I therefore felt that frankly there was an important place for leadership to try not to let the Democratic party be taken over by the ultra-conservative group.

At the same time, unfortunately there developed a split into the more radical or left-wing group, who also wanted to dominate the party, which meant that if they had been successful we'd drive the right wing

*Wellburn Mayock, running against Roosevelt in the primary.

Roosevelt: group out altogether. And therefore I felt there was a place for leadership with what I thought was the majority of the party who were neither very far left nor very far right. And it was that group primarily I felt, if we would come forward, that would be able to keep either of the extremes from governing the party or controlling the party, and at the same time not giving a total excuse for people to be driven out of the Democratic party, which I felt was wrong. Because, after all, my father's strength was a coalition right down the line, and I felt that we must try to keep alive that basic coalition. When you took a Jim Foley on one side and a Harold Ickes on the other side, you were bringing together pretty much both wings, and even Henry Wallace in those days was a part of the Democratic party.

Henry Wallace's Third Party

Fry: And then later a third party was formed, very shortly after that.

Roosevelt: Right, but built around Wallace's campaign for president I think, rather than state politics. I really don't think that it was followed up very strongly, let's say. It was followed up of course, but not very strongly by people leaving the Democratic party to join a third party, in California. Now there was on a national level the Wallace presidential effort, which a great many Democrats became very active in.

Fry: Well, Bob Kenny, who was still kind of a leader of the Democrats, even though he had been defeated for governor--

Roosevelt: Oh yes, right along. Very definitely.

Fry: --seemed to be a heavy Wallace supporter, but then he says* that he really opposed and would not even attend the meetings of the third party move of Wallace's. Is that one reason why the California Democrats didn't go along as strongly for the third party?

*Ibid.

Roosevelt: I think so, because I think that basically Bob Kenny was urging the Democrats to be more to the left than they seemed to be on a national basis, and he thought that by saying that what Wallace stood for was great and wonderful, he at the same time could advocate staying within the Democratic party and working within the Democratic party. So, as the record shows, he never became a spokesman for the Wallace for President movement in California.

Fry: What did you think of Wallace as a presidential candidate?

Roosevelt: I knew him very well and I respected him. I think he certainly contributed to my father's administration very effectively, but I think he was a somewhat uncertain individual who was not always too reliable. I really honestly myself feel that he had thought through all the positions that he took so that he could honestly say that they were practical in his time. And at the same time I do think he made a contribution by advancing ideas that needed to be worked on just as Norman Thomas advocated ideas that certainly contributed to the future development of the country. I even remember my father saying, "The only thing I stole was Norman Thomas' ideas and put them into practice," which he [Thomas] never could do. And I think that much of what Henry Wallace was talking about, the same thing has happened as with Norman Thomas, that Wallace didn't know how to apply them in a practical way. So that I greatly admired him. But that was one reason my father was not for his renomination as vice-president in 1944, Wallace's renomination.

Fry: What reason?

Roosevelt: That he felt that he was not able to apply a practical side to the idealistic ideals which he wanted to advocate, and that if Father had taken him on as vice-president there would have been some uncomfortable moments when Wallace was for something that my father wasn't ready to put into practice. Therefore, as you know, the shift was made to President Truman, or the later-to-be-President Truman.

Fry: It seems to me that years ago when I read Ickes' diary, I got the impression that Wallace was pretty

Fry: vociferous in cabinet meetings and so forth, is that right? So that here was a kind of a party theoretician who nevertheless insisted vociferously that certain things be done at certain times. Am I right on that?

Roosevelt: I haven't read that particular passage but my inclination would be to say that Wallace was always encouraged to speak out and that he was therefore a very valuable member of the cabinet even though his ideas were not always followed--perhaps I should say not followed as much as he would have liked it.

Fry: What steps did you take then to sort of counteract this move of splitting up and going to Wallace?

Democratic Overtures to Eisenhower, Not Truman

Roosevelt: I think in 1948, early, or late in 1947, I began to have the feeling that President Truman couldn't be re-elected (which just shows how wrong one can be) and along with some other liberal Democrats who foresaw that Wallace was probably going to run as a third party candidate, we felt that the Democrats needed a more popular figure to assure, or to have a real chance of, the Democratic ticket winning. Therefore some of us began to try to see whether General Eisenhower would consider himself as a Democrat because at that time he had refused to say whether he was a Republican or a Democrat.

No one really knew. But I had had, and my brother Elliott had had, many conversations with General Eisenhower. My brother Elliott was on his staff for some time. And I was convinced that General Eisenhower was obviously a good executive and that he certainly was a national hero, and if he became a Democrat and subject to the influence of the Democratic party that he would be an effective president. And I still feel that perhaps he would have been an effective president, far more effective than he was as a Republican. So, we began to see whether the party would possibly draft him and accept him.

Roosevelt:

When it became clear that General Eisenhower had decided to run as a Republican--he was, if you remember, opposed by Mr. Taft, and for a while there was quite a battle between them because a lot of people in the Republican party didn't think he was conservative enough. And I honestly don't believe he was that conservative at any point and he would not have been an ultra-conservative, let's say, as a Democrat. But anyway, when it became clear that he wouldn't accept and that President Truman's renomination was assured, of course we all pitched in as hard as we could for President Truman's election because we felt, certainly amongst the choices that the people had at that time, that Truman was clearly a better man than Wallace would be or than Eisenhower would be had he been captured by the conservative Republicans.

Fry:

Let me back up just a minute. In the notes here there are references to meetings that occurred in the movement to oppose Harry Truman's foreign policy. There's one here under the 1947 notes that says that your first position caused Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder to cancel his engagement to speak at the Democratic dinner; that was when there was an attempt made to bring pressure for the United States to abide by and use the United Nations in international relations. Did this concern primarily the U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey--the "Truman Doctrine"?

Roosevelt:

Yes, it did. And I think it was blown out of proportion altogether. It is true that Mr. Snyder did not like the position we took in California, which was in opposition to the Truman foreign policy at that time, but I think that that pretty much worked itself out at a later time.

Then, I think he was still then a congressman, John Condon; his position I think became untenable later on. One had to be somewhat realistic in politics and to compromise was obviously the proper thing at that time and generally was accepted by the vast majority of the Democrats concerned with that particular issue.

Fry:

It's not clear to me whether it was this feeling that Truman's foreign policy was going in the wrong direction, and that this led you and other Democrats

- Fry: to question whether he should run again, or whether this was brought up as a prime issue as a basis on which a new nominee could be brought in. How did this fit in?
- Roosevelt: No, I think it was one of the contributing factors to our thinking that Truman had lost his attractiveness as a presidential candidate, but I don't think it was by any means the sole thing. I think his inability to get things done prior to 1948 we felt would be very harmful to him in the election. Actually of course he turned it into a tremendous asset by attacking the Republican Congress as a "do-nothing Congress" and he made his opponent the Congress rather than anything else. So, I think it proved later that his political judgment was better than ours. But certainly the foreign policy issue or our differences on the foreign policy issue was one of the reasons why we felt that a new face, and particularly General Eisenhower, would be better for the Democratic party.
- Fry: I see. Have you interviewed for the Harry Truman project? Has someone been around with tape recorders to interview you yet?
- Roosevelt: Not yet.
- Fry: Well, then I'm going to go ahead and ask you what were the relations between you and Harry Truman after he became President?
- Roosevelt: When he was re-elected you mean?
- Fry: Well, after your father died and after you returned to California. I wondered how close you were to him as President?
- Roosevelt: Well, let's say in the initial period after I came back--when it became clear in 1947 that I was not particularly anxious to have him renominated, the relationship was not very cordial because I think he felt that we all should support him regardless of anything else. And I think that's understandable, completely understandable.

However, after his renomination I went to him and explained to him exactly what I've explained to you as to our reasons for seeking what we then felt would be a stronger candidate. I told him frankly

Roosevelt: I was sure that probably we were wrong and that we were going to support him now that he'd been renominated. And I think he never quite forgave any of us. He's not exactly a fully forgiving man, so that I doubt whether the relationship was ever as warm as it would have been had we not opposed him for the nomination in those early stages.

However, I would also like to say that whenever there was an opportunity to meet or discuss things with him, he was always completely cordial, and I have some wonderful correspondence with him that someday I suppose will be available to those that want to look at it. He was always objective and always friendly. He was never unfriendly in any sense of the word and I think I would have to say that he was a very broad, big man as far as his relationship with one who clearly opposed him at one stage.

Fry: However you didn't oppose him, as I understand it, for the first couple of years that you were back?

Roosevelt: Well, it wasn't very long. I came back in the end of 1945, and in 1946 I neither opposed him nor supported him and it really wasn't until 1947 that we became active in any way. So, it was a relatively short period that we were in opposition.

Fry: Well, if we roll on here, we have the campaign itself for Truman after the convention. By the way, I picked up one story, and I don't remember which of your Northern California campaign chairmen or managers gave it to me, but apparently there was a meeting in Chicago to which you were invited, about a possible other candidate besides Truman (Eisenhower being the one). As this was explained to me, either George Outland or Langdon Post was asked to go and I guess they couldn't go, and I think you finally did go. The reason I'm bringing this up is because I wondered what other Democrats within the party were present at the meeting to try to find a new candidate? Do you remember that Chicago meeting?

Roosevelt: Vaguely. I think there was such a meeting, but I think it became very clear at that meeting that there was no one else outside of General Eisenhower who had any chance of opposing President Truman. It was sort of a meeting to explore the situation, but it certainly reached no conclusion. Now as to who

Roosevelt: was present I frankly don't remember. But there was a great and rather broad section of quite liberal Democrats at that time and I'm sure if we went back into the newspapers of the time we could find those names without too much difficulty. Helen Gahagan Douglas, for instance, was one, and there were other members of the Congress who joined in that effort.

Fry: I think the main significance of this whole move for Eisenhower for us here today is not so much how it affected your relationship with Truman but how it affected your relationship with the Democrats within the state. This seemed to be where most of the wallop occurred then and caused problems in 1950.

I have a couple of questions about that. One is that because we were such a non-partisan state at that time and the parties weren't very strong (as you brought out in some of your 1950 campaigning) this left a vacuum in which interests rather than party usually determined lines of opposition. One of the difficulties for historians is to recreate which major interests were behind which candidate. For instance, it was oil interests that finally broke off and culminated in some opposition to Warren in 1952, the independent oil companies. I wondered where the different factions of Democrats were able to get their support. For instance, I don't fully understand Pauley's role in this. Did he represent a part of the oil industry or was this just an individual man, Ed Pauley, playing around with the Democrats?

Roosevelt: I would guess that Ed Pauley was very friendly with particularly the independent oil people in California and that he was their liaison with the Truman administration. As you remember, Mr. Truman nominated him as the assistant secretary of the navy and his nomination was later withdrawn, or Mr. Pauley withdrew, I don't remember which one. This was all due to the accusation that this was the back door method that the oil interests in California were using to be important factors in the Truman administration. I remember my mother vigorously opposing his nomination because she remembered very clearly the influence that the oil people had had in the so-called "teapot dome" scandals when the position of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy had been the place from which the scandal really evolved.

Fry: Your father?

Roosevelt: No, this was before my father was assistant secretary. This was in Harding's administration. And my father later was assistant secretary of the navy and re-created for himself the way in which the navy had become involved. My mother felt Pauley's appointment was dishonoring my father's whole antipathy to having the oil companies use the position of the assistant secretary of the navy for their purposes, and Ed Pauley's nomination therefore, not as an individual in any manner but --she feared it was a way in which the oil companies were going to exercise undue influence in the Truman administration. I think it's probably true that this was a faction of the Democratic party that was being used by some of the special interests that were generally known as the conservative wing of the party, Mr. Luckey [former state senator E. George Luckey] and others that belonged to this group.

Fry: I wanted to ask you more about Luckey because he seemed to be a number two man in the party in California.

Roosevelt: He was the vice-chairman of the party in California. He was representing the south at that time, in 1948, and he was a very independently wealthy person in his own right. He had interests, as I understood it, in the oil industries. He was a rancher in the Imperial Valley area of California. And we considered him to be very much of a conservative.

Fry: The Democrats had quite a coalition in those days!

Roosevelt: Oh yes. The thing was to get the coalition together. It was very difficult to do.

Fry: Where else was there money for the Democrats to use in a campaign? Bob Kenny complained of funds drying up when he was running for governor because everybody was paying attention to the senate race; in fact, every Democrat I've talked to complains of lack of money. Did you have some people who emerged (like Ben Swig--but that was later) who could make large, generous personal contributions and bring in a few from their friends--a Ben Swig of those days?

Roosevelt: I remember that there was (at least in my campaign) no one particular person. There were a number of people who work in the arts, sciences, and professions who

Roosevelt: made substantial contributions--from the entertainment area. And there were one or two business people who were quite well-to-do who made generous contributions, and there were some people in the Jewish community who made some generous contributions.

Fry: I think Susie Clifton mentioned to me that you had good support among the Jewish community in the south.

Roosevelt: Yes, they were very friendly. Of course, I still believe very strongly in the state of Israel.

Fry: And that was a very big question at the time.

Roosevelt: That's right.

Fry: Did you have better support from the Jewish community in the south than in the north?

Roosevelt: No, I think it was generally very good in both areas.

The Truman 1948 Campaign in California

Fry: What about the Truman campaign? It didn't really spend very much, according to my notes. Is that right?

Roosevelt: Well, I noticed in your notes that it quotes from Senator Luckey as saying that there was "no real campaign" for Truman in California. I would say that wasn't so. There was a real effort--now maybe there wasn't as much as they had hoped, but again if there wasn't as much as they had hoped, there were the Pauleys and the other people who obviously had money, and certainly more than \$35,000 they could have raised. From our end of it I know we raised more than that working for the Truman campaign and senate campaign in California. So, that there was a campaign in California. I think it gives a false impression to say that there was not an all-out effort to support Mr. Truman in the 1948 election. There was an all-out effort.

Fry: Did you campaign with Truman when he came to this state?

Roosevelt: Oh yes I campaigned. I have a picture somewhere of the two of us on the back end of a train coming down

Roosevelt: from Northern California. I've forgotten whether it was taken just outside of Los Angeles somewhere, but it was on that train trip that he made through California starting in the north and coming down south.

Fry: Did you make speeches for him?

Roosevelt: Oh yes. Very much so. We worked very hard for him. And I was the national committeeman then.

Fry: Right. So were you helping to organize his campaign as a front man before he came? [Laughter] I don't mean a front man--an advance man.

Roosevelt: He had his own organization that did the whistle stop arrangements all the way down. We merely traveled with him, which again illustrates that there wasn't this great estrangement that is talked about. We campaigned together and I campaigned on the train with him, and then of course on my own in different parts of the state as the national committeeman.

Fry: There was also a man who was another Democratic leader in Santa Clara County.

Roosevelt: Mr. McHenry. John McHenry.

Fry: Right, who was terribly upset about your backing Eisenhower.

Roosevelt: Yes, there were a number of people who were. And he never forgave me. He became quite a bitter opponent of mine and as far as I know he never did forgive me.

Fry: In 1948 was there talk of your being a vice-presidential candidate?

Roosevelt: I don't think it was very serious.

Fry: There was an article I read that said that you had just declined this possibility in January of that year.

Roosevelt: There's always somebody looking for a story and somebody was just looking for a story. It wasn't serious.

Fry: You don't remember ever seriously considering it or wanting to throw your hat in the ring?

- Roosevelt: I didn't want to throw it because I was a realist. The president selects his vice-president, and I was very sure Mr. Truman wasn't going to select me.
- Fry: Well, this was in January so I thought that maybe this was before too much had happened between you and Truman.
- Roosevelt: No, we had started--
- Fry: You already had criticized his foreign policy hadn't you?
- Roosevelt: We started in 1947. Yes.
- Fry: Unless he was interested in getting a coalition together and you could represent those who were disenchanted.
- Roosevelt: Let me say it this way: he never approached me on the subject in any way. And if he had, I think I would have easily convinced him that I was not the ideal candidate.
- Fry: I have a note here also that five days after that you called for all the Democrats to back Truman for re-election.
- Roosevelt: After the nomination.
- Fry: This was January 14, 1948.
- Roosevelt: I doubt it very much because we went to the convention in 1948 in opposition to him. We had already started that.
- Fry: But it was six or seven months later when you went to the convention. I'm trying to get a line here on when your opposition to Truman developed.
- Roosevelt: Well, probably it developed and I think the record will show that I did a lot of exploring in late 1947 but that it became active early in 1948.
- Fry: Can you place John Shelley for me, who was chairman of the California delegation to the Democratic convention?
- Roosevelt: Yes, John Shelley later became a Democratic congressman and he was a labor leader from Northern California.

- Roosevelt: I think he may have been the president of the AF of L in California at that time. He was a San Francisco Democratic leader and he vigorously supported President Truman, very much so. And he was the chairman of the delegation to the national convention.
- Fry: Well, the public statements that were made before the train left sound as though there was a split in the delegation but there was also a feeling that the delegation could be flexible, particularly after the first ballot.
- Roosevelt: Right. Very much so.
- Fry: Then the Southern California and the Northern California delegation trains met in Utah, and you all rode to Chicago together from that point. So here you were on the train with everybody, including John Shelley and Pat Brown and a number of others.
- Roosevelt: Yes.
- Fry: Now tell me what happened on the train. Was the split worse when you got to the convention or was it--
- Roosevelt: The train trip was rather tense because we were obviously vying for support for a possible new candidate at the convention without firmly having taken a position yet. And the Shelley group was firmly in support of President Truman and wanted to keep control of the delegation for him all the way through. So there were many meetings, many caucuses, many rumors, and some unhappiness amongst the personalities involved. This went on even in Chicago to some extent. But the fact of course was that in Chicago, in spite of the disagreements, I was elected national committeeman.
- Fry: Was that a later election where you managed to get a number of your people on the Democratic State Central Committee even after this occurred?
- Roosevelt: That was 1950.
- Fry: And you did manage to have a majority?
- Roosevelt: We had a majority, I think, later on. But that was not based upon anything to do with pro or anti President Truman in 1948; it was based more on the

DELEGATES STATEMENT OF PREFERENCE

(Section 2304 Elections Code)

DELEGATES STATEMENT

"I personally prefer Harry S. Truman as nominee of my political party for President of the United States, and hereby declare to the voters of my party in the State of California that if elected as delegate to their National party convention, I shall, to the best of my judgment and ability, support Harry S. Truman as nominee of my party for President of the United States.

And I hereby enroll myself in the expression of preference for Harry S. Truman for presidential nominee, as one of the group of the following named candidates for delegate:

Delegates at Large

Julian Beck
Edmund G. Brown
Tom Carrell
Henry I. Dockweiler
Mrs. Adah F. Dodge
Mrs. Elinor R. Heller
Harley Hise
Glad Hall Jones
Henry C. Maginn
John P. McEnery
Rollin McNitt
Culbert Olson
George Outland
Ed Riley
Will Rogers, Jr.
John F. Shelley

District Delegates

Mrs. Marjorie Aubrey
George Ballard
Mrs. Sylura Barron
Amerigo Bozzani
Mrs. Louise C. Brown
Allan Carter
Oliver J. Carter
Mrs. Gertrude V. Clark
Mrs. Florence M. Clifton
Mrs. Jessie Cullivan
Charles Dail
Roland C. Davis
Daniel F. Del Carlo

Helen Gahagan Douglas
Clyde Doyle
Francis Dunn, Jr.
John Anson Ford
Mrs. Lillian Ford
Monroe Friedman
Samuel W. Gardiner
Chet Holifield
Floyd A. Klinger
Mrs. Ruth Lybeck
William M. Malone
S. C. Masterson
Mrs. William McClaren
Patrick W. McDonough
Donald C. McMillan
Nathan B. McVay
Paul E. Mudgett
Kenneth Murphy
Mrs. Esther Murray
Iener W. Nielsen
Patrick H. Peabody
Mrs. Charles B. Porter
Mrs. Nettie Scott Riherd
James Roosevelt
Clayton Russell
Mrs. Beatrice Shilkroust
John G. Terry
Mrs. Edna Theiss
Vincent Thomas
Chauncey Tramutolo
James Walker
Louis Warshaw
Charles Wortham

Date February 24, 1948

Amerigo Bozzani
Signed

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of February, 1948.

(SEAL)

[Signature]
Notary Public (or other official)

Roosevelt: ideology of bringing the Democratic party forward as the liberal party of California.

Fry: For all the Democrats to rally around, hopefully.

Roosevelt: Right.

Fry: Okay. I think we've gotten up to the beginnings of your 1950 primary. Do you want to stop here and get back to your work today?

Roosevelt: I think probably we should stop.

II THE 1950 GUBERNATORIAL RACE AGAINST WARREN
(Date of Interview--8 August 1972)

Campaign Personnel

Fry: Why don't we just start out with your campaign workers, since you're holding that little blue sheet of notes in your hand? As I understand it, the big guns in your campaign were Susie [Florence McChesney] Clifton and Langdon Post and George Outland. Do you want to explain what their various positions were?

Roosevelt: The head of the campaign, of course, was George Outland. He was the overall campaign chairman. Then Langdon Post, together with his wife Midge Post, were in charge of the northern California effort. Susie Clifton was our chief campaign aide, particularly in southern California. And there were many others that took various positions, such as J. Ray Files who was the head of the advisory committee, which included a lot of businessmen and professional people.

The other one that I remember as chiefly working with us was a marvelous lady by the name of Gertrude Clark, who came from Feather Creek up in Northern California. And we devised a campaign technique of traveling by a sort of renovated bus which had a rear end platform like they used to have on the observation trains. Then we would pretty much live inside the bus as we traveled from place to place and reviewed what had been said and the reactions at the last meeting and the kinds of people and issues that should be discussed at the next stop, which was usually some ten or fifteen miles down the road. Mrs. Clark was a combination hostess and sort of general manager of the bus--not in the technical sense; she didn't do the driving, we had a professional driver. But she saw to it that we had sandwiches and that generally everything worked well. Then she and Mrs. Post and the Post children

- Roosevelt: and anybody else who happened to be along at these various stops would go out in the crowd and pass out the printed material, and generally try to sound out the reactions to the things as we moved along.
- Fry: Oh I see. Was Mrs. Clark a recognized leader in some Democratic circles?
- Roosevelt: I think she was chairman of her county committee at that time. And she was a recognized Northern California Democratic party leader. She's still alive by the way. She's really a remarkable, lovely person.
- Fry: Someone else described her to me as a sort of den mother of the whole campaign.
- Roosevelt: That's probably a good description, but she was really revered more than that. She was a wonderful campaign aide, and she knew people in all kinds of places and so her contacts went well beyond the den.

Then of course there were other people from time to time. Like Monroe Friedman, up north. George Miller, once he became the lieutenant governor candidate and won the primary, he joined us on a good many of these tours on the bus. And other people like Harold Lane who was a field man for Chet Holifield, and also Chet Holifield, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Wortham. I think if my memory is correct that this was my first contact with Ed Roybal, who was sort of an advisor and helped us in organizing the Democratic Mexican-American group. Then, Lisa Bronson--

- Fry: Excuse me, on Roybal this is sort of interesting because it was such an early effort to organize Mexican-Americans.
- Roosevelt: Yes, but one had to remember that in Los Angeles particularly there was definitely a part of the community in Los Angeles that was predominantly Mexican-American. Even in those days there was a Mexican-American radio facility that one could reach far more Mexican-Americans than if you relied on the normal media to reach them. So quite an effort was made in this direction, and Ed Roybal's advice was certainly very helpful.
- Fry: Was he a candidate from that area at one time?

- Roosevelt: I don't remember if he was a candidate himself at that time or not. Vaguely I have a feeling that he was a candidate for either city council or a city council member at that time. But I'd have to look that up to be sure.
- Fry: Was he Mexican-American?
- Roosevelt: Yes, he was considered a part of the Mexican-American community.
- Fry: You can't tell by his name.
- Roosevelt: That's right. There were others of course. The head of publicity in the beginning of the campaign was Hank Reese, who later on kind of faded out of the picture and pretty much was replaced by Mr. Russell Birdwell, who was a very well-known publicist of his time.
- Fry: Why did Hank Reese resign?
- Roosevelt: If I remember, Hank resigned primarily for personality reasons within the campaign itself. There were no really hard feelings out of it. It was more that he was not in too good health and as I remember it, it was just too much to expect him to carry the whole load, and so he passed on the baton to Russell Birdwell. And also, Hank was an individualist. He didn't work too well with anybody else and therefrom grew out some personality problems. But he was a very, very good man in his field. I've always remembered him with great affection because he did a very good job.

Russell Birdwell on the other hand was what I would call a rather flamboyant type of person, who always felt that we should be looking for the spectacular. For every idea that we adopted that he put forward, I suppose we must have turned down ninety-nine.

Public Relations

- Roosevelt: They were all--I can't remember specifically the ones we turned down--but they were all as I say rather

Roosevelt: spectacular moves which most of us, and I think all of us finally, felt that while they might have attracted greater attention and created considerable controversy, they just were not basically sound and therefore would put us in the position of letting the opposition ridicule us and we were against it.

On the other hand he did come up with one program which we used and which became a major part of our effort, which had to do with the proposal to revamp the civil defense structure and work out plans to evacuate the population in the larger population areas on an emergency basis, and prepare emergency habitation and facilities for them in case of atomic attack. This was, of course, you must remember, a time when atomic warfare was quite new and it was a very frightening prospect and we were still close to Hiroshima and the results of that. As a result this was a natural thing in a state campaign because at that time there was no recognition of a federal responsibility, it was primarily a state responsibility. Later on it merged into sort of a joint effort. But at this time it was primarily a state responsibility.

Fry: This was right after the Korean War broke out when he came up with it, according to the newspapers; and everyone did have a case of the jitters. In October China entered the Korean conflict, which made most of us feel that it could even involve Russia and that an atomic attack was a possibility.

Roosevelt: Yes, I think that's true. It was obviously very topical material for a campaign issue. It involved and lent itself of course to ridicule by Governor Warren, who felt that we were building up people's fears and playing on their fears and that our plans were wholly impractical. Of course no one ever put them into practice although parts of it became pretty much accepted: we built shelters if you remember for a while, and we had to stockpile foods, and we marked public shelters in different places. The part of the program that required the evacuation of large parts of the population frankly was never adopted and certainly in our day today with our means of transportation it probably would be completely impossible. We'd all die on the freeways or the other byways. I just think that evacuation with the public facilities available in California is a practical impossibility now.

Fry: What were the "open cities" that were referred to in the newspaper stories?

Roosevelt: The open cities, as I remember it (and it's a little hazy in my mind) was basically a concept of announcing that certain areas would have in them only civilians and appealing therefore to the enemy to recognize that any attack on these open cities, far away from any industrial or military objective, would be unconscionable and therefore would be relatively safe areas for people to flee to.

The further concept was that if you were going to have large movements of population you in essence had to declare them and ask that the world recognize them as open cities, where people would be only temporarily put and that they were in essence civilian refugee places. You would hope that, just as frequently in warfare cities have been declared to be open cities to protect them, like the Vatican in World War II and places of historical importance, the same theory here was that this was such a humanitarian appeal that it might be respected.

Fry: And the response to this was--?

Roosevelt: The response from Governor Warren was what one politically would expect, which was one of ridicule, simply saying that it was totally impractical to move these numbers of people and that therefore it really wasn't worth discussing from his point of view. And by treating it as a ridiculous suggestion and really refusing to comment on it seriously, he hoped that it would lose any liability as a strong campaign issue. And he was successful.

Fry: Did Mr. Birdwell stay with your campaign until the end?

Roosevelt: Yes, he stayed with it until the end. He was recommended to us from one of the people that had been one of our financial money raisers, a man by the name of Cornelius Vanderbilt III, who was a rather well-known character and an interesting person in many ways. That's how the introduction came about.

Fry: So, I guess it would have been a little bit embarrassing or awkward if you hadn't hired him, wouldn't it?

- Roosevelt: No, not necessarily. We were frankly looking for somebody at that point. And I think we generally recognized that the issues that had made good sense in the primary campaign needed to be replaced with something new for the final campaign because the important thing to remember is that we were running against Governor Warren for a long period of time, in essence from January through to November.
- Fry: You were sure enough of your nomination from the beginning?
- Roosevelt: No, we were very doubtful in the beginning that we could defeat Governor Warren in the Democratic primary.
- Fry: I mean from other Democrats you didn't have any other real threats?
- Roosevelt: Not so much from other Democrats, no. But from Governor Warren, who cross-filed; we were told very frankly that there was a strong possibility that Governor Warren would succeed, as he had succeeded in the past, in winning both primaries.
- Fry: Do you want to mention your own cross-filing?
- Roosevelt: There was some criticism of us at that time because we had attacked the cross-filing system (and steadily continued to attack it until it finally was eliminated) but we decided that we should also cross-file, that being the law of the state at that time, and if one is going to play a game one should play it by the rules of the game. It does not mean that you have agreed not to change the rules if some of them are impractical or wrong in principle, and therefore while we played by the rules of the game we did advocate and continued to advocate a change of the rules.
- Fry: On Susie Clifton, Langdon Post, and George Outland: could you tell us more about how you found them? Why they were selected to be the major ones?
- Roosevelt: Well, Susie Clifton of course was a recognized party leader in Southern California with a great many contacts in Northern California. We had sort of agreed in our basic beliefs and as a result it was just something natural that occurred. I don't know how better to explain it to you.

Roosevelt: George Outland had been a member of Congress, and he was a recognized leader also, primarily because he had been a member of Congress and he was recognized as a liberal leader in the party throughout the state. He was sort of a natural over-all chairman for us.

Langdon Post was an old family friend. He had served with Mayor LaGuardia in New York in his administration. He had been the West Coast head of federal housing during the war. He had been a longtime personal friend of my father, so that when I came back we looked each other up and he was living in San Francisco and it was somebody that I knew and I could trust. He believed in the same things I did and he was intensely interested in political matters and this fitted into what he wanted to do. Now part of the problems of his selection was that he was not very friendly with the leader of the San Francisco forces of that day, Bill Malone, and there was a deal of friction with Bill Malone because of Langdon Post's selection. They were not ideologically close. They opposed each other for control of the San Francisco County Democratic Committee and things of this kind.

Fry: As I understand it you already had some problems with Bill Malone because he was still angry about your not supporting Truman.

Roosevelt: Well, Bill Malone is the kind of big city Democratic politician who believed that you never deviated from the party or party line no matter what. He was a supportive Democrat just because he was a Democrat, which of course I had not been brought up to believe. I thought you could certainly fight within the party, and there were times when I believed you could fight outside the party.

But Bill Malone felt that you took your leadership and you abided by it and it was just too bad if you didn't like it; you swallowed it. Well, of course George Outland and people like this and Langdon Post were just not in that mold, and there was some resentment when you did anything that didn't follow the basic principle. But you can well understand. Mayor Daley of Chicago is typical of the same thing today.

- Fry: Susie Clifton, as I understand it, did quite a lot of fund raising.
- Roosevelt: Susie Clifton did everything: fund raising to helping us plan strategy to contacting people on the campaign trips. She was really just a strong right arm through the whole thing.
- Fry: Did either of the other two help with fund raising and were they as generally versatile?
- Roosevelt: Not as versatile as Susie Clifton probably, but Langdon Post didn't have too many financial contacts. George Outland had some and was helpful somewhat in the fund raising area.
- Fry: In your campaign I wonder if it was run like Warren's was run. The south and the north pretty much were responsible for each raising their own funds and handling their own expenditures. Was yours more over-all administered?
- Roosevelt: There may have been some flow of funds back and forth but I would say generally the north was responsible for its funds and the south was responsible for its funds. There would be statewide broadcasts that both north and south would contribute their share for.
- Fry: Who helped raise funds in the north then?
- Roosevelt: A number of people. I don't remember all the people. Mrs. Ellie Heller was helpful, Monroe Friedman was helpful, and probably I'm leaving out people who should be mentioned.
- Fry: What about Cyril Magnin? Was he one of the ones who was not enthusiastic, or did he help?
- Roosevelt: I remember Cyril Magnin raised some money for us, yes. How much or what percentage I just wouldn't be able to tell you without going back through the financial records.
- Fry: I was just trying to get him kind of classified as one who dragged his heels or one who didn't.
- Roosevelt: Well, he was very close to Bill Malone so he had to be a little careful not to hurt Bill Malone's feelings, and maybe he would have done more if Bill Malone had not had some reservations about the campaign.

Roosevelt: I see in your notes here that you have Max Sobel listed. If I remember he was not chairman of the finance committee--I don't remember who was in the north--but he was a contributor and did raise money for us also in the north.

And then there was another marvelous gentleman, [pause] you're going to have to find his name, with one of the big real estate people. He always used to have a luncheon table at Jack's Restaurant. And if you can locate his name he was one of our mainstays in the north for fund raising. Louie Lurie his name was; it just came back to me.

Fry: Oh yes, he was quite a character.

Roosevelt: I've eaten a great deal of fish at Jack's Restaurant with Louie Lurie as the host.

Fry: Yes, that was still going on last I heard.

Roosevelt: Frankly we got a good deal of financial support from the labor unions.

Fry: I have a whole series of questions that I want to ask you about labor. On the fund raising part I thought you might have had a little more trouble getting funds from them because in the AF of L there was Cornelius Haggerty who really was for Warren.

Roosevelt: Well, Neil was always a Republican and frankly always was. But he never kept the unions that he might have had influence with from supporting us. And I ended up by being a very good friend and an admirer of Neil Haggerty's.

Fry: One more question on the people who helped in your campaign: did John Roosevelt and Anna help you?

Roosevelt: Anna was not too well and I think she did practically nothing. John was a Republican and John I think might have raised a little money for me, but I couldn't very well ask him to come out openly and make speeches and things of that kind.

Fry: Why couldn't he have led Republicans for Roosevelt, since you had cross-filed?

- Roosevelt: Well, he was pretty much involved with his Republican friends in business. I wouldn't have asked him to do that; it would have embarrassed him I think. So he very quietly supported me and did raise a few dollars for me and introduced me to a man called Ray Lee who later in my congressional campaigns--who is still a very important fund raiser in the Republican party. Ray Lee became my chief Republican financial support when I was in Congress.
- Fry: Did Anna work with a Berkeley doctor to prepare the biography of you in comic book format?
- Roosevelt: Yes she did.
- Fry: I think Mr. Outland mentioned that.
- Roosevelt: Yes that's true. They were working together and I don't remember his name at the moment.
- Fry: I've got it here somewhere.
- Roosevelt: Right, they were working together, and she was living in Berkeley at that time.
- Fry: How did he come to write the book on your life? Was this done for the campaign?
- Roosevelt: I'm not sure that he did it. I would have to go back. I think maybe he had the idea or an idea about it. I'm not sure that he actually ever did the writing or the project. That I'm sure Susie Clifton could give you more information about.
- Fry: There were two books mentioned, or maybe they're both the same book. Was the format of the book a comic strip illustrated thing?
- Roosevelt: There was an illustrated comic book that was a project. Now whether there was more than one like that, I only remember one.
- Fry: Okay, it wasn't in addition to a hardback glossy campaign biography or anything like that that we're missing?
- Roosevelt: There may have been but no, there wasn't, that went on public sale or anything like that. It was more in the form of campaign material.

Fry: Somewhere in the press there was a little story about a book that was being produced that was supposed to go on public sale for a dollar. It was a biography of James Roosevelt.

Roosevelt: Well, if there is one I'd like to get hold of it. [Laughter.] I don't remember seeing it.

Fry: Well, maybe it was someone's idea that just came and went.

Lack of Support by the Press

Fry: Let's go to your support or lack of support in the press and general publicity. Were there any major newspapers that supported you in the primary or the election as a whole?

Roosevelt: I don't believe that we had any major newspaper endorsement. We had quite a few local newspapers support us, but if I can remember correctly we did not have any major newspaper in Los Angeles. Although I think the Daily News was still going strong here; they were more neutral than anything else.

Fry: Was that Manchester Boddy's, who lost the senatorial primary to Helen Gahagan Douglas?

Roosevelt: Right.

Fry: The Examiner quoted an editorial from Boddy that sounded anti. He thought you were too liberal.

Roosevelt: I think they probably in the end did not support us editorially. That may be true. But all through the campaign they gave us relatively fair treatment.

Fry: And there was the committee to get fair treatment in the press, or something like that, for you. It wrote some letters-to-the-editor and I thought maybe that was an indication that this had been somewhat of a problem.

Roosevelt: It was a problem, no question about it. We were not the favorites of the press.

Fry: Well, then what did you do to try to get around this wall or curtain that had been put between you and the voters?

Roosevelt: We tried to put on what you might call a grass-roots campaign that we tried to reach as many people as we possibly could and ask them to recognize that we were not getting the media representation that we would like to have, and ask them to become sort of precinct workers for us in their areas. Not too good a method, although it was very much what Harry Truman did in his presidential campaign.

Fry: I noticed that Drew Pearson supported you.

Roosevelt: Yes, Drew Pearson gave us a good deal of support from time to time in his, at that time, very popular Sunday broadcasts. They were quite widely listened to in California and they were probably the most effective media help that we had.

Fry: Was he an old friend?

Roosevelt: Yes. I've known him for many, many years. He was an old friend from my father's days in the White House. He just believed in what we were trying to do and gave us his support.

Fry: He was pretty widely syndicated then, wasn't he?

Roosevelt: Yes, he was widely syndicated, and as I said, he was syndicated not only press-wise, but radio-wise, he was very widely syndicated. If I remember, one of the things we used to complain about was that his column, which was published in the Los Angeles Times, was frequently cut whenever he said anything nice about us.

Fry: You mean shortened?

Roosevelt: No, cut out. But this was a recognized right of the publisher, I suppose.

Fry: Well, you did have a problem there. Did you ever try to talk to Kyle Palmer, who was the Los Angeles Times political editor?

Roosevelt: Later on, as you know, the Times, as the elder Mr. Chandler's reign ended, became more broad-minded.

Roosevelt: After I went into the congressional arena, they used to be very fair in their coverage of my congressional campaigns, but I never secured their endorsement.

I would always go down and have lunch with the editorial staff once a year and we would always have it clearly understood that there was no possibility of my getting their endorsement no matter what, no matter how bad or poor my opponent was, they just didn't want to endorse anybody that they considered as liberal as I was. But they recognized that I didn't have horns and that I was doing what I believed in, so that they did in essence give me through their coverage all that I think I could have fairly asked for. And in turn they did not play up my opponent because, frankly, they rarely were of a very first rate caliber.

Fry: There was a very effective organization of the smaller newspapers in the state at that time (and still is) called the California Publisher's Association, and I wonder if you made definite efforts to contact all those little publishers in smaller cities like Bakersfield?

Roosevelt: Yes, we had quite good coverage in San Diego from one of the local papers down there. Not the main one. They were combined anyway later. At that time one of them was ultra-conservative, but there was a liberal paper published down there and they did support me.

Then we were supported in Santa Barbara, if I remember correctly; we were actually endorsed in Santa Barbara by Tom Storke, the editor and publisher. I'd have to look that up to be doubly sure that I'm correct. He was very fair minded and I'm not sure if he finally endorsed us but my impression is that he endorsed us. So, there were a number of areas.

We worked at it wherever we could. We would always call on the newspaper publisher in every town that we went to, even though we knew he wasn't friendly.

Fry: Did you have a man especially to go around to those middle-sized town papers?

Roosevelt: Hank Reese did most of that work.

Fry: My impression was that they might have been pretty well sewn up by Warren, because he had a man on his campaign staff who had been president of the state publishers' association.

Roosevelt: I think probably that he was more successful than we were, but we worked at it and did the best we could.

Endorsements and Financial Aid

Fry: Now, I have a title for my notes for the next chapter here called "Successes in Support," but it's not going to be the end of the interview.

Roosevelt: It should be a very short chapter. [Laughter.]

Fry: Number one is labor. And as you have there in your notes, the Political Action Committee of the CIO backed you on February 6, and backed Helen Douglas, too; then the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union] came out with the charge that this was "phoney" and "a group that represents no one but themselves." I think this was a Harry Bridges blast; there must be a story behind Harry Bridges and the fact that he was blasting them. But didn't he finally come around to support you?

Roosevelt: He was at war with them, not with me. Later on he supported me.

Fry: He couldn't afford to look as though he was throwing in his lot with them; he was not with them?

Roosevelt: We had generally very good labor support from the garment workers, both the amalgamated and the ladies' garment workers. And we had very excellent and wonderful support from the operating engineers; in fact, they gave us an airplane and a pilot, who got us around the state and who did all kinds of things for us.

Fry: That must have saved you an awful lot of money.

Roosevelt: It certainly did. It made it possible for us to keep a lot of engagements that we otherwise couldn't

Roosevelt: have kept. So, generally our labor support was not only friendly in its endorsement and workers, but they certainly gave us workers and they gave us a substantial financial contribution.

Fry: [reading notes]

The AFL did endorse you, in spite of Mr. Haggerty, and the Railroad Brotherhood came out early for you, on February 22.

Roosevelt: Yes.

Fry: How did you bring this about? Did you go out and talk to them?

Roosevelt: Well, generally I would appear before their committees and ask for their support and I'd outline a program as to why we thought we deserved their support. Generally speaking we were quite successful in receiving it.

Fry: Did you get any particularly valuable feedback from them in this process that you could use in your campaign, in the way of issues and what their concerns were?

Roosevelt: Yes. Particularly in the unemployment area. They were very helpful in giving us facts and figures; the types of areas that they felt that the Warren administration had failed them.

Fry: The federal Taft-Hartley law was a rather big issue then, wasn't it?

Roosevelt: Yes, it was a big issue in the sense that it hadn't at that time died from overwork, which it did later on; it was still something union leadership, at least, was dedicated to try to repeal. So that when Mr. Warren did make clear his position on it, and we did, it was certainly one of the factors that helped us get union support.

Fry: During the campaign for the general election, on July 16, that Democratic executive committee meeting was held in which your supporters walked off with the majority of the fourteen appointments for seats in the party state convention. That's in my notes from the files of the San Francisco Chronicle.

[Discussion of notes.]

Fry: That note, I should go ahead and explain, says that you did get a majority of the seats for the party state convention, which was to be held later on, sometime in August, and that Mrs. Heller and Frank Pellett and J. Ray Files and Mrs. Glad Hall Jones and Arthur Watwood, I think, were some of those given seats who were your supporters. I wondered if any of these had changed from opposing you in the primary to supporting you in the general election?

Roosevelt: I really can't answer that. I think Mrs. Heller didn't particularly support me in the primary, but she certainly did in the final election. J. Ray Files was pretty much of a support all the way through, and so was Mrs. Glad Hall Jones. Frank Pellett, if I remember, was part of the Railroad Brotherhood group, and I think he supported me from the beginning. So I would say that with the exception of Mrs. Heller, probably most of them were supportive right along.

Neutral or Opposing Democrats

Fry: Well, since this was after the primary (maybe I'm a little naive) I'm surprised that there would have been a struggle at all to get Democrats to support the candidate.

Roosevelt: It's not that I think you're naive--after all it was a long, long time ago--but there were people like state senator George Luckey who were just saboteurs within the Democratic party, in my opinion, for the benefit of the Republican party. They were ultra-conservative. They were dead set against what we were trying to do within the Democratic party, and they were just out to damage as much as they could.

Fry: That whole area of the Democrats, the conservatives, are a little bit fuzzy as to their identities. I have some names that I've jotted down here. Would you have put Oliver Carter in with that group or not?

Roosevelt: No. Oliver Carter, as you know, pretty much retired from politics [about that time]. He was headed toward the judiciary and his appointment as a judge. I would say that his feelings were more on the conservative side and he probably wasn't too happy.

Jimmy and Franklin now look like main eventers

BY LESLIE E. CLAYPOOL

(Daily News Political Editor)
It's quite a piece Look magazine in its current issue has about the Roosevelt boys, James and his brother Franklin, who, the magazine allows, may run it off for president if Jimmy and Franklin both made the grade for governor in their respective states.

"Jimmy's position has improved considerably since William Boyle replaced J. Howard McGrath on the Democratic national committee," says Look. "Indignation against Roosevelt's anti-Truman stand last year has simmered down and in mid-September Boyle brought word that Truman would keep his hands off the state primary.

This has weakened the position of Jimmy's main competitor, E. George Luckey, the wealthy cattle raiser and Democratic "angel" who wants the nomination himself and has spread word that he has Truman's support.

"The deciding factor in Jimmy's ability to upset (Gov. Earl) Warren may be George McLain and his powerful (we'll know how powerful tonight) organization . . . etcetera and such.

Well, that's one version but not necessarily the way we heard it. But the Roosevelts are always good for a story. Also, where does Goody Knight come in?

Speaking of Roosevelts — Mrs. Anna Roosevelt Boettiger's announced support of proposition No. 2 was questioned by some on the ground that she hadn't been here long enough to vote.

Mrs. Boettiger has been and she is registered and will vote if well enough, she says. Moreover, she dictated the statement.

There are now, it would appear, about four kinds of young Democrats in California. There are the California Federation of Young Democrats headed by Lionel Steinberg, Fresno; the Young Deacons of California, Inc., headed by Frank X. Blackwell, Los Angeles, who was elected last weekend at a convention here; the still rather nebulous Affiliated Young Democrats who revolve more or less around Beatrice Kay, formerly with the YDC's.

Then there are just the Democrats who are young and haven't joined anything.

None of the groups has a national charter yet and there is dispute about who should get it. There was a walkout of several delegates, including those from San Diego from the YD convention Sunday.

This column loves young people, including even young Rep.

Arthur H. Samish, the biggest lobbyist of them all, and hauls out the old Philbrick report to pep it up.

The big idea seems to be to blame Warren for the whole business or a huge hunk of it. Literarily speaking, it's a sick job.

There doesn't seem to be a printer's bug on the book, however. There are folks that say maybe Bill Keck, wealthy oil man, who doesn't hide his disapproval of the governor, helped pay the bill.

Former Gov. Culbert L. Olson was 73 years old yesterday and the Governor Olson Alumni Association, of which Judge Stanley Mosk is president, gave him a luncheon at the Redwood House. There were several judges present, all of whom had been appointed to the bench by Olson. Boy, is he proud of them!

There were Judges James Carter, Peirson Hall and Jacob Weinberger of the federal court; Judges Minor Moore and Parker Wood of the district court of appeal;

Judges Mosk, John Gee Clark, Newcomb Condee and William R. McKay of the Superior court, and Judges Robert Clifton and Ray Bennett of the Municipal court, in addition to the Olson sons, John and Dick, and John Shiels, and your Uncle Leslie.

Olson was presented with a golf bag. He was born on election day in 1876 "when Tilden was counted out by them darn Republicans" and was elected governor on election day, 1938.

POLITICISMS—It was a wow of a party for Rep. Chet Holifield last night at Poppy Trail Villa. Chet is the speaker Thursday noon at the Demo Luncheon Club on "The Welfare State" . . . Murray Stravers is now executive secretary and coordinator of the senate committee on highways, streets

and bridges chaired by Randy Collier, R., Yreka . . . James Roosevelt will air views tomorrow (the handout doesn't say what hour) off the record before the Radio News Club . . . the California Council of Republican Women holds biennial convention Nov. 15-16 in Berkeley . . . apparently there wasn't a single fist fight among city councilmen yesterday. Slippin'?

Nov. 8, 1949

- Roosevelt: But he always remained a good friend. I couldn't say that I have any recollection of his doing anything that harmed us.
- Fry: There was a person whom I don't know named Mr. Dockweiler, and also Frank Freeman, and J. B. Elliott. Were they also part of the conservative group?
- Roosevelt: Frank Freeman, yes. Of course, Frank Freeman voted Republican many many times in his life. J. B. Elliott, I'm not quite clear about what his position was in 1950. He of course, as you know, was in the independent oil group and he later became a very good friend of mine. I just don't believe that I ever identified him as being an all-out opponent. Who else did you mention?
- Fry: Mr. Dockweiler.
- Roosevelt: Well, Mr. Dockweiler, although his father had been a great friend of my father, decided that he felt that we were too far out in those days.
- Fry: So he did offer some opposition?
- Roosevelt: Yes. Very definitely.
- Fry: What form did his opposition take?
- Roosevelt: Well, I'm not sure if he joined the Democrats-for-Warren or not. But he was outspoken in his opposition, publicly and privately.
- Fry: Rick Tuttle of UCLA is doing a book on the history of California Democrats, and he wanted me to be sure and ask you if George Luckey and Oliver Carter asked you to hold back your candidacy.
- Roosevelt: I never remember Oliver Carter asking me to hold it back. Mr. Luckey made it very clear to me that he didn't think I should do anything about it except be quiet and just go away. [Laughter.]
- Fry: I don't understand how Pat Brown fits in either. Could you tell me?
- Roosevelt: I can make that very clear. Pat Brown made up his mind that the best way to win an election to, at that time, the general attorneyship, was to be an

Roosevelt: independent, and Pat Brown did not campaign as a Democrat. He did not campaign with the rest of the Democratic ticket in any way, and he made it very clear that while he appeared once or twice on the same platform with us that his campaign was quite separate from ours. And having failed the first time [1946] in his effort to be elected when he did run as a Democrat, he decided this time that he was going to run as an independent, which he did, and of course was successful.

Fry: Inside the party I'm further confused about Pat Brown, because I pick up some stories here and there that he was first with you in trying to find an alternate candidate to Truman, but then later on he felt that opposition to Truman should cease and everybody should get behind him for the nomination in 1948.

Roosevelt: I think Pat Brown's political antennas were pretty good. Early in the game, it looked like Truman was hopelessly out of it. Pat Brown was against him and wrote me to this effect. Later on his antennas told him that Truman was going to be the nominee and that probably Eisenhower wouldn't agree to run as a Democrat, and Pat has always been quite adjustable in these matters and decided that it was time to adjust. And he adjusted to becoming a Truman supporter and did it in time so that he couldn't have truly been listed as an opponent.

Fry: In this whole picture of the Democrats who felt that you and your group were "too far out," was any of this based on specific issues like Truman's foreign policy or the recognition of China or the Central Valley Project and the 160-acre limitation--philosophical differences?

Roosevelt: I think all of these came into it. Any Democrats who had a special interest in this area felt that I was not business-oriented from the point of view of having any close contacts with either the oil groups or the banking groups or anybody else. Those Democrats who did, like [Wellburn] Mayock and Luckey and Pauley and people of this kind, wanted a Democrat who they felt--I'm not saying that they wanted to dominate him--he would have a more friendly basic feeling for them than they felt I would have. I just never had many contacts in that particular area. And they were correct in their feeling without any question. I

Roosevelt: never disputed their right to that feeling, although I think they were wrong in feeling that I necessarily therefore would have been unfair to them.

Fry: Who were Mayock's backers?

Roosevelt: I never really knew who they were, except that they were obviously the oil people and the people who were afraid of the kind of thing that I would advocate. And as you know from your own notes, they, for instance, felt that I was too liberal on welfare matters and that I might be too close to George McLain.

They considered George McLain to be the lowest form of parasite in the political field, and they felt that therefore he was a danger and that anybody that was sympathetic with the things that he was talking about doing for old people and blind people must be somewhat in his camp, or closely allied to him. Of course we were not, in any way; but there were many things that I thought George McLain was for that were justified. Old people were not getting fair treatment under the programs of those days and he recognized that; and that he used it for his own personal gain, I feel, should not blind me to the fact that some of his goals were quite justified.

Fry: Did you ever accept McLain's help openly? Kind of late in the campaign you were saying publicly that you hardly knew him.

Roosevelt: Yes, at that time I think I did hardly know him and had no personal contacts with him in any way. Now, later on, when I did know him better and felt that it was right to work for the things that he was working for, I did join him occasionally on a broadcast that he made on a so-called old people's radio network. I don't remember the details on that; but it was always on the basis that we were working for the principles that he was advocating, both on a national and a local level in respect to giving the old people a fair deal.

Fry: Did your pension stand evoke a rapid response from Earl Warren?

Roosevelt: Not exactly, although there was an attempt to try to tie me as a sort of personal friend or associate of McLain's, which of course wasn't true in any way. Now, I don't remember that Earl Warren himself ever

- Roosevelt: said that, but there were other people who I know certainly were not disowned, who came from the Warren campaign, who said it.
- Fry: He had just been through this battle at the polls against McLain's ballot proposition in 1949. It was a proposition that undid McLain's successful proposition of the year before, in which Myrtle Williams had been put in by constitutional amendment as head of welfare. How did you handle this in your campaign? It must have been fresh in everybody's mind.
- Roosevelt: Yes, it was quite fresh. I think what we tried to do was say look, I'm not really interested in the personalities involved. I am interested that this came about because welfare was being so badly handled by the state, and if you want to change the rules now and come up with a new program that will really do something for the old people, obviously that's fine, that's great. But that's what you're not doing. You're fighting something more on the basis of personality rather than coming up with your own program which is a sound program.
- Fry: One other question here on the different factions that were at work: Did you have trouble with the Young Democrats? There were a couple of stories about them, and in the general election campaign they voted to support Truman foreign policies. Was this a sidewise swipe at you?
- Roosevelt: I think by about that time we all sort of agreed on a compromise position.
- Fry: So, Truman's foreign policy and aid to Greece and all that was not brought up in this campaign?
- Roosevelt: Not in the state campaign, no.
- Fry: It shouldn't have been logically, but you know sometimes those things are.
- Roosevelt: By that time of course we were all for Truman and he was already elected.
- Fry: Was the Korean War much of an issue?
- Roosevelt: Only in the sense of civil defense.

- Fry: And you finally let [Lieutenant Governor candidate] George Miller join you on the ticket on April 25.
- Roosevelt: That's in the primary.
- Fry: Can you explain what made it necessary for you both to join on the primary ticket?
- Roosevelt: It became clear to me--and I don't remember who the other candidates were--that if the ticket was to be strengthened by a lieutenant governor, then that lieutenant governor should come from Northern California. And the chief opponent, if I remember, was Ellis Patterson, who of course came from Southern California, where I came from, and that didn't make good political sense. We couldn't get Ellis Patterson to withdraw, although we tried. So, it became obvious to me that the only way to achieve a balanced ticket was to support George Miller who frankly, I think, was probably a sounder running mate than Ellis Patterson.
- Fry: Did he have less vulnerabilities than Ellis Patterson at that time?
- Roosevelt: Yes, Ellis Patterson at that time was considered pretty much to be a left-winger and was regarded somewhat dubiously, and George Miller was a young state senator with a good record in the state senate. And as I say, geographically Contra Costa County was an attractive place for a lieutenant governor candidate to come from when your governor candidate came from Southern California.
- Fry: Amador County also contributed a lieutenant governor to the race (along with the woman who was your bus executive), Harold E. Colburn.
- Roosevelt: Yes. Didn't he finally withdraw?
- Fry: He may have.
- Roosevelt: I think he finally withdrew when I came out for Miller.
- Fry: He sure let out a blast for a few days.
- Roosevelt: Because when we came out for Miller we sort of undermined his chances and he was unhappy about it. But of course he had none of the political attributes or wallop that George Miller had, and he really didn't

Roosevelt: belong in the race. He was not a statewide figure. You could probably say George Miller was a statewide leader. As you could about Ellis Patterson, for that matter.

Fry: Then after April 25 did Miller join you on your bus?

Roosevelt: Miller was a great campaigner and joined us on the bus whenever we could do it. But California was a big state even then and frequently we had to go our separate ways in order for someone to cover the meetings that one hoped to be able to make. But whenever we could we did appear together.

Fry: Is there anything else that you would like to bring out on these factional problems?

Charges and Attacks on Roosevelt

Roosevelt: No, I think the only other thing I note from your notes is the attempt from Mr. Mayock to bring forth scandals into the situation. Mr. Mayock was the hatchet man, far enough removed from the respectable candidacy of Governor Warren and others, and he dreamed up most of his charges and of course nothing became of them because there was nothing in it.

Fry: The Tony Carnero name is all through our Earl Warren research because he and his gambling ships were one of the most difficult problems that Warren had as an attorney general. It continued under Warren's governorship too because Carnero was a persistent character who could use almost anything at his command to get what he wanted apparently.

Roosevelt: And he lasted for quite a while until they finally removed his ship. He was ingenious, or his lawyers were ingenious in their attempts to try to put it beyond state control. As far as I'm concerned I never had anything to do with it. I never knew Mr. Carnero or spoke in his behalf or anything else. It was undoubtedly a topic of conversation because he was the topic of conversation himself. But I never went out to his ship or rode on his boats or had any part in his operation.

Fry: Well, the story was that when you were the Democratic

- Fry: state chairman and in that capacity you sought to get the then U.S. Attorney James Carter to go lightly on Carnero, supposedly in return for a little of Carnero's loot for the Democratic party.
- Roosevelt: Mr. Carnero made no offer to me for any support of any kind, and we wouldn't have accepted it if he had.
- Fry: This brings up a larger question of how much did you do in trying to get the Democratic treasury built up in the forties, quite aside from the Carnero story?
- Roosevelt: You mean my own campaign funds?
- Fry: No, I mean when you were Democratic state chairman. Was this one of your jobs, to raise funds?
- Roosevelt: No, I really didn't do too much on that side of it. We went more into the organization end of it, trying to build up precinct organization and trying to get clubs active in the different districts. I didn't personally spend much time on fund raising.
- Fry: I'm wondering if it was later when a kitty did develop that could be parceled out to help in congressional races and things like that?
- Roosevelt: Pretty much later. I think later, after the 1950 campaign, there was a recognition that there ought to be money available for state headquarters and county headquarters, and an effort was made by the Warshaws and people of that kind too; in fact, they contributed a campaign headquarters in downtown Los Angeles. And effort was made at that time by the party officials, but not in my time.
- Fry: Well--to stay on that just a second--at the end of that 1950 campaign there was a question of who would be state chairman, and apparently Ziffren's name was one possibility and Ziffren, Helen Gahagan Douglas, and you, and George Miller, and maybe some others met. Now, Glenn Anderson finally got it, and I wonder what Ziffren's role was in the Democrats at that time. Were you a Ziffren supporter, was this an Anderson vs. Ziffren thing at that time, or how did this happen?
- Roosevelt: I know this is awful, but I don't really remember being active in it one way or the other. I'm pretty sure we supported Glen Anderson though in the final

Roosevelt: result. But I think probably Susie Clifton, because she was much more involved in that end of it, could give you a clearer picture than I can on that.

Fry: Then back to Mayock's rather colorful campaign. His other charge--

Roosevelt: Discolored campaign. [Laughter.]

Fry: His other charge against you was that you had lobbied for a loan-shark bill with thirty percent interest on \$100 loans in the last session of the legislature. What was he talking about?

Roosevelt: I have no idea what he was talking about and it was a hundred percent fabrication and there just wasn't any truth in it whatsoever. You'd find that he would make a charge and then never substantiate it, never name names, never say who you saw or what you did or anything of this kind. So that the charge always sort of died.

But you know one always gets publicity for a charge, and that was his technique: make the charge and then hope somebody would come forward to substantiate it for him. But nobody ever came forward because they couldn't.

Fry: Where do you think the Mayock tactics hurt you the most?

Roosevelt: I don't think they hurt me. I think they were annoying, because you always get up and say, "Look, that's another fabrication. If he has any facts, state them." And then when no facts came along, everybody forgot it. So, in my opinion, they had no effect on the campaign whatsoever.

Fry: Well, do you think they gave the Warren camp an advantage?

Roosevelt: No. None whatsoever. Warren never joined in on that kind of an issue. They might have been delighted with the fact that I had to be on the defensive by denying things all the time, but they conducted a good clean campaign.

Fry: Warren didn't have a Republican opponent because Lieutenant Governor Goody Knight dropped out very early in the Republican primaries for governor.

Roosevelt: Just me.

Fry: I thought maybe you had some suspicions of how they got Goody Knight out or why he dropped out, because this came up in your campaign.

Roosevelt: Well, I might have had suspicions of how they got him out, but that was all. In my book, if you can eliminate your opponent in a good peaceful way, if it's not dishonorable or something, I don't think it was dishonorable. They might have said, "You get out now and I'll support you later," or something of that kind. I might have suspected something of that kind, and it sort of worked out that way later on so maybe my suspicions were well-founded. But I never felt that was anything but fair play.

Fry: There's one other attack on you that was rather spectacular and that was Westbrook Pegler's. Actually his was a long series of attacks. What I need from you is to give us your relationship to Pegler in the first place.

Roosevelt: My relationship with Pegler was that I was my mother's son. [Laughter.] And anything that Mother produced must be awful, and of course the long story of how he libeled her through the years is a matter of history. I always remember that my father always advised the family and everybody else to never answer Mr. Pegler: "you dignify him; just ignore him, and his charges will fall of their own weight they're so ridiculous."

I remember once I got so incensed about something (this was when I was back visiting my father in Washington) something he had written about Mother, and my brother Elliott was there. We'd heard Mr. Pegler was staying at the Mayflower Hotel. So Elliott said,

"I've got a good horse whip around here; in fact I've got two of them. Let's you and I go down to the Mayflower Hotel and dig up this fella and lay him out and horsewhip him."

And I said, "Well, before we do that we ought to go see Father." [Laughter.]

Roosevelt: So, we went in and suggested it to Father, and my father's first comment was, "It's got some very attractive features about it, but I don't think you'd better do it." So we dropped it and we didn't do it. [Laughter.]

Fry: I wonder if there's anything in Pegler's specific attacks that you'd want to comment on now.

Roosevelt: Just to show how completely cockeyed he is, in your notes on his column, it says that Hamilton Fish had personally conducted me to the office of Walter Gifford, president of AT&T. Complete hogwash. Hamilton Fish had his own firm and if he did anything for anybody, it was for Hamilton Fish, it wasn't for anybody else. I might have gone to him at the office of AT&T but not for my benefit, for his benefit, Hamilton Fish's benefit, not for mine. I had no connection with the AT&T investigation by the FCC, as the record will show. I did have the insurance account of the National Distillers, which I got basically through Mr. Joseph Kennedy who was as you may remember a good friend of my father. I had no steamship company accounts whatsoever--in any way, shape, or form. And so, based upon rumors, his stories ended up with one fact that was correct and the rest was purely rumor, which he didn't bother of course to investigate.

The case of the National Grain and Yeast Company under a man called Frank J. Hale, that was correct. That was my first job. I was president of the National Grain and Yeast Company in a little place called Bellevue, New Jersey. I was gotten that job through a friend of mine who was a federal judge in Massachusetts, where I had lived, and known him very well. He recommended me to Mr. Hale and Mr. Hale at that time was looking for somebody to take over his yeast company. He asked me if I could do it, and I did it for about a year and a half.

Then my father pointed out to me that Mr. Hale, although he had done very well, had also probably made some money in bootlegging in prohibition days and thought it would be wiser for me not to do it--although there was nothing irregular about the National Grain and Yeast Company, except that you can make alcohol from yeast. While we were not doing that, my father felt that it was better not to get into this too

Roosevelt: deeply and suggested I leave, which I did.

Fry: I have a feeling that there must have been some charges on Hale that I don't know about, as I read this. There had to be something or otherwise it didn't look like a scandal.

Roosevelt: Mr. Hale had been investigated for having made money bootlegging in prohibition days. He had not been convicted of anything, but he had been investigated and his name probably had been in the public prints. This was enough for Mr. Pegler; he didn't need any more than that. So I decided that the better part of wisdom was to resign, although I enjoyed the work and it was a good experience in running a business.

Fry: The other issue that came up that I wanted to be sure to ask you about was, you said that as some anti-communist and communist charges were being hurled back and forth, mostly from Nixon in the Helen Gahagen Douglas campaign, that this kind of splashed over into your campaign. I don't know what you meant by that.

Roosevelt: It did largely from the fact that my work on HICCASP, the committee for the arts, sciences, and professions, had included working with a great many ultra-liberal people in the arts and sciences, as you always find. And they were subject to being accused of being stooges for the Communist party, although at that time they probably weren't directly being accused of being members, as they were later on.

Fry: Do you mean that it was your work with HICCASP that had made you vulnerable to attack, and you were attacked on that?

Roosevelt: Yes, I was attacked as having been a member of this organization, who in turn supported a man by the name of Robert L. Condon, who had been a congressman and who had himself been accused of being a Communist supporter, and because HICCASP supported Condon that meant that I supported a communist-oriented organization. There was an all-out effort to discredit the organization. And finally, frankly, it was tarnished, to say the least, because there were some ultra-liberals, people like Mr. Dalton the writer and people of this kind, who later were involved in the whole McCarthy era.

- Fry: Who attacked you?
- Roosevelt: I don't really remember who.
- Fry: Earl Warren?*
- Roosevelt: No, no, no. Earl Warren never had any part of this thing. It might have been Mayock, it might have been almost anybody. I can't remember who the ultra-right wing in the state were at that time, but it came from those sources.
- Fry: Do you think there was a middle man between Mayock's campaign and Warren's campaign?
- Roosevelt: I couldn't say that I had any evidence of that at all.
- Fry: I think that there may have been a couple of specific persons that were pointed out, maybe two people in the county organization in Los Angeles, as being too pink. Does this ring a bell with you?
- Roosevelt: Oh yes. There were always accusations against some people in the Los Angeles County set-up, who were being accused. I don't remember their names now, but there were people who were always under fire from somebody on this basis, usually from fellow Democrats.
- Fry: I was wondering why I didn't find any of this in the newspaper articles on you. It must be under something else. Or maybe in Southern California--
- Roosevelt: It was really an indirect attack on me rather than a direct one. It would sort of casually mention that I had been active in HICCASP, but never a direct accusation against me. They would have found it very difficult to make a Communist out of me.

*Hearst's San Francisco Examiner quotes Warren April 23, 1950, in a speech during the primary in which Warren is giving a series of contrasts between his administration and what Roosevelt is proposing. Warren says, " . . . and there are no subversives in this administration, and there will not be any. And there will be no catering to them, because we don't want their vote."

- Fry: On September 12 when your mother came out, she made the statement, "Communism is not the only important issue in the November election."
- Roosevelt: Well, this was because they were after Helen Gahagan Douglas, who of course was a very good friend of my mother.
- Fry: There was--oh--is that all you want to say about the anti-Communism issue?
- Roosevelt: As far as my campaign is concerned. Now as far as Helen Gahagan Douglas' campaign was concerned, it was a much bigger issue. And I suppose since we were running on the same ticket and appearing sometimes together, there may have been some flopover from one campaign to the other, but most of the pro-Communist accusations were levelled at her and her supporters and not so much in my campaign.
- Fry: One rather inconsequential attack by Warren is somewhat of a paradox now, in the light of a later decision by the Supreme Court. The press clippings show on May 5 that he lashed out at you for suggesting "the disfranchisement of people in mountain cities." Had you advocated reapportionment in the state senate by population--one man, one vote?
- Roosevelt: I had not advocated one-man, one-vote exactly. But I did feel there was a disproportionate senate vote at the that-time structure of county government. I wanted some of the rural counties consolidated for one senate district.
- Fry: Another issue that Warren also hammered home was the idea that if you were governor it would be the government of California by Washington.
- Roosevelt: This was a natural reference to the fact that I had worked very closely with my father as often as I could, that I had been a national committeeman and was the national committeeman at the time of the campaign, and therefore it led to the proper effort--there was nothing ignoble about an effort to say that my interests were more on the national level than they were on the state level. And Mr. Warren insinuated that--that he had the record of my national interests, and that my interests in national politics were far more, over a period of years, than my interests in state politics.

- Fry: So, it was just a general picture then. I kept trying to connect you with somebody in the White House at this point.
- Roosevelt: No, that wasn't it at all. It was a general thing, which was that I was identified in the public mind with national politics, and therefore with Washington's goings on, and not really terribly intimately with the state. I had not been a member of the state assembly or the state senate, and I hadn't been very much in Sacramento on what might be called state business. Therefore it was the natural thing to make the accusation that my real interests were on the national level and not on the state level. There was nothing unfair about that.
- Fry: And yet you were having trouble getting Truman's endorsement. In fact, you never did get Truman's endorsement on this campaign, did you?
- Roosevelt: No, I never did. That's correct, except in a back-handed way, wishing me good luck and that kind of thing.
- Fry: Is it right that your mother quit the United Nations delegation because of that?
- Roosevelt: No, that's not correct.
- Fry: That came out in Lassen's book on your mother.
- Roosevelt: Well I think he doesn't say that that was a fact. He says that this was given by some of her acquaintances as a reason, but it certainly was not.

My mother's resignation from the U.N. in my opinion--and I can fairly say that she said so to me directly--was due to the fact that she felt that the president had lost confidence in her and that this was a tradition, that without the president's complete support she shouldn't remain in office. And you've got to remember that this was after Eisenhower was elected that she resigned. She didn't resign during my campaign; during the Truman administration she didn't resign. She resigned when it became clear that President Eisenhower was not going to reappoint her.

- Fry: There was another maybe inner issue, inside the inner sanctum of your staff, on public housing as I understand it. Was there a lack of unanimity on whether

Fry: or not to back a good public housing program as a campaign plank?

Roosevelt: No. I think that there was a feeling that this was an issue which on a state level was difficult to define because public housing primarily came from federal funds with attempts to get local administration to meet the needs of the local community. It was felt, I think, that this was a dangerous issue because of the fact that it involved areas that would not be, probably, properly fitted into a state gubernatorial campaign, and that it was really a thing that ought to be between the federal government and the local government. That generally was accepted as being a fair summation of the actual fact.

Fry: Did you and Langdon Post disagree on this? Post had been head of public housing for this region, I believe.

Roosevelt: Yes. I think that Post felt that we should make more of an effort to bring the state into the responsibilities, and of course we never did do that.

Fry: Do you know if Warren had any position on that? Because if he did I haven't come across it.

Roosevelt: I don't know that he ever discussed it at all. I think that was more a question of our search for new and interesting issues that would make the campaign more effective.

Fry: Should I ask you another one? There's another question that I have from Rick Tuttle of UCLA which is kind of interesting. It again has to do with the way the formal structure of the Democratic party was functioning at that time. We've already talked about whether it was actually a funding agency for candidates back in 1950. Another issue might have been federal patronage then.

Roosevelt: Could I interrupt you just there? I want to make very clear that none of the candidates that I know of in that period in 1950 ever relied upon the state organization for any really substantial part of their financial support. Each candidate separately raised his own money. I hope I can make that totally clear because that was a factor in those days.

More on Financial Aid

- Fry: On funding did you happen to get anything from national Democrats? Did they come through?
- Roosevelt: Oh, I'm sure I did. But not from the national committee. Not from the party organization.
- Fry: That's what I mean.
- Roosevelt: No. The national committee only supported national candidates like congressmen or senators or presidential candidates. As far as I know the national committee has never contributed to state campaigns as such. Nothing significant at all.
- Fry: One of your detractors, I think it was Mr. McEnery, said that the man who was the national head of the Democratic party, William Boyle, also was not for you. Was this true? Did you have trouble getting a verbal support from him?
- Roosevelt: I think the answer to that would be that I never really tried to get that because I was already afraid of the charge that I was really the candidate of the out-of-California interests, and therefore that may well have been true.
- Frankly, I don't remember whether he did or not. I think he was a friend of Mr. Mayock. But he never took any position in the primaries; that I remember.
- Fry: Okay. Well, this was just a public charge by McEnery, that McEnery would never support you and William Boyle wasn't for you either.
- Roosevelt: McEnery undoubtedly could speak for himself, but I don't think he could speak for Mr. Boyle.
- Fry: It looked like kind of an afterthought. Two of your big contributors, according to the report that was turned in to the secretary of state, were Lou Bronstein who gave \$12,500, and Joe Shane gave \$12,500. Who were those men?
- Roosevelt: I don't remember who Bronstein was. It sounds familiar. Lou--

- Fry: I don't know whether they were northern or southern people.
- Roosevelt: Joe Shane is an attorney here in Beverly Hills. He'd been in business with me and was a good Democrat and supported me. Bronstein I'd have to look up to see which Bronstein it is. I knew a lot of Bronsteins.
- Fry: Did you get any financial help from HICCASP?
- Roosevelt: It was just about defunct by 1950.
- Fry: Did any actors' or writers' organizations help?
- Roosevelt: Not that I know of. It came from individuals who had belonged.
- Fry: Did Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., help you any?
- Roosevelt: Yes, he contributed financially. I don't remember how much.
- Fry: Where was he living then?
- Roosevelt: In Beverly Hills.
- Fry: Would insurance groups have helped you?
- Roosevelt: I got no insurance support whatsoever. They were part of the business. You've got to remember that I was a broker, an insurance broker. I was not in the insurance company fraternity.
- Fry: Real estate people? Usually, if you're in insurance, you're also connected with real estate and--
- Roosevelt: Yes, but that again is with the insurance company fraternity, not the brokerage company; they're not too close. I did have some friends in the insurance business. Whether they contributed then I don't remember. I think I really didn't make too good of friends with them until later, some of the people that owned the Beneficial Life Insurance Company. But to the best of my memory there were no so-called professional business groups that supplied very much in the way of financial support.
- Fry: To get back to my question on patronage: did you lose any support--or gain any--in pre-election jockeying for those hundreds of posts a governor gets to fill?

Fry: Who of the big Democrats in the state, like Malone, demanded a voice in selection?

Roosevelt: Nobody--primarily because nobody thought I was going to win.

Relation with Helen Gahagan Douglas-Nixon Race

Fry: And my last question concerns right at the end of the campaign. Helen Gahagan Douglas came out for you--

Roosevelt: At the end of the primary. Because we were together right from the beginning of the final campaign. So she must have come out right at the end of the primary campaign.

Fry: No, I'm talking about right at the end of the general election.

Roosevelt: No, I think you're wrong, because we campaigned together right from the beginning.

Fry: The significant thing about it is that this caused Warren-- This was all sort of engineered by Murray Chotiner, according to most people, and it was to force Warren to accept Nixon as someone that he was running with. Here is a copy of Leo Katcher's account of that.

Roosevelt: Oh yes. Well, you give me the evidence! I think it's probably true, from her point of view, that while she campaigned with me and we worked very closely together, it was not considered good politics to be a part of a "package," as is referred to in that article, and she never formally endorsed me because she didn't think it was necessary. But, evidently, at the end of the campaign she did endorse me, formally. But very frankly, anybody who didn't know we were working together had to be blind.

Fry: Yes. I guess it was that formal endorsement, because this is what the Nixon forces, particularly Murray Chotiner, was trying to get out of Warren, they thought he'd have to endorse Nixon if Helen Douglas endorsed you. Were you aware of this going on at this time?

Roosevelt: I must have been at that time aware of it. I know I never asked her for her endorsement. Whatever she did, she did on her own. And it was always very clear that I was fully supporting her campaign, and all my workers were working for her as well, as well as for me.

Fry: I see. It was very close, then.

Roosevelt: It was a very close campaign. We met regularly with her and her campaign people. We were almost on a day-to-day communicating basis, as I'm sure Susie Clifton will tell you. Susie was a very close friend of Helen Douglas', and she was constantly the liaison between us all the way through it.

Fry: Did Helen Douglas ever come with you on the campaign bus then?

Roosevelt: Not that I remember. I think that was part of our strategy, not to do that. Because she was in a national campaign, nationally oriented, and we were trying to run a state-oriented campaign. Not that she wouldn't have been welcome; she always was.

Fry: Did you ever ask people to vote for you and her, as you went around the state?

Roosevelt: We always asked for questions at these meetings, and I'm sure if anybody asked me, I undoubtedly replied that I certainly hoped they would vote for Helen Gahagan Douglas as well as for me. I'm sure the record would show that somewhere.

Could I make one last sort of summary statement? I just would like to put it on the record that, while a campaign is always a hard-fought thing, and although I suppose I never really had much hope, or certainly the reality of the situation was that I never should have hoped for a final election victory, I thought and still think that Governor Warren campaigned hard against me, and that he used absolutely fair tactics. He used the tactic that I was inexperienced in state government, which I most certainly was; that I was really inexperienced in holding any--what one might call--high executive state position of any kind; even on the national level, my only real experience in government was a fairly short one when I was secretary to the President. And this was an experience that was totally wrapped up in the then important

Roosevelt: federal problems, and had nothing to do with the state of California government. I think this was a proper thing for him to have kept pointing out. And then he attacked me on some of the programs that I was advocating, in which there were honest differences of opinion, philosophically. And particularly he hit me on the program that we talked about earlier, on the program of civil defense.

In retrospect, I think I have to say that our program was a hastily built one, in an effort to get a new and exciting issue, but it was probably an impractical one. And its only real value was in bringing to the fore the fact that civil defense as a whole was not a well-thought-out program and that it deserved to be much better thought-out. Even in its finality, it never was much of a success because they never achieved a proper civil defense posture which was practical and which would have been effective in time of great national emergency or disaster. On the other hand, it did evolve in some other areas where national disasters became a federal responsibility and perhaps it made a contribution to some later programs that were effective.

But in this campaign Governor Warren properly took me to task for what we had proposed, used it effectively and made an overall picture of himself as a man who had been in office and certainly had been successful, and the overall picture deserved re-election. And I have to say that I have no hard feelings about it. I think he campaigned fairly and squarely and that we took our lickings as we probably deserved.

Fry: At the time did you ever consider running for another more local office that would give you more experience first, before you entered the governor's race?

Roosevelt: No. I think maybe that was one of the serious mistakes that I made--in not recognizing that I should not have run for the governorship until I had served some time in a more subordinate position. And I'm free to recognize that now. And then frankly later on the opportunity arose to get into national politics which I always had a great interest in, and, thanks to the present Mayor Yorty, it was accomplished.

(Date of interview - 10 August, 1972)

Gambling as an Issue

- Fry: One of the mop-up questions is about your primary opposition: Brigadier General Herbert C. Holdridge, who entered the race about February 4, and Wellburn Mayock. Did they split a liberal vote or a conservative vote or what?
- Roosevelt: I would have thought they had split a conservative vote because the General was quite conservative and obviously Mr. Mayock appealed only to the ultra-conservatives. So, if anything they split the vote between them, and of course they didn't get a very large vote.
- Fry: Do you remember having any strategy sessions about how to best wipe them out in the primaries?
- Roosevelt: We just ignored them. That was the best strategy. We didn't dignify any of them, we didn't consider them to be very formidable in any sense of the word, and the more we talked about them, the more we would have given them stature. We felt that by ignoring them we indicated how we felt about them, from a political point of view maybe. [Laughter.]
- Fry: No free publicity for them.
- Roosevelt: Right.
- Fry: You had a couple of statements that I read in the newspaper on your position against gambling, but leaving the door open for off-track race track betting. And I wondered why you were willing to change the then-state law permitting betting on-track but not off-track?
- Roosevelt: Well, I've always felt that people were going to bet on horse racing from a human instinct, and it was rather ridiculous to tell them they had to spend the money and the entrance price and go to the track in order to lay a bet. And that if a law could be written that could assure the public that they would be treated honestly and that it could be enforced, I couldn't see the difference between hauling yourself out to the race track and betting on a horse or hauling yourself to some publicly controlled-and-run agency some place in your community and placing a bet.

- Roosevelt: Frankly, I think again we have grown with the times, and while California still doesn't allow it, the state of New York allows it and various other states allow it. The British allowed it for many decades, if not longer. It doesn't seem to have corrupted anybody or made it any worse, and to me the logic is there: either you allow betting on horses or you don't allow betting on horses. And I don't see why it's logical in any sense to take a sort of intermediate course.
- Fry: Did Warren tangle with you on this? The reason I ask is because when he was attorney general and a district attorney, this was quite an enforcement effort of his, to get rid of the bookies.
- Roosevelt: Warren was a good district attorney and he enforced the law. That was his job. I don't think the fact that he enforced the law meant necessarily that he would be opposed to off-track betting. I don't frankly remember whether he was or was not. But, I do not believe that it was any very important issue.
- Fry: Well, I hadn't come across it in the newspapers, his picking up this issue. I was kind of curious about it.
- Roosevelt: I don't remember that he did, but I wouldn't want to make that statement.
- Fry: On gambling, in general, one of your campaign assistants mentioned to me that the Las Vegas interests (I'm not sure that I got this story exactly right)-- I think the story was that the Las Vegas gambling interests were eager for you to keep gambling out of California. Do you remember anything about that?
- Roosevelt: No, I don't remember anything about that. And certainly it never became a problem one way or another.
- Fry: It put you on the side of the angels either way.
[Laughter.]
- Roosevelt: So, I don't think it--
- Fry: I was kind of interested that they would approach a candidate in California and ask you, in case you won, to please keep gambling out of California.
- Roosevelt: I was never approached. Now, whether they approached one of my campaign aides I couldn't say. But certainly

- Roosevelt: they never approached me personally. If they had I would have laughed at them. "That's not an issue in California one way or another. We don't want gambling casinos in California and you're welcome to them in Nevada." That's my position to them anyhow, "whether you are for or against me it doesn't make too much difference."
- Fry: Were you approached to allow gambling in California in any way?
- Roosevelt: No. By no one.
- Fry: They wanted it kept in Nevada I guess.
- Roosevelt: I would have guessed they wanted it kept in Nevada.
- Fry: I didn't ask you about the black political community and how it entered into your campaign, if at all.
- Roosevelt: To the best of my recollection we had very good support in the black community. I wouldn't say that it was as good support as we later received in our congressional races because Warren was not considered to be anti in the black community. But I think partly because of my mother and for other reasons-- such as the first FEPC law was really enacted in my father's administration, and because I myself have always been a strong supporter of civil rights, as such, I would have said we had very solid support, particularly in the primary in the black community.
- Fry: Do you remember the state FEPC being an issue in the campaign?
- Roosevelt: I'm not sure that I remember it in that year. I know that we supported the state FEPC long before it finally was passed.
- Fry: Yes, it was on the ballot a little earlier, two years or four years earlier it had been on the ballot and was defeated.
- Roosevelt: That's right. And we, the party platform, supported the FEPC and of course I personally supported it too.

Inside the Campaign Staff

Fry: Oh, in your campaign staff there were some difficulties with Mr. George Outland, the head of your campaign. I wondered if you could explain why he left the campaign at the end of the primary?

Roosevelt: I think the main problem there was trying to convince Congressman Outland (later Professor Outland) that the statewide campaign was going to be quite a different campaign from the primary campaign. One, you were primarily concentrating on the Democratic party voter and that therefore the issues of the campaign should be changed and should be on a broader basis. And I think George Outland basically found himself in some disagreement with some of the northern leaders that we had agreed to give responsibility to, particularly Mr. Davis up north. And there was some unhappiness on a personality basis amongst others, and I don't remember strictly what those personality differences were now, but it was sort of generally agreed that George had done a marvelous job for us in the primary and that we appreciated it very much but because of his other interests and other things, it would be better to have a stronger statewide team for the final election.

Fry: By the way, you know you can put this under seal.

Roosevelt: Yes. I frankly just plain don't remember, and it would be unfair to name names and then later find that I've mixed A with B and it would mean that I'd have to go back and talk with a lot of people to reconstruct it. I just don't think it's really that important, to be truthful to you, from an historical point of view.

Fry: Along with this, we haven't really talked about your administrative direction of the campaign, in relation to George Outland and the other top campaign managers that you had. In other words, how much of the decisions were referred to you? Can you give us an idea of this?

Roosevelt: Well, I think the day-to-day operation was obviously left to others. I couldn't do and supervise all the details and the advance work and the matters of this kind, even the scheduling. But generally, the main issues and the contents of what we were going to say,

Roosevelt: either in press releases or otherwise, were pretty much brought to me for final decisions.

Now, that didn't mean that they weren't well-prepared by the other people on the staff, and that many ideas certainly did not originate with me, they originated with the people on the staff. The final decision as to what the course would be was my responsibility and I took responsibility for the final decision.

Fry: You mentioned George Davis, and he came into the campaign about March 28 and then he left it in mid-September. Was that because of his indictment?

Roosevelt: I think it was primarily because he felt, and we agreed with him, that there was no point in starting a controversy that had to do with some personal business matters of his, which really was not involved in the campaign one way or another. And I don't know the outcome of those problems as far as he was concerned. If I remember, he was acquitted completely; but he felt that in order to avoid anybody making an issue out of it that it was better for him to resign, and we concurred on that opinion.

Fry: I wondered if he came on--

Roosevelt: He was the Mr. Eagleton of that day.

Fry: Yes, I guess he was. Had he originally come on as an effort to have a Truman man in a prominent place, because I think he had been Northern California campaign chairman for Truman in 1948?

Roosevelt: Yes, that played a part in it. And also he had a very wide acquaintanceship in Northern California, and it was a very valuable asset in contacting financial sources that of course we badly needed in the campaign.

Fry: Was he kind of filling the vacuum that Malone's neutrality was leaving?

Roosevelt: Well, he helped to fill the vacuum. I wouldn't want to say, and I'm sure he wouldn't have said, that he was in the same category as Bill Malone. Bill Malone was an organization, old line, big city, Democratic boss if you want to put it that way, and in doing that, he of course had very good financial connections. I

- Roosevelt: would say that Mr. Davis filled the financial side of it much more strongly than he did what you might call the organizational precinct side.
- Fry: In May of 1949 the "James Roosevelt for Governor, Incorporated" organization was formed. This was Lucien A. Sauvage, Max A. Kneppor, Frank Scully, and in a newspaper article you pointed out that you were not a stockholder. What was this? Was this for your campaign funds?
- Roosevelt: I think this was a brainchild of Frank Scully. I don't know how much you know about Frank Scully, but he was a very interesting character, who was sort of a left-wing writer of those days. Why he created the committee and incorporated it, I don't know. But we had nothing to do with it whatsoever. To this day I really don't know what they did, if anything. It did nothing at all. As a matter of fact, vaguely I remember that he split from us or decided he didn't want to support us.
- Fry: Was that the Scully that split with you?
- Roosevelt: Yes.
- Fry: Because there was more than one Scully that split with you.
- Roosevelt: Oh, yes. There was another Scully here who was a business person and married--
- Fry: Well, Frank Scully is the one who ran with General Holdridge against you.
- Roosevelt: That's right. The same Frank Scully. So, you can see that his devotion was hardly, shall I say, very deep set. He was very emotional. He wasn't a paraplegic exactly, but he had had some problems with his legs and had to use crutches. He was a highly emotional person, and basically I think a very decent person, but I think his political judgments were made rather in haste and didn't always stick there too long.
- Fry: So, that between May of 1949 and February of 1950 Scully switched.
- Roosevelt: I think that's correct.

Fry: Well, as far as I'm concerned that wraps up your 1950 campaign. You had said off-tape that you have something to say about Earl Warren when you were both in Washington.

III RELATIONS WITH EARL WARREN AS CHIEF JUSTICE

In Washington

Roosevelt: I would just like to put on the record that when I went to Washington in the last month of 1954 and then of course became a resident in January of 1955, the first person to write me a little note of welcome was the Chief Justice. I went around to see him and to thank him, and from that time on, I wouldn't say frequently, but from time to time, if I had a problem or felt that I needed some advice that was in no way in conflict with his duties as a Supreme Court justice, I would call his office and simply ask if it would be possible for me to come over and have an appointment with the Chief Justice. And he'd always receive me.

We had some very pleasant social meetings, my wife and I with Mrs. Warren and himself. We knew the rest of his family. And instead of being, as one might have well understood it if he had been, a rather aloof person to a Democratic congressman, I think over the years we sort of discovered without spelling it out that our political philosophies were really not too far apart. Obviously the decisions which the Warren court was making were decisions which I applauded at every opportunity, and particularly in the civil rights area.

I must say that I felt that it was the luckiest thing that General Eisenhower had picked a man of this caliber. So it made me feel rather that, you know, if General Eisenhower had been a Democrat he wouldn't have been a bad Democrat. He was under other influences once he became firmly established as a Republican, but his selection of Chief Justice Warren I think was a marvelous thing for the country, and I think it advanced the causes of social justice which, if the Supreme Court had not acted, might have meant a great deal of more strife and a great deal of permanent injury to the country. I would simply like to

Roosevelt: say that I don't believe that any American has acted more courageously or with a more foresighted way than Earl Warren did as the Chief Justice of the United States.

Fry: Do you remember what sort of issues you would bring to discuss with him? Could you give us an example?

Roosevelt: I wouldn't really want to violate conferences because they were really private conferences, they were not public ones. We didn't issue statements or things of this kind.

I think they were largely to ask his assessment of things that were happening in California, to ask how he viewed, for instance, the Knight administration and things of this kind, which he was willing to discuss very frankly with me but not for publication, obviously. It would have been improper for him to do so. Therefore, of course, I never quoted him and will never quote him. But he was, I think, anxious to see that I had, from his point of view, a correct understanding of developments in the state.

Once in a while I went to him on other matters where I just wasn't sure in my own mind--on matters of education or labor issues--in my own mind just exactly what a proper liberal position should be; not seeking for him to make the decision for me, but rather to have a discussion and broaden my knowledge. There were few men in America who had as great a background and experience as he had.

He was always willing to discuss it with me. Now, he never attempted to say, "this is how you ought to think or what you ought to think," but he would say, "I'm inclined to feel this way" or that way or some other way, and he certainly helped my understanding of problems tremendously. I owe him a great debt of gratitude.

Fry: I can see how he would be a great help, having had the problems and needs in California politics at his fingertips for so long.

Roosevelt: Exactly.

Fry: Do you think that other California congressmen, and maybe the senators, also conferred with him?

Roosevelt: I didn't keep his datebook, so I can't really tell you that.

Fry: But you were with the members of the California delegation frequently.

Roosevelt: Yes, I know other members of the delegation did discuss things with him, but which ones--I know for instance, think that Congressman George Miller was a very good friend of the Chief Justice and certainly, I'm sure, others were too, both on the Republican and Democratic side.

Fry: Were the Warrens fairly close socially to the Kuchels, do you know?

Roosevelt: That, I really don't know. This being somewhat of an historical record, I wouldn't want to go on record about the closeness of their social ties. Obviously they were politically very much in tune.

Fry: And they both had that bi-partisan stride that made it so tough for their opponents (up to a point for Kuchel).

Roosevelt: That's correct. Right.

Fry: What about constituents who visited your office and were dying to see California's contribution to the Court. Was he fairly cooperative?

Roosevelt: He was always cooperative in seeing people. I always felt that if someone just wanted to meet him for curiosity's sake, that this was an unfair burden to place upon the Chief Justice; he had a tremendous burden anyhow. But occasionally there would be someone who, either because he had known him or had some connection in the past, felt that he wanted to pay his respects or something like that, but didn't quite have the nerve to call in himself. I would make a call to the office and the Chief Justice was always very kind in accommodating the people.

I think the only other place--occasionally I would call to the Chief Justice's office to arrange for people to be sworn in before the Supreme Court. As you know, if you want to practice before the Supreme Court you have to have a proposer and I was not a lawyer, so I would always get somebody who was a lawyer as a proposer, but I often would call the Chief Justice for the proper time and procedure to have the individual presented to the Court.

Fry: Do you have anything else that you would like to wrap up about you and him in Washington? What about those attacks that were made on him from the floor of Congress frequently? Did you enter into that? Or come to his defense?

Roosevelt: I know, as I think you will remember, there was mounted at one time an "Impeach Earl Warren" campaign, and occasionally people would insert things in the record or perhaps even occasionally make a rather pointed reference to the court, obviously aimed at the Chief Justice. I can remember a number of instances, although I would have to fish for the actual quotations, in which I felt it was proper for me, first of all as a Californian and secondly as a believer in what the Court was doing, to not let that kind of statement go unchallenged.

[Interruption: Secretary, Gloria Corruthers, with a message.]

Roosevelt: Gloria first started with Hubert Humphrey and then she came to me. I almost lost Hubert's friendship over it. Then when I left, she went up to the United Nations with me but she just couldn't stand New York, so she went back and did something else. And then when Alan Cranston was elected why she joined him back in Washington.

[Continuing the interview.]

Fry: You were just explaining that when Warren was attacked on the floor, you felt that you couldn't let these things go unanswered, so what did you do?

Roosevelt: Occasionally if someone had said something which I thought was just beyond the pale, I would drop him a little note and just tell him how shocked and horrified I was and hoped he understood that there was a vast majority of us who strongly felt that Warren was doing a terrific job and that these kinds of things were not only unfortunate from the unpleasantness that he felt about it, but more important in that they were very harmful to the country because they were so blatantly biased or blatantly untrue.

Fry: So, if anyone wants to search the congressional records they could find these rebuttals and so forth?

Roosevelt: Yes.

In Geneva

Roosevelt: And then later on when the Chief Justice was still Chief Justice, he came to Geneva when I was working over there, and I attended a number of functions at which he was the guest of honor. Once I actually believe we gave a dinner for him in Geneva, for Mrs. Warren and for the Chief Justice. When he retired we had hopes that we could set up a chair for him at the University of Geneva, and I had considerable discussions with him about it. He was quite interested but in working out the details with the University of Geneva, as you know these academic matters move rather slowly, before we could get it completed the I.O.S. [Investors Overseas Services] problems arose to plague us and the matter had to be dropped.

But frankly I was terribly disappointed because I felt that he had made such contributions in the field of civil rights, that from the point of view of setting an example world wide, he had contributed to the quickening of the solution of many civil rights problems in other parts of the world. Therefore a chair in his honor at the University of Geneva was very appropriate and would have given him an honor which he richly deserved. And it didn't come to pass.

Maybe someday I'll be able to carry out something like that because I'd like to do it. And of course, as you know, he was really a prime mover in the organization (I don't remember the name--I'm sure you could look it up for me) but it was 'peace through law,' to that effect. I think he made it and gave it the strength which it had. Many, many jurists around the world--well, he was the president or head of the organization for quite a number of years, and I think this was again in recognition of his services by other jurists who felt that he was not only an important American, but had contributed to jurisprudence and the importance of this area in other parts of the world.

Fry: I wondered if you noticed more of a concern with international relations and world peace in those later Washington years of his than perhaps he had been able to exercise earlier. Is this a generalization?

Roosevelt: Well, it's a little bit of a generalization and it would be pretty hard for me to make a flat statement

- Roosevelt: on that. I would say that I think he became more active in the international area in those latter years, but as you well put it, he just didn't have the time. His main duties had to do with domestic matters coming before the Supreme Court.
- Fry: And of course there isn't much in records about his feeling on international issues because he was never in a position to make any statements on it.
- Roosevelt: That's right. They were really not within his jurisdiction.
- Fry: So I was kind of curious of how he evolved in this area.
- Roosevelt: I think it was mostly through his interests in peace and in the accomplishing of reforms or advances in the ability of man to develop in a peaceful way through law as against resorting to armed combat.
- Fry: What was your position when he came out to Geneva for this World Peace through Laws Center?
- Roosevelt: I was a senior vice-president of Investors Overseas Services, a financial firm.
- Fry: Hadn't you been there also in connection with the United Nations?
- Roosevelt: No. I had been attached to the United States mission to the United Nations in New York as the ambassador to the Economic and Social Council. As a result of that, of course, I had visited Geneva a number of times as well as other places in the world, in my duties connected with that. I had also been in Geneva as the delegate from the House of Representatives to the International Labor Organization meetings, the ILO. So, I was fairly familiar with Geneva; I had been in and out of it a good many times.
- Fry: Well, that's the end of my questions.
- Roosevelt: You've been very kind and I hope I haven't strained your kindness, and your willingness to listen. I will be fascinated to see the whole series when you get to a point when it is "visible."

[End of Interview]

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RE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

As the grass roots mouthpiece of the huge Democratic majority in one of the most populous counties in the nation, holding more people than thirty - eight states of the Union, the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee, with an acute sense of its responsibilities at a critical juncture in world history, records its collective view of proposed national foreign policy in respect to the Middle East, as follows:

WHEREAS, President Harry S. Truman, in whose good intentions we repose confidence, and Secretary of State Marshall, for whose high character and great ability, we entertain the most genuine respect, have proposed a national program of action with special reference to Greece and Turkey, embracing apparent unilateral economic, political and military moves in conflict with the primary responsibilities of the United Nations, and

WHEREAS, the present governments of neither country appear consistent with our standards of democracy, and

WHEREAS, The American Government has regarded as untenable interference in internal affairs to support democratic forces in such clearly fascist states as Franco's Spain, Peron's Argentina, Paraguay, Santo Domingo and elsewhere more nearly within American sphere of responsibility than either Greece or Turkey, and

WHEREAS, embarkation on a course of power politics flouts every pretension and practice of historic and traditional American foreign policy, and

WHEREAS, SIMILARLY CONCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED British-French power politics between the two world wars destroyed the American evolved League of Nations, thereby generating World War II, and

WHEREAS, the 1946 Food and Agricultural Organization report, issued March 17, 1947, on Greece indicates the futility of imposed neo-Fascist regimes in both Greece and Turkey, and points the cure of intolerable economic, political and social conditions by way of the United Nations, and

WHEREAS, if it be said that the United Nations is not strong enough to undertake the task, it should be pointed out that the United Nations will be as strong as the United States and its major allies stand ready to give it the support and strength which comes from readiness to resort to the United Nations even when vital national interests are at stake, and

WHEREAS, the American people have not been adequately informed as to the facts which prompted the President to make his report to Congress on March 12, 1947, asking for aid to Greece and Turkey on a unilateral basis,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee that President Truman, Secretary Marshall and the Congress of the United States be vigorously urged to reconsider the pending Greco-Turkish policy, to the end that the dire needs of the suffering Greek people be promptly and generously met through the United Nations by means of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the establishing by it of a United Nations Advisory Mission for Greece, as recommended by the F. A. O. report, or by other means within the jurisdiction and under the supervision of the United Nations, and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that these leaders be cautioned to refrain from all military action which runs counter to the proper functioning of the Security Council of the United Nations, of which the United States is now a member, and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that America must exert all its great influence, prestige and power to insure the growing success of the United Nations as the sole hope of a civilized and democratic "one world", and

BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED that copies of this resolution be sent to the President, to Senators Downey and Knowland, to the representatives in Congress from Southern California, and to the press.

Adopted by Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee Tuesday, April 8, 1947, upon the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on Post War Planning and International Affairs.

The Democratic Party of California, aware that developments of modern science have linked the far corners of the world and brought ever closer associations on our own Continent, affirm our faith in certain fundamental principles.

FIRST: We believe that human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms are most likely to be realized under the American form of Democracy.

SECOND: We believe neither our own people nor new adherents elsewhere will continue to have faith in our Democracy unless we prove conclusively that more than any other system it can secure human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms.

THIRD: We believe the only justified use of armed force is against a proven aggressor seeking by force of arms and unlawful methods to destroy opposition.

FOURTH: We believe that inasmuch as atomic power can easily destroy all civilization and humanity, the United States of America bears the heaviest responsibility in installing methods of peaceful mediation and settlement for the conflicts of Peoples and Governments.

Believing thus, we feel it is our duty to state clearly our alarm at domestic legislation which, under the guise of curbing the abuses of certain leaders and groups of organized labor, actually destroys the safeguards of economic and social liberty won so recently by the men and women of labor. We heartily commend President Truman for his veto of the Republican-sponsored Taft-Hartley Bill, a measure primarily designed, not to correct abuses within organized labor, but to emasculate the legitimate safeguards of collective bargaining.

We believe also that the people should be told that under the guise of an attack upon a "labor monopoly," the Republican Party is fostering an ever increasing Corporation or Business Monopoly. It is an undeniable fact that the Federal Trade Commission has warned of a greatly accelerated pace of postwar business mergers and has ascribed high prices directly to them..."Monopoly waxes fatter than ever." Three companies account for 89 percent of American automobiles; gasoline prices rise, even at minute fractional changes, exactly together; four companies have 85 per cent of our structural steel capacity; four more make all our (prefab. roofing shingles and ten per cent of corporations control 90 per cent of our corporate wealth. These are the sure signs that the Republican Party is making an attack upon Labor the excuse for allowing our competitive system to become one of monopoly at the expense of every little business man and woman in the country. We therefore urge that the Democratic Party, nationally, put its full weight behind the legislation proposed by Senator O'Mahoney and Representative Keefe which would put some real strength in the Anti-trust Acts, and we urge that the Department of Justice vigorously prosecute those who are menacing our competitive free price system. We heartily commend the President for his courage and wisdom in vetoing the inequitable Knutson Tax Bill; now that the Republican leadership has reintroduced it in the Congress, we urge him to stand firm in again vetoing.

The Democratic State Committee of California believes that it has the responsibility to inform the national leaders of our Party of constructive suggestions made in our State. Surely no man or woman today in public life has all the answers to the many complex problems which face us, most especially in the field of international relations. We feel that the greatest proof of our loyalty to our Country is to give to President Truman the benefit of the considered thinking of the no bars

of our Party in this State.

We endorse wholeheartedly the President's stated principles that:

- A. We should do everything within our power to bring relief to the suffering people of the world from hunger and economic want and that such relief should know no political boundaries.
- B. That, as perhaps the only strong creditor nation left in the civilized world, we should insure that no peoples should be forced to adopt political ideologies of any nature whatsoever because of economic or armed aggression against him.

It is in the spirit of this idealism that we understand the "Truman Doctrine" to have been conceived. We find, however, that while there is overwhelming support for these worthy aims there is a growing concern as to the method of achieving them.

In war time it may not be possible to fully take the whole people into the confidence of the national leadership; in peace time it must be done. We therefore urge that the President, the Secretary of State, and all other qualified officials publicly discuss the full implications of our foreign policy in far greater detail than has yet been done. The Democrats of California feel that it was under the leadership of our Party, and here in our own State, that the United Nations was born as the key instrument to a lasting peace. We, therefore, insist that the strongest possible steps and the strongest possible active policy of cooperation with the United Nations Organization must come from our Democratic Administration.

Concretely, we feel that a way should be found to place the responsibility for the execution of the principles of the "Truman Doctrine" upon the United Nations. If adequate machinery for the carrying out of such responsibilities does not now exist within the framework of the United Nations, we urge that the United States take the initiative in every possible way for establishing such machinery.

(Unilateral action in international matters must be abolished;

only by so doing can that mutual trust among nations essential to lasting peace be fully achieved.)

As the strongest of the nations and the one whose people have the highest standard of living and which by the Democratic processes have most nearly achieved the Four Freedoms, the United States has the obligation to maintain bold leadership in support of the United Nations.

We recognize frankly that some countries have not yet lost their fears of Old World power politics. Russia in particular, struggling to rise from czarist serfdom and having suffered repeatedly from aggression, will be slow in accepting the unselfish idealism which must be the guiding principle for all members of the United Nations. However, we feel that eventually all nations, including Russia, must and will repudiate unilateral action and support wholeheartedly the principle of international cooperation. Any other course, inevitably means obliteration by atomic warfare.

Without the threat of war differing economic systems will be judged solely on their accomplishments for mankind; we confidently reassert our faith in the American way of life.

Recognizing that political stability throughout the world will be the most effective climate not only for the preservation of world peace, but in which to produce more rapid economic recovery and increased world trade, we nevertheless believe that neither American arms nor American money for arms should be loaned or given to any Country unless this matter has first been presented to the United Nations. We recognize frankly that as long as the veto power exists in the Security Council it will probably not be possible for that particular organ of the United Nations to take effective action on all occasions which may menace the peace of the world. However, the General Assembly of the United Nations is specifically authorized by

Article XI of the Charter to consider any "question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security"; it is our contention that any prospective gift or loan of arms or money for arms on the part of any nation comes in this category and should first be presented to the General Assembly for a thorough airing before the court of opinion of the peoples of the world. Furthermore, Article XLV of the Charter specifically states that "the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." We hope that our Government will take full advantage of this provision of the United Nations Charter. We frankly recognize that a large proportion of the money for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the world will be of American origin, but again we emphasize that where such funds are to be used specifically for armament the situation automatically becomes one that does menace international peace and therefore should be promptly and completely brought before the General Assembly. It should be re-emphasized, moreover, that in the General Assembly no nation can use the veto or the threat of veto.

We endorse the principles of the "Marshall Plan" both because these principles offer the most likely prospect for the stabilization of European life and because the Plan itself clearly falls within the regional arrangements specifically authorized by the Charter of the United Nations in Article 52.

We respectfully suggest and urge that a definite policy for giving the people of the world factual information in regard to the working of American democracy via radio, the interchange of students and the encouragement of visitors, cultural and trade, to and from our shores should be given a most prominent place in our program.

We condemn the penny-wise policy of the Republican Party in curtailing the information service of our Department of State, especially when we realize that it has been merely proposed that we spend for the selling of Democracy a sum of money smaller than the advertising budget of many of our national business concerns.

We feel strongly that a definite program to convince the Russian people of our friendship and our horror of any possible war between us should be devised immediately.

We reiterate again that the greatest assurance of lasting peace and the activation of democracy throughout the world will come from a steadfast and successful economy here in our own country. The path of unemployment is the road to war.

We make these suggestions in order that the great body of people in our country desiring to achieve world peace and the principles of American Democracy may know with certainty the position advocated by the Democratic Party of California.

Respectfully submitted,

George E. Outland
Chairman, Policy Committee

EDWIN W. PAULEY

716 SOUTH BROADWAY
LOS ANGELES, 14, CALIFORNIA

May 28, 1947

Colonel James Roosevelt, Chairman
Democratic State Central Committee
Hotel Alexandria
Los Angeles, California

Dear Jimmy:


I have your mimeographed letter of May 25 to all members of the Executive Committee of the State Central Committee, and am returning herewith my ballot marked "No."

I hasten to do this for reasons discussed with you over the phone. Not only do I disapprove of many of the phases of the policy outlined but in the manner in which it is handled. It is undemocratic and obviously intended to embarrass people within our own Party. I know of no way of dividing the Democratic ranks more quickly than by a procedure of the kind outlined in your letter of May 25 along with its attachments.

If such a procedure is followed I shall be compelled to do all within my power to renounce it.

With kindest regards, I am

Most sincerely,



May 31, 1947

Mr. Edwin W. Pauley
National Committeemen from California
756 South Broadway
Los Angeles 14, California

Dear Ed:

I have your letter of May 28. Naturally, I am disappointed that you are not in agreement with the Statement of Policy submitted by the Policy Committee.

I do not quite understand what you mean when you say that the manner in which the policy is handled is undemocratic and intended to embarrass people within our own Party. Every step taken in the formulation of the policy was in accordance with the properly recorded votes of the Executive Committee of the Democratic State Central Committee, and I am only sorry that you have not been able to attend those meetings so that you could be more familiar with the steps which have been taken.

Also, I cannot see why a statement of policy should necessarily divide Democratic ranks, unless, as you told me on the telephone, you feel it is not proper for Party members sincerely to offer suggestions to the leadership of the Party for the improvement of existing policy. I doubt very much whether President Truman would ever take such an attitude. The press has repeatedly reported the President's interviews with the Party leaders of other States who have frankly made suggestions similar to those contained in the policy statement; these, the President has received in the spirit in which they were intended.

From your letter, however, I gather that you are not in agreement with such an attitude. I want to go on record as saying that I believe if the

Mr. Edwin Pauley

No. 2

May 31, 1947

time ever comes when leaders of the Party try to strangle constructive criticism merely for the sake of trying to give the appearance of a false unity, the Party would certainly die - as it should.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding between us, I want to go on record again as saying that I believe the Democratic Party, under whose leadership the United Nations was created, bears a most special responsibility for the growth of that institution. I feel that our present foreign policy needs some vital changes if this is to be accomplished, and that our present actions, therefore, need considerable revision. I am sure that the President will welcome the knowledge that a strong body of opinion exists in this State in agreement with this principle, and I am hopeful that he will give it the fullest consideration. That is all the policy statement asks him to do.

For the sake of the democratic reputation of our Party I hope you will take no steps which would appear to attempt to deprive Party members from the expression of honest opinions, especially when the motivation is one of assistance to and strengthening of our Party leadership and which, at least at this time, contains no element of animosity.

Kindest regards to you.

Most sincerely,

JAMES ROOSEVELT
Chairman, Democratic
State Central Committee

June 3rd 1947.

Hon. James Roosevelt, Chairman
Democratic State Central Committee
Los Angeles, California

Dear Colonel Roosevelt:

I am in receipt of the Political Statement of the Democratic State Central Committee, which your secretary kindly sent me in response to my request of several days ago for a copy of this document.

You asked for my opinion of this Statement after I had an opportunity to study it. I have read the document carefully, and will give you briefly my opinion for what it may be worth. I will not undertake to go to really necessary length at this time, but will confine my expressions to somewhat general opinion. I do wish, however, definitely, at the outset, to be understood as approving of many, and perhaps most, of the liberal recommendations of this Political Statement.

It is my opinion that the document, in its present form, is not suited to general distribution at such a party celebration as the Jackson Day Dinner next Thursday night. My reason for this opinion is that the Statement is, in part, a criticism of past actions of Democratic public or party officials on matters of important international policy, however merited, and thus opens the way for controversy and perhaps ill feeling, incompatible with that is intended to be a Democratic love feast and a gathering primarily for advancing Democratic principle, or for criticism of the opposition party and its program. Certainly, criticism of Democratic public officials by Democratic party officials on such an occasion can only tend to give joy and satisfaction to the Republicans, and would, in my opinion, accomplish no worth-while purpose at this time.

It would be altogether proper, it seems to me, for the Statement to recommend future policies and procedure for the party and its elected officials. To illustrate this point I think I can hardly do better than quote from an address by Pope Pius XII on the immense subject of accomplishing World Peace, delivered at Vatican City yesterday:

"We have before our eyes a higher purpose than to pass judgment on what has been done. We wish to forestall now any greater evils in the near and distant future."


Hon. James Roosevelt - 2

At the Jackson Day Dinner next Thursday, you have scheduled to speak a member of President Truman's Cabinet, who doubtless sat in the official conferences at Washington, and no doubt there approved the policy that is criticized in the Statement. Another scheduled speaker is the directing head of the Democratic National Committee. Neither of these gentlemen could hardly be expected to acclaim this document in its present form.

Without going into any detail in this letter, I feel I must say to you that, in my humble judgment, the document in many respects is not well done. Considering the source, this is somewhat of a surprise to me, and it is my opinion that the Statement is open to valid criticism in several particulars and ought to be more carefully edited. It is probably too late for anyone to undertake now to edit this Political Statement for use at the Jackson dinner. I have not been given any previous opportunity ~~to~~ to see it, but I do think that the document should be given more careful consideration before it is made public in any way. I would be glad to talk it over with you and tell you in detail what I think is wrong with it, if you care to have my opinion at this late date.

I believe that I can see a likelihood of very considerable inharmony, bickering and strife within the party resulting from any official promulgation of the document in its present form.

Sincerely yours,


JOHN E. ELLIOTT

JBE:j

OFFICE OF
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
550 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO 11, CALIFORNIA
DOUGLAS 2838

EDMUND G. BROWN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY

June 5, 1947

Colonel James Roosevelt
Chairman, Democratic State
Central Committee
Alexandria Hotel Room 933
Los Angeles, California

Dear Jim:

I think the statement of policy released
today is outstanding. Keep up the good work and get
more of these releases.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Ed", written over the typed name.

EDMUND G. BROWN
District Attorney

EGB:AS

July 1, 1947

Dear Fellow Democrat:

Sometime ago, our State Chairman sent out a proposed "Statement of Policy." It is, I understand, to be discussed, perhaps modified, and then voted on at a forthcoming State Convention to be held sometime in July or August.

Personally, I feel that the calling of a meeting at this time to discuss a highly controversial "Statement of Policy" is a step that can only aid the disruptive forces in the Democratic Party.

This meeting is not called to rally all Democrats behind our President and the doctrines he and his Secretary of State have enunciated. In fact, one of its purposes is to debate these policies; and to propose a statement of our own.

This is not assisting Democratic Unity. It is giving a well-publicized platform and an excessive voice to a few dissidents who will use it to criticize the President -- especially as this meeting is called to discuss a "Statement of Policy" in contradiction with the national administration and in disagreement with our State Democratic Platform.

We are a State Committee whose duty is the election of Democrats to office. At this time, our State leadership should not assist the enemies of our administration by giving them a rostrum from which to discuss their brand of foreign policy.

I have urged our State Chairman not to call this meeting, and I have urged him, at any rate, certainly not to place a discussion of foreign policy on the agenda.

Furthermore, the "Statement of Policy" is, in my opinion, a most ill-advised statement.

Other than by giving a spring-board to those who want to launch into divisive speeches, I fail to see its function. Unlike the regular party platform, which is mentioned in the Election Code, and which, theoretically at least, all candidates are pledged to support, any "Statement of Policy" can only be binding on those who agree to adopt it. It certainly cannot influence any incumbent who ran on the old platform, nor can it be in any way binding on the Democratic Party or the next State Convention in 1948.

The 1946 Platform of the Democratic Party of California is quite exhaustive and complete. It contains an anti-communist preamble (which the Statement of Policy does not), and a full endorsement of President Truman's foreign policies (which the "Statement of Policy" does not).

-2-

I suggest the Committee simply re-endorse the State Platform.

In any policy that is adopted, if the State leadership does not insert an anti-Communist Statement, I hope the membership will.

This "Statement of Policy" as submitted by George Outland, endorsed by James Roosevelt and sent to the State Committeemen, says, in its section on foreign affairs:

"Neither American arms nor American money for arms should be loaned or given to any country unless the proper United Nations authority has certified that such loans or arms are necessary to resist outside aggression. We specifically include Greece and Turkey."

That sort of statement should not appear even in a draft of a Democratic policy proposal.

Such certification of aggression can only be given if Russia approves. And Russia has vetoed even the consideration of such matters by the United Nations. So what that statement actually says is that "America should send no arms to any country resisting Russian aggression unless we get Russian approval."

Russia today occupies the same position in international politics that Germany did in 1933-39. Already Russia has over-run more countries than Hitler did before the war. Just as appeasement of Hitler led to war, so will appeasement of Stalin lead to war.

The best chance of peace is not to overlook the Russian concentration camps, their savage holding of families as political hostages, their mass arrests, their secret police. The best chance for peace is to constantly expose and oppose totalitarianism, whether in a red or black shirt.

The best chance of peace is to continue the policies of President Roosevelt: Aid to the free peoples of the world; Defend the rights of small nations to freedom from external coercion; Quarantine the aggressor; Assist countries resisting aggression. And that is precisely what President Truman is doing.

-3-


Whether it is called the Roosevelt or Truman or Marshall Doctrine, I am for the present direction of American foreign policy down to the bricks. We have here a Democratic doctrine with which almost all America agrees. But more important than the fact that Democrats can be elected and re-elected on it, the Truman Doctrine is the best thing for our country and the best hope for free men all over the world.

Feeling that way, naturally I am opposed to any statement of policy that smacks of appeasement to aggression.

If foreign policy is discussed, I hope the Committee will come out of its deliberations with a ringing endorsement of our present foreign policy and the manner in which it is being conducted.

Best personal regards -- and a Truman victory in 1948.

WR/icg


Will Rogers, Jr.

RE DRAFT OF DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

ON

NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Democratic Party of California, aware that developments of modern science have linked the far corners of the world and brought ever closer associations on our own Continent, affirm our faith in certain fundamental principles.

FIRST: We believe that human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms are most likely to be realized under the American form of Democracy.

SECOND: We believe neither our own people nor new adherents elsewhere will continue to have faith in our Democracy unless we prove conclusively that more than any other system it can secure human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms.

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FOURTH: We believe that inasmuch as atomic power can easily destroy all civilization and humanity, the United States of America bears the heaviest responsibility in installing methods of peaceful mediation and settlement for the conflicts of Peoples and Governments.

Believing thus, we feel it is our duty to state clearly our alarm at domestic legislation which, under the guise of curbing the abuses of certain leaders and groups of organized labor, actually destroys the safeguards of economic and social liberty won so recently by the men and women of labor. We heartily commend President Truman for his veto of the Republican-sponsored Taft-Hartley Bill, a measure primarily designed, not to correct abuses within organized labor, but to emasculate the legitimate safeguards of collective bargaining.

We believe also that the people should be told that under the guise of an attack upon a "labor monopoly", the Republican Party is fostering an ever increasing Corporation or Business Monopoly. It is an undeniable fact that the Federal Trade Commission has warned of a greatly accelerated pace of postwar business mergers and has ascribed high prices directly to them... "Monopoly waxes fatter than ever." Three companies account for 89 percent of American automobiles; gasoline prices rise, even at minute fractional changes, exactly together; four companies have 85 percent of our structural steel capacity; four more make all our (prefab.) roofing shingles and ten percent of corporations control 90 percent of our corporate wealth. These are the sure signs that the Republican Party is making an attack upon Labor the excuse for allowing our competitive system to become one of monopoly at the expense of every little business man and woman in the country. We therefore urge that the Democratic Party, nationally, put its full weight behind the legislation proposed by Senator O'Mahoney and Representative Kefauver which would put some real strength in the Anti-trust Acts, and we urge that the Department of Justice vigorously prosecute those who are menacing our competitive free price system. We heartily commend the President for his courage and wisdom in vetoing the inequitable Knutson Tax Bill; now that the Republican leadership has reintroduced it in the Congress, we urge him to stand firm in again vetoing.

The Democratic State Committee of California believes that it has the responsibility to inform the national leaders of our Party of constructive suggestions made in our State. Surely no man or woman today in public life has all the answers to the many complex problems which face us, most especially in the field of international relations. We feel that the greatest proof of our loyalty to our Country is to give to President Truman the benefit of the considered thinking of the members of our Party in this State.

We endorse wholeheartedly the President's stated principles that:

- A. We should do everything within our power to bring relief to the suffering people of the world from hunger and economic want and that such relief should know no political boundaries.
- B. That, as perhaps the only strong creditor nation left in the civilized world, we should insure that no peoples should be forced to adopt political ideologies of any nature whatsoever because of economic or armed aggression against him.

It is in the spirit of this idealism that we understand the "Truman Doctrine" to have been conceived.

In war time it may not be possible to fully take the whole people into the confidence of the national leadership; in peace time it must be done. We therefore urge that the President, the Secretary of State, and all other qualified officials publicly discuss the full implications of our foreign policy. The Democrats of California feel that it was under the leadership of our Party, and here in our own State, that the United Nations was born as the key instrument to a lasting peace. We, therefore, insist that the strongest possible steps and the strongest possible active policy of cooperation with the United Nations Organization must come from our Democratic Administration.

We urge that the United States take the initiative in every possible way for establishing adequate machinery within the United Nations organization for achieving world peace and the economic recovery of the world.

Unilateral action in international matters must be abolished; only by so doing can that mutual trust among nations essential to lasting peace be fully achieved.

As the strongest of the nations and the one whose people have the highest standard of living and which by the Democratic processes have most nearly achieved the Four Freedoms, the United States has the obligation to maintain bold leadership in support of the United Nations.

We recognize frankly that some countries have not yet lost their fears of Old World power politics. Russia in particular, struggling to rise from czarist serfdom and having suffered repeatedly from aggression, will be slow in accepting the unselfish idealism which must be the guiding principle for all members of the United Nations. However, we feel that eventually all nations, including Russia, must and will repudiate unilateral action and support wholeheartedly the principle of international cooperation. Any other course, inevitably means obliteration by atomic warfare.

Without the threat of war differing economic systems will be judged solely on their accomplishments for mankind; we confidently reassert our faith in the American way of life.

Recognizing that political stability throughout the world will be the most effective climate not only for the preservation of world peace, but in which to produce more rapid economic recovery and increased world trade, we nevertheless believe that neither American arms nor American money for arms should be loaned or given to any Country unless this matter has first been presented to the United Nations. We recognize frankly that as long as the veto power exists in the Security Council it will probably not be possible for that particular organ of the United Nations to take effective action on all occasions which may menace the peace of the world. However, the General Assembly of the United Nations is specifically authorized by Article XI of the Charter to consider any "question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security"; it is our contention that any prospective gift or loan of arms or money for arms on the part of any nation comes in this category and should first be presented to the General Assembly for a thorough airing before the court of opinion of the peoples of the world. Furthermore, Article XIV of the Charter specifically states that "the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." We hope that our Government will take full advantage of this provision of the United Nations Charter. We frankly recognize that a large proportion of the money for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the world will be of American origin, but again we emphasize that where such funds are to be used specifically for armament the situation automatically becomes one that does menace international peace and therefore should be promptly and completely brought before the General Assembly. It should be re-emphasized, moreover, that in the General Assembly no nation can use the veto or the threat of veto.

We endorse the principles of the "Marshall Plan" both because these principles offer the most likely prospect for the stabilization of European life and because the Plan itself clearly falls within the regional arrangements specifically authorized by the Charter of the United Nations in Article 52. We regret the failure of the Russian Government to cooperate with the Marshall Plan and we urge that she reverse her decision and lend her influence and leadership in establishing a basis of mutual trust among all nations.

We respectfully suggest and urge that a definite policy for giving the people of the world factual information in regard to the working of American democracy via radio, the interchange of students and the encouragement of visitors, cultural and trade, to and from our shores should be given a most prominent place in our program.

We condemn the penny-wise policy of the Republican Party in curtailing the information service of our Department of State, especially when we realize that it has been merely proposed that we spend for the selling of Democracy a sum of money smaller than the advertising budget of many of our national business concerns.

We feel strongly that a definite program to convince the Russian people of our friendship and our horror of any possible war between us should be devised immediately.

We reiterate again that the greatest assurance of lasting peace and the activation of democracy throughout the world will come from a steadfast and successful economy here in our own country. The path of unemployment is the road to war.

We make these suggestions in order that the great body of people in our country desiring to achieve world peace and the principles of American Democracy may know with certainty the position advocated by the Democratic Party of California.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. OUTLAND
Chairman, Policy Committee

STATEMENT OF POLICY OF THE California Democratic State Central Committee

Adapted at the Meeting of July 26, 1947

PREAMBLE

At all times in a democratic society, it is essential that the people know and understand the principles for which their political parties stand. Now, in a period of international and domestic crisis, more than ever before does it become imperative that the Democratic party, the traditionally progressive party of California, reaffirm its faith in the basic democratic principles of equality of opportunity for all persons, the capability of human beings to govern their own destinies, and the maximum amount of individual liberty consistent with the liberty of others. It also becomes imperative for our party to re-state its position on the vital issues facing the state, the nation, and the world, confident that through such action will the people of California recognize that leadership which they are so desperately seeking, and which the Republican party in control has completely failed to give them.

We frankly state that, in our increasingly complex economic and social system, we believe it will become more and more necessary for us to plan as a people. We contend that it is only through intelligent and far-sighted planning on the part of our state and national governments that we can cope with the problems facing us, that we can bring a greater share of prosperity to more people, indeed, that in the long run we can survive as a nation. We maintain that it is only through such intelligent and far-sighted planning that we can conserve our rapidly dwindling national resources, that we can best utilize our wonderful human resources and save them from those who for selfish gains would use people as means rather than ends; only thus will the United States be able to realize its full potentialities as the great leader in the international struggle for world peace.

We propose the democratic approach with all plans, international and domestic, openly discussed and conclusions reached by majority rule. Secret arrangements, political or economic, can destroy a democracy; with full and open discussion, a genuinely free press and radio, and the ever-present power of the ballot, the American people can choose—they can reject those plans which they disapprove and adopt those which they believe will best serve them. This does not mean regimentation, but its exact opposite; it is only through such democratic planning that we can eliminate the constant crises of war and depression which bring necessary regulation and regimentation.

We can no longer afford to let nature take its course and then meet emergency after emergency with careless, haphazard efforts. We must anticipate and plan in advance just as every successful business man and every professional man plans intelligently for the days ahead.

As long as the people by their vote retain the ultimate control of their Destiny, we have nothing to fear, not even fear itself.

We denounce those who contend that such social planning means the end of individual enterprise; we contend that for the salvation of our free enterprise system, and for the maintenance of the greatest possible amount of individual initiative, social planning is essential. Wars and depressions we have always had but WE NEED NOT ALWAYS HAVE THEM. However, their elimination will not come about simply by hoping and wishing; we must plan and we must work. The Democratic party of California takes its stand firmly for such planning and such working as will bring the maximum amount of prosperity and a state of permanent peace to all peoples everywhere.

HOUSING:

We hold that it is the responsibility of Government to provide decent housing for that section of our population which private enterprise cannot reach. At least one-third of our population as described by the late President Roosevelt in his famous speech on the state of the Nation, is ill-housed. We have been justly shocked at the conditions under which our veterans are compelled to live at the present time. It is essential that we recognize the present emergency, with particular reference to the need for providing decent homes for the veterans of this State, but a permanent solution for

the provision of decent homes for all the people in California is also an immediate problem.

WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING LEGISLATION:

That the State Housing Authority created at the last Legislature be provided with the funds to assist communities to provide decent homes for (1) those veterans who cannot be reached by the ordinary operation of private enterprise and (2) for those individuals who are compelled to live in the slums of the cities, towns and rural areas of the State. We also favor an amendment of that act authorizing the State Housing Authority to itself provide homes where necessary.

We also recommend that funds be made available to aid the communities is carrying out an urban redevelopment program under the terms of the Community Redevelopment Act passed by the California Legislature in 1945. We condemn the refusal of the Republican-controlled Legislature to accept the workable housing program offered by Democratic leaders in the State Legislature. We demand a special session of the Legislature to deal with the emergency problem of housing.

FULL AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT:

Every citizen able to work and willing to work is entitled to a job. This holds true regardless of color, creed or national origin. The danger of unemployment as the result of Republican policy is growing. We deny that this has to be. Rather do we believe that it is not only possible, but that it is our duty to take steps now to prevent unemployment.

We recommend the immediate establishment of a State Commission, empowered to cooperate fully with the machinery of the Federal Government to assist in the providing of work in the event that such individuals are unable to obtain jobs in the private enterprise system. Full employment means fair employment. There are those who believe that education alone can assure fair employment practices. The Democratic Party believes that although education is an important element, fair employment practices cannot be assured without specific legislation.

RENT CONTROL:

In spite of the continued acute housing shortage the Federal rent control program has been demolished by the Republican-dominated Congress. In addition Congress made it impossible for the states to enact their own rent control legislation. Step by step rent control effectiveness has been undermined, as was pointed out by President Truman. This action by the Republican-dominated Congress has created additional chaos for millions of people whose rent bills are being sharply increased. While it is important that all war controls, including rent control, be terminated at the earliest possible moment, that moment has not yet arrived.

We recommend that the Governor call a special session of the Legislature to enact stand-by rent control legislation, especially as regards giving tenants additional protection against evictions.

MINIMUM WAGE:

In return for a decent day's work, a living wage must be paid: The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act marked a milestone in legislation to provide more adequate wages for the American working man. However, this Act was only the first step in the right direction.

In the light of present day economic conditions, the Democratic Party of California recommends that in this State legislation be enacted providing for a minimum wage for all people of at least seventy-five cents per hour.

The great gains in the standards of living of the working man of America have come because of the principle of collective bargaining. The Wagner Labor Relations Act has been called—and rightly—the Magna Carta of labor.

The Democratic Party strongly reaffirms the right of collective bargaining and condemns the Republican attacks that are being made on a State and National scale against this principle. It is important to state also that every right has a corresponding responsibility. This is true of management and labor alike. The Democratic Party believes that the preservation of labor's basic right to organize, bargain collectively, strike and picket peacefully are essential to the continued economic well-being of all the people.

We therefore deplore the anti-labor legislation adopted by the Republican-controlled state Legislature and approved by the Republican Governor. We believe that it is designed to place more power in the hands of the already powerful monopoly interests.

TAXATION:

The basic principle of fair taxation is ability to pay. The income taxes with their exemptions and all other taxes under the control of the State should be based on this principle. We further recommend that when tax reductions are feasible they be made by reducing the sales tax.

HEALTH:

The health of the individual is as important as his education. Adequate medical care must be made available to everyone. The great unfilled need is now for those in the lower and middle income groups. Republican leadership has proved its inability, nationally and in this State, to take any steps toward the solution of this problem. The Republican Governor's recommendations following the recommendation of his Democratic predecessor, have been repudiated by a Republican-controlled Legislature.

The Democratic Party believes that it is possible to provide a fair and adequate health program in cooperation with the forward-looking members of the medical profession of California. Many prominent physicians have endorsed the principles contained in the program suggested to the Congress of the United States by President Truman. On the State level we recommend the enactment of similar measures

We further recommend that the maximum amount of State and Federal funds be utilized to enable counties and municipalities to construct hospitals and other facilities necessary for the even distribution of health facilities in the counties and municipalities of the State.

EDUCATION:

The Democratic Party in the last election specifically endorsed the initiative proposal guaranteeing a minimum salary for teachers of \$2,400 and additional state support of schools. However, we cannot stop here. California has long been in the vanguard in the recognition of its responsibility to veterans, children and youth. Its standards and its compensation to the teachers in the educational field are higher than those prevailing in most of the states of the Nation. However, much yet remains to be done. More State aid to impoverished school districts to provide more adequate school buildings, more and better equipped teachers and facilities of all types must be provided from the nursery schools through the university.

One of the great American educational traditions is freedom of expression. Schools must be free to explore and teachers free to create. The Democratic Party condemns with all of its force the Republican Tenney Committee's effort to stifle educational opportunity by indulging in the un-American practice of persecuting school teachers and attempting to dictate school policies.

Education should not be a political football. We condemn those Republican legislators who are attempting to make it so, and we commend the educational leaders and clear-thinking citizens of both parties who have joined in the fight for academic freedom.

We believe the State should assume the responsibility for an adequate school luncheon program in case the present Federal program is mutilated by the Republican Congress.

We enthusiastically endorse every measure designed to raise educational standards in California. We believe that nursery schools should be included as an integral and permanent part of the educational system of the State.

California, historically, has generally recognized its obligations to its veterans. It established one of the most forward-looking and progressive aids to the veterans of World War I seeking homes of any state of the Nation, and it expanded this particular type of aid to the veterans of World War II. However, while the overall and basic problem of care for the veteran is

the responsibility of the Federal Government, the State of California is faced with a special problem by reason of the many veterans who have come into the State intending to make their homes here and those who continue to come in the future.

These veterans are one of the State's greatest assets, and at the same time they represent a special responsibility which immediately demands attention beyond that which the Federal Government can be justly called upon to provide. This responsibility reaches out into fields of housing, employment, education, health—in fact every phase of our social and economic life. The Federal Government will provide much of this assistance, but in view of the tremendous population growth of California the aid which the Federal Government will give, although adequate in many other parts of the country, will not begin to meet the responsibility facing the State of California.

The Legislative and Executive branches must recognize these additional responsibilities and take appropriate steps to meet them. We wish to emphasize again the vital importance of housing in this connection and demand the Republican State Administration take concrete steps to meet this problem.

PENSIONS:

Year by year more and more of our citizens reach the age of sixty without adequate means of support. These men and women have devoted the productive years of their lives to our society and they are entitled to security during their later years. If they are to enjoy the years which are ahead of them the State must assume a greater part of the responsibility of providing them with adequate means for the maintenance of a decent standard of living.

Therefore, we recommend that the State, in cooperation with the Federal Government, take necessary legislative steps at the earliest possible moment to insure an income of at least \$85.00 a month at sixty years of age. We further recommend that provisions be made for adequate increases above the basic amount whenever prices rise. We call upon the State Legislature to enact legislation which will make pensions to our senior citizens a matter of right rather than charity by elimination of the relatives' responsibility provisions of the present law.

FARM CREDIT:

During the past twenty years thousands of small farms throughout this and other states have been saved from the auction block by national farm credit agencies. At the present time there is an increasing danger that the Republican-controlled Congress may discontinue such Federal agencies.

In anticipation of this possibility, we recommend the establishment of State farm credit machinery to assume this obligation in the event that national farm credit agencies are discontinued.

SMALL BUSINESS:

The basic unit in American economic life has always been the small businessman. In recent years there has been a dangerous trend toward concentration of industrial strength and power to the end that the individual small businessman has suffered—sometimes to the extent of being driven out of business. Private monopolies are as dangerous to our free enterprise system as any of the "isms" which are so frequently mentioned.

We recommend that the State, in cooperation with the Federal Government, take adequate steps to protect the individual small businessman against the encroachments of monopolies, cartels, or any unfair discrimination.

We call attention to the existence of a State Anti-trust Law which under Republican control has been ignored. We call for the re-establishment in the Attorney General's office of an active and honest Anti-trust Division.

TRANSPORTATION:

The State must not only assume the responsibility for developing a highway system in California, but it must also carry the major portion of the burden for the development of a cheap rapid transit system within the great metropolitan areas of the State which will relate the home to the job, both insofar as time and economy are concerned. Furthermore, since our farmers depend upon adequate transportation facilities to carry their products from farm to market, it is essential that adequate roads be built in our rural areas.

Therefore, we recommend the immediate establishment of a State Transportation Authority clothed with adequate powers and adequate funds to develop and place into operation plans for the building and financing of rapid transit systems within the metropolitan areas of the State and a system of rural highways fully adequate to meet the farm to market needs of our farmers.

NATURAL RESOURCES:

The natural resources of the State cannot be left to uncontrolled exploitation. The welfare, present and future, of the people of this State depends upon a firm defense of this position. Since the indirect method of regulation will not produce the full potentialities of the great natural resources of California, the Democratic Party believes that it is essential that these resources be developed by a public authority. At the present time the most important development of the natural resources in California is that of the great Central Valley Project.

The Democratic Party strongly recommends that the work of the Central Valley Project be centralized in the hands of the Bureau of Reclamation of the United States Department of the Interior. We call upon all Democrats in this state to make their voices heard in Washington in protest against the Republican efforts at false economy. If these funds are not restored, millions of dollars of potential food supply will never be realized and thousands of family-sized farms for our veterans will not be created. We favor public distribution of hydro-electric power developed in the Central Valley Project.

We believe furthermore that it is only wise and just that the traditional 160 acre limits be maintained.

CROSS-FILING:

The two-party system is essential to the protection of our political democracy. In order to preserve this two-party system, we must establish within each party a sense of responsibility toward those policies which it upholds and those persons which it selects for public office. The system of cross-filing prevailing in this State jeopardizes this system of party responsibility. It confuses the voters and it tends to cause candidates for public office to "straddle the fence" and not take a firm stand on essential public issues.

We are strongly opposed to this cross-filing system and we pledge ourselves to take the leadership in the effort to repeal it.

LOBBYING:

The Democratic Party recognizes that the pressure of powerful interests has long had too great an influence on the Legislature. Legitimate representation of groups before the Legislature and its committees, should be encouraged, but the existence of a large number of professional lobbyists who offer their services for pay and who have themselves become wealthy in this dubious activity, opens the door to corruption and has aroused justified suspicions that a great deal of corruption has gone on and is going on.

In order to improve conditions we urge the passage of a bill requiring not only the registration of all lobbyists but a yearly accounting of their income and expenditures.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH:

We recommend that legislation be enacted to guarantee that all publicly-owned forums of public expression be available without censorship or political control for the purposes of public discussion upon all political and economic matters.

CONCLUSION:

The Democratic Party will go forward in its traditional liberal and progressive spirit. It is our conviction that our American democracy is the political affirmation of the religious concept of the brotherhood of man.

NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Democratic Party of California, aware that developments of modern science have linked the far corners of the world and brought ever closer associations on our Continent, affirm our faith in certain fundamental principles.

FIRST: We believe that human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms are most likely to be realized under the American form of democracy. Totalitarianism, whether it finds expression in fascism or communism has no place in our free land.

SECOND: We believe neither our own people nor new adherents elsewhere will continue to have faith in our democracy unless we prove that more than any other system it can secure human progress, individual liberties and the Four Freedoms. *The surest way to forestall communism and fascism in our country is to make democracy work.*

THIRD: We believe that inasmuch as atomic power can easily destroy our civilization and humanity, the United States of America bears the heaviest responsibility in the matter of encouraging methods of peaceful mediation and settlement for the conflicts of Peoples and Governments.

Believing thus, we feel it is our duty to state clearly our alarm at domestic legislation which, under the guise of curbing the abuses of certain leaders and groups of organized labor, actually destroys the safeguards of economic and social liberty won so recently by the men and women of labor. We wholeheartedly commend President Truman's veto of the Republican-sponsored Taft-Hartley bill and we denounce the daring, equivocal, and ambiguous measure which a Republican Congress sought to saddle upon the American people.

We believe also that the people should be told that under the guise of an attack upon a "Labor Monopoly," the Republican Party is fostering an ever increasing Corporation or Business Monopoly. It is an undeniable fact that the Federal Trade Commission has warned of a greatly accelerated pace of postwar business mergers and has ascribed high prices directly to them. . . . "Monopoly waxes fatter than ever." Three companies account for 89 percent of American automobiles; gasoline prices rise, even at minute fractional changes, exactly together; four companies have 85 percent of our structural steel capacity; four more make all our (prefab.) roofing shingles and ten percent of corporations control 90 percent of our corporate wealth. These are the sure signs that the Republican Party is making an attack upon Labor the excuse for allowing our competitive system to become one of monopoly at the expense of every little business man and woman in the country. We therefore urge the country to put its full weight behind the legislation proposed by Senator O'Mahoney and Representative Kefauver which would put some real strength in the Anti-trust Acts, and enable the Department of Justice to vigorously prosecute those who are menacing our competitive free price system. We urge the President to continue to stand fast in his opposition to all tax bills that favor the corporate few, and against any tax legislation which does not first reduce our national debt, especially in these times in which corporate profits are higher than in any period of our history. We point with pride to the ringing messages of President Truman that accompanied his vetoes of Republican-sponsored tax legislation.

The Democratic State Committee of California believes that it has the responsibility to make constructive suggestions to the national leaders of our Party and we believe that President Truman will welcome the considered thinking of the members of our Party in this State.

We endorse wholeheartedly the President's principles that:

- A. *We should do everything within our power to bring relief to the suffering people of the world from hunger and economic want and that such relief should know no political boundaries.*
- B. *That, as perhaps the only strong creditor nation left in the civilized world, we should insure that no peoples should be forced to adopt political ideologies because of economic or armed aggression against them.*

It is in the spirit of this idealism that we understand the "Truman Doctrine" to have been conceived.

The road to peace has not been easy. After the war, it was with amazing unity that the people of this country believed that the outlawry of war was democracy's next great task; that suicide hovered over civilization so long as nations were left no better solution for their problems than a resort to war; that the hour had struck and the time was ripe for the creation of an instrument to gather behind it the organized manhood of the world, bent upon evolving a clearer international conscience, a firmer international law, substituting reason for passion and hate in the field of human affairs.

To that end the United Nations was launched as the key instrument to a lasting peace.

It was clear then and it is increasingly clear now that unilateral action in international matters can be justified only when the exercise of arbitrary vetoes by a member power stalls the functions of the United Nations and renders it impotent.

As the strongest of the nations, and the one whose people have the highest standard of living, and which by the democratic processes have most nearly achieved the Four Freedoms, the United States has the obligation to maintain bold leadership in support of the United Nations. Any nation may be big if it has the size, but it is much harder to be great. Recognizing our responsibility, we place ourselves squarely behind the Marshall Plan as it offers help and hope for the rehabilitation of a war torn world, and at the same time gives the greatest assurance for our own peace and safety in a family of prosperous nations. We indulge the hope that the nations of Eastern Europe may enter the open door to participation in that plan.

We recognize frankly that some countries have not yet lost their fears of Old World power politics. Russia, in particular, struggling to rise from czarist serfdom and having suffered repeatedly from aggression has been slow in accepting the unselfish idealism which must be the guiding principle for all members of the United Nations. Ten times she has exercised her right of veto against the overwhelming weight of world opinion. We feel that eventually the veto must go, as a weapon in the hands of a single nation, for then only can the world have protection against arbitrary unilateral action. Any other course inevitably means obliteration by atomic warfare.

Without the threat of war, differing economic systems will be judged solely on their accomplishments for mankind; we confidently assert our faith in the American way of life.

Recognizing that political stability throughout the world will be the most effective climate in which to produce world trade and economic recovery; recognizing further that the United Nations is the best and may be the last hope for the achievement of world order; we urge continued and increasing effort on the part of America to coordinate, whenever possible, its program for the rehabilitation of Europe with the aims and purposes of the United Nations. Our own contributions will be magnified if we endeavor always to mesh them with the machinery of the United Nations. We covet

the support of the freedom-loving people of the world as expressed through the agency of that organization.

We respectfully urge that a definite policy for giving the people of the world factual information in regard to the working of American democracy, through radio and the interchange of students, should be given a most prominent place in our program. We condemn the penny-wise policy of the Republican Party in curtailing the information service of our Department of State, especially since the proposed expense of selling democracy is a sum of money smaller than the advertising budget of many of our national business concerns.

We feel strongly that every effort should be made to convince the Russian people of our friendship and our horror of any possible war between us. We commend the repeated statement of President Truman that while our nation does not seek to impose our form of government on any other nation, neither do we look with favor upon the action of any other nation that may interfere with the free and peaceful expression in government on the part of its neighbors.

We reiterate that the greatest assurance of lasting peace and the activation of democracy throughout the world will come from a steadfast and successful economy here in our own country. Depression and discontent lead to despair; despair breeds distrust of government and paves the way to an intolerable and inevitable clash between fascism and communism. The path of unemployment is the road to war.

We believe the United States must remain militarily strong while working for and until world disarmament is accomplished.

We make these suggestions in order that the great body of people in our country desiring to achieve world peace and the principles of American Democracy, as we know it, may render their support wholeheartedly to the leadership of the Democratic Party.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. OUTLAND
Chairman, Policy Committee

JAMES ROOSEVELT
Chairman, Democratic State
Central Committee

July 30, 1947

Mr. J. Ray Files
Freston & Files
1010 Bank of America Building
650 South Spring Street
Los Angeles 14, California

Dear Ray:

Just a little note until we get together again to tell you how much I appreciate all the help you have given me in the past few weeks...I know it has been quite a burden. Everything considered, I think the meeting went on in good shape and now we can begin to lay our strategy for the future.

I want also to thank you for the copy of your letter to the President. I think you have stated the situation absolutely clear and I am hoping against hope that they will see the light of day in Washington.

I am looking forward to seeing you next week; and in the meantime, again, my most sincere thanks to you.

Cordially yours,

JAMES ROOSEVELT

LAW OFFICES
FRESTON & FILES

CABLE ADDRESS: FREFILE

HERBERT FRESTON
J. R. FILES
RALPH E. LEWIS
BYDNEY WETZLER
ARTHUR E. FRESTON
ROBERT H. DIETRICH
GORDON L. FILES
CHARLES A. LORING
BION B. VOGEL
H. RICHARD KELLY

1010 BANK OF AMERICA BUILDING
650 SOUTH SPRING STREET
LOS ANGELES 14

IN REPLY REFER TO MR. J. R. Files
FILE NO.

July 28, 1947

President Harry S. Truman
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear President Truman:

Re: Democratic State Committee meeting,
July 26, 1947

As one who sincerely desires your reelection, I am extremely anxious that you may see the California picture clearly.

Undoubtedly you have seen or have been informed of the "Public Statement" and the single resolution adopted by the State Committee at its recent convention. More than 300 members attended and some 250 proxies were sent in from the remainder of an unwieldy committee of 600.

The statute calls for but two meetings of the State Committee - the day it is born and the day it dies. This was the second called, or interim, meeting in history. That is why California has always had a notoriously undisciplined party organization - that, and the fact that the state, 1000 miles in length, always presents geographical difficulties.

James Roosevelt did a bang up job in the face of difficulties that arose from three sources: (1) a lunatic fringe on the left, led by Mr. Henry; (2) some persons seeking to capitalize on your popularity, and spoiling for a fight with a group of very substantial

President Harry S. Truman
7-28-47 --- #2

people who are not red or radical, but who have been very kindly disposed toward Mr. Wallace, even though they can be saved to the Democratic party and to you; and (3) a republican press, always anxious to create or widen a democratic rift.

I was chairman of a subcommittee that rewrote the plank on foreign policy, and also chairman of the resolutions committee that reported by unanimous vote the resolution that was forwarded to you. It was adopted by the convention with almost complete unanimity.

I have been a delegate to four Democratic National Conventions, but have no desire to hold any office or to seek political preferment of any kind. I know, however, that the hope of progressives everywhere - and I claim to be one - is in the Democratic Party. We must save the liberals of this state to the party. Otherwise we can not possibly carry the state. The meeting last Saturday laid the foundation for exactly that. It was good team work, but primarily, major credit belongs to the State Chairman, Colonel Roosevelt. His generous and intelligent handling of the conference dissipated the fears of some and confirmed the hope and confidence of most. No finer political leadership has been shown in this state in my generation.

There has been much loose talk - mostly discussed in the Hearst Press - that there may be two Truman slates of delegates presented at the June 3rd presidential primary. Of course that would be tragic. I hope that some one close to you, and who knows the California score, may aid in preventing such a travesty. We have a peculiar primary statute. There can be no group of uninstructed delegates. Every member of every group must be pledged to a specific candidate. In both 1936 and 1940 a debacle was narrowly averted in that through factional strife, two Roosevelt slates were being assembled. Farley in '36 and Ickes in '40, came out here and composed the situation.

President Harry S. Truman
7-28-47 --- #3

Of course, I should like to see a thoroughly representative delegation - our Congressmen, our Senator, our State Chairman and our National Committeeman and woman placed on the slate - but it would be disastrous if it were to be dominated by Mr. Pauley, and unfortunate if he should stand for reelection. Regardless of his qualities or of your confidence, he does not answer the specific requirements of 1948.

With affectionate regard, I am

Sincerely,

J. R. FILES

JRF:A

VOLUME APPENDIX II

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MINUTES
MEETING, CALIFORNIA DELEGATION
SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1948.

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 2 P.M.,
Saturday, July 10, in Room 456, Benjamin Franklin Hotel, California
Headquarters.

The Secretary read the roll and determined a quorum was present.
47 delegates were present -- 32 alternates were present.

At the suggestion of the Chairman, it was moved by Mr. Maurice
Saeta that the caucus be in executive session of delegates and
alternates, and California press travelling with the delegation,
one member each of the United Press, Associated Press, International
News Service, Mrs. Oliver Carter, Mr. Joe Bender and Mr. Morton
Zeigler as staff members. The motion was seconded, and, after
considerable discussion, it was passed.

The Secretary read the minutes of the previous meeting,
which were approved as read.

Mrs. Ruth Lybeck moved that a second alternate be selected
by the committee on vacancies to serve in the absence of the first
alternate serving in the place of the delegate. It was seconded
and passed.

The Secretary reported on the tentative existing vacancies
in the list of alternates. The report was offered to the sub-
committee on vacancies for recommendation. The Chairman announced
that he had appointed Assemblyman Julian Beck and Mr. Chauncey
Tramutolo to serve with him on this committee.

* Chairman. was Jack Shelley, state senator. . . .

The Chairman made extensive opening remarks. He called attention to the general remarks he had made at the San Luis Obispo Delegation meeting. He reiterated his intention to work for the greatest amount of unity possible and the elimination of geographical division, so that the Delegation would be an effective unit at the Convention.

The Chairman explained the background and history of Section 2304, California Election Code, which sets forth the statement of preference, and in which he had been instrumental in amending at the 1939 session of the Legislature. He called attention to the opinion of the Legislative Council, Deputy Attorney General and several attorneys, both Democratic and Republican. He stated that the conclusion of these opinions set forth that there was no technical legal bind, it was a matter of conscience of each delegate as to his moral obligation.

At this point Mr. Edmund Brown raised a point of order and stated the remarks of the Chairman were not pertinent. The Chair ruled the point of order was not well taken. The Chairman continued his remarks and made a plea that differences of opinion be discussed on the basis of the issue rather than personalities. He also expressed the hope that this procedure could be followed in future, especially in matters of policy and platform.

Assemblyman Vincent Thomas asked for the floor to raise the question "Are we a Truman delegation?" After a short discussion, Assemblyman Julian Beck raised a point of order in that there was no motion on the floor. The Chairman ruled the point was well taken.

Mr. Saeta asked for a call for the order of business.

The Chairman suggested that the question of the next

caucus be settled first. After discussion, Mr. George Ballard moved that the Sunday caucus be dispensed with, and that the next caucus be held at 9:00 o'clock Monday morning. It was seconded and so ordered.

The Chairman then suggested that the agenda also include a discussion of the method of obtaining badges and the discussion of recommendations to the members of the Platform Committee on the general subjects of Taft-Hartley legislation, Indian affairs, Civil Rights, Central Valley, Palestine and Tidelands.

There were no objections to this order of business.

Mr. McDonough then asked for the floor and gave his reasons why he believed that the members of the California Delegation were Truman delegates. Mr. McEnery spoke to the same question, and, after extended remarks, called for the resignation of Mr. James Roosevelt as National Committeeman-elect. After a discussion of the form of the motion, the Chair ruled that the motion had not been properly made. Mr. McEnery then moved that the Delegation ask for the resignation of the National Committeeman-elect, James Roosevelt. The motion was seconded by Will Rogers, Jr. Mr. William Malone rose to oppose the motion. Mr. Patrick McDonough raised a point of order which was ruled out by the Chairman. Mr. Malone continued his discussion. Assemblyman Julian Beck moved that the motion be tabled. After some discussion of parliamentary procedure, the motion was seconded by Mr. Maurice Saeta, and a roll-call was called for. The motion to table was carried by a vote of 40 ayes, 7 noes, 9 absent, one pass, and the Chairman announced the motion was tabled.

Mr. George Ballard asked for reconsideration, and the Chairman ruled him out of order.

Mr. Malone moved that that this delegation go on record as voting for Harry S. Truman on the first ballot. It was seconded by Mrs. Adah Dodge. After considerable discussion, Assemblyman Thomas moved that the motion be tabled. The Chairman suggested a standing vote. Mr. Malone then asked that the motion be withdrawn. Mr. Irwin DeShetler raised a point of order that a motion could not be withdrawn after debate. He was ruled out of order by the Chairman and then Mr. DeShetler appealed the ruling of the Chair. The Chairman stepped out of the Chair and turned the Chair over to the Vice-Chairman, Mrs. Adah Dodge. After discussion, the Chair was sustained in its ruling. Mrs. Ester Murray gave a report on the work of the pre-Platform Committee. Mr. Dave Foutz called for the commendation of Mrs. Murray's work on the Committee. The following recommendations were made to the members of the Platform Committee from our delegation as guidance in their work on the Committee:

Will Rogers, Jr. proposed a plank on Indian affairs favoring complete civil liberties, vote, and adequate educational facilities. Francis Dunn, Jr., proposed that we support Federal aid to public education. Irwin DeShetler proposed that we sponsor the strongest plank possible calling for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Bill, and that the California delegation make a vigorous effort to support this plank. Louis Warschaw recommended a plank on the subject of Palestine incorporating the following points:

1. Complete abiding by the United National decision.
2. Full de jure recognition of Israel.
3. United States extend a long-term loan to Israel, and
4. The transfer of all displaced persons of Jewish faith.
4. Full support to the State of Israel in its fight

against aggression.

Reverend Clayton Russell made the following recommendations on Civil Rights:

1. An FEPC law similar to Executive Order 880 as placed in operation by President Roosevelt.
2. The strongest and most out-spoken plank in favor of free speech.
3. That there be an end to racial discrimination in the Capital of the United States.
4. That the poll tax be repealed.

Mr. Roosevelt recommended the restoration of the public housing features that were eliminated by the 80th Congress from the Wagner-Ellender-Taft Bill.

Mrs. Beatrice ShilkROUT recommended that we include the 1933 plank on the Central Valley project. Mrs. Jessie Cullivan asked about our position on the tide-lands question. After some discussion Francis Dunn, Jr. suggested further consideration at a future meeting. There was no objection.

The Delegation went on record as accepting all of the above recommendations as statements in principle of the stand of the California Delegation.

Mr. Daniel DelCarlo moved for adjournment.

The meeting was adjourned.

Respectfully submitted.

March 9, 1948

The Honorable George E. Outland
528 Font Boulevard
San Francisco, California

Dear George:

One of the most urgent problems confronting the world today is the United Nations decision to partition Palestine.

What the United States does to back up the General Assembly recommendation that provisional Jewish and Arab states be set up by April 1 will determine either the fate or the future of the United Nations, our one mechanism for world peace.

The matter of a homeland for the Jews dates back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which placed the British Government on record "in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" and which provided that nothing be done to "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities."

This pledge was incorporated in the League of Nations Mandate of 1922 appointing Britain as the mandate power in the Holy Land. The mandate was voted upon by 52 nations. It was also incorporated in the British-American Convention, ratified by the United States Senate in 1925, through which the United States recognized the mandate. The establishment of Palestine as a National Homeland for the Jewish people had the full support of President Woodrow Wilson and of every President since.

Both Houses of Congress have on several occasions unanimously passed resolutions reaffirming our position on Palestine. Therefore, the action of the United States in taking a leading part in the decision to partition Palestine at the United Nations meeting of November 29, 1947, was in line with our long established policy to create a Jewish State.

I feel strongly that our national administration should provide positive leadership in supporting the agreement for partition which the General Assembly has agreed upon. The Jewish State is an imperative for the Jewish people and for a democratic world. The survival of the United Nations is likewise a necessity for a democratic world.

The refusal of the Arab states to abide by the decision of the United Nations cannot be tolerated, no matter how much they attempt to blackmail us by threats of withdrawing oil concessions to American and British capital. The violence now being used by the Arabs at the command of the Grand Mufti, who is one of the most reprehensible gangsters in modern history, should be stopped at once.

Every thinking person must realize that our only hope for world peace is a strong United Nations. We have seen strong resistance from the United States to the Soviet Union's use of the veto power and apparent attempts upon the part of Russia to undermine the strength of the United Nations. It is my firm belief that we can show the same resistance to the Arab threats of force, and that it is our responsibility to provide a solution which will enable the decision of the United Nations to be enforced. If the General Assembly decision can be flaunted by weak nations, the United Nations cannot long survive.

Certainly we must urge, immediately, the finding of ways and means to convince the Arabs, and any forces which are helping them for devious political reasons, that the day is past

for blackmail and coercion and that our position places the rights of minorities and human values above everything else. Historical justice and human conscience demand that we save the United Nations and right one of the greatest wrongs in history.

Few are so rigid as to feel that no further adjustments in this program will be necessary, but there is an effort on the part of some to prevent even a start toward a solution.

The present solution was agreed upon as the best available under present circumstances, and it is a basis from which improvements and changes may be made as experience dictates in ensuing years. The arguments that we should now give up our leadership as a nation in solving this problem are based wholly on selfish materialism, and in fact, they are not valid except in the eyes of those special oil interests who would benefit by complete inaction.

The fear that the Arabs will cut off our oil supplies from the Middle East which we so vitally need for defense purposes as well as domestic consumption, raises this immediate problem: would it not be wiser for us to take some of the funds now appropriated to carry out our present foreign policy and place them in the hands of scientific researchers to do for the oil industry what was done for the rubber industry in the development of synthetics during the war?

The argument that a United Nations Police Force (which would have to include Russian troops) would give the Russians a foothold in this strategically important country is unsound. We must realize that if no solution is now attempted, we are inviting not participation by Russia in a police force, but an invasion by Russian forces and dominance by Russia as a result of direct action to bring about justice.

Let us be practical and realize that the Arab is a smart trader who will realize when he has played his bluff to the limit - and if the bluff is called - that in the long run only the Western World will pay him for his natural resources in the values which he really wants.

George E. Outland ... 4

I feel, therefore, that the Democratic Party in California, through its Policy Committee, should make our position crystal clear and I urge that you place before the Policy Committee a resolution requesting action by our government to include the following:

1. Lift the embargo of arms in Palestine.
2. Recognize the Haganah as the official Jewish Militia.
3. Propose and support a police force in Palestine, made up of volunteers under the command and supervision of the United Nations, to keep the peace and see that the decisions of the United Nations are enforced.

If the Policy Committee approves such a Resolution, I suggest that it be forwarded to the President, to the Secretary of State and others who are interested in the problem, and that it emphasize the urgency of immediate action.

Only thus will our own people retain faith in the practical value of the United Nations organization. Only thus will it be demonstrated to Mankind that persuasion and not force is the path that civilization must take; and that the peoples of big nations will guard the freedoms and welfare of the small.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES ROOSEVELT

OFFICE OF
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
550 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO 11, CALIFORNIA
DOUGLAS 2-2838

EDMUND G. BROWN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY

March 29, 1948

Colonel James Roosevelt
Hotel Alexandria, Suite 933
Los Angeles, California


Dear Jim:

Your eloquence at the Democratic Conference last Thursday influenced me much more than I wanted to be. I wanted to say that we should face the fact that Truman cannot be re-elected and even if he could we really should not want him. He is not strong enough in these perilous times to achieve even the smallest goal.

At the Convention four years ago I refused to permit the same voices that spoke so loudly in favor of Truman to influence me. I felt then, as I feel now, that the nomination of Truman was one of the most serious mistakes ever made. I feel that it could well influence the entire course of history. I feel, also, that the delegation from California could be a potent force in encouraging a man like Eisenhower to become a candidate. Your time-table may yet permit this to be done, but I am afraid that the situation might get out of hand long before that time. I have such respect for your opinion I did not want to throw a monkey wrench in your plans. Now it is over I want you to know how I feel.

As Chairman of the Jackson Day Dinner, I herewith formally extend an invitation for you to be present at the dinner on Saturday, April 10. I will call upon you for a few words at that time. As soon as the program is arranged I will let you know what it is, but I want you to put everything else aside and be sure to be here.

Sincerely,



EDMUND G. BROWN
District Attorney

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One Team...

FOR ALL CALIFORNIANS

For
Governor



**JAMES
ROOSEVELT**

For
Lt.-Governor



**GEORGE
MILLER**

For
U. S. Senator



**HELEN
GAHAGAN
DOUGLAS**

For
State Senator



**GLENN
ANDERSON**

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- ENACT ADEQUATE PENSIONS
- PROMOTE CIVIL RIGHTS
- ACHIEVE EQUITABLE TAXES
- ESTABLISH HEALTH INSURANCE
- PROVIDE HOUSING FOR ALL
- DEVELOP PUBLIC WATER AND POWER
- REPEAL ANTI-LABOR LAWS
-
- INCREASE AID TO EDUCATION
-

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Vote Tuesday June 6th

JAMES ROOSEVELT FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE, INC.

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LOS ANGELES 14, CALIFORNIA

TRINITY 4911

J. RAY FILES, CHAIRMAN
MRS. GLAD HALL JONES, SECRETARY
O. S. WEIDE, TREASURER

GEORGE E. OUTLAND

GENERAL CAMPAIGN MANAGER

M E M O R A N D U M

To: All Chairmen, Roosevelt for Governor Committees
 From: George E. Outland, General Campaign Manager
 Subject: Morris Zusman, CIO-PAC State Director
 Date: April 5, 1950

Mr. Morris Zusman, State Director of the CIO-PAC will be visiting a great many communities in California during the next few weeks working with local CIO groups on behalf of Jim Roosevelt's campaign. He is not certain at the present time how many counties he will be able to visit; however, I wanted you to know in case he sees you personally that he is cooperating very closely with the State Office and I hope you will be able to work with him and his local representatives in bringing about a closer coordination between the efforts of the CIO-PAC and your Committee. Problems will vary in different sections of the state but Mr. Zusman has a wide knowledge of local situations and I am sure you will welcome working with him and his representatives in the furthering of the campaign.

JAMES ROOSEVELT FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE, INC.

307 West Eighth Street
Los Angeles 14, California

MEMORANDUM

To: All Roosevelt for Governor Committee Chairmen
From: George E. Outland
Date: April 21, 1950

In view of widespread sentiment from Democratic leaders throughout California, James Roosevelt and George Miller, Jr. have joined forces in their campaign for Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The enclosed press release is to be made on Tuesday, April 25, but I wanted to get this into your hands in advance of that date.

I hope that all Roosevelt for Governor Committees will find it advisable to cooperate with Senator Miller in his campaign for Lieutenant Governor, especially in view of the fact that his program and that of Mr. Roosevelt are practically identical. It has been the policy of the Roosevelt for Governor Committee to urge the highest degree of autonomy on all local committees throughout the state and that policy still maintains in this as in all other matters; however, I did want you to have this information concerning the position on the Lieutenant Governorship for the guidance of your Committee.

I have been greatly encouraged in recent weeks by the rapid spread of Roosevelt sentiment throughout the state, and the principal reason for that, of course, is the hard work and enthusiasm of Jim's countless supporters. As we go into the final six weeks I know that all of us will redouble our efforts to put him over in a big way in the primaries. Here's anticipating a tremendous victory in June and final success in November.

George E. Outland
George E. Outland

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Roosevelt for Governor Committee Chairmen, So. Calif.
FROM: George E. Outland
Date: April 26, 1950

The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen has advised me that they have three organizers working in Southern California at this time; Mr. George Kelsey, Mr. Frank Costello, and Mr. John Dodson. These three men while organizers for the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, in their spare time will donate their services in Mr. Roosevelt's behalf, and will be working through this office. I have given to each of them a letter of identification and suggested that they get in touch with the Chairmen of local Roosevelt for Governor Committees, in order that their efforts may be coordinated with those of the local committee. I hope that when any of these men get in touch with you that you will be able to work out, together, the best procedure for furthering the campaign.

It would be my suggestion that their efforts would be especially valuable in working with the Brotherhoods and other Union groups, and also in those areas where local committees have not yet been formed, or where Mr. Roosevelt has not been able to speak personally. However, these are details which should, and will be, left in the hands of the local committees.

I should like to say that I have been greatly encouraged by the increased tempo of the campaign throughout the entire state. I think that if we can keep up our efforts and intensify them over the next six weeks, we shall all be rewarded with a tremendous primary victory.

All the best to you.


GEORGE E. OUTLAND

(sticker)

ROOSEVELT

MILLER

906 20743

Amelia R. Fry

Graduated from the University of Oklahoma, B.A. in psychology and English, M.A. in educational psychology and English, University of Illinois; additional work, University of Chicago, California State University at Hayward.

Instructor, freshman English at University of Illinois and at Hiram College. Reporter, suburban daily newspaper, 1966-67.

Interviewer, Regional Oral History Office, 1959--; conducted interview series on University history, woman suffrage, the history of conservation and forestry, public administration and politics. Director, Earl Warren Era Oral History Project, documenting governmental/political history of California 1925-1953; director, Goodwin Knight-Edmund G. Brown Era Project.

Author of articles in professional and popular journals; instructor, summer Oral History Institute, University of Vermont, 1975, 1976, and oral history workshops for Oral History Association and historical agencies; consultant to other oral history projects; oral history editor, Journal of Library History, 1969-1974; secretary, the Oral History Association, 1970-1973.

